THE LINGUISTIC SPECULATIONS OF THE HINDUS

Prabhat Chandra Chakravarti

SANSKRIT PUSTAK BHANDAR

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Prabhat Chandra Chakravarti
Kāvyatīrtha, M.A. Ph.D
Premchand Roychand Scholar

'स्थितप्रज्ञस्य का भाषा ?' – *Bhagavadgītā*, II. 54

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Preface

The Department of Special Assistance (DSA), Sanskrit, Jadavpur University is extremely happy to announce that *The Linguistic Speculations of the Hindus*, written by the Late Professor P.C. Chakravarti, has been published as reprint-edition after a long gap of about half a century. This highly meritorious book and Professor Chakravarti's other work '*Philosophy of Sanskrit Grammar*' are the two outstanding creations in the field of Philosophy of Languages which is one of the thrust areas specified by the UGC for our DSA (Sanskrit) programmes. In thirteen Chapters of the present work Prof. Chakravarti has discussed almost all the philosophical aspects of Sanskrit grammar and each chapter is concerned with philosophical enquiry and psychological treatment of Sanskrit Grammar. From the present treatise we are enlightened on the fact as to how some of the modern conceptions remain in germinal forms in the ancient grammatical texts. The subject-matter of both the works of Prof. Chakravarti is complicated and difficult to grasp by ordinary scholars, but the well-reputed Professor has presented the theme in such a smooth way that it creates enough interest in the minds of scholars studying the linguistic history of the Sanskrit language. We are grateful to Professor S.R. Banerjee, a gifted scholar of the Sanskrit Grammar and Linguistics, for writing a valuable 'Foreword' for this reprint edition, and by doing this he, on behalf of all the members of the DSA (Sanskrit), has paid befitting trubute to the late talented Professor Chakravarti. Thanks are due to Sri Debasish Bhattacharya of Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar for bringing out this reprint-edition of the book for the DSA (Sanskrit). Hope Prof. Chakravarti's illustrious piece of refined intellect will create enormous interest in the scholarly world.

Manabendu Banerjee
Co-ordinator, DSA (Sanskrit),
Jadavpur University
Kolkata-700 032

Dedicated

To

The Sacred Memory of

My Parents

पिता स्वर्गः पिता धर्मः पिता हि परमं तपः ।
पितरि प्रीतिमापन्ने प्रीयन्ते सर्वदेवताः ॥

देवीं वाचमजनयन्त देवास्तां विश्वरूपाः पशवो वदन्ति ।

—Ṛgveda, VIII. 100. 11.

* * * * *

चत्वारि वाक् परिमिता पदानि तानि विदुर्ब्राह्मणा ये मनीषिणः ।
गुहा त्रीणि निहिता नेङ्गयन्ति तुरीयं वाचो मनुष्या वदन्ति ॥

—Ṛgveda, I. 164. 45.

* * * * *

इयर्त्ति वाचं जनयन् यजध्यै ।

—Ṛgveda, IV. 21. 5.

* * * * *

आ नो यज्ञं भारती तूयमेत्विडा मनुष्वदिह चेतयन्ती ।
तिस्रो देवीर्बर्हिरेदं स्योनं सरस्वती स्वपसः सदन्तु ॥

—Ṛgveda, X. 110. 4.

* * * * *

अग्निर्वाग् भूत्वा मुखं प्राविशत्—

—Aitareyopaniṣad.

*   *   *   *   *

पुरुषस्य वाग्रसो वाच ऋग्रसः—

—Chāndogyopaniṣad.

*   *   *   *   *

वाचारम्भणं विकारो नामधेयम्—

—Chāndogyopaniṣad.

*   *   *   *   *

स यो वाचं ब्रह्मेत्युपास्ते यावद्वाचोगतं तत्रास्य यथाकामचारो भवति—

—Chāndogyopaniṣad.

*   *   *   *   *

स मनसा वाचं मिथुनं समभवत्—

—Bṛhadāraṇyaka.

*   *   *   *   *

वाग्वै सम्राट् परमं ब्रह्म—

—Bṛhadāraṇyaka.

*   *   *   *   *

सोऽयमक्षरसमाम्नायो वाक्समाम्नायः पुष्पितः फलितश्चन्द्र-तारकवत्प्रतिमण्डितो वेदितव्यो ब्रह्मराशिः, सर्ववेदपुण्य-फलावाप्तिश्चास्य ज्ञाने भवति, मातापितरौ चास्य स्वर्गे लोके महीयेते ।—

—Mahābhāṣya.

*   *   *   *   *

श्रोत्रोपलब्धिर्बुद्धिनिर्ग्राह्यः प्रयोगेणाभिज्वलित आकाशदेशः शब्दः—

—Mahābhāṣya.

*   *   *   *   *

नित्येषु च शब्देषु कूटस्थैरविचालिभिर्वर्णैर्भवितव्यमनपायोप-जनविकारिभिः—

—Mahābhāṣya.

*   *   *   *   *

एवं हि श्रूयते—बृहस्पतिरिन्द्राय दिव्यं वर्षसहस्रं प्रतिपदोक्तानां शब्दानां शब्दपारायणं प्रोवाच नान्तं जगाम—

—Mahābhāṣya.

*   *   *   *   *

नित्यो ह्यर्थवतामर्थैरभिसम्बन्धः—

—Mahābhāṣya.

*   *   *   *   *

सूक्ष्मामर्थेनाप्रविभक्ततत्त्वामेकां वाचमभिस्यन्दमानाम् ।
उतान्ये विदुरन्यामिव च पूतां नानारूपामात्मनि सन्निविष्टाम् ॥

—Sruti quoted by Puṇyarāja.

* * * * *

ब्रह्मेदं शब्दनिर्माणं शब्दशक्तिनिबन्धनम् ।
विवृतं शब्दमात्राभ्यस्तास्वेव प्रविलीयते ॥

—quoted by Puṇyarāja.

* * * * *

अथेदमान्तरं ज्ञानं सूक्ष्मवागात्मना स्थितम् ।
व्यक्तये स्वस्य रूपस्य शब्दत्वेन निवर्त्तते ॥

—Vākyapadīya.

* * * * *

यदन्तं शब्दतत्त्वं तु नादैरेकं प्रकाशितम् ।
तदाहुरपरे शब्दं तस्य वाक्ये तथैकता ॥

—Vāk[illegible]īya.

* * * * *

शास्त्रेषु प्रक्रियाभेदैरविद्यैवोपवर्ण्यते ।

—Vākyapadīya

* * * * *

शब्दस्य परिणामोऽयमित्याम्नायविदो विदुः ।
छन्दोभ्य एव प्रथममेतद्विश्वं व्यवर्त्तत ॥

—Vākyapadīya.

* * * * *

न सोऽस्ति प्रत्ययो लोके यः शब्दानुगमादृते ।
अनुविद्धमिव ज्ञानं सर्वं शब्देन भासते ॥

—Vākyapadīya.

* * * * *

शाब्दी वाग् भूयसी येषु पुरुषेषु व्यवस्थिता ।
अधिकं वर्त्तते तेषु पुण्यं रूपं प्रजापतेः ॥

—quoted by Puṇyarāja.

* * * * *

PREFACE

This volume has grown out of my linguistic researches which were originally submitted for the Premchand Roychand Studentship, and published in the University Journal of Letters, Vol. XII, 1925. But the work has been considerably enlarged by the introduction of additional matters which seemed to me necessary for the purpose of improvement. Nevertheless, the reader of the following pages will, I am afraid, miss much that the vastness of the subject demands.

Students of Comparative Philology may not find here as much data as will suffice for a systematic study of their subject. Nor would the purely philosophical speculations of the ancient Hindus, which form the subject of my enquiry, be of any direct help to them. Moreover, the course of Indian speculations on language lay through such a subtle and mystical path that the whole trend of discussion was bound to be more theological than scientific.

It requires to be stated at the outset that a work which pretends to deal with so vast and abstruse a subject as the linguistic speculations of the Hindus cannot put forth any legitimate

claim to perfection and precision. The task I have taken upon myself is to set forth only the important speculations of the Hindus regarding the various problems of the linguistic science, and occasionally to bring them in line, wherever possible, with the theories and observations of the modern philologist. Scholars better equipped with a comprehensive knowledge of the science of language might have done greater justice to the subject, and herein do I offer a word of apology.

The study of grammar is intimately related to that of language. While collecting materials for my *Philosophy of Sanskrit Grammar*, I came across so many important passages bearing directly on the science of language that the idea occurred to me of preparing a monograph on the Hindu speculations on language. I must frankly admit here that in the execution of my scheme I had never to complain of the dearth of materials. On the contrary, I was embarrassed by an immense mass of data too unwieldy to be manipulated within such a short compass. In course of preparing this volume many noteworthy facts of language came in upon me, and consequently I found it rather difficult to arrange them systematically and deal with every question in detail.

That Indian teachers seriously occupied themselves with the problems of language, as with enquiries into other departments of knowledge,

cannot be doubted. The phenomena of speech (*vāk*) was wonderful enough to rouse their keen interest, and the result has been the evolution of Indian philosophy of language.

The sources from which one is to draw materials for the reconstruction of Indian philology are numerous. The Saṃhitās, the Brāhmaṇas, the Niruktas, the Prātiśākhyas and the extensive grammatical literature all afford us valuable information concerning the study of language. The systems of Indian philosophy, though their main object was far from building up a science of language, have also made many important observations on linguistic problems here and there. In short, there lies embedded an untold treasure of philological interest in the vast mine of Sanskrit literature

The study of Sanskrit has not only opened up a new vista for the student of Comparative Philology, but it has also shown how the ancient thinkers of India elaborately dealt with the inner or psychological aspects of language. While, however, it is maintained that Indians have their own philosophy of language, there is no denying the fact that Indian speculations on language were mixed up to a great extent with religious and metaphysical dissertations, and it therefore requires a good deal of circumspection to find out what is intrinsically linguistic from the mass of heterogeneous materials. The Science of

Meaning which is of comparatively modern origin in the Western world did not also escape the notice of Indian teachers.

On the evidence of the facts gathered by a careful study of Sanskrit, we can avow that there is hardly any Indian theory on language that cannot claim a high degree of scientific perfection. The impression one would ultimately draw from the testimony of these speculations is that Indian thinkers have not given us a mere theological or metaphysical interpretation of language, but they have taken count of the actual phenomena of speech. We can assert without any fear of contradiction that the study of language on a scientific basis was not wholly unknown in ancient India. Frequent references, as I have made in these pages, to Yāska's Nirukta, Pāṇini's Aṣṭādhyāyī, Patañjali's Mahābhāṣya, Bhartṛhari's Vākyapadīya and other allied treatises are in themselves sufficient evidence of the genuine interest and assiduity with which the study of language and grammar was followed up by Indian teachers. Their labours, I am sure, will in many cases yield profitable results, even if they are judged by the standard of scientific accuracy.

It is often alleged that the Indian speculations on language run through a narrow channel. This allegation is, I am afraid, true

to some extent. The unfortunate lapse of Indian thinkers has been that they did not take notice of languages other than Sanskrit in all their linguistic speculations, their entire outlook being confined to the small arena of one language. This was somewhat due to the orthodox assumption that Sanskrit was the mother of all languages. The defect, one might say in defence, has been partly compensated by the valuable stock of knowledge which these speculations have brought within our reach.

The linguistic speculations of the Hindus comprise a vast field of study. What I have been able to show here is but an insignificant fraction of that intensive treatment which such a great volume of deliberation deserves. The present attempt is by no means exhaustive, and even in what little it offers there is, I believe, much room for improvement.

I take this opportunity of acknowledging my gratefulness to the late lamented Sir Asutosh Mookerjee for the encouragement I received from him while I was engaged in researches on this subject.

I shall be failing in my duty if I do not express my obligation to my esteemed friends Pandit Kshitischandra Chatterjee, M.A., Mr. Sailendranath Mitra, M.A., Mr. Indubhushan Banerji, M.A., P.R.S., Dr. Prabodh Chandra Bagchi, M.A., D.Lit., Mr. Amiyakumar

Sen, M.A., Mr. Sukumar Sen, M.A., P.R.S., Lecturers, Calcutta University, and particularly to Pandit Chintaharan Chakravarti, Kāvyatīrtha, M.A., Lecturer, Bethune College, who helped me occasionally with their valuable suggestions.

I am indebted to my pupils Kalicharan Mitra, M.A. (Gold Medalist) and Nagendranath Haldar, M.A. (Silver Medalist) who were good enough to take the trouble of preparing the Index.

My thanks are due to Mr. Jogeschandra Chakravorti, M.A., Registrar, Calcutta University, for his uniform courtesy in the matter of publication.

I am also thankful to Mr. Atulchandra Ghatak, M.A., Superintendent of the University Press, and his staff who were always ready to help me in the progress of the work.

CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY.
The 1st April, 1933.

P. C. CHAKRAVARTI.

Foreword

I am very much gratified and derive immense pleasure in complying with the request of the Co-ordinator of DSA, of the Department of Sanskrit, Jadavpur University, Kolkata, for requesting me to write a Foreword to a book, *The Linguistic Speculations of the Hindus* by Prabhat Chandra Chakravarti. It goes without saying that I am not competent enough to write a Foreword to a book like the present one. Professor Chakravarti was a well-reputed scholar on Sanskrit grammar and his two books — *The Philosophy of Sanskrit Grammar* and *The Linguistic Speculations of the Hindus* — are by far the best contributions to the subject. We are grateful to Professor Chakravarti for writing such difficult books where most of the scholars have not yet penetrated. The main purpose of reprinting this book is to emulate interest in studying the linguistic history of the Sanskrit language as embalmed and treasured up in the treatises of Sanskrit literature. The book deals with the philosophical or psychological treatment of Sanskrit grammar.

Linguistic or grammatical studies in India and in Europe have been very much fascinating from time immemorial. In India, apart from Pāṇini (400 B.C.), there were innumerable grammarians whose works are lost, except their names and views recorded by later Sanskrit grammarians. Before Pāṇini, we have hosts of Sanskrit grammarians. Sanskrit grammar started with the *Māheśa Vyākaraṇa* in the hoary antiquity. After that we have *Aindra Vyākaraṇa* written by Indra, a mythological personage. In a similar way, we have the grammars of Bhāguri, Karmandi, Kāśakṛtsna, Senakīya, Kāśyapa, Sphoṭāyana, Cākravarman, Āpiśala, Vyāḍī, Śākalya, Bhāradvāja, Gālava, Śākaṭāyana, Gārgya and many others whose names are only

found in different books of grammar. Though all these books are not available, their views are sometimes mentioned *inter alia* in stating some of the rules of Sanskrit grammar. So also Yāska (500 B.C.) who in his Nirukta has mentioned the names of several teachers and schools of grammarians, such as, Audumbarāyaṇa, Aurṇavābha, Upamanyu, Krauṣṭuki, Pāraskara, Vārṣāyaṇi, Śākapuṇi, Sthaulāṣṭivi, and many others whose works are not available till today, but whose views on the Sanskrit language have been recorded by him. Pāṇini (400 B.C.) has incorporated in his Aṣṭādhyāyī the views of Bhāradvāja, Sphoṭāyana, Gālava, Śākaṭāyana, Śākalya, Āpiśali and many others. The most important elements of these names are the facts that Pāṇini has included their views in his grammar as one of the features of the Sanskrit language. Though this fact shows the catholicity of Pāṇini in recognising the views of others as a part and parcel of the Sanskrit language, this also shows that Pāṇini has registered some of the traditional views current in his time. Besides, he has also mentioned some features of the Sanskrit language as were current in different parts of India, such as, east (*prācām*), west (*pracīcām*), north (*udīcām*) and so on. Patañjali (150 B.C.) has mentioned some more regional features of the Sanskrit language, such as, *priyataddhitāḥ dākṣinātyāḥ*, which show that these ancient Sanskrit grammarians have not forgotten in recording the views of some of the features of Sanskrit as were current in different schools and parts of India. After that we have hosts of Sanskrit grammarians beginning from the 1st century A.D. down to the 18th century, some important of them being Kalāpa (1st or 2nd. c. A.D.), Candragomin (between 470-600 A.D.), Jinendra (by 678 A.D.), Śākaṭāyaṇa (between 814-877 A.D.), Bhojarāja (11th c. A.D.), Hemacandra (1088-1172 A.D.), Kramadīśvara (12th. and 13th. c. A.D.), Vopadeva (13th. c. A.D.), Padmanābhadatta (1375 A.D.), Anubhūtisvarūpa (13th/14th.c.A.D.), Jīva Gosvāmī (16th c. A.D.), Puruṣottama Vidyāvāgīśa (17th./18th. c. A.D.), and many others. In this long tradition beginning from pre-Pāṇinian hoary antiquity down to the

18th. century A.D., we have thousands of Sanskrit grammat-ical treatises whose history can only be written in so many volumes.

In India, apart from Sanskrit grammar, the tradition of Prākrit and Pāli grammars was also followed and in both the languages we have cartloads of Prākrit and Pāli grammatical literature which continued till the middle of the 17th. century. These grammars were composed after the model of Sanskrit grammars.

In Europe, on the other hand, though grammatical study was also a favourite subject to them, they discussed the grammar from a different angle, not on a par with the Indian traditions. In Greece, Dionysius Thrax (2nd. c.B.C.) was the first grammarian whose τἐχνη γραμματική (tékhnē Grammatikē) [ed. by I. Bekker, Anecdota Gracca : ü, Berlin, 1816, pp- 627-43; by G. Uhlig, *Dionys ii Tracis Ars Grammatica,* Leipzig, 1833], though written in order to understand Homer, is not a comprehensive grammar for the Greek language. Though the work is very small, divided into 25 sections and containing not more than 15 pages of 1/16 double demy size, yet it aroused interest among various later writers in classical and Byzantine times to write commentaries, known as *scholia.* The *scholia* are more than twenty times (containing 326 pages) bigger than the original text. At a later stage, Dionysius of Halicarnassus (1st c. B.C.) wrote an elaborate commentary on his grammar with more material than it contained in the book of Dionysius Thrax. Dionysius Thrax's book is valuable, because it contains the definitions of grammar and different components of the grammatical subjects. A comparison between the Indian grammarians and Dionysius Thrax was made by me in several of my articles where I have shown how the grammatical studies were evolved among the Indo-European peoples. (*On the Conception of Language and Phonetics in Indian Tradition vis-à-vis Greek and Latin.* Journal of the Department of Sanskrit, Calcutta University. 1987, pp 51-62; *Dionysius Thrax and Pāṇini on Grammar,* Pracī-prabhā, ed by D.C.Bhattacharya and D. Handa, Harman Publishing House, New Delhi, 1989,

pp. 25-41; *Dionysius Thrax and Pāṇini on Parts of Speech*. Corpus of Indological Studies, Sharada Publishing House, Delhi, 1992, pp. 72-81).

It should be noted that though Dionysius Thrax was the first formal grammarian, in Greece grammatical discussions were also made before him by Protagoras (5th. c.B.C.), Plato (429-347 B.C.), Aristotle (384-322 B.C.), Chrysippus (280-207 B.C.). Diogenes Babylonius (240-151 B.C.) and so on. The tradition of Dionysius Thrax was also followed by Apollonius Dyscolus (2nd. c. A.D.). Diogenes Laertius (3rd. c. A.D.) and by many others. Dionysius book was so famous at that time that it was translated into Aramaic and Syriac in the fifth century A.D. His grammar had also influenced the Latin writers, just as Pāṇini's grammar infuenced the Prākrit grammarians.

In Latin tradition Marcus Terentius Varro (116/117-27 B.C.) is the first Latin grammarian whose *La Lingua Latina* is bigger than that of Dionysius Thrax. Though it is a fragment of the whole book some 5/8 chapters were discovered and edited by R.G. Kent in the Loeb Classical series. Varro has analysed in detail the meanings of words and their semantics. To our utter surprise, it is normally seen that most of the examples he has analysed are from the Greek language. He has also discussed cases his chapter on case can go on a par with the Sanskrit case-system. After Varro we have Quintilian (1st. c. A.D.), Donatus (4th. c. A.D.), Priscian (5th. c. A.D.), Isidore of Seville (570-636 A.D.), Bede (673-735 A.D.), Aelfric (955-1020 A.D.), Anselm (1033-1109 A.D.), Alexander of Villedieu (1170-1250 A.D.), Albertus Magnus (1193-1280 A.D.), Roga Bacon (1214-1294), Thomas of Erfurt (1325 A.D.), Sanctius (1523-1601) who have adorned the Latin Language by their grammatical contributions.

The Latin tradition, along with the Greek, was mostly continued by the European countries till the end of the 18th century. In England, the Latin tradition was followed from the 16th century till the end of the 18th. In France also, the French grammars were almost the grammars of Latin as applied to the French language. The same Latin tradition was also followed in Spain, Portugal and in Italy.

It appears from this survey that as in India, so also in Europe, the traditional grammars have helped much for the development of the grammatical studies of their respective countries. Even in the development of the philosophical speculations of language, the two countries can go on a par with each other. In India, the philosophical speculation of language started as early as in the 7th century. It was Bhartṛhari (651 A.D.) whose work *Vākyapadīya* was a book on the philosophy of language, whereas in Europe the philosophical study of language started from the Mediaeval period (600-1600 A.D.). In that period there seemed to have developed four types of grammar : literary, logical, speculative and rational.*

The literary grammar is the follower of Donatus (4th cent. A.D.) and Priscian (c. 500 A.D.). These groups of grammarians follow the literary rather than the logical parts of Priscian's outlook.

The logical grammar is the logical portion of the grammatical studies. That is to say, these groups of grammarians tried to establish the relationship between logic and grammar. To them language moves in a very logical pattern, and whatever grammatical pattern is formulated, it follows a logic behind the origin of grammatical categories.

The third type, quite different from the other two, has been called 'Speculative' to be discussed later on.

In the rational grammar, reason plays a prominent part. It started in the 17th century A.D. in France from the time when the philosopher-cum-sciestist René Descartes (1596-1650) published his book — *Discours de la Méthode de bien conduire sa Raison* ('Discourse on the Way to Guide One's Reason Rightly) in 1636 where he has emphasized that 'reason is the most widely shared thing in the world'. His main idea is to lay stress on the reason part of language and grammar. The general public soon equalled Descartes with

* See my article, *The Speculative Grammarians in the Middle Ages of Europe,* Bulletin of the Department of Linguistics No. 11, 1986, pp 38-48.

ordinary common sense using Cartesian rationalism as a justification for upholding traditional attitudes'[1] towards language. This pseudeo-rationalism was the basis of the influential *Gramaire de Part-Royal* (1660 A.D.) supposed to be written by Antoine Arnauld (1612-1694) and Claude Lancelot (1615-1695). 'This work was the initiator of a long tradition of discussion of language on a presumed basis of "reason", actually of Latin grammar as applied to French, and claiming to discover fundamental principles and to set up rules for all human languages on a universal basis'[2]. In France most school grammars 'were based on the doctrines of this universal grammar' which prevailed from the time of Port-Royal (1660) to the *Grammaire des Grammairens* (Grammar of Grammars) published in 1811.

The development of a scientific approach to the study both of the Roman tongues and of language in general was checked for nearly a century and a half (1660-1880) by the general grammar movement beginning with the *Grammaire generale et raisonnée* (General and Reasoned Grammar 1660). This book is often referred to as a *Grammaire de Port-Royal* or simply 'Port-Royal Grammar' since Arnauld-Lancelot were connnected with the Port-Royal movement. This book was intended 'to be a comparison of Latin and French grammar for students on an intermediate level,[3] and most of the features of French were interpreted in terms of Latin grammar. However, though this grammar was also criticised because of Latin model on the French language, it ultimately elicited the favour of Latin grammarians of the French language. However, in modern times Chomsky's Cartesian Linguistics (1966), though written on a different model, is nothing but the revival of the idea of Descartes and other rationalist philosophers.

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1. Robert A. Hall, *External History of the Romance Language*, American Elsevier Publishsing Company, Inc. New York, 1974, p. 177.

2. *Loc. cit.*

3. Ibid., p. 233.

Below is given a brief conspectus of the pioneers of the different schools of the medieval period in Europe :

	Literary	Logical	Speculative	Rational
Dates by centuries A.D.	based on Donatus and Priscian	based on logical concepts	based on Priscian system, modistae	based on reason
8th Cent.	Bede (673-735)			
9th Cent.	Alcuin (735-804)			
10th 11th Cent.	Aelfric (955-1020)	Anselm (1033-1109)		
12th Cent.	Hugo of St Victor (d. 1141). Alexander of Villedieu (1170-1250). Eberhard of Bethune (1200).	Johannes de Pigna (12th cent.), Ralph of Beauvais (12th cent.), William of Conches (12th cent.)		
13th.	John Garland (before 1236). Remigius of Auxerre (?)	Robert Grosseteste (d. 1253), Petrus Ysolella (13th cent.),	Albertus Magnus (1193-1280), Roger Bacon (1214-1294) Richard Kilwardby (d. 1279)	

Dates	Literary	Logical	Speculative	Rational
14 Cent.		Siger of Courtrai (d. 1341)	Thomas of Erfurt (fl. 1325) = Duns Scotus. Joannes Josse de Marville (1322) Johannes Aurifaber (1332)	
15th Cent.			Theodore of Gaza (1400-75)	
16th. 17th. 18th.				René Descartes (1596-1650), Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz (1646-1716). Port Royal Grammar (1660)
19th. 20th.			**Modern** H.A.F. Haase (1856) Charles Thurot (1868) Johann Müller (1878) Martin Grabmann (1926 ff) Heinrich Roos (1952) G.L. Bursill-Hall (1971, 1972)	

However, of the four types of grammar developed in the medieval period, the speculative grammar is the most distinctive in nature. Approximately this school started from the 13th cent. A.D. and went on till the 16th cent. A.D. The writers of this school accepted Donatus (4th cent. A.D.) and Priscian's (c. 500 A.D.) system of categories, but 'roofed it over with a theory of language derived from scholastic logic and philosophy.'[4] This school is also known as 'modistic school' (*modistae*), as their system of expression of language (i.e. grammar) is made with 'modes'.

The purpose of writing this paper is to show that Saussure's idea of *signifie* and *significant* might have a link with the speculative grammarians of the medieval period.

The earliest specimens of this school are the *Summa Grammatica* of Roger Bacon and the *De Modis Significandi* attributed to Albertus Magnus, both belonging to the early part of the 13th cent. A.D. The *Speculativa Grammatica* of Thomas of Erfurt (fl. 1325 A.D.) was printed only in the 15th or 16th cent. A.D. The grammars of Joannes Josse de Marville and Johannes Aurifaber, written in 1322 and 1332 respectively, are yet unpublished.

In modern times H.A.F. Haase in his *De medii aevi studiis philologicis disputatio*, Breslau, 1856, Charles Thurot in his *Notices et Extraits*, dated 1868, and Johann Müller (1878) emphasized the importance of the speculative grammars. Lately, the two scholars who devoted most of their times on the research of Speculative Grammars are Professors Martin Grabmann of Munich and Heinrich Roos. Professor Grabmann's two books, such as, *Mittelalterlichen Geistesleben*, Munich, 3 vols. (I, 1926, II, 1936, III, 1956), and *Thomas von Erfurt und die Sprachlogik des mittelalterlichen Aristolelismus*, Munich, 1943, are very important for the study of speculative grammars. He has quoted extracts from various original works in original Latin language. In a similar way, Heinrich Roos in his *Die Modi Significandi des Martinus de Dacia, Beiträge*

4. Ian Michael, *English Grammatical Categories*, p. 14.

zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, Vol-37, part. 2, Munster, 1952, is also significant for the extracts of the original authors. It is interesting to note that Grabmann quotes one German humanist who says that speculative grammars should never be used with children.

In the present century, the speculative grammarian, Thomas of Erfurt (fl. 1325 A.D.), attracted the attention of scholars. In 1902, P. Fr. Mariani Fernandez Garcia, Quaracehi, edited his *Grammatika Speculativa.* Lately, G.L. Bursill-Hall made two wonderful contributions of Thomas. His two books — *Grammarians of the Middle Ages*, the doctrine of Partes Orationis of the Modistae, Mouton, 1971, and *Grammatica Speculativa* of Thomas of Erfurt, Longman, London, 1972, have really unfurled the hidden treasures of the middle ages of European linguistic studies.

Ian Michael in his *English Grammatical Categories*, 1970, has shown how the English grammarians in the early phase of their grammatical studies were greatly indebted to the speculative gramarians of the middle ages. Lately, G.A. Padley's book *Grammatical Theory in Western Europe*, 1500-1700, the Latin tradition, Cambridge, 1976, is valuable for the fact that he has shown how speculative grammarians have moulded some of the linguistic ideas of the present day. I am indebted to all of these writers, and particularly to G.L. Bursill-Hall and Ian Michael for writing this paper. In a sense, most of the Latin quotations are taken from these books. As most of the grammars of the speculative school are not printed, I have to depend on the quotations of Latin passages as collected and recorded by Grabmann and Roos from the works of Siger and Thomas of Erfurt, besides the quotations given by Michael.

Though the fundamental question of the speculative grammarians is to establish the relationship between words and things, the type of questions they discuss are the following[5] :

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5. Ibid., pp. 15-16, English translations are by me.

I. *Utrum possibile sit vocem imponi ad significandum.*

'Whether it is possible to think that words have no power over things (*significations*)'.

II. *Quis grammaticam invenit, an scilicet grammaticus an philosophus.*

'Who invented grammar? Can it be a grammarian or a philospher?' In other words, whether grammar was invented by a grammarian or by a philosopher.

III. *Utrum grammatica sit eadem in omnibus ydiomatibus in quibus inventa est, et scilicet in ydiomate greco ebrayco et latino.*

'Whether grammar depends likewise upon all types of idioms (= expression = speech) in which invention is made or evidently upon Greek and Latin idioms'.

IV. *Utrum in verbis primae et secundae personae intelligitur nominativus casus.*

'Whether in words the understanding of the first and second persons is on the nominative case'.

V. *Quid primum sit et minimum ex quo incipit consideratio grammatice.*

'What primary and minimum meaning depend on the consideration of grammar'.

VI. *Quid sit subiectum in grammatica.*

'Which fundamental subject-matter (is to be) discussed in grammar'.

These questions are more or less philosophical rather than grammatical. The speculative grammarians establish the relation between words and things by the term *impositio*. 'Words have meaning (*significatio*) by being imposed on things (*per impositionem*) by the inventor of the language'.[6] This idea of the speculative grammarians recalls the ideas of Greece and India who believed that language was arbitrary and conventional rather than *phusei* and *thesei*, *kārya* and *nitya-vāda* of Indian philosopher.

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6. Ibid., p. 16.

The question whether grammar was invented by a philosopher or by a grammarian is almost equivalent to asking "whether language was, by its structure, systematically related to reality, or whether it was at random and *ad hoc*. The normal and accepted answer was that grammar was invented by a philosopher, and thus, by implication, logical. This would seem inconsistant with any belief that language was a purely conventional system.... The relations between a single word and a single thing may be arbitrary and conventional, while relations between the words, that is the *structure* of language, may logically reflect the *structure* of reality."

It was the speculative grammarians who suggested the idea of the universal nature of grammar. In the 13th century, A.D. Richard Kilwardby (died in 1279 A.D.) while commenting on Priscian's *Ars Minor* remarks[7] :

> Cum scientia maneat eadem apud omnes, et subiectum eius idem manet, quare subiectum grammaticae debet manere idem in omnibus. Sed oratio constructa vel vox literata ordinabilis propter congruum non idem manet apud omnes; quare non erit subiectum grammaticae.

"Since science remains the same in any part of the world, and its subject-matter remains the same, the subject-matter of grammar ought to be the same in all parts of the world. But discourse, or words in order and agreement, does not remain the same in all parts of the world. Therefore discourse is not the subject-matter of grammar."

The speculative grammarians are the first who talked about the universal grammar. To them the forms of a given language are not important, but the language itself. Universal grammar is one of their distinctive and original notions. In the middle of the 12th cent. A.D. Peter Helias did not like the idea of a universal grammars as there were languages." While discussing the subject-matter of grammar, Albertus says that "the true subject-matter is the mode of construction (*modus construendi*), contrasted with the mode of knowledge (*modus sciendi*) which is

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7. Ibid., p. 17.

the subject-matter of logic. One feature of the early speculative writers' conception of grammar is their repudiation of pholology'. Roger Bacon[8] (*Greek Grammar*) discusses the scope of grammar thus :

"A grammarian can say that there are so many letters in such and such a language; he can show how they resemble each other and how they differ in different languages. But he cannot teach why it is impossible for there to be more letters, whether vowels or consonants. We know that in every language there are only five vowels which differ in their substantial capacity for sound. But to say why there cannot be more or fewer will always be impossible for the grammarian, as such, out of the resources of his own branch of knowledge".

Bacon in his *Summa Grammatica* also says "whether one should say *pars est...* or *pars sunt.* Doubt arises because the thing to which pars refers may in fact be plural, as a part of a crowd is composed of many people. So far as the grammarian is concerned, Bacon argues, it is better to advocate *pars est,* because the principal function of the grammarian is not to consider the things to which words refer in the most fundamental sense (*significata*) but the acquired, secondary meaning of words (*consignificata*). *Pars* is to be regarded as grammatically singular whether or not it refers to a plurality of objects".[9]

Another aspect of the speculative grammarians' idea about grammar is to make a distinction between organic (i.e. inarticualte) sounds and speech (articulate) sounds. Martin of Dacia (late 13th cent. A.D.) makes a distinction between *dicto* and *vox,* Thomas of Erfurt explains the difference in modern language thus[10] :

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8. Ibid., p. 30-31.
9. Ibid., p. 32.
10. Ibid., p. 45-46.

Sciendum est, quod vox, inquantum vox, non consideratur a Grammatico, sed inquantum signum, quia Grammatica est de signis rerum; et quia vox est habilissimum signum inter alia signa, ideo vox inquantum signum prius consideratur a Grammatico, quam alia signa rerum. Sed quia esse signum accidit voci, ideo Grammaticus considerans vocem, considerat eam per accidens."

"You must understand that a word, regarded merely as a sound, is no concern of the grammarian; as a sign, it is his concern. Grammar deals with signs of things, and the spoken word is considered as a sign before other signs of things because it is the most easily used of them all. But functioning as a sign is an accident of the word, and the grammarian, therefore, when he is discussing the word is discussing it *per accidens*".

He further explains thus :

"When the mind imposes an articulate sound (*vox*) [on a thing] so as to make it directly or indirectly meaningful it gives the sound a double power: the power of signifying directly (called *significatio*) by means of which the articulate sound is made a sign, something which signifies, and thus, considered formally, a word (*dictio*) ".

"The second power is that of signifying indirectly, which is called the active mode of signification, by means of which the significant articulate sound is made a secondary sign, something which signifies indirectly and is thus, considered formally, a part of speech (*pars*). For a part of speech is a part of speech in itself because of this power of indirect signification...as if by means of some formal principle. But a part of speech is a part of speech in its relation to other parts by means of the same active power of signifying indirectly, but as if by an inherent efficient principle."

In accordance with the above description, in the English sentence 'He is wearing a green jacket', the word 'green' is *dictio,* becuase it means 'colour', and it is also *pars,* because it attributes the colour to the jacket.

With regard to the question whether grammar is a natural or a practical science, the speculative grammarians,

particularly Thomas of Erfurt, consider grammar as natural. But in 1670, Mark Lewis in his Essay used the two terms speculative and practical in a rather different way. What he means to say is this that "the Speculative Part of Grammar ought to be left to riper years, and the Practical Part may be made very short and easie".[11] A century later William Ward in his book *Essay on Grammar* (1765) clarified the scope of speculative grammar thus.[12] :

"It is the province of speculaitve grammar to consider, both language in general, and likewise each language in particular, so as to discover the principles upon which the application proceeds: not pretending to account for each particular mode of expression; but for the properties of construction which are observed in all languages, and for the peculiar turn and genius of any language that is to be especially explained."

Coming back to Saussure,[13] we can suggest that the basic idea of Saussure's *signifie* (=signified = concept) and *significant* (= signifier = sound image) based on the conception of *langue* and *parole* has a germ in the modistic school.

Langue, according to Saussure, is the social part of language, while *parole* is the individual aspect of language; the *langue* is abstract and the *parole* is concrete; and *langue* corresponds to language and *parole* to speech, and the two are connected. Though *langue* appears to be at a more abstract level than *parole* , Saussure stresses that *langue* is an object of concrete nature, and in explaining this he uses the technical term *signs* which Saussure thinks constitute *langue*, and therefore, are not abstractions, but real things which have their place in the brain and can be represented in writing or otherwise.[14]

This idea of Saussure's *langue* and *parole* has a reference to E. Durkheim and G. Tarde. Durkheim's *social fait* (= social fact) corresponds to Saussure's *langue* which is 'a psycho-social

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11. Ibid., p. 175 fn.
12. Ibid., pp. 175-76.
13. G.C. Lepschy, *A Survey of Structural Linguistics*, pp 47 ff.
14. *Loc. cit.*

phenomenon, which exists in the collecitve conscience of the social group, outside the individual', [15] while *parole* of Saussure corresponds to Tarde's individual element'.

This idea of Saussure's *langue* and *parole* is again interpreted by Transformationalists in terms of *competence* and *performance*.

However, Saussure thinks that *langue* is a sign system which stands for a relationship between two things : 'the linguistic sign unites...a concept and an acoustic image' i.e. a *signifié* (= signified) and a *significant* (= signifier). The sign has two main characteristics : it is arbitrary, and its *significant* is linear. That sign is arbitrary is not a new thing, but the relationship between the two is important.

These philosophical ideas of the speculative school of the middle ages of Europe were thoroughly and meticulously discussed by ancient Indian Sanskrit grammarians and philosophers. It is as early as in the 7th century A.D., Bhartṛhari (650 or 651 A.D.) interpreted the grammatical categories of the Sanskrit language in terms of philosophical exposition. His book, *Vākyapadīya*, in three Kāṇḍas, is written in verse. It deals with the questions of the philosophy of speech, it contains much evidence of thorough knowledge of contemporary philosophical disputes.

The *Vākyapadīya* is divided into three chapters : the *Brahma* or *Āgama Kāṇḍa*, the *Vākya-kāṇḍa*, and the *Pada* or *Prakīṇa-kāṇḍa* (subdivided into 14 sections). The detailed contents of all the Kāṇḍas are given below for the benefit of the readers :

First Kāṇḍa : Brahma-Kāṇḍa (157 ślokas)

Second Kāṇḍa : Vākya-Kāṇḍa (493 ślokas)

Third Kāṇḍa : Pada-Kāṇḍa :

I. Jāti-samuddeśa (106 ślokas) [section on the universal]

II. Dravya-samuddeśa (18 ślokas) [section on the ultimate substance]

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15. Ibid., p. 47.

III. Sambandha-samuddeśa (86 ślokas) [section on the Relation]

IV. Dravya-samuddeśa (3 ślokas) [section on the ultimate substance]

V. Guṇa-samuddeśa (9 ślokas) [section on the quality]

VI. Dik-samuddeśa (28 ślokas) [section on the Direction or Position]

VII. *Sādhana-samuddeśa*:

(i) Karmādhikāra (88 ślokas) [on accusatives]

(ii) Karaṇādhikāra (89-98 ślokas) [on instrumental]

(iii) Kartrādhikāra (99-122 ślokas) [on nominative]

(iv) Hetvādhikāra (4 ślokas) [on reason]

(v) Sampradānādhikāra (7 ślokas) [on dative]

(vi) Apādānādhikāra (12 ślokas) [on ablative]

(vii) Adhikaraṇādhikāra (8 ślokas) [on locative]

(viii) Sambandhādhikāra (7 ślokas) [on genitive]

(ix) Sādhana-samuddeśa(5 ślokas) [on means]

VIII. Kriyā-samuddeśa (63 ślokas) [section on action]

IX. Kāla-samuddeśa (114 ślokas) [section on time]

X. Puruṣa-samuddeśa (9 ślokas) [section on person]

XI. Saṁkhyā-samuddeśa (32 ślokas) [section on number]

XII. Upagraha-samuddeśa (27 ślokas) [section on the notion of Aspect]

XIII. Liṅga-samuddeśa (31 ślokas) [section on Gender]

XIV. Vṛtti-samuddeśa (624 ślokas) [section on manifestation]

The first Kāṇḍa is called *Brahmakāṇḍa*, because in that Kāṇḍa constant references are given to state the nature of *Brahman*, either as *stattā* or as *parā prakṛti*. It is known as *āgama-samuccaya*, because it describes the "collection of tradition". The author exphasises the importance of oral tradition (*āgama*). In other words, the author stresses the superiority of *āgama* to *tarka* as a valid form of knowledge in order to get the correct form of words.

The second Kāṇḍa, called the *Vākyakāṇḍa* ,deals with the patterns of sentence and the sentence-meaning which again is the result of joining together smaller unit of words in a sentence.

The third Kāṇḍa deals with the meanings of individual words in a sentence, and that is why, it has all the grammatical categories.

Recently K. A. Subramania Iyer has made a brilliant study on Bhartṛhari and has unfurled all sorts of philosophical expositions on Sanskrit Grammar. In his book (*Bhartṛhari*, Deccan College, Poona, 1969), he has nicely summed up the very core of the contents. He says, "The work deals with eight subjects : two kinds of meaning (*artha*): that which is obtained by analysis and that which is of a fixed character (*sthitalakṣaṇa*), two kinds of word (*śabda*) : that which is to be grammatically explained and that which is a means of explaining it (*pratipādaka*), two kinds of relation : causality and fitness to express the meaning and two kinds of result or purpose : spiritual merit (*dharma*) and the understanding of meaning." (p. 56).

At a much later date, Mādhavācārya (14th cent. A.D.) in his *Sarva-darśana-saṃgrąha*, has included a chapter on *Pāṇini-darśana*. He has analysed the grammatical principles on a philosophical basis, and has profusely quoted from Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya*.

It is needless to say that the Naiyāyikas and the Mīmāṃsakas have dealt with the problems of sentence (*vākya*) and the meaning of words (*śabdārtha*).

Prabhat Chandra Chakravarti in his *The Linguistic Speculations of the Hindus* has discussed the philosophical aspects of the Sanskrit Grammar in thirteen chapters. Each chapter is related with philosophical enquiry. In his chapter on Sentence Professor Chakravarti has taken the recourse of the Naiyāyikas for the definition of a sentence. For example, he quotes the views of Jagadīśa Tarkālaṁkāra (between 1605-1657 A.D.) for the definition of a sentence. In the opinion of Jagadīśa "a sentençe is a combination of words (mostly subject and predicate) connected together by a mutual relation." (p. 99) Jagadīśa is of opinion that "the so-called verbal cognition (*śabda-bodha*) is derivable only from a sentence when a number of significant words (*sārthaka*) having expectancy (*ākāṅkṣā*) and compability (*yogyatā*) with one another is related in such a way as to constitute a sentence in logical sense of the term". (p. 99) The Indian rhetoricians have also defined a sentence accordingly. Professor Chakravarti has also said that Aristotle has also spoken in the same strain of the unity of sense (cf. p. 134). His chapter on Logic and Language clearly reflects the views of *modistic school.*

However, the reprint of this book will surely enhance our knowledge on the subject and for that, Shri Debashis Bhattacharya is to be congratulated and the Co-ordinator of DSA Sanskrit, Professor Manabendu Banerjee, has rendered valuable service to the scholarly world by including this book in the DSA Sanskrit project.

Finally I can humbly say that this paper discusses only in a nutshell to show how some of the modern conceptions of linguistics have some germs in the ancient texts, and time has come now to ransack the past lore in the light of the modern ideas.

Satya Ranjan Banerjee

CONTENTS

LINGUISTIC SPECULATIONS OF THE HINDUS

CHAPTER I

Introductory

Antiquity of Indian speculations on language—nature and extent of early speculations on language—the study of Sanskrit and its contributions to the development of linguistic science

Much has been done by western scholars in the development of the science of language; they have carried on their researches strictly following a comparative method and carefully systematising the materials gathered from a laborious study of the different branches of the so-called Indo-European family of languages. Their achievement—we mean the development of 'Comparative Philology'—judged by the standard of scientific value, is, indeed, great. But, while we hear so much about the Greek and other western speculators on language, who are credited with having 'prepared the rise of linguistic science,' it is really to be regretted that very little notice has been taken of the ancient Indian thinkers whose observations on the science of language, though confined to the

small area of one language, are yet of some real value. Just as Indians may take pride in possessing one of the oldest languages, though not the oldest, as their glorious heritage, so they may be bold enough to assert that speculations on language had their origin in India in a very remote period of human history.

In a very primitive age, Indian minds were occupied with such subtle linguistic problems as the origin of language, different forms of speech, the relation of a word with its meaning, whether speech is eternal or created, and how speech was undivided in its original state. These and similar other questions concerning language were discussed in the Vedic literature. The same ancient stock of knowledge in which we come across the first philosophical enquiry about the universe (*cf.* Ṛg Veda, *Nāsadīya sūkta*)[1] gives us a glimpse into the crude beginnings of linguistic speculations. The ancient teachers of the Brāhmaṇas, where we first meet with etymological interpretations of names (such as, *rudra*, *pṛthivī*, etc.) may be said to have laid the foundation of linguistic science. The Brāhmaṇas, which differ from the sacred hymns both in language and originality, also mark a considerable advance in grammatical speculations. The Śatapatha, for instance, contains in one section

[1] Ṛg Veda, X. 129.

most of the technical terms of grammar. In the transitional period of the Brāhmaṇas, we find that the older Vedic forms are gradually disappearing and new words and expressions with greater tendency towards classical forms are being used. In view of the facts at hand, we shall not be far from the truth if we say that Indian thinkers have not really been given the prominence which they rightly deserve in consideration of the antiquity of their linguistic speculations and the scientific insight revealed by them.

Long before Aristotle's division of words into 'Parts of Speech,' the Indian etymologists conceived of the four-fold classification of words,[1] (*catvāri padajātāni*) and made it sufficiently clear that all words, including *saṃjñās* or personal names, were capable of being derived from verbal roots. The growth and development of different systems of grammar with their numerous commentaries is also a conspicuous indication that Indians paid particular attention to the study of language.

The rules of Sanskrit grammar, as they unfold the laws that regulate the growth and formation of words and ensure the correctness of recognised forms, are in themselves short formulæ of the science of language. Based as it is on the strictly scientific method of *generalisation* and

[1] Nirukta, 1. 1.

particularisation on the one hand, and that of agreement (*anvaya*) and difference (*vyatireka*) on the other, Sanskrit grammar, specially the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* of Pāṇini, may be viewed as throwing much light on problems of philology. Again, the rule '*akaḥ savarṇe dīrghaḥ*' (Pāṇ. 6.1.101), which virtually shows the natural tendency of two homogeneous vowels to lengthening, is as much phonological as grammatical. There was, moreover, a period in the history of the Sanskrit language when, in the absence of such technical devices and nomenclatures of grammar, *Samāsas* had to be determined by different modulations of voice. The division of *svara* into *udātta*, *anudātta* and *svarita*, the transformation of sounds, as is illustrated by the rules of *saṁprasāraṇa*, and the principles of euphonic combinations clearly indicate how intimately grammar is related to phonology. We shall subsequently find that the *Nairuktas* and the *Vaiyākaraṇas* dealt with important linguistic phenomena, and largely contributed to what is now called the *science of language*, the former laying greater stress on the psychological and the latter on the physical aspect of language.

No literary records have possibly been preserved either in Babylonia or Greece that are older than the Vedic hymns, and which contain traces of more accurate observations on language than those to be found in the Vedic literature.

In Sanskrit literature, both ancient and comparatively modern, we find many dissertations which have practically a philological importance, and give us no less valuable knowledge of the science of language than the works of the early Greek thinkers. Whether the relation between a word and its meaning is *natural* or *conventional* proved the most difficult linguistic problem to the speculative minds of the Greek thinkers. The same problem, we must remember, presented itself in all its seriousness to the primitive Indian teachers not posterior to Plato, and it is interesting to note that the Sanskrit terms *nitya* and *kārya* approximately correspond in sense to the Greek *phúsei* and *thései*. But what we actually lack in Indian speculations on language is the scientific study of different languages on a comparative method. That their linguistic survey was limited to the scope of one language is probably due to the fact that the early Hindus, as is the case even with the present-day orthodox class of Brahmins, used to look upon their own language as the most sacred and original and took but very little notice of other languages—we mean the different kinds of *Prākṛta* current at that time, which were believed to have been the direct descendants of Sanskrit (*tadbhava*).

Further, no western speculator on language is known to us who, far from being anterior to

the Vedic *seers* of respectable antiquity, might be placed even before Yāska whose work is a conspicuous record of the scientific development of Sanskrit philology. This being the actual state of things, we can hardly make out what led Prof. Sayce to assert in bold terms that it was not in India but in Babylonia that the first attempt had been made to solve the problems of language. It will suffice here to say that the Vedic passages—which speak of the 'four-fold division of *vāk*,'[1] of '*vāk* as string and names as knots,'[2] of '*vāk* as originally undivided into parts,'[3] of '*vāk* as the product of mental operation,'[4] and of '*vāk* as inseparably connected with the meaning,'[5]—are, in no way, posterior to the cuneiform inscriptions and the linguistic speculations of Heracleitus and Democritus. The passages quoted above, along with similar others to be found in the wide range of the Vedic literature, will serve to show the nature and extent of early Indian speculations on language. Most of the Vedic passages dealing with *vāk*, such as 'gods created *speech* that is spoken

[1] चत्वारि वाक् परिमिता पदानि—Ṛg Veda, II. 3. 22.

[2] वाक्तन्तिर्नामानि दामानि—Ait. Āraṇyaka, 2. 1, 6.

[3] वाग्वै पराच्यव्याकृता—Tait. Saṃ., VI. 4. 7.

[4] मनसा वाचमक्रत—Ṛg Veda, X. 71. 2.

[5] सूक्ष्मामर्थेनाप्रविभक्ततत्त्वामेकां वाचमभिस्यन्दमानाम्—Śruti quoted by Puṇyarāja.

by all animals,'[1] '*speech* was invented for the performance of sacrifice,'[2] are theological; there are other passages, *viz.*, 'there are as many words as there are manifestations of *Brahman*,'[3] and 'the wise created *speech* by their mind,' which are more or less philosophical in character.

Yāska, who is supposed to have been older than Plato, had already divided speech into four well-marked parts, strictly adhered to the doctrine of derivability of words from roots, and distinguished verbal roots from prefixes and suffixes. He has further observed that the imitation of sound (*śabdānukṛti*)[4] played an important part in the formation of words, specially in the names of birds, such as *kāka*, etc. It is no small amount of credit to an ancient teacher like Yāska that he found out, in his own independent way, the facts upon which is built the much modern onomatopœic or the *bow-wow* theory of language. Yāska had evidently in view a few words like *kāka*, *kokila*, *dundubhi*, and so on. He also appears to be conscious of the other instruments of communicating thought, such as gestures and the

[1] देवीं वाचमजनयन्त देवास्तां विश्वरूपा पशवो वदन्ति—Ṛg Veda, 100. 11

[2] वाचं जनयन् यजध्वं—*ibid*, 4. 11

[3] सहस्रं यावत् ब्रह्मविष्टितं तावती वाक्—*ibid*, X. 2.

[4] काक इति शब्दानुकृतिस्तदिदं शकुनिषु बहुलम्—Nirukta, VII. 4. I.

like, for he declares that 'the use of words represents the easiest process of expressing ideas and naming objects.' Though the works of earlier etymologists (*Nairuktas*) who founded their own schools like those of the grammarians are not unfortunately available to us, and we have access to the work of Yāska alone, we do not fail to notice the scientific accuracy with which Indian etymologists dealt with the problems of language.

Examples may be multiplied to show that speculations with regard to the science of language had their origin in India in that remote period of the Vedic literature when the *Padapāṭha* texts had been arranged, on a purely grammatical line, by Śākalya, and numerous treatises on phonology (*Śikṣā*), etymology (*Nirukta*) and grammar had come into existence with the supreme necessity of facilitating the study of the Vedas. It was, of course, at the hands of Pāṇini, Kātyāyana, Patañjali and Bhartṛhari in a later period that studies in the science of language, specially in the philosophy of grammar, seem to have received a systematic treatment.

Indian tradition has attributed to Sanskrit a hoary antiquity, and raised it to the dignity of a '*divine tongue.*' Whatever may be the views of philologists regarding the antiquity of this language, we may reasonably assume that

the power of speech, often personified as a goddess (*vāgdevī*), was not unknown to the Vedic *ṛṣis*. They seem to have been rather lavish in their exaltation of *vāk*. One entire Sūkta (Ṛgveda, X. 6. 71) has been devoted to the description of the function and importance of *vāk*; another couple of *Ṛk* verses (Ṛgveda, VIII. 10. 100) eulogises *vāk* as 'the creation of the gods.' There is evidence to believe that *vāk*, sometimes called by other names as *iḷā*, *sarasvatī* and *bhāratī*, attained the status of a Vedic divinity like *uṣas* and *pṛthivī*, and subsequently developed into a full-fledged goddess in the age of the Purāṇas. According to Yāska, the word *sarasvatī* means both a goddess and a river.[1]

The monumental works of the Vedic period bear ample evidence to the fact that the problems of language engaged the attention of Indian thinkers even at that remote age. The amount of success they attained in this particular line of thinking cannot altogether be underestimated. Although, on the assumption of a hypothetical 'parent-tongue' one may dispute the claim of Sanskrit to be regarded as the oldest of all languages, it is an undeniable fact that the first speculations on language are to be found in the sacred literature of the Hindus.

The old theory according to which Asia, or,

[1] सरस्वतीत्येतस्य नदीवद्देवतावच्च निगमो भवति—Nirukta, II. 6.

more particularly, the Indus valley, was acknowledged to be the original home of the first race of men speaking the parent-tongue, finds but scanty favour with the majority of present-day scholars. Other theories, based on anthropological and linguistic facts, have grown up which point to either the Baltic provinces or the Assyrian tract as the cradle of human civilisation. But the recent archaeological discoveries at Harappa and Mohenjodaro have brought about a revolution in the domain of historical enquiries inaugurating a new era of scientific investigation with greater possibilities for throwing further light on the history of human civilisation. As the historical data now stand, it is not quite unlikely that the Indian civilisation, as it developed in '*the land of the five rivers*,' might in future be proved to be older than Semitic culture.

Sanskrit, though no longer a spoken tongue, has got such a vast stock of words and so comprehensive a system of grammar and etymology that the foundation of comparative philology had to be laid by a study of this language along with Greek and Latin. 'The discovery of Sanskrit,' [1] says Sir R.G.Bhandarkar, 'and the Indian grammatical systems at the close of the last century led to a total revolution in

[1] Wilson Philological Lectures, p. 5.

the philological ideas of Europeans.' It is astonishing, indeed, to find that the early Indian speculators on language, though their enquiry was limited to one language only, had succeeded in imparting to their speculations a strictly scientific character by their accurate observations on linguistic phenomena—a fact which will be amply illustrated by a reference to the various discussions regarding the different aspects of linguistic science, noticeable in different parts of Sanskrit literature.

The contribution made by Sanskrit to the scientific study of language has been really valuable, and, in the words of a great Indian scholar, 'India may justly claim to be the original home of scientific philology.'[1] It is admitted by reputed authorities that the real beginning of the comparative study of languages was made possible by the discovery of Sanskrit —a language bearing so striking a resemblance to Greek and Latin and so rich in its vocabulary and inflections.

Sir William Jones was the first among European scholars to notice the close affinity between Sanskrit and Greek. Their wonderful structural similarity led him to believe that languages, now comprised under the so-called Aryan group, have descended from a

[1] Bhandarkar: Wilson Philological Lectures, p. 4.

common source which does no longer exist. Between Greece and India, similarity is not only visible in respect of language and grammar, but in other aspects also. They seem to have been bound together by a strong tie of cultural relationship. The resemblance which the old Hellenic culture bears to that of India, in religion, mythology and philosophical thinking, points to a far greater kinship between these two ancient countries. Sir W. Jones' important observation produced the desirable result. Students of language were induced to observe the affinity among different branches of the Indo-European family, and in the next stage, attempts were made to reconstruct, though in a hypothetical way, the 'parent-tongue' wherefrom those branches with their local peculiarities are supposed to have sprung up. What was simply a passing remark with him was worked out with diligence by a group of linguists and the result obtained was considered to be a great triumph for all philological investigations.

The great American scholar, William Dwight Whitney, has also pointed out how fruitful has been the study of Sanskrit for the construction of Indo-European philology. 'The discovery of Sanskrit,' says he, 'made an era in linguistic science;'[1] and 'it is still the main support

[1] Oriental and Linguistic Studies, p. 203.

of Indo-European philology.' An intimate knowledge of Sanskrit not only widened the scope of linguistic investigation, but afforded greater facility for a comparative study of the different systems of grammar.

The part played by Sanskrit in the development of linguistic science as well as the scientific character of Sanskrit grammar are well described by Prof. Sayce in the following words:[1] 'What has been termed the discovery of Sanskrit by western scholars put an end to all this fanciful playing with words and created the science of language. The native grammarians of India had at an early period analysed both the phonetic sounds and the vocabulary of Sanskrit with astonishing precision, and drawn up a far more scientific system of grammar than the philologists of Alexandria or Rome had been able to attain............Their grammatical system and nomenclature rest upon a firm foundation of inductive reasoning, and though based on the phenomena of a single language, show a scientific insight into the nature of speech which has never been surpassed.'

It is not, therefore, too much to say that the knowledge of Sanskrit prepared the ground for more solid work and a critical treatment of linguistic facts; it was a valuable acquisition

[1] Introduction to the Science of Language, Vol. I, p. 38.

to all students of philology that helped them to a great extent in determining the Indo-European forms. The extensive Sanskrit roots (*dhātu*), each denoting a particular action (*kriyā*), and mostly monosyllabic in form, and the grammatical method of deriving a word from these crude elements were of greater service to the leading exponents of the science of language than the grammatical principles of other Aryan languages.

'The German mind,' says Prof. Sayce, 'was already prepared to seize and unfold the consequences which resulted from the discovery of Sanskrit.' It must be acknowledged that the knowledge of Sanskrit gave a strong impetus to the study of languages from a historical point of view. A good deal of enthusiasm was shown by eminent linguists in discovering the scientific basis of Sanskrit grammar; and the idea of preparing a '*comparative grammar*' was only possible by a comparison of the Sanskrit grammatical forms. A closer acquaintance with Sanskrit—a language which is considered to have preserved the original tongue more perfectly than its kindred dialects—brought to the students of language many interesting things, namely, the analytical method of Sanskrit grammar, the principles of derivation as enunciated in the Nirukta and the exhaustive list of roots (*dhātu-pāṭha*) that denote all possible

kinds of *action* (*kriyā*). The striking similarity between Sanskrit and other European languages induced a number of scholars like Schlegel, Rask, Bopp and others, to make a careful study of Sanskrit with particular reference to its grammatical systems. 'These similarities, according to Schlegel, are not merely accidental or the result of mutual borrowings, but serve to establish a close relationship.'

Schlegel[1] is said to have studied Sanskrit, and had great admiration for the typical oriental language on account of its antiquity and highly developed systems of grammar. He divides languages into two broad classes, namely, flexional and affix languages, including Sanskrit with its *organic growth of the roots* within the former class. He neither believes in the common origin of languages nor advocates the so-called onomatopoeic theory as an exhaustive explanation of the ultimate origin of language. His argument, on the contrary, is that a highly flexional language, like Sanskrit, is not likely to have developed merely from *imitation of natural sounds*.

The nineteenth century marks the real beginning of the science of language. A number of European scholars, mostly German, began to

[1] Language its Nature Development and Origin, by O. Jespersen, p. 34.

speculate on the subject, in their independent way, aided by their acquaintance with different languages. How far the study of Sanskrit has contributed to the development of this particular science, and what an important part has been played by Sanskrit in extending the field of linguistic studies are sufficiently clear from the valuable writings of such well-known scholars as Rask, Bopp, Max Müller and Whitney. All of them are renowned for their important contributions to the cause of philological researches, and all including 'the founder of the modern science of language,' seem to have been thoroughly conversant with Sanskrit.

In course of his extensive tour, Rask had occasion to visit India and to gain a first-hand knowledge of Sanskrit and other Indian languages. How intensely he studied the Indian languages is best shown by his weighty remark that 'the Malabaric (Dravidian) languages speak of an origin which is virtually different from Sanskrit.'

Franz Bopp, sometimes called 'the true founder of comparative philology,' was a great Sanskrit scholar. He made a comparative study of the grammatical systems of different languages which are supposed to be connected with one another by some degree of family likeness. In most of his linguistic enquiries, specially in the determination of the primitive

forms of languages, Sanskrit finds a foremost place. He has sometimes made the Sanskrit forms the basis of his scientific comparison, looking upon them as what have preserved the original tongue more faithfully than any other language. "Starting from his logical conception of grammar, Bopp is inclined to find everywhere the 'substantive verb' *to be* in its two Sanskrit forms *as* and *bhū* as an integral part of verbal forms."[1]

Max Müller and Whitney were Sanskrit scholars of great reputation. Their names are too well-known to require any introduction to Indian students. The former edited and translated a number of ancient Sanskrit texts, the most laborious work being his famous edition of the Ṛg-veda, and thus he rendered an invaluable service to the cause of Sanskrit learning. We are under obligation to Whitney for his authoritative translation of the Atharvaveda and his well-known papers on Vedic literature (comprised in the volume—Oriental and Linguistic Studies). Max Müller's *Lectures on the Science of Language* and Whitney's *Language and the Study of Language*, though adversely criticised by scholars in the light of subsequent philological researches, are works that repay more than a passing perusal.

[1] O. Jespersen, Language : Its Nature, Development and Origin, p. 49.

Max Müller found in Sanskrit a typical language dating from a remote age and containing by far the greatest amount of religious and philosophical thinking of the world—a language that should *always remain the only safe guide through all philological intricacies.* With Max Müller the knowledge of Sanskrit was practically indispensable for a comparative study of languages, so much so that he ungrudgingly compares 'a comparative philologist without a knowledge of Sanskrit with an astronomer without a knowledge of Mathematics.' Classical scholars were not, however, prepared to accept this indispensable position of a highly complicated language like Sanskrit. *The prominence given to Sanskrit* was too great to be tolerated by a group of linguists in the present generation. They were either ignorant of Sanskrit or did not think it always necessary for all their linguistic studies to look to Sanskrit as what alone would give them a true insight into the original form of languages in general.

CHAPTER II

Philosophy of Language

Vāk—its origin—mysticism involved in *vāk*—evolution of the world from *vāk*—eternality of *vāk*—*sphoṭa* as the ultimate form of *vāk*—classification of *vāk*—function and importance of *vāk*

The philosophy of language, in its Indian conception, means a good deal both theological and metaphysical, which the powerful mind of the ancient Hindus naturally grasped in course of speculating on language. It is almost a truism that our ancient forefathers were highly philosophical in their general outlook on life. The climatic condition and the influence of the environments in which they were born and brought up had been such as to create a peculiar frame of mind that was apt to approach everything from a religious and metaphysical point of view. In India, again, religion and philosophy seem to have been mixed together almost inseparably. Most of the Hindu philosophical doctrines, to speak the truth, rest on a religious background. Even the linguistic dissertations of the Hindus are not immune from the dominating influence of religion. When we trace back the origin of Indian speculations on language and minutely examine the nature of the texts dealing

with problems of language, we very often see how they have been interwoven with theological ideas.

The ancient language of the Indo-Aryans, afterwards known by the popular appellation *Saṃskṛta,* is spoken of in the Ṛgveda as a *divine tongue*, created by the gods for the use of all animals.[1] It is believed to be the language current among the gods, and consequently called *deva-bhāṣā* by the orthodox class of Indians. Moreover, the designation *gīrvāṇa-vāṇī*, as often applied to it, purports to show the sacredness of Sanskrit as being the language of the gods. Whether man got language as a divine gift or it was simply acquired by him through natural instinct or imitation, a strong belief regarding its divine origin continued to gain ground. Even in much later times, we find Daṇḍin[2] and Bhartṛhari[3] eulogising Sanskrit as the language of the gods (*daivī vāk*). Later teachers went a step further and spoke of the supreme God as the creator of language. 'From *svayambhū* or self-born proceeded the sacred *vāk* that has neither beginning nor end.'[4] It is further stated that the

[1] Ṛgveda, VIII. 100. 11.

[2] संस्कृतं नाम दैवी वागन्वाख्याता महर्षिभिः—Kāvyādarśa, 1. 33.

[3] दैवी वाग् व्यवकीर्णेयम्—Vākyapadīya, 1. 156.

[4] अनादिनिधना नित्या वागुत्सृष्टा स्वयम्भुवा ।
आदौ वेदमयी दिव्या यतः सर्व्वाः प्रवृत्तयः ॥—*Smṛti* text quoted by Śaṅkara under Vedānta-sūtra, 1. 3. 28.

Vedas are the embodiment of this eternal form of speech out of which all objects received their particular names.[1]

It does not require a Herder or a Grimm to point out the absurdity and inconsistency of an unscientific view like this. *To bring in the idea of God* for explaining the origin of language is not peculiar only to the Indian way of thinking, for we hear of a group of scholars in Steinthal's linguistic discourses who shew *deeper insight* by defending the divine origin of language. We can partially justify this orthodox standpoint by holding that the early Aryans could not but take language to be a gift from the gods, because they were trained in such an atmosphere of religious belief that it was only natural for them to look upon everything exciting wonder as emanating from a supernatural power. It is, therefore, no wonder that the ancient people, who sincerely acknowledged their gratefulness to the host of merciful gods for all they were masters of, would readily recognise speech as a gift from the gods, and not as a creation of their own faculty. The credit of creating a mysterious means of communicating thought, *i.e.*, language, was thus ascribed to the activity of the all-powerful

[1] सर्व्वेषां च स नामानि कर्म्माणि च पृथक् पृथक्।
वेदशब्देभ्य एवादौ पृथक् संस्थाश्च निर्म्ममे ॥
Manu, 1. 21.

God from whom the first race of men or *the first human pair*, as Steinthal believes, got it as an invaluable gift.

Vāk is, again, said to have been produced for the performance of sacrifice.[1] The first and foremost thing necessary for a Vedic ritual was the recitation of the sacred *mantras*. As it was through the medium of *vāk* that the priests had to offer their prayers to the gods, the importance of *vāk* had been early recognised by the Vedic *seers*. A strict discipline was observed in the performance of a sacrifice. No one was allowed to use a corrupt form while engaged in a sacrifice.[2] It is further enjoined that a Brahmin should never utter a word of foreign origin (*mleccha*),[3] and if he does so, he will be liable to observe a *purificatory rite*. The *asuras* (non-Aryans) are said to have been defeated in consequence of using corrupt (ungrammatical) words. Great precaution was consequently taken to keep the sacred tongue free from all corruptions. Here we find the main reason why the study of

[1] इयर्त्ति वाचं जनयन् यजध्यै—Ṛgveda, IV. 21. 5.

यज्ञेन वाचः पदवीयमायन्तामन्वविन्दन्नृषिषु प्रविष्टाम्—*Ibid*, X. 71. 3.

[2] याज्ञे कर्म्मणि नापभाषन्ते—Mahābhāṣya, 1. 1. 1.

[3] ब्राह्मणेन न म्ले च्छितवै नापभाषितवै—*Ibid.*

grammar was considered to be so essential for the preservation of the Vedic texts.[1]

It must, however, be remembered that the Indian conception of *vāk* is not exactly the same as that of speech in its ordinary application. To the spiritual vision of the Hindus, *vāk* is more sacred than speech and carries with it a far deeper significance. The *ṛṣis* are said to have visualised the mystic form of *vāk* which is *subtle, eternal* or imperishable and *incomprehensible* by ordinary sense-organs.[2] This form of *vāk*, to speak the truth, is only perceptible by *yogins* and not even conceivable by ordinary men. It is, therefore, emphatically stated that *vāk* reveals her real nature only to those who possess sufficient spiritual insight to get into the ultimate essence of things.[3] If we closely follow the way in which *vāk* has been finally comprehended by the ancient teachers, we find the conclusion irresistible that *vāk* in its ultimate shape is the same as *Brahman*. This identification accounts for the practical

[1] रक्षार्थं वेदानामध्येयं व्याकरणम् and दुष्टाञ्छब्दान् मा प्रयुक्ष्महीत्यध्येयं व्याकरणम्—Mahābhāṣya, 1. 1. 1.

[2] यां सूक्ष्मां नित्यामतीन्द्रियां वाचमृषयः साक्षात्कृतधर्म्माणो मन्त्रदृशः पश्यन्ति—quoted by Puṇyarāja under Vākya. *Kār.*, 1. 5.

[3] उत त्वः पश्यन्न ददर्श वाचमुत त्वः शृण्वन्न शृणोत्येनाम् ।
उतो त्वस्मै तन्वं विसस्रे जायेव पत्य उशती सुवासाः ॥
Ṛgveda, X. 71, 4.

adoration of *vāk*, as is to be found in the Vedic literature. In the Upaniṣads, the worship of *vāk* (*udgītha*) has been enjoined as a kind of spiritual practice that ultimately leads to a *state of perpetual bliss.*[1]

This mystic aspect of *vāk* is represented by *praṇava*. To get a clear idea about the ultimate nature of *vāk*, one must, therefore, turn to what has been said of *praṇava* with particular reference to its potentiality and unique character in the history of Hindu religion. This sacred combination of three particles (*a*, *u*, *m*), variously explained as representing either *the trinity of Hindu gods* or *Prakṛti*—the primordial substance consisting of the three *guṇas*—was believed to be so powerful and worthy of reverence that the repeated utterance of it, accompanied by a deep concentration of mind, became an essential factor for the realisation of the *Highest*. What a unique place *praṇava* had occupied in the spiritual thought of India is evident from the mass of traditions that have grown round it from the Vedic times. *Praṇava* first unfolded itself, it is held, in the shape of *gāyatrī*, which, again, gave birth to the three Vedas wherefrom all things were created with their respective names and forms. It is curious to see how the cosmic

[1] अथ ह वाचमुद्गीथमुपासांचक्रिरे—Chāndogya, I. 1.
वाचमुपास्स्वेति, *Ibid*, VII. 2. and ते मृत्युमतिवर्त्तन्ते ये वै वाचमुपासते
—quoted by Puṇyarāja.

world came into existence from so subtle an entity as *praṇava*. *Praṇava*, as a powerful factor of creation, finds its analogy in the Stoic conception of the *Logos*.[1] Just as the *Logos*, through which the world, according to the Jewish theologians, has been created, is called the *divine wisdom* or *the producing rational power of the Supreme Being*, so *Praṇava*, which comprehends in itself *the sum-total of world-thoughts*, is regarded as the verbal or intellectual cause lying behind the veil of creation.

Praṇava has been often called *akṣara* or *udgītha* in the Upaniṣads.[2] There we find *praṇava* exalted to the height of the supreme Godhead. So much sanctity and reverence were accorded to it and its power and spiritual aspect magnified in such a manner that *praṇava* ultimately came to be identified with *Brahman* itself. The word *akṣara* which means literally imperishable is used to signify both *Brahman* and *varṇa* (letter). Starting with his grammatical discourse on letter, Patañjali has finally arrived at a position which is nothing but theological. The entire scope of *vāk* or *akṣara*, he observes, should be understood as representing so many

[1] History of Philosophy by W. Windelband, translated by J. H. Tufts, p. 242.

[2] ओमित्येतदक्षरमुद्गीथमुपासीत—Chāndogya, 1. 1, and अथ खलु य उद्गीथः स प्रणवो यः प्रणवः स उद्गीथः—*Ibid*, 1. 5.

sparks of the *all-illumining Brahman*, laden with flowers and fruits and shining in divine splendour like the moon and the stars.[1]

In the Yoga system of Patañjali, *praṇava* is held to be what positively denotes the *Highest Being*[2] (*Īśvara*). Viewed as a symbol of, or virtually the same as, *Brahman*, *praṇava* is called the ultimate source of all forms of *vāk*.[3] It is *vāk par excellence*. To this primordial sound *rising from the heart of Brahman* is attributed the origin of the entire world of speech (*vāṅmaya-jagat*). Following in the track of the Upaniṣads, Bhartṛhari and Puṇyarāja have tried to make it clear that all kinds of learning (*vidyā-bheda*) have emanated from *praṇava*.[4] It is really difficult to follow the trend of thought as to how all words are capable of being reduced to a single syllable as *praṇava*. Those who are gifted with a divine vision like the ancient *yogins* will undoubtedly say that it requires a good deal of meditation to reach the portal of that spiritual

[1] सोऽयमक्षरसमाम्नायो वाक्समाम्नायः पुष्पितः फलितश्चन्द्रतारकावत् प्रतिमण्डितो वेदितव्यो ब्रह्मराशिः । सर्ववेदपुण्यफलावाप्तिश्चास्य ज्ञाने भवति ।

Mahābhāṣya, 1. 1. 2, p. 36.

[2] तस्य वाचकः प्रणवः—Yoga-sūtra, 1. 27.

[3] ओँकारमेवेदं सर्वा वाक्—Nṛsiṃhottaratāpanyupaniṣad, 8, and स हि सर्वशब्दार्थप्रकृतिः ।

[4] (प्रणवस्य सर्वरूपत्वमाह) विधातुस्तस्य लोकानामङ्गोपाङ्गनिबन्धनाः । विद्याभेदाः प्रतायन्ते ज्ञानसंस्कारहेतवः ॥—Vākyapadīya, 1. 10.

एवं च प्रणवादेव साङ्गोपाङ्गश्रुतिस्मृतितयन्ता विद्याभागाः प्रभवन्ति—

Puṇyarāja.

region, attainable by pure consciousness alone, where all forms of *vāk* merge into the subtle sound *Om* and nothing else remains to disturb the serene tranquillity of spiritual absorption.

The mysticism underlying the phenomenon of speech, however deep and wonderful, is such as to often escape our notice. Scarcely does it direct our attention to find out how we learn to speak, or how the manifestation of internal ideas takes place through the medium of audible sound. When we consider, however, the magnitude of what has been said about the origin of speech by Indian thinkers, we cannot but appreciate the width of vision with which they sought to trace the ultimate origin of *vāk*. The faculty of speech, it is further maintained, has been implanted in human nature by the Creator himself; man does not create it but simply manifests it by the exercise of his vocal apparatus. The power of articulating sound was given to man by the same *agency* in order to distinguish him from other animals. Thus, the problem regarding the origin of *vāk* became more and more theological rather than scientific, and much that is mystical and lies beyond the scope of ordinary experience came to be associated with the question of language. When the all-absorbing *Brahma-vidyā* began to exercise its stupendous sway over all departments of Indian thought, the goal of most of the Hindu specu-

lations was to establish the unity of *Brahman* in all diversities of the world and to realise the manifestation of *Brahman* in all phenomena of nature. It is, therefore, finally held that *the world of speech* represents the audible manifestation of *Brahman* permeating the entire sphere of thought and existence.

The attention of the reader seems to have been somewhat engrossed by the long but tedious dissertation on *praṇava*, the mystical character of which often passes one's comprehension. Before extricating ourselves fully from the shackles of theological dogmatism, we turn to the origination of the world from *śabda*—a problem which in its exposition will be no less taxing to our patience. Evolution of the universe is in itself a mystery quite sufficient to rouse our deep wonder, but it becomes still more a mystical phenomenon when we are told that the whole cosmic world owes its origin to *vāk* and not to the nebulæ, 'force-element' or atoms.

In the opening verse of the Vākyapadīya,[1] Bhartṛhari has referred to the doctrine of evolution (*vivarta-vāda*) with a view to show the process in which the world with its *modus*

[1] अनादिनिधनं ब्रह्म शब्दतत्त्वं यदक्षरम् ।
विवर्ततेऽर्थभावेन प्रक्रिया जगतो यतः ॥
—Vākyapadīya, 1. 1,

operandi is said to have evolved in the shape of meaning from the imperishable *śabda-tattva* or the essence of the *Logos.* This universe, he continues, had first evolved from *śabda.* Puṇyarāja has quoted a couplet that goes to corroborate the same view by showing identity between *śabda* and *Brahman. Śabda,* it is maintained, is the positive embodiment of *Brahman* that gets itself manifested from the fine elements of speech, *e.g., śabda-mātrā,* whereto it finally returns when all *modifications* due to the operation of *māyā* are set at naught.[1] To lay further emphasis on the point, he has mentioned another passage from the Vedic literature. The whole world, both mortal and immortal, it goes to say, was produced from *vāk.*[2] This will clearly show the extent to which *vāk* was magnified by the Hindus. To them, we must remember, words were not only lifeless mechanisms invented for the purpose of assigning phonetic labels to objects, but represented in themselves the *pure intellect* or 'Thought-stuff' which accounts for the creation of the world.

When we go back to the cosmogonic speculations of the Hindus, we find a clear tendency

[1] ब्रह्मेदं शब्दनिर्माणं शब्दशक्तिनिबन्धनम् ।
विवृतं शब्दमात्राभ्यस्तास्वेव प्रविलीयते ॥ quoted by Puṇyarāja under Vākya. Kār. 1. 1.

[2] वागेव विश्वा भुवनानि जज्ञे वाच इत् सर्वममृतं यच्च मर्त्त्यमिति— quoted by Puṇyarāja under Vākya. Kār. 1. 121.

to invest *śabda* with the power of creating the world, or more properly, to comprehend in *vāk* the characteristics of an intellectual cause of creation. This strange position has been, however, supported by both *Śruti* and *Smṛti*.[1] It is said that the supreme Being created the earth after pronouncing the word *bhū*.[2] This is how the utterance of significant words on the part of *Brahman* was immediately followed by the creation of the world. Similarly, the evolution of all *cosmic matters* might be traced to their corresponding words (*vācaka-śabda*). In view of the inseparable association of sound with sense, which is sometimes explained in terms of *cause* and *effect*, one may be allowed to hold that words that denote objects (*vācaka*) were already in existence as causes wherefrom the world (*vācya*) was created with all the diversities of its names and forms (*nāma-rūpe vyākarot*). Just as the meaning follows from a word, so did the world evolve from words by the very force of their abiding relation. It is further stated that Prajāpati[3] created the gods

[1] कथं पुनरवगम्यते शब्दात् प्रभवति जगदिति। प्रत्यक्षानुमानाभ्याम्। ते हि शब्दपूर्वां सृष्टिं दर्शयतः—Śaṅkara-bhāṣya on the Brahma-sūtra, 1. 3. 28.

[2] स भूरिति व्याहरन् भूमिमसृजत—Tait. Brāhmaṇa, 2. 2. 4. 2.

[3] 'एते इति वै प्रजापतिर्देवानसृजतासृग्रमिति मनुष्यानिन्दव इति पितॄंस्तिरः पवित्रमिति ग्रहानाशव इति स्तोत्रं विश्वानीति शस्त्रमभिसौभगेत्यन्याः प्रजाः'—*Śruti* quoted by Śaṅkara under Brahma-sūtra, 1. 3. 28.

by uttering the word *ete*, men by uttering the word *asṛgram*, the manes (*pitṛ*) by uttering the word *indava* and so on.

Under the Yoga-sūtra,[1] 1.27, which has established a close relation (*vācya-vācaka*) between *praṇava* and *Brahman*, Vyāsa takes notice of the fact that words do not lose their respective signification even in different cycles, that is to say, the same word would continue to express the very same thing in the successive creations.[2] We may add here that *pralaya* means dissolution of all finite objects in the *infinite* cause[3] and *sṛṣṭi* simply indicates the passage from the indeterminate (*avyakta*) to the determinate (*vyakta*). Now we shall see that this principle of dissolution and manifestation may apply to *śabda* as well. Viewed as an intellectual emblem of *Brahman*, *śabda* is the subtle *world-stuff* out of which the world proceeded, just in the same way as the meaning follows from a word, and to *śabda* all objects of thought will be finally reduced on the destruction of their particular names and forms. According to the orthodox point of view, *śabda* is an entity that has neither beginning nor end. It is what represents the creative power of *Brahman*. Moreover, the world is supposed to have been

[1] तस्य वाचकः प्रणवः

[2] सर्गान्तरेष्वपि वाच्यवाचकशक्त्यपेक्षस्तथैव सङ्केतः क्रियते

[3] नाशः कारणलयः—Sāṃkhya-sūtra, 1. 121.

inherent in *śabdas* before creation. Words occupied a similar position in the Christian theology, as is evident from the following passage of the Bible: 'In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God' (John I. I). The antecedence of words to matter and the identity of word with God are the two important facts thus deducible from the theological discussions regarding the origin of the world.

Thus, we need not go far to determine the ultimate basis of creation and make a number of assumption in the light of physical science that will point to either fire or water as the *world-ground*. What was declared by Heraclitus as *the essence of all things* is, we should say, nearly the same as *parā vāk* which symbolises the active energy of 'soul-fire'.

Bhartṛhari has more than once drawn our attention to the fact that *śabda* forms the ultimate *world-element*.[1] Here we should not take *śabda* as a mere phonetic sound but look upon it as pure intellect (*pratibhā*). The creative power, holds Bhartṛhari, lies in *śabda* alone. He is thus thoroughly in agreement with the Vedic *seer* so far as the evolution of the world from

[1] (इदानीं शब्दस्य जगन्मूलत्वमाह)
शब्देष्वेवाश्रिता शक्तिर्विश्वस्यास्य निबन्धनी ।
यन्नेत्रः प्रतिभात्मायं भेदरूपः प्रतीयते ॥
Vākyapadīya, 1. 119.

śabda is concerned.[1] Puṇyarāja makes the point more clear by holding that all objects of thought lie inherent in *śabdas* in a subtle form.[2] Just as a pot, continues Puṇyarāja, is said to be a modification of earth, since it possesses all the properties of the same element, so the world proceeding from *śabda-mātrā* is called *śabda-vivarta* or transformation of *śabda*.[3] He has given a number of Vedic verses for throwing further light on the *world-building* power of *vāk*.[4] He has also made mention of a scriptural passage that gives the idea of a 'Verbal Being' (*vāṅmaya-puruṣa*) capable of creating the world.[5]

The Vedānta-sūtra has also supported the evolution of the world from *śabda* on the logical basis of perception and inference.[6] Śaṅkara has dwelt upon this problem at some length with his characteristic clearness. He first notices the difference[7] between 'evolution from *Brahman*'

1 शब्दस्य परिणामोऽयमित्याम्नायविदो विदुः ।
छन्दोभ्य एव प्रथममेतद्विश्वं व्यवर्त्तत ॥ – Vākya. *Kār.*, 1. 121.

2 सर्वा अप्यर्थजातयः सूक्ष्मरूपेण शब्दाधिष्ठानाः—under Vākya. *Kār.*, 1. 119.

3 यथैव मृद्धर्मसमन्वयान्मृद्विवर्त्तं घटं व्यवस्थापयन्ति तथैवाम्नाये वागात्मनो बहुधा करणत्वमाम्नातम् --Puṇyarāja under Vākya. *Kār.*, 1. 121.

4 वागेव विश्वा भुवनानि जज्ञे ।

5 ऋङ्मयो यजुर्मयः साममयो वैराजः पुरुषः—quoted under Vākya. *Kār.*, 1. 121

6 शब्द इति चेन्नातः प्रभवात् प्रत्यक्षानुमानाभ्याम्—Vedānta-sūtra, 1. 3. 28.

7 न चेदं शब्दप्रभवत्वं ब्रह्मप्रभवत्ववदुपादानकारणत्वाभिप्रायेणोच्यते—*Ibid.*

and 'evolution from *śabda*' from the view-point of causation. The former is intended to imply that *Brahman* is the material or essential cause (*upādāna-kāraṇa*) of the world, while the latter tends to make *śabda* only an efficient cause. He takes *śabda* in the latter sense, for it involves the direct volition of *Brahman*. The evolution of the world from *śabda*, he observes, is a matter of ordinary experience.[1] It often comes to our notice that in doing something we first remember the significant words and then perform the same as denoted by those words. In the same way, he continues, the eternal Vedic words had first flashed in the mind of the Creator of Prajāpati before He could create the corresponding things. The same fact is also illustrated by the Christian faith, as incorporated in the Biblical passage—'Let there be light and there was light.' While dealing with *śabda* as the final source of creation, we must proceed a step further to find out the regulating force behind it—the real factor that makes *śabda* so powerful. The truth underlying the whole phenomenon of creation is that the creative volition (*sisṛkṣātmikā pravṛtti*) on the part of the *all-knowing* and *all-powerful* God was just sufficient to bring the world into

[1] चिकीर्षितमर्थमनुतिष्ठन् तस्य वाचकं शब्दं पूर्वं स्मृत्वा पश्चात्तमर्थमनुतिष्ठतीति सर्वेषां नः प्रत्यक्षम्। तथा प्रजापतेरपि स्रष्टुः सृष्टेः प्राक् वैदिकाः शब्दा मनसि प्रादुर्बभूवुः, पश्चात्तदनुगतानर्थान् ससर्जेति गम्यते।

Śaṅkara under Vedānta-sūtra, 1. 3. 28.

existence. His desire *to get into diversity from unity* was the direct cause of creation,[1] independently of elements like fire and atoms.

The next question naturally arising in connection with the evolution of the world from *śabda* is what Śaṅkara has thus clearly put forward [2]: What kind of *śabda*, he asks, is really meant when one speaks about the origination of the world from *śabda*? The *sphoṭavādins* (grammarians) will undoubtedly say that it is *sphoṭa* or the eternal unit of speech from which the world was produced. Śaṅkara finds, however, the *varṇavāda*, as expounded by Upavarṣa,[3] more reasonable than the *sphoṭavāda* which, he argues, is vitiated by verbal prolixity and unwarrantable assumption.[4] It must be carefully noticed here that he was no less a supporter of the eternality of *śabda*, though he does not believe in the existence of *sphoṭa* like the grammarians. The eternality of the Vedas has been established by the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā system on the ground that no author is definitely mentioned who might be supposed to have composed the Vedas with a pre-meditated scheme.

1 तदैक्षत बहु स्यां प्रजायेयेति—Chāndogya, VI. 2. 3. On this is based the Vedānta-sūtra ईक्षतेर्नाशब्दम्, 1. 1. 5.

2 किमात्मकं पुनः शब्दमभिप्रेत्येदं शब्दप्रभवत्वमुच्यते? स्फोटमित्याह—Śaṅkara-bhāṣya on Brahma-sūtra, 1.3.28.

3 वर्णा एव तु शब्द इति भगवानुपवर्षः—*Ibid.*

4 स्फोटवादिनस्तु दृष्टहानिरदृष्टकल्पना च—*Ibid.*

The Vedāntins, as is evident from the Brahma-sūtra, 1. 3. 29, have also supported the same stand-point in order to explain the evolution of the world from the Vedic words. The Vedas, as we know, consist of a particular collection of *śabdas* comprehending the *mantras* and the *Brāhmaṇas*.[1] It is from such eternal *śabdas*, Śaṅkara holds, that all beings including the gods were created.[2] To strengthen his position he quotes a *Ṛk* to which we have already alluded. The *seers* did not create *vāk* for their use but got the same as it already existed.[3]

Rightly or wrongly, some of the Hindu teachers have called their traditionally sacred language *nitya* (eternal). A thing is known to be *nitya* which has abiding existence and does not result from any cause.[4] Those who are more rational in their judgment have called it *pravāha-nitya*, *i.e.*, current from time immemorial, failing to accommodate themselves to the strict idea of eternality in respect of speech.[5] In the Ṛgveda we meet with the expression

[1] मन्त्रब्राह्मणात्मकशब्दराशिर्वेद:—Sāyaṇa.

[2] नित्येभ्य: शब्देभ्यो देवादिव्यक्तीनां प्रभव इत्यविरुद्धम्—Bhāṣya on Brahma-sūtra. 1.3.28.

[3] स्थितामेव वाचमनुविन्नां दर्शयति—*Ibid.*

[4] सदकारणवन्नित्यम्—Vaiśeṣika sūtra. 4. 1. 1.

[5] That words are current from immemorable time has been noticed by the author of the Nyāya-vārttika under the Nyāya-sūtra, 2. 1. 69.

vācā virūpanityayā[1] which assigns eternal character to *vāk*. When *vāk* in its essential feature is held identical with *Brahman*, it is no wonder that it should merit the same attributes as are popularly assigned to *Brahman* in accordance with the Vedāntic conception.

The eternality of speech may be understood from another point of view. The relation in which a word stands to its meaning is one of abiding character that suffers no disruption even in the chaotic changes of cyclic destruction (*pralaya*). This continuity of popular usage in regard to the sign (*vācaka*) and the object signified (*vācya*) is what makes the relation (between a word and its sense) eternal.[2] The world is held to be without beginning[3] just like the words that are permanently associated with their meanings. They do not lose their power of denotation even in the successive cycles. This world, hold the Vedāntins, is exactly the same as it was in a previous state of existence. At every cycle (*kalpa*) a new world with different sets of names and forms does not really come into existence.[4]

What is actually meant by holding language to be thus current from eternity is that

[1] Ṛ. V., VIII. 75.6.

[2] अभिधानाभिधेयाभिधातृव्यवहाराविच्छेदात् सम्बन्धनित्यत्वेन विरोधः शब्दे परिह्रियेत—Śaṅkara-bhāṣya on Vedānta-sūtra, 1.3.30.

[3] संसारस्यानादित्वं तावदभ्युपगन्तव्यम्—*Ibid*.

[4] Vedānta-sūtra, 1.3.30.

its origin cannot be definitely traced back to any particular period of human history. Moreover, speech seems to be almost coeval with man. Man without language is incomprehensible. We are hardly justified to believe in the existence of a society in which men might be supposed to have been living in a state of absolute muteness before they could invent a practical means of communication as language. We may compare language to a *living organism* having both growth and decay; we may adhere to the doctrine of evolution for the sake of getting some clue as to the articulation of sound from the gibberish of lower animals; and we may look upon language either as an instinctive faculty or as a mechanical art acquired by men under pressure of necessity; but in all cases it will ever remain an enigma to ascertain when and how man first began to speak.

This belief in the eternality of speech, though inconsistent with the present state of our knowledge regarding the origin of language, was not, however, without its adherents. The entire system of Mīmāṃsā philosophy is based upon the theory of eternality of *śabda.* The Mīmāṃsakas, we should remember, had no other alternative than to advocate the eternal character of sound for the sake of maintaining the non-human or impersonal origin (*apauruṣeya*) as well as the unquestionable authoritativeness of the Vedas. The non-eternal

view of *śabda*, as held by Audumbarāyaṇa and the Naiyāyikas, found no favour with the etymologists and the grammarians. The Mīmāṃsakas, therefore, were not alone to lend support to such a tenet, because the grammarians are also found to have arrived at the same conclusion, though in a different way, by formulating the doctrine of *sphoṭa*.

As we had occasion to point out in the foregoing pages, the question whether *śabda* is eternal or created is one of the fundamental problems of the linguistic science that has been seriously taken up by all systems of Hindu philosophy supporting either of the views. This question, says Patañjali,[1] is one that was elaborately dealt with in the *Saṃgraha*—a huge work on grammar attributed to the authorship of Vyāḍi. While dealing with *śabda*, the author of the Mahābhāṣya has more than once called it *nitya* and brought out its real nature by such epithets[2] as *kūṭastha* (subtle), *avicāli* (motionless), *avikāri* (without modification), *anupajana* (without origin) and *anapāya* (indestructible) which are, according to the Vedāntic conception, frequently used to signify the supreme Being. Under the *Vārttika*—*siddhe śabdārtha sambandhe*,

[1] किं पुनर्नित्यः शब्द आहोस्वित् कार्य्यः ? संग्रह एतत् प्राधान्येन परीक्षितं नित्यो वा स्यात् कार्य्यो वेति—Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 6.

[2] नित्याश्च शब्दाः। नित्येषु च शब्देषु कूटस्थैरविचालिभिर्वर्णैर्भवितव्यमनपायोपजनविकारिभिः—*Ibid*, p. 18.

Patañjali has clearly shown that words as well as their meanings and relation are all eternally fixed. The way in which he has interpreted *nityatva*[1] ('that is also eternal where of the essence is not really destroyed') will tend to strengthen one's view in regard to the eternality of word. Though the outward sounds are liable to disappear just after their utterance is over, the real *śabda*[2] (*śabdākṛti*), as it comes from within, does not actually perish.

That words are eternal and not created is further explained by Patañjali with reference to the affairs of ordinary life. We give below a literal translation of that particular passage from the Mahābhāṣya.[3] "How is it known that words, meanings and relations are eternal? From the experience of ordinary life. In every-day life men first think of some objects and then make use of words to denote them; but they never attempt to create words. With regard to things that are created, an attempt is, however, made to produce them whenever necessity arises. As, for example, one having something to do with a pot goes to the house of a potter and asks him, 'Make a pot,

[1] तदपि नित्यं यस्मिंस्तत्त्वं न विहन्यते—Mahābhāṣya, 1. 1. 1, p. 7.

[2] शब्दव्यक्तय एव ध्वंसन्ते न शब्दाकृतयः—Bhāṣya-pradipoddyota.

[3] कथं पुनर्ज्ञायते सिद्धः शब्दोऽर्थः सम्बन्धश्चेति। लोकतः। यल्लोकेऽर्थमर्थमुपादाय शब्दान् प्रयुञ्जते नैषां निर्वृत्तौ यत्नं कुर्वन्ति। ये पुनः कार्य्या भावा निर्वृत्तौ तावत्तेषां यत्नः क्रियते। तद् यथा—घटेन कार्य्यं करिष्यन् कुम्भकारकुलं गत्वाह कुरु घटं कार्य्यमनेन करिष्यामीति। न तद्वच्छब्दान् प्रयोक्ष्यमाणो वैयाकरणकुलं गत्वाह कुरु शब्दान् प्रयोक्ष्य इति। Mahābhāṣya, Vol. 1, p. 7. (Keilhorn ed.)

I shall do something with it.' In the same way, one wishing to use words does not go to the house of a grammarian and ask him, "Make words, I shall use them."

Following in the wake of Patañjali, the author of the Vākyapadīya has started with the assumption that *śabda* and *Brahman* are convertible with each other, and consequently looks upon *śabda* as an entity that has neither beginning nor end. He further goes to say that words have been declared eternal by the great *ṛṣis* like Jaimini and others and that their views received a strong support from the *trinity* of Hindu grammarians.[1] Those who do not see eye to eye with the grammarians will also acknowledge, observes Puṇyarāja, the eternality of words in some way or other, because it is almost impossible to trace the beginning of their use.[2]

In opposition to the logical dictum which assigns momentary existence to words, intelligence and actions, Nāgeśa[3] takes *śabda* to be a constant and permanent thing. It is sound, he continues, that changes, but the real word (*sphoṭa*) lying behind the sound remains

[1] नित्याः शब्दार्थसम्बन्धाः समाम्नाता महर्षिभिः ।
सूत्राणां सानुतन्त्राणां भाष्याणां च प्रणेतृभिः ॥
Vākyapadīya *Kār.*, 1.23.

[2] परे पुनर्व्यवहारानादित्वेनैषां नित्यत्वं स्वतोऽनित्यत्वं चेति मन्यन्ते—
Under Vākya., 1.23.

[3] शब्दबुद्धिकर्म्मणां क्षणिकत्वमिति तु न युक्तम्। इदानीं जानामि उच्चरिता इति व्यवहारात्—Vaiyākaraṇa-siddhānta-mañjūṣā, p. 216.

absolutely unchanged. His arguments in support of the eternality of *śabda* stand on the principle of re-cognition (*pratyabhijñā*). A statement like 'It is exactly the same word which I heard yesterday,' will convince one that words do not entirely disappear as soon as the operation of vocal organs ceases, but they have got an abiding character.[1] This *re-cognition*, according to the Naiyāyikas, indicates only the *sameness* (*sājātya*). It is fallacious to argue, they hold, that the same *ka*-sound is heard again and again. But *ka*-sounds belonging to the same class (*katva*) are only heard at different times.

We now turn to the interpretations of the grammarians in order to understand what is actually meant when *vāk* is said to be *constant* and *eternal*. The native grammarians have looked at the final germ of all speech-sounds from a peculiar standpoint. Proceeding far beyond the region of perceptible sound, they have acknowledged the existence of *sphoṭa*.[2] Thought in course of its translation into sound, they maintain, shows how the subtle germ of speech lying dormant within (*avyakta*) becomes more and more perceptible while passing from the innermost part of the body to the vocal apparatus. Of the twofold division of words, namely, *permanent* and *created*,

[1] तावत्कालं स्थिरं चेनं कः पश्चान्नाशयिष्यति—quoted in the Upaskāra on Vai. sūtra, 2.2.33.

[2] For a detailed information regarding this theory see my Philosophy of Sanskrit Grammar, Chap. IV.

it is the *permanent reservoir of sound* that is represented by *sphoṭa*. It is indivisible, formless, and not at all liable to either production or destruction. It is, in a sense, pure consciousness that is without beginning and end. It is called *sphoṭa* because the meaning is ultimately expressed by it, and not by sounds of momentary existence.[1] The grammarians have assigned expressiveness to *sphoṭa* alone, and have unhesitatingly identified it with *Brahman*.[2]

What induced the grammarians to recognise an almost incomprehensible thing as *sphoṭa*, is as follows: The meaning is usually conveyed by a word as a whole and not by its parts individually. Letters that represent the sounds have no signification when considered individually, *i.e.*, detached from a word or a sentence. Thus, when the word *gauḥ* is dissolved into its component sounds, namely, *ga*, *au* and *visarga*, the meaning does not follow from any of them individually, but only from a particular combination of those letters. But a combination of letters is practically impossible, inasmuch as letters are not simultaneously uttered and, moreover, they are liable to disappear as soon as their utterance is over.[3] There is a small interval

[1] स्फुटत्यर्थोऽस्मादिति स्फोटः and वाचकता स्फोटैकनिष्ठा।

[2] निष्कर्षे तु ब्रह्मैव स्फोटः—Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa, *Sphoṭa-nirṇaya*, under *Kār*. 74.

[3] एकैकवर्णवर्त्तित्वाद्वाच उच्चरितप्रध्वंसित्वाच्च वर्णानाम्—Vār. 10 under Pāṇ., 1. 4. 109.

of time between the utterance of two letters,[1] which also stands in the way of forming a combination of letters in the strict sense of the term. Moreover, a word, as Durga points out, because it consists of letters that are without any significance of their own, is likely to be meaningless.[2] The whole whereof the parts are thus meaningless and momentary cannot logically have significance as well as a permanent character. Wherefrom, then, comes the meaning? The grammarians have their answer ready. It is from *sphoṭa*, they hold, as is suggested by sound (*dhvanivyaṅgya*), that the meaning is expressed.

Now we see why the grammarians could not take sound, consisting of letters, as the really significant unit of speech, but they had to go further to trace the ultimate source of sound to which they applied the significant name *sphoṭa*. According to the strict interpretation of *sphoṭa-vāda*, the grammatical method of resolving a sentence into parts is nothing but a fanciful procedure, only useful for the purpose of general comprehension.[3] 'Just as letters,' says Bhartṛhari, 'have no parts, so there are no letters in a word, and a

[1] पौर्वापर्य्यम् ।

[2] वर्णैरनर्थकैरारभ्यमाणं पदमप्यनर्थकमेव स्यात्—Durga on Nirukta, 1. 3.

[3] शास्त्रेषु प्रक्रियाभेदैरविद्यैवोपवर्ण्यते—Vākyapadīya *Kār.*, 2. 235. एवं निरवयवेष्वपि वर्णपदवाक्येषु [illegible]वाविभागो वर्णविभागः पदविभागश्च काल्पनिको मिथ्येति भावः—Puṇyarāja under Vākya. *Kār.*, 1. 93.

word has no existence detached from a sentence.'[1] *Sphoṭa* is essentially one and does not involve any order (*krama*) like priority and posteriority and, though usually indicated by sound, *sphoṭa* is virtually different from it.

The standpoint wherefrom the grammarians have viewed the ultimate germ of all speech-sounds is thus materially different from those of Śaṅkara, Kumārila, Śrīdhara and others. To the grammarians, *sphoṭa* is sacred and divine, symbolising the *cit-śakti* or conscious element that lies in all beings. Notwithstanding all adverse criticisms that have been heaped upon the assumption of a metaphysical entity like *sphoṭa*, the theory of *sphoṭa* will continue to survive as embodying the grammatical interpretation of the real origin of speech.

It will not be out of place to point out here that the doctrine of *sphoṭa*, as expounded by the grammarians, is one of the paramount features of Sanskrit grammar, considered as a system of philosophy. The identification of word, or more properly of *sphoṭa*, with *Brahman*, as is finally established by the *sphoṭa-vādins*, runs the risk of being discarded by all philologists, since a thin veil of mysticism hangs over the assumption of an element like *sphoṭa*. The grammarians in their method of

[1] पदे न वर्णा विद्यन्ते वर्णेष्ववयवा इव ।
वाक्यात् पदानामत्यन्तं प्रविवेको न कश्चन ॥—Vākya. *Kār.*, 1.77.

analysis started with the matter-of-fact idea of words, but finally reached a stage in which they could not help encroaching on the domain of pure metaphysics. In this tendency of exaggerating a common thing to a great magnitude the author of the Śabda-kaustubha finds a beautiful analogy with the popular saying mentioned in the Yogavāśiṣṭha. Just as one, he observes, is said to have fortunately received the much-coveted *cintāmaṇi* in his search after *cowries*, so the grammarians, while dealing with the nature of words, ultimately found *Brahman* as the essence of all *vāk*.[1]

In order to show that *sphoṭa* alone is expressive of sense, Nāgeśa[2] has made an attempt to explain the origin of *vāk* with reference to cosmogony. After the annihilation of the cosmic world, accompanied by a complete cessation of all actions, the creative function (*māyā*), he maintains, is finally absorbed in the infinite consciousness. When the supreme

[1] वराटिकान्वेषणाय प्रवृत्तश्चिन्तामणिं लब्धवानिति वाशिष्ठरामायणोक्ताभाणकन्यायेन शब्दविचाराय प्रवृत्तः सन् प्रसङ्गाददैते औपनिषदे ब्रह्मण्यपि व्युत्पद्यतामित्यभिप्रायेण भगवान् भर्तृहरिर्विवर्त्तवादादिकमपि प्रसङ्गाद् व्युदपादयत्—S. K., p. 12 (Asia. Soc. ed.).

[2] प्रलये नियतकालपरिपाकानां सर्वप्राणिकर्मणामुपभोगेन प्रचयाल्लीनसर्वजगत्का माया चेतने ईश्वरे लीयते। ततः परमेश्वरस्य सिसृक्षात्मिका मायावृत्तिर्जायते। ततो बिन्दुरूपमव्यक्तं त्रिगुणं जायते। इदमेव शक्तितत्त्वम्। तस्य बिन्दोरचिदंशो बीजम्, चिदचिन्मिश्रोऽंशो नादः, चिदंशो बिन्दुरिति—
Mañjūṣā, p. 171.

Being feels the necessity of creation, His potentiality takes the form of a *bindu*—a subtle point retaining in itself immense power and combining the three *guṇas*. This is, in reality, an inexhaustible source of energy (*śakti-tattva*). The unconscious part (inertia) is called (*bīja*), the part representing a mixture of both *cit* (consciousness) and *acit* (unconsciousness) is known as *nāda* (sound), and the intelligent element generally goes by the name of *bindu*. Regarded as the ultimate source of all forms of *vāk*, this *nāda* is called *Śabda-Brahman*.[1] The *tāntrika* descriptions of *vāk*, as we find in the Śāradātilaka and other treatises, have a striking similarity with this view. *Bindu*, *nāda* and *bīja* are all said to represent the different aspects of one and the same thing.[2] It is further stated that they stand for the *trinity* of godhead having its manifestations in fire, in the moon and in the sun.[3] In accordance with the *tāntrika* conception, *bindu* is a symbol of the seminal principle while *nāda* means a dissemination of energy (*śakti*), and it is out of their combination that the world is said to have been created:

1 स एव श्रुतिसम्पन्नं शब्दब्रह्मेति गीयते—
Quoted in the Mañjūsā, p. 172.

2 परशक्तिमयः साक्षात्त्रिधासौ भिद्यते पुनः ।
बिन्दुर्नादो बीजमिति तस्य भेदाः समीरिताः—Śāradātilaka, 1. 8.

3 सज्ञानेच्छाक्रियात्मानो वह्नीन्द्वर्कस्वरूपिणः—*Ibid.*

Then we turn to the classification of *vāk*. One *Ṛk*[1] speaks of four different kinds of *vāk*, though it does not definitely mention their names, and it distinctly lays down that it is the last and fourth form of speech which is spoken by men, the other forms lying latent, *i.e.*, too subtle to be uttered by our vocal organs. Patañjali has explained *catvāri vākparimitā padāni* as what refers to the four categories of grammar, namely, noun, verb, preposition and particle.[2] But later grammarians like Bhartṛhari and Nāgeśa as well as philosophers like Gauḍapāda and Sāyaṇa found in this particular expression a clear reference to the four well-known divisions of speech, *viz.*, *parā*, *paśyantī*, *madhyamā* and *vaikharī*. Nāgeśa's interpretation of *guhā nihitā* seems to be quite in agreement with the *tāntrika* point of view. *Guhā* means, he holds, the three innermost parts of the body, namely, *mūlādhāra*, naval region and the heart,[3] and he goes on to say that the first three types of speech are not comprehensible to everybody. The *yogins* with their inward vision

1 चत्वारि वाक्परिमिता पदानि तानि विदुर्ब्राह्मणा ये मनीषिणः ।
गुहा त्रीणि निहिता नेङ्गयन्ति तुरीयं वाचो मनुष्या वदन्ति ॥
Ṛgveda, I. 164. 45.

2 चत्वारि पदजातानि नामाख्यातोपसर्गनिपाताः—Mahābhāṣya, 1.1.1.

3 गुहायामाधारनाभिहृदयेषु निहिताः– सर्वेषां ज्ञानविषया न भवन्ति—
Mañjūṣā, p. 182.

revealed are only competent to realise these mystic forms of speech. A grammarian of the type of Patañjali and Bhartṛhari is also supposed to have visualised these subtle things by dispelling the darkness of ignorance through the aid of their illuminating knowledge of *śabda-śāstra*.[1] The *vaikharī* is, however, distinguished from the rest by being perfectly audible and capable of being expressed through the medium of letters. This is, therefore, known as the popular form of speech current in human society.

We find the detailed accounts of these forms of speech in various treatises.[2] Such classifications, we must remember, are based upon the conviction that *nāda*—the first manifestation of eternal consciousness—is materialised into sound by the operation of internal air blowing from the *mūlādhāra*. The four forms of speech really correspond to the four different stages through which *nāda* passes till it becomes perfectly audible. Thus, we may start with *bindu* or the final point as the crude germ of sound and proceed from the *mūlādhāra* to the *viśuddha* in order to see how *Śabda-Brahman* or *parā vāk* transforms

[1] वैयाकरणास्तु शास्त्रबलेन तद्बललब्धयोगेन च गुहान्धकारं विदार्य्य सव जानातीति भाव:—Pradīpoddyota.

[2] See Mahābhārata, Aśvamedha parvan (Brāhmaṇa-gītā).

itself into popular speech. From *bindu*,[1] it is said, arises *nāda* which is called *Śabda-Brahman*; it is featureless, intellectual in essence, and possesses the characteristics which are favourable to the cosmic creation. It is the essence of the world that is often signified by such words as *rava* and *parā*. The nature of *parā vāk*, as described in the Mahābhārata and elsewhere, convinces us that it is luminiferous consciousness residing in the *mūlādhāra*, creative but indestructible. It is what is known as *Śabda-Brahman*[2] or the essence of the *Logos*. When *nāda* or *parā vāk* gets manifested a little and the internal air that serves to reveal it comes up to the navel region from the *mūlādhāra*, we have *paśyantī*[3] form of *vāk* which is not divisible into parts. These two kinds of speech are exceedingly subtle and cognisable by *yogins* alone in a state of perfect spiritual absorption (*samādhi*). Next in order comes *madhyamā* which is revealed by the same air when it passes

1 अस्माद्बिन्दोः शब्दब्रह्मापरनामधेयं वर्णादिविशेषरहितं ज्ञानप्रधानं सृष्ट्युपयोग्यवस्थाविशेषरूपं चेतनमिश्रं नादमात्रमुत्पद्यते। एतज्जगदुपादानं रवपरादिशब्दैर्व्यवह्रियते—Mañjūṣā, p. 175.

2 स एव श्रुतिसम्पन्नं शब्दब्रह्मेति गीयते—*Ibid*, and शब्दब्रह्मेति तं प्राहुः सर्वागमविशारदाः—Śāradātilaka, 1.12.

3 तदेव नाभिपर्य्यन्तमागच्छता तेन वायुनाभिव्यक्तं मनोविषयं पश्यन्तीत्युच्यते। एतद्द्वयं सूक्ष्मा श्वराधिदैवं योगिनां समाधौ निर्विकल्पकज्ञानविषयमित्युच्यते—

Mañjūṣā, p. 178.

to the region of the heart.[1] It has intelligence as its only ingredient. Nāgeśa has drawn our attention to the fact that these three kinds of *vāk*, gradual stages of amplifications as they are of the same *nāda*, represent, so to speak, the minutest, the minuter and the minute forms of *praṇava*.[2] The *vaikharī* form of speech is what is spoken by men. It is generated when the internal air passes through the throat and reaches the mouth.

No such classifications of speech are likely to be found in any other ancient literature of the world. What has formed the subject of general discussion on language in all countries is the outward aspect of speech, *i.e.*, sound as is produced by the exercise of vocal organs, and no attempt has ever been made to explore such subtle or psycho-physiological operations as are involved in the vocalisation of thoughts.

Before closing this dissertation on the mystic aspect of *vāk*, we should like to point out that the metaphysical side of the phenomena of language was an important part of the study of language to Humboldt, Heyse and Steinthal. They tried in their own way to grasp the psychological or 'inner form of language,' taking

[1] ततो हृदयपर्य्यन्तमागच्छता तेन वायुना हृदयदेशेऽभिव्यक्ता बुद्ध्या विषयीकृता...सूक्ष्मा मध्यमा वागित्युच्यते—Mañjūṣā, and मध्यमा त्वन्तःसन्निवेशिनी परिगृहीतक्रमेव—Puṇyarāja under Vākya. *Kār.*, 1. 144.

[2] एतदवस्थात्रयमपि सूक्ष्मतमसूक्ष्मतरसूक्ष्मप्रणवरूपः—Mañjūṣā, p. 179.

speech as the creation of the spirit in man. It must be, however, admitted that their philosophy of speech is different from that of the Hindus both in intensity as well as in its mystical character. To look upon words as *spiritualised sound* or as *the music of the soul* is a close approximation to the Hindu conception of *parā vāk*. It is not the outward sound, we have repeatedly stated in these pages, that constitutes the real word which comes from within as a result of movement in *the ever-vibrating sphere of consciousness.*[1]

We have pointed out in a previous section that *vāk* won the most laudatory verses from the Vedic *seers* on account of its manifold importance. The *Śruti* eulogises *vāk* as the source out of which the whole world evolved. The Vedic passage[2] quoted by Puṇyarāja describes the various purposes that are served by *vāk*: by *vāk* is expressed the sense; ideas are conveyed to others by means of *vāk*; the world with all its diversities is represented by *vāk*. The Aitareya-Āraṇyaka[3] has used a

[1] वाग्रूपत्वमेव चितिक्रियारूपमित्येके—Puṇyarāja under Vākya. *Kār.*, 1. 128.

[2] वागेवार्थं पश्यति वागब्रवीति वागेवार्थं सन्निहितं संतनोति। वाचैव विश्वं बहुरूपं निबद्धम्—under the Vākya. *Kār.*, 1. 119.

[3] वाक्तन्तिर्नामानि दामानि तस्येदं वाचा तन्त्या नामभिर्दामभिः सर्वं सितम्—again वाचा वै वेदाः सन्धीयन्ते, वाचा छन्दांसि वाचा मित्राणि सन्दधति—Ait· Āraṇyaka, 1.6.

well-conceived metaphor when it describes *vāk* as the string and names as the knots whereby the world is bound up. The names of all objects are said to have been derived from *vāk* with the help of intelligence.[1] In the dialogue between Sanatkumāra and Nārada, the various functions of *vāk* were narrated for the sake of persuading Nārada to a solemn worship of *vāk*: all the Vedas and the different branches of learning are represented by *vāk*, and no cognition of either virtue or vice, truth or falsehood, would have been ever possible, if there had been no such means of expressing thought as *vāk*.[2] Those who adore *vāk*, taking it positively to be the same as *Brahman*, are blessed to gain mastery over as many objects of thought as are capable of being denoted by *vāk*.[3] We have stated in the foregoing pages that the Hindu teachers found in *vāk* the audible manifestation of *all-pervading Brahman*. The whole of speech, says Lauhikya, is *Brahman*. The Sāṅkhyāyana-Āraṇyaka has dwelt at some length on the manifold function of *vāk*. *Vāk* is called *the essence of all beings* (*puruṣa*)

[1] प्रज्ञया वाचं समारुह्य वाचा सर्वाणि नामान्याप्नोति—
Kauṣitaki-brāhmaṇopaniṣad, III. 6.

[2] वाग्वा ऋग्वेदं विज्ञापयति—यद्वै वाङ्नाभविष्यन्न धर्म्मो नाधर्म्मो न सत्यं नानृतं वागेवैतत् सर्वं विज्ञापयति वाचमुपास्स्वेति—Chāndogya, VII. 2.

[3] स यो वाचं ब्रह्मेत्युपास्ते यावद्वाचो गतं तत्रास्य कामचारो भवति—*Ibid*.

[4] Sāṅkhyāyana-Āraṇyaka, VII. 3.

in the Chāndogya-Upaniṣad.[1] *Vāk* is sometimes compared to a cow capable of yielding all desirable things.[2] It is further asserted that if a word is properly used and correctly understood, it turns out so powerful as to fulfil all mundane and celestial desires.[3]

Bhartṛhari is emphatically of opinion that no knowledge whatsoever is possible without *vāk*.[4] It is through the instrumentality of *vāk*, he holds, that the internal consciousness assumes an audible form and all ideas are communicated to others. What we really learn from this bold statement is that the author of the Vākyapadīya believed in the impossibility of thinking without speech—a fact which reminds us of the well-known paradox: *man is man by speech*. Bhartṛhari continues further that *vāk* represents all different branches of science and arts, and that names or distinguishing stamps are given to objects only through the medium of *vāk*,[5]

[1] पुरुषस्य वाग्रस:—Chāndogya, I. 1.

[2] सा नो मन्द्रेषमूर्जं दुहाना धेनुर्वागस्मानुपसुष्टुतैतु—Ṛgveda, VIII. 100. 20, and गौरिव प्रचरत्येका रसमुत्तमशालिनी। दिव्यादिव्येन रूपेण भारती गौ: शुचिस्मिता—Mahābhārata, Aśvamedha-parvan (Brāhmaṇa-gītā).

[3] एक: शब्द: सुप्रयुक्त: सम्यग् ज्ञात: शास्त्रान्वित: स्वर्गे लोके कामधुग् भवति—Mahābhāṣya, Vol. III, p. 58.

[4] न सोऽस्ति प्रत्ययो लोके य: शब्दानुगमादृते।
अनुविद्धमिव ज्ञानं सर्वं शब्देन भासते॥—Vākyapadīya, *Kār*. 1.124.

[5] सा सर्वविद्या शिल्पानां कलानां चोपबन्धनी।
तद्वशादभिनिष्पत्तौ सर्वं वस्तु विभज्यते॥—*Ibid*.

otherwise the world would have ever remained an unnameable and indiscernible complexity.[1] The definition and classification, as two scientific methods of distinguishing or isolating things, have been made possible only through the help of *vāk*. The *Śruti* which runs as *nāma-rūpe vyākarot* means that God not only manifested Himself in infinite things, but He gave particular names and forms to each object in order to help the understanding of men.

What Bhartṛhari has tried to establish with so much boldness of conviction has been unfortunately a matter of controversy. 'No language, no thought' is a theory that is no longer supported by the students of language. The reason is not far to seek. Though deprived of the faculty of speech from their very birth, the dumb are not found altogether incapable of thinking and developing this power to a certain extent. According to the psychologists, *it is not impossible to think in concrete pictures instead of words.*[2]

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1 तदुत्क्रान्तौ विसंज्ञोऽयं दृश्यते काष्ठकुड्यवत्—

Vākyapadīya *Kār.*, 1. 128.

2 'The popular belief that there can be no thought without language is incorrect.'—W. B. Pillsbury: Psychology of Language, p. 4.

CHAPTER III

The Origin of Speech

Theories of Western scholars—divine origin—the doctrine of the Naiyāyikas—human invention—theory of *saṅketa* or divine will—root-theory of language—imitation of sound—articulation of sound—gestures as significant means of communication

The much-vexed question of the origin of language is the problem of philology on which by far the greatest amount of discussion has been focussed. At one time it was almost a fashion with most of the speculators on language to approach this difficult problem with much ingenuity and pretensions. *The unprofitable result in proportion to the labour expended* has been the appearance of a number of theories, none of which is capable of giving an explanation worthy of universal acceptance. The *onomatopœic*, the *interjectional*, the *ding-dong* and the *yo-he-ho* theories were propounded at different periods and defended with a considerable degree of tenacity by their advocates, yet unfortunately they now stand rejected on the ground of being insufficient and unscientific.

Each of these theories is, however, acceptable in so far as it throws light on the origin of a few isolated words. But when we apply these theories to explain a

language as an organic whole, and not as a mere combination of isolated words, we find them inadequate and unsatisfactory. Considering the magnitude of a language like Sanskrit, the part played by *imitation of natural sound* is insignificant. A few words like *kāka*, *kokila*, *kala-kala*, *dundubhi*, *kukkuṭa*, as every one will admit, are not quite sufficient to constitute a language. Similarly, we must reject the theory of interjection, if it unduly claims to be the most scientific explanation of the origin of language, for a small number of words like *aho*, *bata*, *ā*, *ahaha*, etc., are only likely to have originated from emotional ejaculations, while the vast majority of words would show no sign of interjectional origin in themselves. The main objection raised against these theories lies in the assumption with which they were started, *i. e.*, the origin of language is the same as the origin of isolated words. It would be a veritable mistake to identify language with individual words detached from a sentence.

To trace the origin of language is as difficult as to ascertain the first unfolding of the human intellect. And as language is, from an intellectual point of view, only an outward garment of thought, the history of language should necessarily be looked upon as a symbolic record of human thought. The whole intellectual outlook of a nation, its particular characteristics

and ideals, are to some extent embodied in its language. Though it has practically become a dead language, Sanskrit has been in itself a history of the people who used to speak it as their mother tongue.

Without making a detailed reference to other physical and psychological theories of the origin of language,[1] we give below short accounts of the different views that were held by Indian thinkers with regard to the origin of language. We shall have to recapitulate here for the sake of clearness and elaborate treatment most of the topics which have been somewhat touched upon in the previous pages.

In the second chapter we have referred to the Vedic hymns which characterise *vāk* as a creation of the gods. According to this theory, which may be styled the divine origin of speech, language, though spoken by man, does not betray any trace of human invention; it is a divine gift, and not an achievement of which man has any reason to be proud. It was possibly to distinguish man from other animals that the faculty of speech as well as the power of articulating sound had been given to him. It is further stated that the *self-born* Being created the divine speech. The Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad maintains the same view by

[1] Theory of Wundt.

ascribing the origin of the four Vedas and all branches of learning to the breath of the mighty *Being*.[1] Again, we find the primordial sound *praṇava* described as the ultimate source of all forms of *vāk*. The sacred character of the Sanskrit language is due to the belief, still current among the orthodox Brahmins, that it is the language of the gods.

The ancient *seers* of the Vedic age were however, aware of the fact that language is a product of human activity. 'The creation of language by divine agency' is not the only idea that was conceived by them in connection with the problem regarding the origin of language. That language is the result of human activity is also to be found in the Ṛgveda. The Brahmins who used to take *soma-rasa* at the time of sacrifice are said to have created speech.[2] Again, Vaśiṣṭhas while invoking the gods are spoken of as having invented speech just in the same way as their forefathers had done.[3] Reference has already been made to the *Ṛk* that speaks of the performance of sacrifice as what necessitated the invention of speech.

The eternality of speech, as advocated by the Mīmāṃsakas and the *sphoṭavādins* (grammarians),

1 अस्य महतो भूतस्य निःश्वसितमेतद् यदृग्वेदो यजुर्वेदः सामवेदोऽथर्वाङ्गिरस इतिहासः पुराणम्, etc.—Bṛhadāraṇyaka, II. 4.10.

2 ब्राह्मणासः सोमिनो वाचमक्रत—Ṛ. V., VII. 103.8.

3 वसिष्ठासः पितृवत् वाचमक्रत—Ṛ. V., X. 66.14.

was subjected to severe criticism by the rationalistic schools of Indian philosophy. In opposition to the doctrine of eternality of sound which involves far-fetched speculations, the Naiyāyikas as well as the Vaiśeṣikas took a reasonable view of the case by holding language to be a creation of man. The operations of vocal organs, it is held, are the immediate causes that give rise to sounds which are liable to disappear as soon as their utterance is over. As they exhibit two aspects (production and destruction) invariably associated with objects that have momentary existence, words are considered to be far from being permanent.[1] Having discussed all doubtful points as to whether *śabda* is a *substance*, *action* or *quality*, the Vaiśeṣikas have finally discarded the theory of eternality of sound by a number of aphorisms.[2] It might be also pointed out that the diversity of languages is an evidence that goes against the eternality of speech. No two languages are identical, and moreover, we have different languages in different countries, which would not have been the case if language were eternal.

[1] अनित्यश्चायं कारणतः—Vai.-sūtra, 2.2.28. and आदिमत्त्वादैन्द्रियकत्वात् कृतकवदुपचारात्—Nyāya-sūtra, 2.2.13.

[2] सतो लिङ्गाभावात्—Vai.-sūtra, 2.2.26.
नित्यवैधर्म्यात्—*Ibid*, 2.2.27.
लिङ्गाच्चानित्यः शब्दः—*Ibid*, 2.2.32.

Long before the many-sided developments of modern science took place, the Naiyāyikas,[1] we are proud to say, had established the scientific fact that 'sound is a quality of ether,' *i.e.*, sound is the result of ethereal vibrations (*śabdaguṇamākāśam*) and had gone so far as to refer to the *wave-theory* of sound[2] (*vīcitaraṅga-nyāya*). What has given an abiding name to these two schools of Indian philosophy, and what has formed their fundamental tenet is the theory of atoms (*paramāṇuvāda*). Like Leucippus, the Naiyāyikas are credited with having founded this doctrine which is claimed to be more scientific than philosophical.

Though they laid greater stress on the physical aspects of language than on the metaphysical side, and tried to free their linguistic discussions from all mystical conceptions, the Naiyāyikas, it must be borne in mind, could not entirely exclude the idea of *divine interference* in the phenomenon of language. The significance, particularly the primary significance of a word (*śakti*), does not, hold the Naiyāyikas, depend on popular usage or social convention but is fixed by the will of God (*saṅketa*).[3] The salient feature of this doctrine is that meanings are said to have been

[1] Naiyāyikas of course include Vaiśeṣikas.

[2] वीचितरङ्गन्यायेन तदुत्पत्तिस्तु कीर्त्तिता—Bhāṣāpariccheda, *Kār.*, 166.

[3] सामयिकः शब्दादर्थप्रत्ययः—Vai.-sūtra, 7.2.20. and न सामयिकत्वाच्छब्दार्थसंप्रत्ययस्य—Nyāya-sūtra, 2.1.55.

assigned to words primarily by God, His volition being expressed in the following terms: 'Let this meaning be denoted by this word.' The question as to whether the relation between a word and its meaning is natural or conventional has already been hinted at. Like Plato, the Naiyāyikas were not in favour of the theory of *natural connexion*.[1] Their arguments are drawn from common experience. Had this relation been an innate one, they hold, the same word could not have been used by different people with different significations.[2] As, for instance, the word *yava* has been used in one sense (barley corn) by the Aryans and in other by the *Mlecchas*.[3] The Naiyāyikas have, however, no agreement with Plato so far as regards the creation of an *ideal speech* in which words and their meanings would be bound together by a natural connexion. The main point in which the Naiyāyikas differ from the Greek philosophers, specially Aristotle, is that they could not look upon this relation as one of social convention, but made the *divine will* (*saṅketa*) responsible for it.

When we turn to the science of etymology, and examine the analytical method of grammar,

1 सामयिकः शब्दादर्थसंप्रत्ययो न स्वाभाविकः—Vātsyāyana under Nyāya-sūtra, 2.1.56.

2 जातिविशेषे चानियमात्—Nyāya-sūtra, 2.1.56.

3 आर्या हि यवशब्दाद्दीर्घशूकविशेषं प्रतियन्ति, म्लेच्छास्तु कङ्गुमिति—Nyāya-vṛtti under Nyāya-sūtra, 2.1.56.

we are confronted with a new theory of language—a theory which reveals to us a world of roots to which the real origin of language should be traced. There is no distinct reference to the *root-theory* of language as such in any recognised works on the Nirukta or grammar. But the doctrine of *derivability of words from verbal roots,* as expounded by Śākaṭāyana[1] and seriously adopted by the etymologists as the fundamental principle of derivation, presupposes the existence of *a language of roots.* In order to get some idea of this theory, we need picture before our mind an infantile stage of language when men used to give expression to their thoughts through the medium of short sounds resulting from internal emotions. Each of those sounds was as expressive as a sentence and ordinarily denoted some sort of action. These short notes, formed either in imitation of natural sounds of birds or flowing spontaneously from *the music of the heart*, are called *roots.*

According to the strict interpretation of Śākaṭāyana's view, the entire body of language is supposed to have grown from crude elements —roots. The fundamental principle underlying all etymological explanations is that all word-forms, looked at from an analytical point of

[1] नामान्याख्यातजानीति शाकटायनो नैरुक्तसमयश्च – Nirukta, I.12.

view, are capable of being reduced to a number of verbal roots which admit of no further grammatical analysis. These verbal roots, like the atoms of the Vaiśeṣikas, are the germs out of which all words have been formed. They represent permanent *word-stuffs* each of them having its distinct significance. In combination with formative elements and prefixes, they have undergone various modifications in form, one and the same root giving rise to numerous words, of course, with difference of meaning. As *the last result of linguistic analysis*, these roots proved equally useful to the etymologists and the grammarians. We find, however, the influence of onomatopœia on a number of roots like √*gard*, √*mard*, √*bharj*, √*gad*, √*pat*, etc., and consequently maintain that the imitation of natural sounds played a considerable part in the evolution of verbal roots.

We have a few remarks to offer here. What we actually learn from an examination of linguistic forms is a contradiction of the bold assertion of Śākaṭāyana. As all words are not found to be derivable from verbal roots, we are prepared to accept this theory only with certain limitations. It is for this reason that Gārgya and a section of grammarians recorded their disapproval of this theory.[1] There are

[1] न सर्वाणीति गार्ग्यो वैयाकरणानां चैके—Nirukta, I. 12.

some words, falling under the so-called *uṇādi* class, which are so rigid in their composition that they do not conform to the grammatical method of analysis. This class of words, called *asaṃvijñāta* by Yāska, *avyutpanna* by the grammarians, and *prakalpya-kriya* by Durga, is practically underivable. Pāṇini could not diminish the scientific character of his grammar by formulating rules for the derivation of this class of words (*avyutpanna*). This theory, however, gave a bad repute to the entire system of etymological interpretations. The etymologists carried this theory to such an extent that they could not refrain from deriving even personal names (as *Cyavana*, *Śāntanu*, etc.). It is really strange that in the derivation of the so-called *avyutpanna* words the etymologists found a free scope to indulge in all sorts of fanciful interpretations.

It is also surprising to find that the Indian speculators on language did not fail to detect the influence of onomatopœia in the formation of certain words, specially in those that denote the names of birds. We may not fully agree with those who assign the origin of language entirely to imitation of natural sounds, but we can hardly afford to deny that some words were really formed through this kind of imitation. Yāska is of opinion that the word *kāka* has been formed in imitation

of the sound (*kā*) naturally made by crows, and he particularly notices that this kind of naming is largely to be found in the designation of birds.[1] Similarly, the words *kokila*, *kukkuṭa*, *dundubhi*, etc., may be interpreted as furnishing examples of *śabdānukṛti*. The form *kṛka-* in *kṛkavāku* and *kṛkalāsa* (lizard) is another instance of onomatopœia. As we have already pointed out, the origin of a number of verbal roots might also be traced to the same process of imitation.

Yāska has shown further how a class of men has derived its particular designation from the peculiar set of words it frequently uses. He thus finds onomatopœia in the word *kitava* meaning a gambler. A gambler is so called because while cheating a man he often enquires, 'what have you' (*kiṃ tavāsti*?).[2] The author of the Mahābhāṣya has similarly explained two personal names. There were great sages, says he, who were nick-named Yarvāṇa and Tarvāṇa owing to the fact that they used to utter in ordinary conversation those two corrupt forms instead of *yad vā naḥ* and *tad vā naḥ* (let us have anything).[3] The derivative meaning of the word *maskara*, as suggested by Patañjali, gives

[1] काक इति शब्दानुकृतिस्तदिदं शकुनिषु बहुलम्—Nirukta, III. 18.

[2] कितवः किं तवास्तीति शब्दानुकृतिः—*Ibid*, V. 21.

[3] यर्वाणस्तर्वाणो नामार्षयो बभूवुः । ते तत्रभवन्तो यद्वानस्तद्वान इति प्रयोक्तव्ये यर्वाणस्तर्वाण इति प्रयुञ्जते—Mahābhāṣya, 1.1.1, p. 11.

us another example of this kind of designation. A class of wandering monks was designated as *maskara* on account of its preaching the doctrine of absolute abstinence from works in the following words: *mā kṛta karmāṇi, mā kṛta karmāṇi* (do not do any works).[1] In the same way, the word *vadānya* (generous) has been interpreted by Lokanātha in his commentary on the Rāmāyaṇa. A generous man is called *vadānya*, since he often makes use of such expression as *vada kimanyat tubhyam dāsyāmi* (say, what else I shall give you).[2]

Pāṇini has more than once referred to the imitation of indistinct sounds (*avyaktānukaraṇa*) in his grammatical aphorisms.[3] He had undoubtedly in view such words as *paṭa-paṭa, khaṭa-khaṭa* and *mara-mara*, etc., which are direct imitation of sounds made by things under certain conditions. These imitative sounds are generally reduplicated in most of the languages.

It should, however, be borne in mind that the number of onomatopœic words is not very large in any language. One would search in vain for imitation of sound, if one attempts to explain most of the words known to him. When applied to the vast structure of a

[1] Mahābhāṣya under the rule Pāṇ. 6.1. 154.

[2] Lokanātha's commentary on Rāmāyaṇa, Ādikāṇḍa, 1.3.

[3] अव्यक्तानुकरणस्यात इतौ—Pāṇ., 6.1.98.
and अव्यक्तानुकरणाद् द्व्यजवरार्धादनितौ डाच्—*Ibid*, 5.4.57.

language, this theory seems to be quite inadequate. Many causes were in operation to bring about the origin and development of a language and what has really been done by onomatopœia in regard to a language is that it played an important part in the primitive stage of its growth. As most of the names of birds, far from speaking of the vast multitude of words, do not seem to have been formed in imitation of natural sounds, the teacher Aupamanyava[1] could not persuade himself to support this theory. He does not acknowledge the very existence of *śabdānukṛti*. No sign of imitation of sound, according to his view, is traceable even in the word *kāka* which he derives from the root √*kala*.[2]

The possession of articulate sounds is one of the many features that serve to distinguish man from other animals. It is extremely doubtful whether he could have merited his present position, if he had been wanting in distinct utterance. Man is naturally endowed with the power of articulating and modulating his voice, whereas lower animals are physically unfit to utter distinctly. Experience goes to show that animals like birds and mammals have got their own language, though

[1] न शब्दानुकृतिर्विद्यते इत्यौपमन्यवः—Nirukta, III. 18.

[2] काकोपकालयितव्यो भवति—*Ibid.*

they are unable to exercise their power of reasoning beyond a certain limit. They are no less gifted with knowledge which enables them to discern things in their own way,[1] but what they really lack is an aptitude for developing crude speech-germs into articulate utterance. Inspite of their absolute meaninglessness to us, the sounds they usually make under different emotions have their significance. But it is not within the power of man to follow the language of lower animals as clearly as his own. In one *sūkta* of the Ṛgveda the frogs are said to have made use of words in imitation of the roaring of clouds.[2] Birds of the *śuka* species are well-known for their power of imitation as well as distinct utterance. *Śukas* under regular training are capable of speaking as clearly as men. Not only in folk-lores but also in most of the ancient mythologies we have plenty of instances in which men are found conversing with birds and mammals. In the Rāmāyaṇa, for instance, we find the monkey-leader speaking with Sītā in a human speech.[3] The author of the Yoga-sūtra strongly believes that a *yogin* possessing sufficient spiritual

[1] ज्ञानमस्ति समस्तस्य जन्तोर्विषयगोचरे and यतो हि ज्ञानिन: सर्व्वे पशुपक्षिमृगादय:—Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa—*Devī-māhātmya*, 1.46.

[2] वाचं पर्जन्यजिन्वितां प्रमण्डूका अवादिषु:—Ṛgveda, VII. 103. 1.

[3] वाचं चोदाहरिष्यामि मानुषीमिह संस्कृताम्—Rāmāyaṇa, Sundarā-Kāṇḍa, XXX. 17.

power and concentration of mind, so as to distinguish word, meaning and cognition from one another, is capable of understanding the language of all creatures (*sarva-bhūta-ruta-jñānam*).[1]

Pāṇini denotes man by the expression *vyakta-vāk*, *i.e.*, 'one possessing distinct speech.' Commenting on the rule, Pāṇ. 1.3.48, Patañjali observes that the epithet *vyakta-vāk* might be applied to all animals, and that the difference with regard to the distinctiveness is one of degree only.[2] He holds that the sound (*kuṭ*) made by cocks is as distinct as those uttered by men. Who are, then, precisely meant by *vyakta-vāk*? It is men who are rightly so called inasmuch as they alone are gifted with a speech wherein letters are distinctly audible.[3] A sound is thus called distinct when it is capable of being represented by letters (*varṇātmaka*).

Modern philologists have given the term language such a wide scope as to include all possible instruments whereby our thoughts may be conveyed to others. As they usually form a medium of communication, the movements of fingers and face are regarded as good as

[1] Yoga-sūtra, 3.17.

[2] सर्वे एव हि व्यक्तवाचस्तत्र प्रकर्षगतिर्विज्ञास्यते—Mahābhāṣya under Pāṇ., 1.3.48.

[3] व्यक्ता वाचि वर्णा येषां त इमे व्यक्तवाच इति—*Ibid.*

language. But the Hindu linguists, on the other hand, have excluded gesture and the like from their conception of language. The Sanskrit word corresponding to 'language' is *bhāṣā* which, as derived from the root *bhāṣ*, to speak, applies only to articulate sounds or to a spoken language as such.

There is no gainsaying the fact that certain ideas are sometimes communicated to others through the help of *iṅgita* or gesture, almost in the same way as by the use of words. Yāska seems to have been aware of the expressiveness of such physical signs, but he prefers the use of words as being the most precise and comprehensive way of communication.[1] It is for this reason, says Yāska, that *saṃjñās* or names are usually indicated by words and not by gesture or *physiological processes* that serve to indicate certain mental conditions. Durga holds that gesture is often accompanied by ambiguity and confusion and involves a greater amount of physical exertion than the use of words. The use of words, on the contrary, is free from all confusions, and expresses a good deal of meaning by means of a little effort.[2]

A clear reference to gestures as a mode

[1] अणीयस्त्वाच्च शब्देन संज्ञाकरणं व्यवहारार्थं लोके—Nirukta, I. 2.

[2] अभिनया अपि व्याप्तिमन्तः। न त्वणीयांसः। ते महता यत्नेन व्याप्नुवन्ति न च निःसन्दिग्धं कुर्वन्ति। शब्दस्त्वपरिमितमर्थमल्पीयसा यत्नेनोच्चारितो व्याप्नोति—
Durga under Nirukta, 1.2.

of expression of thought has been made by the author of the Mahābhāṣya. He states expressly that a good many ideas are capable of being indicated without the use of words, that is to say, by the particular movements of fingers and eyes.[1] Kumārila has also noticed that certain physical signs are sometimes used to denote some notions.[2] When a man fails to give adequate expression to his emotions through words, he is seen to make different physical movements for the same. Movements of this kind which are largely due to nervous activity are sometimes exhibited by speakers in course of delivering speeches for the sake of laying greater stress and emphasis on what they intend to speak.

It is evident that gestures are, to a limited extent, as significant as words. The question that next presents itself is whether they have natural connection, like words, with what they denote, or they are merely used in substitution of articulate sounds. Puṇyarāja compares gestures with *apabhraṃśas* (corrupt forms), since both of them are meaningless by themselves and express the intended sense only through a process of inference.[3] The direct expressiveness

[1] अन्तरेण खल्वपि शब्दप्रयोगं बहवोऽर्था गम्यन्तेऽक्षिनिकोचैः पाणिविहारैश्च—Mahābhāṣya under the rule Pāṇ., 2.1.1, p. 363.

[2] हस्तसंज्ञादयो येऽपि यदर्थप्रतिपादने ।
भवेयुः कृतसङ्केतास्ते न लिङ्गमिति स्थितिः ॥ Śloka-vārttika, 5.20.

[3] अक्षिनिकोचादिवदपभ्रंशाः—Under Vākyapadīya, 1.151.

of gestures is thus contested by the Hindu teachers. Gestures, like telegraphic codes, have no signification popularly assigned to them, but they seem to be significant only by reminding one of those particular words which have innate relation with the objects to be denoted. What we usually understand when one shakes his head in course of a conversation is that he intends to imply some sort of negation, disagreement or denial. According to the interpretation of Puṇyarāja, the shaking of the head and negation are not really connected with each other just in the same way as words and their meanings are tied together (in a perfectly conventional way), the former serves to make one think of the word 'no' before it can become suggestive of negation or refusal as the case may be.

In course of determining the accurate number of instruments for obtaining valid knowledge, the founder of the new school of Logic (*Navya-nyāya*) has discussed at length the desirability of including *the movements of the body* in the category of *pramāṇa*. Gaṅgeśa has finally rejected gestures and the like as constituting independent sources of knowledge, because the supposed expressiveness of physical signs depends upon the fact of their reminding one of those particular words which are in reality capable of conveying the intended sense. He compares gestures with writing and says that

it is words alone which have necessary connection with the objects they denote.[1] Viśvanātha, the author of the *Nyāya-vṛtti*, does not think it reasonable to acknowledge *physical movements* as a kind of *pramāṇa*. These movements, he argues, which are really similar to writing, do not constitute a separate class of *pramāṇa*, but come under the category of either *śabda* or inference.[2] The movements of fingers and face presuppose the existence of words or expressions of which they are only physical symbols, the real signification lying in the words alone. True it is that there are, apart from language as such, some other ways as gestures, etc., whereby we can sometimes give expression to our mental ideas, but it can hardly be maintained that physical signs are as perfect and comprehensive in all cases as the use of articulate sounds. We can neither believe in the existence of a speechless period in human history when the communication of ideas was absolutely carried on through the medium of gestures, nor do we find any positive

[1] सङ्केतग्रहे चेष्टातोऽप्यनुभवसम्भवात् शब्दवत् सापि प्रमाणमतश्चत्वारि न प्रमाणानि इति चेदुच्यते, शब्देन चेष्टायां सङ्केतग्रहात् शब्दस्मृत्युपयोगिनी चेष्टा लिपिवत् शब्द एव प्रमाणमर्थे क्लृप्तत्वात्—

Tattvacintāmaṇi, śabda-khaṇḍa, A.S.B. ed., p. 860.

[2] चेष्टाया निर्व्यापारत्वेन न प्रामाण्यम्। वस्तुतो लिप्यादिवत् साङ्केतिकत्वात् तस्या अप्यनुमाने शब्दे वान्तर्भाव:—Vṛtti under the Nyāya-sūtra, 2.2.12.

evidence in support of the view that the invention of articulate speech had been preceded by a period of pure mimesis.[1]

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[1] 'Language is the work of man ; it was invented by man as a means of communicating his thoughts, when mere looks and gestures proved inefficient.'

Max Müller: Science of Language, Vol. I, p. 31.

CHAPTER IV

Evolution of Sound

Word and sound—the problem of production and manifestation—conflicting views between the Mīmāṃsakas and the Naiyāyikas—different theories on the evolution of sound—operation of internal air and fire in the manifestation of sound—activity of the mind and the transformation of knowledge into sound.

What precisely is a word ? The unsophisticated answer is that a word is nothing but a sound, though usually restricted to a sound which is articulate and at the same time significant.[1] Patañjali has raised this question in the very beginning of his discourses on grammar (*śabdānuśāsana*)[2] and has clearly shown how a word in its essential aspect differs from *substance*, *action*, *quality* and *class*. A sound that is expressive of sense, he holds, is popularly called *śabda*.[3] That which really constitutes the ' word ' when one utters *gauḥ*, for instance, is the sound which simultaneously with its utterance gives the idea of an animal possessing dewlap, hump, hoofs and horns.[4] A word is, therefore, the same as

[1] श्रोत्रग्रहणे हि अर्थे लोके शब्दशब्दः प्रसिद्धः ।

Śabara under Mīm.-sūtra, 1. 1. 5.

[2] अथ गौरित्यत्र कः शब्दः ?—Mahābhāṣya 1. 1. 1.

[3] अथवा प्रतीतपदार्थको लोके ध्वनिः शब्द इत्युच्यते ।—*loc. cit.*

[4] येनोच्चारितेन सास्ना-लाङ्गुल-ककुद-खुर-विषाणिनां संप्रत्ययो भवति स शब्दः ।

loc. cit.

sound.[1] This is the conclusion at which the grammarians and other Indian thinkers arrived in course of dealing with the exact nature of *śabda*.

There are others who have divided *śabda* into two classes, namely, *dhvani* and *varṇa*.[2] Sounds pure and simple, that is, those sounds that do not usually convey any definite sense, are called *dhvanyātmaka-śabda*. This class is represented by those unintelligible sounds that are, for instance, produced by the beating of drums and the blowing of conches. The *varṇas* (*varṇātmaka-śabda*) or real words, on the other hand, are such as consist of sounds capable of being expressed by letters.

Words have been declared to be the same as letters (*varṇa*) by the ancient teacher Upavarṣa whose observation has been respectfully referred to by both Śabara and Śaṅkara.[3] Śabara has distinctly laid down that it is letters (*akṣara*) that constitute a word.[4] He

[1] तस्माद् ध्वनिः शब्दः ।—*loc. cit.*

[2] शब्दो ध्वनिश्च वर्णश्च मृदङ्गादिभवो ध्वनिः ।

Bhāṣāpariccheda, Kār. 64.

[3] गौरित्यत्र कः शब्दः ? गकारौकारविसर्जनीया इति भगवानुपवर्षः ।

Śabara-bhāṣya under Mīm.-sūtra, 1. 1. 5.

and वर्णा एव तु शब्द इति भगवानुपवर्षः ।

Śaṅkara under Ved.-sūtra, 1. 3. 28.

[4] तस्मादक्षराण्येव पदम् ।

Śabara-bhāṣya under Mīm.-sūtra, 1. 1. 5.

does not find any reason for recognising sound as anything distinct from letters.[1] The cognition of letters formed an important part in Patañjali's conception of sound. In his exposition of the term *vyakta-vāk*, Patañjali has pointed out that sounds are called articulate when they are dissolvable into letters. A sound is called distinct when it clothes itself in letters. Of the four forms of *vāk* described in the previous chapter, *vaikharī* alone is known to be audible because it is usually represented by letters (*kṛtavarṇaparigrahā*).

The point at issue between the Naiyāyikas and the Mīmāṃsakas is the controversial question as to whether the vocal organs actually produce or create sound, or simply make it manifest. This topic has, we must remember, a direct bearing on the question of eternality or non-eternality of words. In philosophical language there is a good deal of difference between the connotations of *utpatti* and *abhivyakti*. Production (*utpatti*) presupposes previous non-existence (*prāgabhāva*) and manifestation (*abhivyakti*) simply means bringing to light something that is already existent. We speak of a thing as *utpanna* when it is actually brought into existence, whereas we call something *abhivyakta* when it happens to be already existent,

[1] अतो न तेभ्यो व्यतिरिक्तमन्यत् पदं नामेति—*loc. cit.*

and is only rendered perceptible by some kind of effort. *Production*, therefore, refers to things that are created or non-eternal and *manifestation* relates to only permanent entities. So far as the evolution of sound is concerned, the former represents the view of the Naiyāyikas and the latter that of the Mīmāṃsakas.

Those who defend the eternality of sound will emphatically declare that sounds are made manifest by the vocal apparatus and are not actually produced by them.[1] It is the existent alone, they argue, that is said to be manifested, and what is non-existent can never be manifested.[2] What we actually find in everyday life is that a sound is always made whenever a thing is struck by another, as in the case of beating a drum by means of a rod. Here the Mīmāṃsakas will say that the sound is already existent there but it only requires some exciting causes (*abhivyañjaka*) for its manifestation. Now, what are those exciting causes that render sounds audible or perceptible? It is both conjunction and

[1] ततो नित्यप्रत्ययसामर्थ्यात् प्रयत्नेनाभिव्यज्यते ।

Śabara-bhāṣya on Mīm.-sūtra, 1. 1. 12.

and यथा घटादेर्दीपादिरभिव्यञ्जक इष्यते ।
चक्षुषोऽनुग्रहादेवं ध्वनिः स्याच्छ्रोत्रसंस्कृतेः ॥

Ślokavārttika, 6. 42.

[2] संश्चाभिव्यज्यते नासन् ।

Śabara-bhāṣya on Mīm.-sūtra, 1. 1. 6.

disjunction pertaining to air that are acknowledged to be the immediate causes of manifestation.[1] This is, in short, the method of reasoning on which rests the Mīmāṃsaka view regarding the evolution of sound.

The Naiyāyikas, as we shall find, are at variance with this point of view. The point at issue is, says Vātsyāyana, whether *conjunction* and *disjunction* should be regarded as the causes of *production* or of *manifestation*.[2] The trend of his arguments goes to show that a sound is brought into existence by the operation of these two causes. It does not require any proof that a thing resulting from a cause and at the same time liable to destruction cannot be treated as a permanent entity. Having considered all the points raised by the Mīmāṁsakas, Vātsyāyana has finally established his thesis that a sound is produced (*kṛtaka*) and not manifested.[3]

We consider it necessary to give here a brief account of the discussion that followed between the two rival systems of Indian thought on the question of eternality of sound. The Naiyāyikas have included *śabda* within the category

[1] संयोगविभागावेवाभिव्यञ्जकाविति वक्ष्यामः ।—*op. cit.*, 1. 1. 13.

[2] सांशयिकमेतत् किमुत्पत्तिकारणं संयोगविभागौ शब्दस्य, आहोस्विदभिव्यक्तिकारणमिति ।

Vātsyāyana-bhāṣya on Nyāya-sūtra, 2. 2. 13.

[3] तस्मादुत्पद्यते शब्दो नाभिव्यज्यत इति ।—*loc. cit.*

of *pramāṇa*.[1] But they refuse to agree with the grammarians who assume the imperceptible *sphoṭa* as the ultimate origin of sound, and with the Mīmāṁsakas, on the other hand, who have maintained a rather unphilosophical position by advocating the eternality of sound.

Gotama introduces the discussion by pointing out dual negations with regard to sound, *i.e.*, a sound does neither exist before it is uttered, nor does it seem to be existent after the act of utterance is over.[2] Thus, having non-existence before and after the utterance, sound is decidedly a non-eternal thing like an earthen pot. The main objections raised against the eternality of sound are clearly set forth in a *sūtra*.[3] First, sound has its cause, since it is directly produced by the operation of the vocal organs. Secondly, sound is comprehended by the organs of hearing. According to the *wave-theory* as expounded by the Naiyāyikas, a sound in course of its transmission gives rise in succession to numerous sounds the last of which reaches the tympanum of the ear.[4] Thirdly, we often speak of sounds as if they were the product of physical effort. Further, sounds are produced and not manifested,

1 Nyāya-sūtra, 1. 1. 3.

2 *op. cit.*, 2. 2. 12.

3 आदिमत्त्वादैन्द्रियकत्वात् कृतकवदुपचाराच्च—*op. cit.*, 2. 2. 13.

4 उत्पत्तिमत्त्वे तु वीचितरङ्गन्यायेन शब्दात् शब्दान्तरोत्पत्त्या श्रवणेन्द्रियप्राप्तिः सम्भवति—Nyāya-Vārttika.

because attributes like *loudness* an*d* *mildness* are sometimes applied to them in order to indicate the degree of their intensity.[1] These arguments, we should remember, are materially the same as those anticipated by Jaimini as *pūrvapakṣas*.[2] The anticipation of such *pūrvapakṣas* and their refutation are indicative of the historical relationship between the Nyāya and the Mīmāṃsā systems.

The upholders of the eternality of sound advanced counter-arguments in support of their position. But they were unfortunately rejected. Below are given some instances to show how these arguments were set aside by the Naiyāyikas in a manner that reflects much credit on their power of argumentation. (1) Sound is eternal like space, since both are imperceptible to touch.[3] This argument, hold the Naiyāyikas, cannot stand because neither tangibility nor intangibility is, strictly speaking, a characteristic feature of an eternal entity. As a matter of fact, atoms, though tangible, are said to be eternal, whereas actions (*karman*) are held to

[1] यत्कार्य्यं तत् तीव्रं मन्दमिति प्रयुज्यते यथा सुखं तीव्रं मन्दमिति। एवं शब्दोऽपि तीव्रमन्दप्रयोगविषयत्वात् कार्य्यमिति भाव: ।—*op. cit.*

[2] कर्मैके तत्र दर्शनात्—Mīm.-sūtra, 1. 1. 6.

करोतिशब्दात्—*op. cit.* 1. 1. 10.

[3] अस्पर्शत्वात्—Nyāya-sūtra, 2. 2. 23.

शब्दो नित्य: अस्पर्शत्वात् गगनवदिति—Vṛtti on the above sūtra.

be non-eternal (transient) in spite of their intangibility.[1] (2) Sound is eternal and not liable to perish immediately after its utterance, inasmuch as it is capable of being given to others, as in the case of a teacher communicating *words* to his pupil.[2] This is also open to objection on the ground that the existence of *words* between the teacher and the pupil is not comprehensible by any evidence.[3] (3) Sound is eternal, as there is no cognition of the cause that might destroy it.[4] The answer from the opposite side is a very simple one. When a sound, it is said, gives rise to another it is the latter one that is supposed to destroy the former.[5] In this way, the doctrine of eternality of sound was put to severe tests, and the edifice so cautiously built up by the Mīmāṃsakas was shattered to pieces.

It is to be carefully noted how one sound gives rise to another as the immediate cause of it. The Naiyāyikas seem to have given here the most plausible explanation so far as the propagation of sound is concerned. Ripples that

1 सोऽयमुभयतः सव्यभिचारः। स्पर्शवांश्चाणुर्नित्यः अस्पर्शं च कर्मानित्यं दृष्टम्—Vātsyāyana-bhāṣya.

2 संप्रदानात्—Nyāya-sūtra, 2. 2. 15.

3 येन संप्रदीयते यस्मै च, तयोरन्तरालेऽवस्थानमस्य केन लिङ्गेनोपलभ्यते—Vātsyāyana-bhāṣya.

4 विनाशकारणानुपलब्धेः—Nyāya-sūtra, 2. 2. 33.

5 उत्तरोत्तरशब्दानां पूर्वपूर्वशब्दनाशकत्वं कल्प्यत इत्यर्थः—Vṛtti.

appear on the surface of water constitute the scientific illustration of how sound-waves are transmitted through the vibrating sphere of ether. Just as a slight agitation on the surface of water produces ripples, so from the first sound a series of sounds are generated in quick succession in the ethereal region. This is why a sound is also heard from a distance. A sound acts upon the tympanic membrane of the ear before it becomes audible. This is what is known as the wave-theory or *vīcitaraṅga-nyāya*. According to another theory, popularly called *kadambakoraka-nyāya*, from a single sound uttered ten sounds are simultaneously produced in different quarters which continue to give rise to numerous sounds of the same nature.

There are many theories regarding the evolution of sound. Almost all systems of Hindu thought have acknowledged sound as a quality of space *ś(abdaguṇamākāśam)*. According to the Buddhist conception which does not essentially differ from that of the Hindu teachers, sound is without any substratum, it results from the disruption of the great elements, and has both production and destruction.[1] Vātsyāyana has alluded to as many as four different theories representing respectively the views of the Mīmāṃsakas, the Sāṅkhyaites,

1 महाभूतसंक्षोभजः शब्दोऽनाश्रित उत्पत्तिधर्मको निरोधधर्मक इत्यन्ये—
Vātsyāyana-bhāṣya under Nyāya-sūtra, 2. 2. 12.

the Vaiśeṣikas and the Buddhists.[1] Bhartṛhari has also taken notice of the difference of views current among the ancient teachers in respect of the origin of sound. He has clearly shown how *air*, *atom* and *knowledge* has each been treated as capable of developing into sound.[2]

That air plays an important part in the evolution of sound is a fact now established by scientific experiments. The question relating to both evolution and transmission of sound is intimately connected with the movement of air and *speech is now being recognised as a modification of the act of breathing.* The transformation of air into sound is an idea traceable to the old scriptures. The Chāndogya Upaniṣad has described the speech-sound as a kind of internal air. It has clearly stated that the internal air called *vyāna*, which represents an intermediary stage between inspiration (*prāṇa*) and expiration (*apāna*), is the same as *vāk* ; and that it is on this account that at the time of speaking one has to refrain from both inhaling and exhaling.[3]

1 *loc. cit.*

2 (इदानीं शब्दविषये मतभेदानाह)—

वायोरणूनां ज्ञानस्य शब्दत्वापत्तिरिष्यते ।

कैश्चिद्दर्शनभेदो हि प्रवादेष्वनवस्थित: ॥

Vākyapadīya, Kār. 1. 108.

3 अथ य: प्राणापानयो: सन्धि: स व्यानो यो व्यान: सा वाक्। तस्मादप्राणन्नपानन् वाचमभिव्याहरति—Chānd. 1. 3.

The same view is also to be found in the Mahābhārata.[1] It is the experience of every-day life that we require an amount of air, both outflowing and inflowing, at every time of uttering a sound. It is nothing but a stream of air, says Bhartṛhari,[2] made active by physical efforts, that develops into sound by virtue of its contact with the 'sound-producing apparatus.'

The Śikṣās also speak of the internal air as the creative factor of sound. The course in which the physical air gets itself manifested in the shape of audible sound is as follows: having intellectually determined the object to be communicated to others, the soul urges the mind in order to give expression, *i.e.*, to vocalise the thought rising within. The mind so stimulated acts upon the physical fire which in its turn brings about a movement in the region of internal air. The internal air thus moved gets upwards till it reaches the vocal apparatus.[3]

This view seems to have been widely accepted and further corroborated by well-known

[1] प्राणापानान्तरे देवी वाग् वै नित्यं हि तिष्ठति—Brāhmaṇa-gītā (Aśvamedha Parvan).

[2] लब्धक्रियः प्रयत्नेन वक्तुरिच्छानुवर्तिना।
स्थानेष्वभिहतो वायुः शब्दत्वं प्रतिपद्यते॥
Vākyapadīya, *Kār*. 1. 109.

[3] आत्मा बुद्ध्या समेत्यार्थान् मनो युङ्क्ते विवक्षया।
मनः कायाग्निमाहन्ति स प्रेरयति मारुतम्॥
Pāṇinīya-śikṣā.

philosophers like Śabara svāmin, Vātsyāyana and Praśastapāda. Śabara admits that a good deal of physical effort is necessary for the utterance of a sound and goes on to mention the different parts of the body through which the subtle air passes before it manifests itself in the shape of audible sound. The internal air, he says, first rises from the navel region, receives expansion in the heart and undergoes changes in the throat; then it strikes the head (palate) and comes back and finally gives rise to different kinds of sounds in the mouth which acts as a 'resonance-chamber.'[1] Vātsyāyana does not go into such details but simply states that the utterance of sound is caused by the conjunction of the internal air, set in motion by an effort on the part of the speaker, with the organs such as the throat, the palate, etc.[2] The Vaiśeṣika view as represented by Praśastapāda is somewhat more elaborate. Whenever a desire is felt within, it is said, to communicate one's thoughts to another, the mind invariably comes in touch with the soul. This conjunction is what

[1] वायुर्नाभेरुत्थित:, उरसि विस्तीर्ण:, कण्ठे विवर्त्तित:, मूर्द्धानमाहत्य परावृत्त:, वक्त्रे विचरन् विविधान् शब्दानभिव्यनक्ति ।

Śabara-bhāṣya under Mīm.-sūtra, 1. 3. 25.

[2] किमिदमुच्चारणं नामेति ? विवक्षाजनितेन प्रयत्नेन कोष्ठस्य वायो: प्रेरितस्य कण्ठताल्वादभिघात:, यथास्थानं प्रतिघाताद्वर्णाभिव्यक्ति: ।

Vātsyāyana-bhāṣya under Nyāya-sūtra, 2. 2. 18.

finally causes the utterance of sound. The utterance of sound, however, presupposes the cognition of similar sounds that are said to have left their impressions already on the memory. Desire for utterance is then followed by efforts which create a movement in the region of the internal air. The internal air, thus stirred, proceeds upwards and strikes the vocal apparatus.[1]

How air is transformed into sound has been clearly shown by both Bhartṛhari and Puṇyarāja. The former holds that air under the influence of the mind gets itself materialised into audible sound.[2] Again, he says that it is the life-breath or *prāṇavāyu* that gives rise to all kinds of sounds.[3] Puṇyarāja has referred to more than one theory which practically offer the same explanation concerning the evolution of sound.[4] We must remember first that the volume of air ordinarily required for the utterance of a sound comes from within

[1] तत्र वर्णलक्षणस्योत्पत्तिरात्ममनसोः संयोगात् स्मृत्यपेक्षाद्वर्णोच्चारणेच्छा. तदनन्तरं प्रयत्नस्तमपेक्षमाणादात्मवायुसंयोगात् वायौ कर्म जायते, स चोर्द्ध्वं गच्छन् कण्ठादीनभिहन्ति ।—Praśastapāda-bhāṣya, Ben. ed., p. 288.

[2] अन्तःकरणतत्त्वस्य वायुराश्रयतां गतः ।
तद्धर्मेण समाविष्टस्तेजसैव विवर्त्तते ॥
Vākyapadīya, *Kār*. 1. 115.

[3] प्राणो वर्णानभिव्यज्य वर्णेष्वेवोपलीयते ।—*op. cit.*

[4] अन्तर्वर्त्तिना प्रयत्नेनोर्द्ध्वमुदीरितः प्राणो वायुस्तेजसानुगृहीतः शब्दतामापद्य शब्दघनसंहन्यमानया प्रकाशमानया युक्तश्चान्तः सन्निवेशिनः शब्दस्याविभक्तं बिम्बमुपगृह्णातीत्येकेषां मतम् ।—Puṇyarāja under Vākyapadīya, *Kār*. 1. 116.

and not from without. This will go to prove the existence of a *reservoir of air* in some locality of the body. The navel region is generally considered to be the place wherefrom air passes upwards till it reaches the speech-organs that are finally employed for the production of sounds like *ka*, *kha*, etc. The *Tāntrika* interpretation is somewhat different. To a *Tāntrika*, it is the *mūlādhāra* or the seat of eternal consciousness from which all active impulses come out. Every sound, according to this view, has its ultimate source in the *mūladhāra*, and a sound is held to be nothing but a distinct manifestation of *cit-śakti* that lies dormant in the shape of a sleeping serpent (*kulakuṇḍalinī*). Letters whereby sounds are usually represented are called *mātṛkā-varṇas* in the *Tantras*. It is further stated that the operation of *nāda* is continually going on, and that in every act of inhaling and exhaling all animals are consciously or unconsciously making two indistinct sounds, namely, *haṃ* and *saḥ*.

Another point that is of considerable interest in this connexion is the influence of bodily fire on the production of sound. Fire, to speak the truth, is the 'most active element known to the world of philosophers and what we call *energy* or *power* is presumably a manifestation of it. The world is said to be an embodiment of fire. It was considered to be *the essence of all things*

by one of the ancient Greek thinkers. From a physiological point of view, fire is the vital force which animates all living beings, and accounts for the activity of all physical mechanisms. During the course of evolution of sound, the mind, it is held, first acts upon the physical fire which in its turn serves as the immediate incentive to the movement of internal air, deposited in the navel region of the body.[1] The evidence that leads to such an assumption is available in the Upaniṣads. Viewed from a metaphysical standpoint, *vāk* is described in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad as constituting the fourth part of the mind which shines with the co-operation of fire (energy) residing in the body.[2] *Vāk*, says Śaṅkara, is compared to the leg of the mind, because it is by the use of *Vāk* (word) that the mind gives expression to what it has got to communicate to others, just as a cow reaches her destination with the help of her legs.[3] It is further stated that *vāk* is not only made active by *tejas* (energy) but also becomes articulate and distinct as a result of its association with fire. The act of breathing, which in ordinary course is transformed into audible sound, is essentially connected with physical heat

[1] मनः कायाग्निमाहन्ति ।—Pāṇinīya Śikṣā.

[2] वागेव ब्रह्मणश्चतुर्थः पादः सोऽग्निना ज्योतिषा भाति च तपति च ।
Chāndogya-Upaniṣad, III. 18.

[3] वाचा हि पादेनेव गवादि वक्तव्यविषयं प्रति तिष्ठति ।
Śaṅkara on the above.

(energy). Bhartṛhari has more than once drawn our attention to the fact that *tejas* (energy) largely contributes to the materialisation of sound. By the expressions *tejasā pākamāgataḥ* and *tejasaiva vivartate*, he has tried to show that the evolution of sound involves the operation of *fire* as a primary condition. It is fire that pushes air upwards or sets the internal air in motion and represents the energy that is required for the utterance of a sound. Thus, this view apparently tends to make sound a modification of fire (*tejovivarta*).

Having shown the force exerted by air and fire on the production of sound, an attempt will now be made to see how far the activity of the mind is associated with the phenomenon of speech. In this attempt, naturally we shall have to shift from the domain of physiology to that of psychology. We have noticed how the *Śikṣās* and other ancient Sanskrit treatises have described the minute physiological processes involved in the evolution of sound and how they have distinctly referred to the operation of the mind striking the internal air, *i.e.*, turning fire to action, as the first step towards the evolution of sound. Both fire and air, as directly connected with the production of sound, act under a stimulus received from the mind.[1]

1 अन्तःकरणतत्त्वस्य वायुराश्रयतां गतः। तद्धर्मेण समाविष्टस्तेजसैव विवर्त्तते ॥
Vākya. 1. 115.

From the epistemological point of view, the contact of the mind with the soul is a necessary or primary condition for all cognitions. Knowledge of all shades is, hold the Naiyāyikas, so dependent on such conjunction (*ātmamanaḥ-saṃyoga*), that is to say, no cognition is possible unless the mind invariably comes into touch with the soul. It is surely an activity of the mind that sends a stimulus to the whole mechanism of speech and sets the *sounding apparatus* to work. In course of communication of thought is exhibited the activity of the consciousness which has its seat within the body.[1] The mind, however, does not merely serve as an instrument. What we call *inner speech* is a direct reflection of the mind. The mind of the speaker, so to speak, reveals itself in the visual images of words. The psychologists seem to be, therefore, perfectly right when they say that *speech has its origin in the mind of the speaker* and consequently look upon language as a mental phenomenon.[2]

Every word has its particular image behind it. These *verbal images*, often presenting themselves before the thinking mind as visible

1 प्रत्यक्चैतन्यस्यान्तःसन्निविष्टस्य परबोधनाय शक्तिरभिस्यन्दत इति ।—

Puṇyarāja under Vākyapadīya, 1. 1.

2 W. B. Pillsbury: The Psychology of Language, p. 91.

pictures, are interpreted by the Naiyāyikas as *visible presence of the object* (*padārthopasthiti*) excited by the utterance of words. To many the utterance of a word brings with it an image of the thing denoted. These images leave their lasting impressions (*saṃskāra*) on the mind, and the mind by its very nature is capable of reproducing them whenever an excitation similar to the one that gave rise to it is produced in the nervous system. On the other hand, whenever a word is uttered the object denoted by it is at once brought before the mind of the listener, or, to put it in a different way, in course of receiving the impressions through the medium of sensory organs, the mind is apt to assume, though temporarily, the particular form of the object comprehended (*tadākāreṇākārita*).[1]

Language is truly and not only metaphorically said to be the garment of thought. No one can deny that there is correspondence between the two. The relation between them is the same as that between the soul and the body. Words serve as the symbolic representation of the mental ideas with which they are inseparably connected. Bhartṛhari does not evidently make any distinction between knowledge and word. To him they are only different in form but not in

[1] तैजसमन्तःकरणमपि चक्षुरादिद्वारा निर्गत्य घटादिविषयदेशं गत्वा घटादिविषयाकारेण परिणमते—Vedāntaparibhāṣā (Pratyakṣa-pariccheda).

essence.[1] He goes on to say without any reservation that knowledge is translated into word. Words that we speak come out as an embodiment of thought. What actually happens during the process of transformation is that ideas, crude and imperfect in their purely intellectual form, become vivid and precisely complete in structure when they are expressed through words. The internal knowledge, holds Bhartṛhari, remaining within as a subtle element of speech, assumes the concrete form of words when necessity arises for the purpose of revealing its own identity.[2] It is said further that thought that rises in the mind is developed and materialised by fire (*tejas*) and is next driven out by the force of outflowing current of air.[3] The ideas of the speaker, he says elsewhere, find their audible expression in words that stand as their phonetic symbols capable of arousing those ideas precisely in the listener.[4] This association connecting the subjective world of thought with the

1 एकस्यैवात्मनो भेदौ शब्दार्थावपृथक् स्थितौ।

Vākyapadīya, 2. 31.

2 अथेदमान्तरं ज्ञानं सूक्ष्मवागात्मना स्थितम्।
व्यक्तये स्वस्य रूपस्य शब्दत्वेन निवर्त्तते॥—*op. cit.*, 1. 113.

3 स मनोभावमापद्य तेजसा पाकमागतः।
वायुमाविशति प्राणमथासौ समुदीर्य्यते॥—*op. cit.*, 1. 114.

4 ज्ञानं प्रयोक्तुर्बाह्योऽर्थः स्वरूपं च प्रतीयते—*op. cit.*, 3. 2.

corresponding objective world of matter bespeaks the natural relation that exists between thought and language.[1]

The evolution of sound proved in itself so complicated a problem as to give rise to various interpretations in the different schools of Indian thought. The views already dealt with in the previous pages do not comprehend all that the Hindu teachers have said on the subject in question. Bhartṛhari, for instance, has shown the possibility of approaching the problem from other directions as well. Reference is made to a theory which tends to make the world full of sounds (*vāṅmaya*).[2] The commentator Puṇyarāja has brought out the full import of this theory in the following way: there are, like fine ethereal fluids, subtle elements of sound, incomprehensible for their extreme fineness, lying inside and outside all material bodies.[3] This type of sound, identified by some with the all-pervading space, is manifested by its own self and comes to our comprehension only when

[1] अतएव सम्बन्धः समवस्थित इत्याह। स्वभावत एव निरूढो न तु पुरुषेण निवेशित इत्यर्थः—Helārāja unde. Vākya. 3. 2.

[2] अजस्रवृत्तिर्यः शब्दः सूक्ष्मत्वान्नोपलभ्यते।
व्यञ्जनाद्वायुरिव स स्वनिमित्तात् प्रतीयते ॥

Vākyapadīya, 1. 117.

[3] सूक्ष्मो वायुरिव सर्वमूर्तीनामन्तर्बहिश्च ध्वनिरवस्थितः। स एव कैश्चिदाकाश इति पठ्यते।

it reaches the auditory organs. We would conclude this chapter by just referring to another analogous theory. According to this theory, which corresponds in its main features with those we have already stated, word possesses a twofold activity originating as it does from the vital breath (*prāṇa*) and intellect (*buddhi*).[1] Being thus manifested or brought into being by the combination of two forces, words naturally turn out so powerful as to express the intended sense.[2]

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[1] तस्य प्राणे च या शक्ति र्या च बुद्धौ व्यवस्थिता।
विवर्त्तमाना स्थानेषु सैषा भेदं प्रपद्यते ॥

Vākyapadīya, 1. 118.

[2] द्वाभ्यां प्राणबुद्धिशक्तिभ्यामभिव्यक्तोऽर्थं प्रत्याययति—Puṇyarāja.

CHAPTER V

SENTENCE

Sentence as the significant unit of language—logical proposition and the method of deriving verbal cognition—words used with the implication of a sentence—the Vedic *mantras* and their rigid composition—the views of the *padavādins* and *vākyavādins*—definition and structure of sentence—*vākya* as *khaṇḍa* and *akhaṇḍa*—the meaning or import of a sentence—*pratibhā* as the denotation of a sentence—Aristotle's division of sentence.

The task we have set before us in writing these pages is not so much to discuss in detail the philosophical issues connected with the phenomenon of speech as to present the linguistic dissertations of the Hindu thinkers in a more or less critical way. But for obvious reasons the subject we have got to deal with has been one that inspired minute examination and voluminous discussions in almost every school of Indian philosophy. The non-eternality of sound, for instance, which provided the starting point for many a discussion in Logic, is a problem that is more philosophical than linguistic. The evolution of sound, as we have just seen, is decidedly a psycho-physiological question directly concerned with the internal region of the body ; and it was, therefore, impossible to prevent the subject from taking a philosophical turn, specially at the hands of those who were traditionally fond of indulging

in subtle deliberations. The philosophical side of the present topic has been discussed in my *Philosophy of Sanskrit Grammar* and it now remains to show the linguistic aspect of the problem.

The foregoing discussions have brought us to an almost decisive point from which language may be viewed as a product of the mind—a spontaneous overflow of the human mind. Taking a wider view of the fact, both historical and physical, one may describe language, in consonance with Humboldt's observation, as *the expression of national thought.* Expression of thought is the sole purpose that is served by the use of language. Ideas are, again, completely and best expressed through the medium of sentences as such and not by means of individual words. Distinct as it is from the elements that go to constitute it, a sentence is rightly called the unit of significant speech.

An idea in its mental or elementary stage remains crude and indefinite so long as it is not capable of being expressed in the usual form of a sentence. 'Thought in language' will, therefore, mean that a man does not really think in isolated words but in a coherent combination of words, in order to give both consistency and relevancy to his very mode of thinking. This is an important linguistic fact to which the Naiyāyikas have drawn our careful attention

in the course of delineating the nature of logical propositions. A logical proposition, as we know, is, to all appearance, a sentence—a combination of words (mostly subject and predicate) connected together by a mutual relation. Jagadīśa is, therefore, of opinion that the so-called verbal cognition (*śābda-bodha*) is derivable only from a sentence, that is to say, when a number of significant words (*sārthaka*) having expectancy (*ākāṅkṣā*) and compatibility (*yogyatā*) with one another is related in such a way as to constitute a sentence in the logical sense of the term.[1] A logical proposition is thus an idea or judgment expressed in the form of a sentence. But we must be careful to remember one thing in this connexion. Since it usually follows from the sentence as a whole, the meaning of a sentence is distinguished from that of its constituent parts. Jagadīśa has particularly noticed that *śābda-bodha* is not materially the same as *śabdārtha* or the meaning of an isolated word. The meaning of a sentence is something more than the mere sum-total of the significations of its component parts.[2]

It cannot, however, be denied that there are instances in which a single word is found to

1 वाक्यभावमवाप्तस्य सार्थकस्यावबोधतः ।
सम्पद्यते शाब्दबोधो न तन्मात्रस्य बोधतः ॥
Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā, 12.

2 विलक्षणो बोधः—*loc. cit.*

be as much expressive of an idea as a sentence would be. We need not go far for an illustration. Failing to imitate and recall the whole sentence they hear from their parents, children often pick up from a sentence a word suitable for their utterance and use it occasionally with the full implication of a sentence. It is quite obvious that in such cases the individual word is used as if it were retaining in itself the entire meaning of a sentence the import whereof is always determined by usual inference. Each individual word, significant as we call it, is thus an epitome of the sentence of which it forms an integral part in the ordinary course of speaking. This will be sufficiently clear if we look at the derivative meanings of a number of words. Those who are not prepared to reject the whole system of etymological interpretation as misleading and far from the truth will find in most of the Sanskrit words the precise meaning of a sentence. Words like *pādapa* (tree) and *deva* (god), to mention only a few, stand respectively for such sentences as *one that drinks through the legs* and *one who shines*.

In his comment on the Yoga-sūtra, III. 17, Vyāsa has stated in unequivocal terms that all words contain in themselves the force of a sentence.[1] A word, when used individually, is

1 सर्वपदेषु चास्ति वाक्यशक्तिः वृक्ष इत्युक्ते अस्तीति गम्यते ।

Vyāsa-bhāṣya.

intended to convey the entire import of a sentence. To Vyāsa a word has no existence apart from a sentence. When the word *vṛkṣaḥ* alone, for instance, is uttered, we should necessarily contemplate a word like *asti* meaning 'existence' so as to get a complete sentence, *viz.*, *there is a tree.* He observes further that there is no object in this world to which *existence* as an attribute cannot be predicated.[1] The grammarians have also adopted the same principle. As a rule, they are found to supply such verbs as *asti* and *bhavati* when the idea of the sentence seems to be otherwise incomplete. The drift of the whole discussion is to show that a word is not expressive of sense by itself, the real expressiveness being associated with the sentence. But we find that a word is often used as a significant part of speech from the consideration that it represents a sentence in a shortened form. Both Patañjali and Vyāsa seem to have been aware of the fact that certain words are so constituted as to retain in their very formation the entire meaning of the sentence. How a word sometimes stands as an abbreviation of a sentence, or, how a word is actually created with the full import of a sentence, is best illustrated by the word *śrotriya* which is only a condensed form of the sentence *chando'dhīte* (one who reads the Vedas).[2]

1 न हि सत्तां पदार्थो व्यभिचरतीति ।—*loc. cit.*

2 दृष्टं च वाक्यार्थे पदरचनं श्रोत्रियश्छन्दोऽधीते ।—*loc. cit.*

Words of this character are numerous in the Sanskrit language.

In dealing with the sentence as a vehicle of thought, we are compelled to refer again to the history of the origin of language. It is sentences that show the beginning as well as the essential features of a language. As an embodiment of thought, language has come to us in the shape of sentences and not in that of detached words. When we think of an object, our ideas, if expressed in terms of language, will invariably assume the form of a sentence, showing either agreement or disagreement between two or more concepts. Sentences are, therefore, regarded as the best medium of expression. Moreover, the rigid and unalterable form in which the vast structure of the Vedic *mantras* has been transmitted to us through ages will go to justify the philological dictum that 'language started with sentences and not with individual words.' Whether they were actually created by the *ṛṣis* or simply revealed through their instrumentality, the *mantras* have come down to us in the shape of sentences with their traditional rigidity of composition. If they represent, as is claimed, the specimen of first human utterances, we must be bold enough to say that primitive men used to speak (in sentences) just in the same way as we now do.

What will, however, first strike a scholar in his enquiry into the linguistic structure of the *mantras* is the immutable character of their composition. In the *mantras* we meet with a fixed combination of words (*niyata-vācoyukti*) marked by a definite syntactical order (*niyatānupūrvya*) which is so rigid and unrelaxable as not to allow any alteration whatsoever.[1] So far as the Vedic language (*chandas*) is concerned, one is not permitted to use synonyms, *i. e.*, to change *agna āyāhi vītaye* into *vibhāvaso āgaccha pānāya*, though the meaning is not at all affected by this kind of formal alteration or mere substitution of synonymous words. Again, a reversion of the syntactical order is not allowed and consequently one cannot change *agna āyāhi* into *āyāhyagne* by altering the position of the verb, as we often do in a spoken language. This fixity with regard to both form and order is undoubtedly a unique feature of the Vedic language. But we should not forget at the same time that a strict principle or injunction of this description was also necessary to keep the *mantras* free from all linguistic distortions and corruptions that generally creep into our spoken tongue. The rationalist school with which this kind of rigidity was both unjustifiable and intolerable made it a

1 नियतवाचोयुक्तयो नियतानुपूर्व्या भवन्ति ।—Nirukta, I. 15.

strong ground for attacking the unimpeachable authority of the Vedas. On account of this and other reasons recorded by Yāska, a teacher of antiquity declared the *mantras* as meaningless.[1] And the orthodox school which used to derive all their religious and spiritual inspiration from the Vedas has had to experience a great difficulty in defending its own position in the face of such opposition shaking the very foundation of its faith.

We should now try to find out the reason that compelled the ancient *seers* to observe so much rigidity in respect of the textual arrangement of the *mantras*. It is true that this unchangeability of form had been of supreme importance in differentiating the *chandas* from the *bhāṣā* or current speech in which such hard and fast rules are not strictly followed. This principle may, therefore, be regarded as a logical criterion for distinguishing the two well-marked types of Sanskrit language. The Vedas, according to the orthodox interpretation, are considered to be eternal and not as a product of human activity. All that is human is changeable. Particular stress is, therefore, laid on the unchangeable character of the Vedic composition, because both eternality as well as the non-human origin of the *mantras*

[1] यदि मन्त्रार्थप्रत्ययायानर्थकं भवतीति कौत्सोऽनर्थका हि मन्त्राः ।

Nirukta, I. 15.

finally rests upon such rigid construction that knows no change through long years of its existence.

In the Vedas we naturally meet with consolidated sentences, *i.e.*, sentences which are supposed to have been originally undivided into parts. The *Taittirīya-Saṃhitā* bears clear testimony to this primitive stage of language.[1] It is the whole sentence, complete in its particular form, that constitutes the Vedas proper and not any detached portions thereof. The grammatical method of analysis, we must remember, is a later development in the history of language. This view is strengthened by the definition of *saṃhitā* or euphonic combination of letters, as we find in the *Ṛk-Prātiśākhya*.[2] It is said that the *saṃhitā* or close combination of letters, as *agnimīle*, is what represents the original form and the practice of breaking it up, *i. e.*, into *agnim* and *īle*, shows only a grammatical process followed in a much later period. The dictum *padaprakṛtiḥ saṃhitā* gave rise to a considerable controversy, particularly with regard to the interpretation of the compound *padaprakṛtiḥ*. The *padavādins* (Mīmāṃsakas) and the *vākya-vādins* (grammarians) have construed it in

1 वाग्वै पराच्यव्याकृता—Tait. Saṃ., VI. 4. 7.

2 पदप्रकृतिः संहिता—Ṛk Prātiśākhya, II. i.

different ways to suit their respective standpoints. The *padavādins*, with whom the *padas* are real and significant and the sentence is only a combination of such *padas* (inflected words), are in favour of expounding this compound in such a way as to prove the priority or originality (*prakṛtitva*) of the *padas* (*padāni prakṛtir yasyāḥ*). The *vākyavādins*, who take, on the other hand, the sentence or, more properly, *vākya-sphoṭa*, as the only significant unit of speech, are not likely to recognise the precedence or priority of the *padas* in preference to that of the sentence and they have consequently construed it as *padānāṃ yā prakṛtiḥ seyaṃ padaprakṛtiḥ*. Now we see that it is really difficult to say which of these two conflicting views is in accordance with the actual state of things. Philologists will undoubtedly give their verdict in favour of the *vākyavādins* for reasons we have already stated. What the commentator Durga has said on this controversial point deserves our best attention.[1] It is emphatically stated that the *mantras*, revealed as they were through the holy *seers* of antiquity, manifested themselves in the compact form of

1 संहितायाः प्रकृतित्वं न्यायः। मन्त्रो ह्यभिव्यज्यमानः पूर्वैमृषिभिर्मन्त्रदृशः संहितयैवाभिव्यज्यते न पदैः। अतश्च संहितामेव पूर्वमध्यापयन्त्यनूचाना ब्राह्मणा अधीयते चाध्येतारः। अपि च याज्ञे कर्मणि संहितयैव विनियुज्यन्ते मन्त्रा न पदैः।

Durgācāryya on Nirukta, 1. 17.

the *saṃhitā* or combination and not in that of isolated words. The teacher, Durga argues further, makes the student acquainted with the Vedas first in their *saṃhitā* form before he is allowed to proceed in his study on a grammatical line. Moreover, at the time of performing the Vedic rites, the *mantras* are cited by the priest in the same consolidated form.

Turning to the views held by the grammarian (*sphoṭavādin*) we find that much importance has been attached to *Vākya-sphoṭa* on account of its being the really significant element of speech. We consider it necessary to point out here for the sake of avoiding confusion that the *sphoṭavādins* and the *vākyavādins* do not represent two different schools of thought but they are practically one and the same (*i. e.*, grammarians), insisting on the indivisibility of the sentence with a marvellous tenacity. Of the eight different varieties of *sphoṭa*, says the author of the *Śabdakaustubha*, it is the *vākya-sphoṭa* alone that is accepted by the grammarian as *real* and *significant*.[1] To the *sphoṭavādins* the sentence is an indivisible unit (*akhaṇḍa*), and the analytical method adopted by the grammarian in breaking up a sentence into parts is but an artificial device useful for

[1] यद्यपीहाष्टौ पक्षा उक्तास्तथापि वाक्यस्फोटपक्षे तात्पर्यं ग्रन्थकृताम् ।

the understanding of unintelligent people.[1] Bhartṛhari was not, however, the first to take such an uncompromising view of the sentence. It is definitely stated by Puṇyarāja that the indivisible character of the sentence, so vigorously defended by later grammarians in the face of strong opposition raised by the *padavādins*, has been quite in keeping with the views of both Pāṇini and Patañjali.[2] That this view received the approval of Patañjali is sufficiently clear from the statement of the Mahābhāṣya itself.[3] The word *padakāra* (one who makes *padas* or inflected words), as it occurs in the well-known passage, is really significant, since it evidently shows by the very formation of the term (*padakāra*) that *padas* are created and as such they cannot be real. What the grammarians tried to establish with all their force of arguments and logic is to conspicuously bring out the reality of the sentence—a

[1] उपायाः शिक्षमाणानां बालानामपलापनाः। असत्ये वर्त्मनि स्थित्वा ततः सत्यं समीहते ॥—Vākyapadīya, 2.240.

तस्मान्मन्यामहे पदान्यसत्यानि, एकमभिन्नस्वभावकं वाक्यम्। तदबुधबोधनाय पदविभागः काल्पतः।—Puṇyarāja under Vākya., 2.57.

[2] एवं सूत्रकारस्य भाष्यकारस्य चाखण्डपक्षोऽभिरुचितः—Puṇyarāja under Vākya., 2. 37.

[3] न लक्षणेन पदकारा अनुवर्त्त्याः—

Mahābhāṣya under Pāṇ., 6.1.207.

fact which constituted in itself a strong ground against the reality of *padas*.[1]

Further light has been thrown upon the question of reality and unreality by the philosopher-grammarian Bhartṛhari. Gifted with a true *Vedāntic* insight, Bhartṛhari, an accredited exponent of the philosophy of Sanskrit grammar, has tried to explain all diversities of linguistic forms, grammatical analysis and nomenclature as the product of mere imagination or unreal work of human creation. He has, moreover, made use of such technical *Vedāntic* terms, as *upādhi* (quality) and *adhyāsa* (illusion), to explain this sort of grammatical device, namely, cognition of the diversity of words in the unity of a sentence.[2] How *avidyā* or negation of reality has been studiously resorted to by all departments of study in their respective manners of representing facts is a point which Bhartṛhari has sought to impress on us more than once.[3] He had to rise to the height of the *Vedānta* standpoint to voice the eternal truth, preached by the *seers* of the Upaniṣads, *viz*., that it is the indivisible (*akhaṇḍa*)

[1] पदान्यसत्यानि वाक्यमेव सत्यमित्यर्थः।

Puṇyarāja under Vākya., 1.74.

[2] उपाधिभेदेनैव शब्दस्य भेदप्रतिभासो न स्वतो नित्यत्वात्।

Puṇyarāja under Vākya., 2.22.

अभिन्नत्वमध्यासरूपत्वमागतः शब्दः—Puṇyarāja under Vākya., 2.129.

[3] शास्त्रेषु प्रक्रियाभेदैरविद्यैवोपवर्ण्यते।—Vākyapadīya, 2. 234.

which is real (*satya*), and it is the divisible (into parts) (*khaṇḍa*) which is just the opposite (*asatya*). True it is that the grammarians started with a rather fanciful procedure in their analysis of sentences and words, but one can hardly deny that they succeeded in reaching the supreme *truth*, though walking along the bewildering track of illusion and unreality.[1] It is thus said: as letters like *ka*, *kha*, etc., do not admit of further division into parts, so there are no parts in a word; and words, again, have no existence apart from the sentence.[2] Again, just as we have recourse to an unreal thing like the practice of analysing a word into *prakṛti* (stem) and *pratyaya* (formative elements), so we disjoin the words from the sentence in pursuance of the principle of *apoddhāra* (disintegration).[3] Though it does not correspond to reality, this principle, we should remember, has been of great help to the grammarian for the purpose of grasping the meaning of a sentence. To make it perfectly clear that a sentence is an indivisible whole and not made up of any parts, a clear line of demarcation was necessarily drawn

1 असत्ये वर्त्मनि स्थित्वा ततः सत्यं समीहते—*op. cit.*

2 पदे न वर्णा विद्यन्ते वर्णेष्ववयवा इव ।

वाक्यात् पदानामत्यन्तं प्रविवेको न कश्चन ॥—*op. cit.*, 1.73.

3 यथा पदे विभज्यन्ते प्रकृतिप्रत्ययादयः ।

अपोद्धारस्तथा वाक्ये पदानामुपवर्ण्यते ॥—*op. cit.*, 2.10.

between the sentence and its so-called constituents (*padas*) or, in other words, between what is real and what is unreal. We should not, however, lose sight of the fact that this *reality* may be explained in a much simpler way. To a student of language a sentence is real and is distinguished from its unreal parts for the simple reason that it represents the form in which one generally speaks in order to give popular expression to one's ideas. But words when isolated from a sentence always fail to convey the intended sense.

It is further stated that the sense conveyed by a sentence is also indivisible.[1] Just as a word (*śabda-sphoṭa*) or a sentence does not really consist of any parts, so the meaning denoted by it does not admit of any division.[2] Both the form of, and the object denoted by, a word conform to the same principle. Indivisibility is thus a peculiar characteristic that equally applies to both the sentence and its meaning. Truly speaking, no difference of sense, as is denoted by each individual word, is discernible when we have before us the meaning of a sentence as a complete unit of thought.

The examples cited by Bhartṛhari to show

[1] वाक्यार्थस्यापि तथैव निर्विभागत्वं प्रतिपादयितुमाह ।—Puṇyarāja.

[2] शब्दस्य न विभागोऽस्ति कुतोऽर्थस्य भविष्यति ।
विभागैः प्रक्रियाभेदमविद्वान् प्रतिपद्यते ॥—Vākyapadīya, 2.13.

that the signification lies with the sentence taken as a complete whole and not with its individual parts will go to set aside the view of the *padavādins* who regard, on the contrary, *padas* (inflected words) as the significant parts of a sentence and interpret the sense of a sentence as the composite or united meaning of the *padas* that go to constitute it. What is particularly emphasised by the *vākyavādins* in this connection is that words which seem to enter into the composition of a sentence do not retain their separate identity either in their formal or material aspect. The meaning of each individual word is found to lose itself almost entirely in the sense that is finally expressed by the sentence in its harmonious unity. Accordingly, the word *brāhmaṇa* has no separate meaning of its own in the expression *brāhmaṇa-kambalam* (a blanket for a Brahmin), since it has been united with the word *kambala* in such a way that it seems to have no meaning apart from that of the whole combination of words.[1]

In accordance with the doctrine of *indivisibility*, as set forth above, the meaning expressed by a sentence is *pratibhā* or intuition which is innate or ingrained in us all.[2] The word

[1] ब्राह्मणार्थो यथा नास्ति कश्चिद्ब्राह्मणकम्बले ।
देवदत्तादयो वाक्ये तथैव स्युरनर्थकाः ॥—Vākyapadīya, 2.14.

[2] तत्राखण्डपक्षे प्रतिभा वाक्यार्थः ।—Puṇyarāja under Vākya., 2.1.

pratibhā has more than one signification in our literature.[1] In the absence of any exact equivalent in English that would precisely bring out the Indian conception of *pratibhā*, we think it better to use such words as intuition or supersensual intelligence in accordance with Western philosophy. We are not concerned here with the manifold aspect in which the problem presented itself to different schools of Indian thought, but we simply propose to confine ourselves to the grammatical interpretation of the question, specially as given by Bhartṛhari.

To the grammarian *pratibhā* is inborn intelligence ; it is innate and not *post-natal*. *Pratibhā* is neither an acquisition that is sense-born nor does it result from common experience. It is called *saṃskāra* or *bhāvanā*, firmly seated in our mind and linked together with the continuous currents of knowledge flowing from previous stages of existence. Here we find the justification why *pratibhā* is sometimes denominated as *pūrva-vāsanā* (knowledge drawn from prior births). The mind has, truly says Kālidāsa, the power of recalling the deep-rooted

[1] For detailed information on the subject, see the learned paper—'The Doctrine of *Pratibhā* in Indian Philosophy' (Annals of the Bhandarkar Research Institute)—Pandit Gopīnāth Kavirāj.

impressions of previous births.[1] The grammarian finds it, therefore, difficult to explain the real nature of *pratibhā* without referring to the theory of previous existence. Our life, to speak the truth, is a great continuum in the long series of births and rebirths. It is a process, unbroken in its run, which is made by Hindu philosophers a strong argument to establish the *immortality* of the soul.

In the first place, what a sentence really signifies is the sense abiding in intelligence (*bauddhārthasya vācyatvam*). Words may have different meanings when they are individually apprehended, but the moment they are united together in the form of a sentence we have a single sense which is distinct from *padārthas* or the meanings of isolated words. This kind of sense derived from the sentence as a whole is called *pratibhā*.[2] *Padārthas*, says Puṇyarāja, though unreal in themselves, largely help in the manifestation of *pratibhā*.[3] One will find here a curious process as to how truth is revealed

[1] मनो हि जन्मान्तरसङ्गतिज्ञम्—

and तच्चेतसा स्मरति नूनमबोधपूर्वं

भावस्थिराणि जननान्तरसौहृदानि ॥—Sakuntalā, V. 2.

[2] विच्छेदग्रहणेऽर्थानां प्रतिभाऽन्यैव जायते ।

वाक्यार्थ इति तामाहुः पदार्थैरुपपादिताम् ॥—Vākyapadīya, 2.145.

[3] पदैरसत्यैरेवोपाधिभूतैरुपपादितामभिव्यक्तामिति ।

Puṇyarāja under Vākya., 2. 145.

through the veil of appearance or nescience. Regarding the function of *pratibhā* in so far as the comprehension of sense is concerned, Bhartṛhari goes to say that the immediate operation of *pratibhā* is to bring about an association of the meanings which seem to have been otherwise unconnected (*asaṃsṛṣṭa*). It is the objective (*viṣaya*) that is directly denoted by a sentence.[1]

This flash of divine light (*pratibhā*) is directly manifested by the use of words or by the ever-blossoming intellect originating from the experience or memory of by-gone lives.[2] *Pratibhā* is the source of all popular usages, and serves as the most reliable evidence determining the ultimate reason for one's particular inclination (*pravṛtti*).[3] With Kālidāsa it is definitely the function of the mind (*antaḥkaraṇa-vṛtti*) that works as a strong guiding principle (*pramāṇa*) when one finds himself in the midst of doubts for ascertaining the right course to be followed.[4] This is not only true of human beings alone but all creatures seem to be

[1] उपश्लेषमिवार्थानां सा करोत्यविचारिता।
सार्वरूप्यमिवापन्ना विषयत्वेन वर्त्तते ॥—Vākyapadīya, 2.147.

[2] साक्षाच्छब्देन जनितां भावनानुगमेन वा।
इतिकर्त्तव्यतायां तां न कश्चिदतिवर्त्तते ॥—*op. cit.*, 2.148.

[3] प्रमाणत्वेन तां लोकः सर्वः समनुपश्यति।—*op. cit.*, 2.149.

[4] सतां हि सन्देहपदेषु वस्तुषु प्रमाणमन्तःकरणप्रवृत्तयः।—Sakuntalā, I.19.

endowed with this faculty or power of discretion from their very birth.[1] As soon as it comes out of the egg, a swan, for instance, shows a natural tendency for swimming, a newly-born child for sucking the breast of its mother, and a monkey for clutching the branch of a tree and so on. The existence of *pratibhā* is thus of a self-certifying character—a reality which we can hardly disbelieve. It dawns upon a being as an intellectual heritage by the force of *abhyāsa* (practice) experienced in the long chain of previous cycles of births.[2]

Bhartṛhari has made mention of a well-chosen pair of examples in order to justify the existence of this natural but intellectual faculty which is not at all dependent either on experience or training. What, he asks, makes the cuckoo pour its rapturous music on the advent of spring ? What is there that teaches the bird the art of preparing its nests in that simple but skilful way ?[3] It is not all. Their simple mode of dancing, jumping, amusement, jealousy and the very manner of their collecting food are all found to be inborn with them.[4] The answer

[1] समारम्भाः प्रतीयन्ते तिरश्चामपि तद्वशात् ।—Vākyapadīya, 2.149.

[2] जन्मान्तराभ्यासहेतुकेयम् ।—Puṇyarāja.

[3] स्वरवृत्तिं विकुरुते मधौ पुंस्कोकिलस्य कः ।
जन्त्वादयः कुलायादिकरणे केन शिक्षिताः ॥—Vākyapadīya, 2.151.

[4] आहारप्रीत्यभिद्वेषप्लवनादिक्रियासु कः ।
जात्यन्वयप्रसिद्धासु प्रयोक्ता मृगपक्षिणाम् ॥—*op. cit.*, 2.152.

to the above queries is that *pratibhā* lies at the root of all such untutored activities shown by all animals from their very birth. *Pratibhā*, therefore, practically comes to be the same as *nature*. Bhartṛhari has finally concluded his thoughtful discourse on *pratibhā* by stating in plain terms that the use of words rouses this innate intelligence.[1] He also speaks of six different kinds of *pratibhā* as rising from nature, exercise, repeated practice, concentration of the mind, actions done in prior lives and special efficiency or aptitude.[2]

We are confronted by considerable difficulty in defining what precisely a sentence is. Let us first consider the constitution of a sentence from the logical standpoint. It is not a mere collection of words, as Jagadīśa rightly points out, that goes to constitute a sentence, but the words composing a sentence should be such as are related to one another by mutual *proximity*, *expectancy* and *competency* in order to convey the intended sense. These three characteristics are, therefore, regarded as the indispensable conditions of a sentence. *Proximity* should be

[1] प्रतिभायाश्च शब्द एव मूलमित्याह—Puṇyarāja.

भावनानुगतादेतदागमादेव जायते ।

आसत्तिविप्रकर्षाभ्यामागमस्तु विशिष्यते ॥—Vākyapadīya, 2.53.

[2] स्वभावचरणाभ्यासयोगादृष्टोपपादिता ।

विशिष्टोपहिता चेति प्रतिभां षड्विधां विदुः ॥—*op. cit.*, 2.54.

understood as pertaining to the formal closeness of words, and it has very little to do with the meaning, whereas *expectancy* and *competency* absolutely refer to the logical aspect, *i.e.*, consistent correlation of the meaning.[1] *Āsatti* implies extreme proximity of words without which the very idea of combination becomes impossible. Words that are not uttered in quick succession but at long intervals of time cannot have that inter-relation among themselves which is so essential for the construction of a sentence. But even in the case of close proximity a combination of words which are not mutually expectant, will naturally fail to give a coherent idea. We cannot, for instance, get any consistent idea from such a group of unconnected words as *gauraśvaḥ puruṣo hastī*. *Yogyatā* (compatibility) demands that words entering into the composition of a sentence should have competency for correlation of their meanings. The expression *vahninā siñcati* does not make a sentence, because the idea of sprinkling is not strictly compatible with the instrumentality of fire.

Thus, we come to see that a mere combination, *i.e.*, an inconsistent group of words,

[1] अयमर्थोऽर्थान्तरसाकाङ्क्ष इति व्यवहारात् ।—Laghumañjūṣā, p. 497.
पदं साकाङ्क्षमिति तु साकाङ्क्षार्थबोधकमित्यर्थम्—*op. cit.*, p. 503.
अर्थनिष्ठा योग्यता—*op. cit.*

whether *subanta* or *tiṅanta*, is not competent enough to make a sentence.[1] This is why Jagadīśa had to reject the definition of sentence, as suggested by the lexicographer Amarasiṃha, because it is over-wide as well as over-narrow or, to use the language of the Naiyāyikas, open to the fallacies of *ativyāpti* and *avyāpti*. There is, however, some peculiarity in the logical conception of a sentence. Sometimes a single inflected word (*pada*) is considered to be as good as a sentence. To the Naiyāyikas the form *ghaṭam* is nothing short of a sentence denoting as it does *karmatva* pertaining to a pot (*ghaṭa-vṛtti-karmatva*). According to this view, the entire expression *ghaṭam karoti* (he is making a pot) should necessarily be regarded as a *mahāvākya* or a compound sentence.

According to the Mīmāṃsakas, a sentence is a combination of words with *oneness* of sense.[2] The *oneness of sense* on which much stress is laid implies that a sentence in its synthetical form gives rise to one single idea, though on analysis it is found to be made up of words that are mutually expectant.[3] A

[1] सुप्तिङन्तचयो नैवमतिव्याप्त्यादिदोषतः ।—Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā, 13.

[2] अर्थैकत्वादेकं वाक्यं साकाङ्क्षं चेद्विभागे स्यात्—Mīm. sūtra, 2.1.46 ; and एकार्थः पदसमूहो वाक्यम्—Śabara-bhāṣya under the above sūtra.

[3] साकाङ्क्षावयवं भेदे परानाकाङ्क्षशब्दकम् ।
कर्मप्रधानं गुणवदेकार्थं वाक्यमिष्यते ॥—Vākyapadīya, 2.4.

combination of words, though capable of being split up into many significant parts, is considered by the Mīmāṃsakas as a single sentence, provided it is found to express only one connected idea. There is not only a combination in respect of the formal side, but the meanings too are related to one another in such a way as to produce *one* coherent idea resulting from the association of the meanings. The dictum that a sentence signifies either *difference* or *association* does not render the *oneness* of the meaning inconsistent, because a sentence as a whole is generally used for the purpose of denoting an idea that is complete in itself.[1] It is the verbal form (*krīyāpada*) in a sentence to which the greatest amount of importance has been assigned by the Mīmāṃsakas. In accordance with their view, the verb *yajeta*, for instance, is the predominant element in the sentence *svargakāmo yajeta* (one desirous of heaven should perform the sacrifice), inasmuch as the force or object of the whole sentence (attainment of heaven) is particularly determined by the verb. *Apūrva* or unseen result to which the action ultimately leads is said to be denoted by the

[1] भेदः संसर्गो वा वाक्यार्थ इति यदुच्यते ।···एकप्रयोजनत्वादुपपन्नम्—
Śabara on Mīm. sūtra, 2.1.45.

verb and not by any other words in the sentence.[1]

Much divergence of opinion regarding the constitution of the sentence has been recorded by Bhartṛhari in his *Vākyapadīya.* He has not only enumerated as many as eight different theories on this particular subject but has fully dealt with them in the light of philosophical interpretation.[2] Of these the first one is of considerable importance from the standpoint of linguistic studies.[3] It is held that a verbal form (*ākhyāta-śabda*) is alone sufficient to constitute a sentence. This will undoubtedly remind one of the *vārttika* which attempts to define a sentence as a *tiṅanta* or verbal form (*ekatiṅ*). The verb *varṣati* (pouring water), for instance, may be used with the same signification as is usually expressed by the complete sentence *varṣati devo*

1 …तस्मात्तेभ्यः प्रतीयेताश्रितत्वात् प्रयोगस्य—Mīm. sūtra, 2.1.4.
अपूर्वस्याख्यातपदप्रतिपाद्यत्वम्—Śabara-bhāṣya ; and
भावशब्दा एवापूर्वस्य चोदकाः—*loc. cit.*

2 आख्यातशब्दः सङ्घातो जातिः सङ्घातवर्त्तिनी ।
एकोऽनवयवः शब्दः क्रमो बुद्ध्यनुसंहृतिः ॥
पदमाद्यं पृथक् सर्वपदं साकाङ्क्षमित्यपि ।
प्रति मतिभिन्ना बहुधा न्यायवादिनाम् ॥—
Vākyapadīya, 2.1.

3 आख्यातशब्दो वाक्यमिति—
आख्यातशब्दे नियतं साधनं यत्र गम्यते ।
तदप्येकं समाप्तार्थं वाक्यमित्यभिधीयते ॥—*Op. cit.*, 2.327.

jalam (the god is pouring water), both the subject and the object being readily understood from the very association of ideas. According to this view which tends to make a single word as complete and significant as a sentence, the essence of a sentence is necessarily action (*kriyā*).[1] The definition enunciated by the author of the *vārttika* has also laid emphasis on the predominance of the verb.[2] Kātyāyana holds that a verb is efficient enough to constitute a sentence in combination with either an indeclinable, a *kāraka*, an adjective, or an adverb, as the case may be. *Uccaiḥ paṭhati* (he reads loudly) may be cited as an example of a sentence consisting of a verb and an indeclinable; and similarly, *odanam pacati* (he cooks rice) is a sentence which shows the combination of a verb and a *kāraka* and so on. In all such instances we find that the verb plays the most dominant part, and it is, therefore, rightly called the very life of a sentence. Those who look upon indeclinables, cases (*kāraka*) and adverbs as virtually the same as qualifying adjuncts in relation to the verb are likely to reduce the above definition to a much

[1] आख्यातशब्दो वाक्यमित्यस्मिन् पक्षे क्रिया वाक्यार्थः—

Puṇyarāja under Vākya., 2.1.

[2] आख्यातं साव्ययकारकविशेषणं वाक्यम्—

Vārttika 9 under Pāṇ., 2.1.1.

simpler form, *i.e.*, a verb with its possible attributes is competent enough to make a sentence.[1] The next *vārttika* is practically the same as we have already referred to, that is to say, a *tiṅanta* or a verbal form should be considered as good as a sentence.[2] The assumption to which these two *vārttikas* lead is that a sentence should contain one and only one verb. But when there is more than one verb in a sentence, as in *pūrvam snāti pacati tato vrajati* (he first takes his bath, then cooks and then walks), we find it difficult to determine whether it is a single sentence or a number of sentences put together.[3] Following the second *vārttika* one will detect here positively three sentences as constituted by three different verbs. But contrary runs the decision of the *sūtrakāra*. The whole expression, it is held, should be treated here as a single sentence notwithstanding many verbs, because *vrajati* is the main verb with which the sense is completed and the rest are only subordinate to it or capable of being interpreted as qualifying attributes of the

[1] अपर आह। आख्यातं सविशेषणमित्येव। सर्वाणि ह्येतानि क्रियाविशेषणानि—Mahābhāṣya under Vār., 9.

[2] एकतिङ्—Vār., 10.

[3] यथानेकमपि क्त्वान्तं तिङन्तस्य विशेषकम्।
तथा तिङन्तं तत्राहुस्तिङन्तस्य विशेषकम्॥—Vākyapadīya, 2.6.

same.[1] There is no denying the fact that all these verbs are not of equal importance. In this particular instance *vrajati* indicates the action (movement) which is desired by the agent as his main object in view and *bathing* and *cooking* are only subservient to it.

There are others who have sought to find in an inflected word (*pada*) the full import of a sentence. It is not only the verbal form that receives the designation of *sentence* under circumstances stated above, but an inflected word is also found capable of being treated as such, provided it is one that retains in itself the *action* usually denoted by a verbal root.[2] We cannot deny that there are sentences in which some words seem to be so prominent by their very nature as to denote the entire meaning by themselves without the help of others. The meaning of the sentence—*gāyako gāyati* (the singer is singing)—may well be denoted by the single word *gāyakaḥ* the verbal form *gāyati* being unnecessary. It is only in such cases that a single inflected word is found to stand for the whole sentence, even independently of the verbal form. But one cannot strictly dispense with the action (*vyāpāra*) so

[1] नास्त्यत्र वाक्यभेदः, व्रजतीत्येतत् प्राधान्येनैकं क्रियापदमत्र स्थितमन्यानि क्रियान्तराणि तद्विशेषणान्येव—Puṇyarāja ; and

बह्वष्वपि तिङन्तेषु साकाङ्क्षेष्वेकवाक्यता ।—Vākẏapadīya, 2. 450.

[2] वाक्यं तदपि मन्यन्ते यत् पदं चरितक्रियम् ।—*op. cit.*, 2.326.

far as the grammatical conception of the sentence is concerned. We should not fail to notice here that a sentence, whether consisting of a single word (either a *nāman* or an *ākhyāta*) or a combination of words, must be, as a rule, indicative of some action, either directly or indirectly. Because a sentence without a verb is almost an impossibility to the Indian grammarian.

The definitions we have brought under discussion will make it perfectly clear that the verb forms the main constituent of a sentence. What the soul is to the body, the verb is to the sentence. It goes almost without saying that a sentence in its grammatical sense cannot be framed without the help of a verb. The Naiyāyikas are not, however, in agreement with the grammarian who insists on the presence of a verb as the first and indispensable condition of a sentence. Jagadīśa maintains that a sentence is a combination of mutually expectant and consistent words, but he does not lay so much stress on the inclusion of the verb. As we shall find later on, Aristotle also does not insist on the existence of the verb, so far as the idea of a sentence is concerned. He goes so far as to say that a sentence 'may dispense even with the verb.'[1] It is not, as a rule, always necessary to have the verb explicitly mentioned, specially

[1] Poetics, XX ; Butcher's ed.; p. 71.

when *kriyā* (action) is easily understood from the very nature of the context. Jagadīśa does not, therefore, find any logic in the dictum of the old grammarians that there can be no sentence without the verb.[1] His contention is based on the popular usage. While a combination of words like *kuto bhavān* (where are you [coming] from ?), which does not contain any verbal form, is also found to be clearly expressive of the sense, it is not strictly correct to say that a sentence without a verb is practically incomprehensible. To the grammarian the above expression will necessarily imply such a verb as *āgacchati* without which neither the sense is complete, nor is the proper *kāraka*, (*i.e.*, *apādāna*) determinable.

We have already said that Bhartṛhari has referred to eight different views on the constitution of a sentence, making an exhaustive and thoroughly critical study of the subject. These views, generally speaking, fall under two distinct categories, namely, *akhaṇḍa-pakṣa* and *khaṇḍa-pakṣa*. The *sphoṭavādins* with whom a sentence is an indivisible unit have necessarily supported the former, and the Mīmāṁsakas and the Naiyāyikas, who consider the sentence as a combination of words, are in favour of the latter.

[1] क्रियारहितं न वाक्यमस्तीति प्राचां प्रवादो निर्युक्तिकत्वादश्रद्धेयः—
under Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā, kār , 13.

We have got to say here a few words on *sphoṭa* and its different aspects in order to follow the line of thinking in which the *sphoṭavādins* have approached the present problem. To a *sphoṭavādin*, we should remember, *sphoṭa* represents the real word (the eternal *Verbum*), sound being only a quality of it.[1] *Sphoṭa*, again, is of two kinds, *viz.*, external and internal.[2] The external *sphoṭa* admits of further division into class and individual.[3] Now, those who maintain the indivisibility of a sentence are likely to take a sentence as forming either a class (*jāti-sphoṭa*) pertaining to a combination (*saṃghātavartinī*), or an individual (*vyakti-sphoṭa*), that is to say, a sentence is one and without any parts (*eko'navayavaḥ*), or an intellectual assimilation (*buddhyanusaṃhṛtiḥ*).[4] These three kinds of definition of. a sentence emanating from the *sphoṭavādins* have been duly noticed and explained by Bhartṛhari. From the standpoint of *sphoṭavāda* a sentence that is expressive of sense is one and not dissolvable into parts (*niraṃśa*) ;[5]

1 स्फोटः शब्दो ध्वनिः शब्दगुणः—Puṇyarāja under Vākya., 2.1.

2 स्फोटस्य द्विविधो बाह्य आभ्यन्तरश्चेति—*loc. cit.*

3 बाह्योऽपि जातिव्यक्तिभेदेन द्विविधः—*loc. cit.*

4 तत्राखण्डपक्षे जातिः सङ्घातवर्त्तिनी, एकोऽनवयवः शब्दो बुद्ध्यनुसंहृतिरिति त्रीणि लक्षण —*loc. cit.*

5 एवं निरंशमेव वाक्यं वाचकमित्येव युक्तम्—
Puṇyarāja under Vākya., 2.12.

it represents either *vyakti-sphoṭa* (individual) or *jātisphoṭa* (class) in so far as the outward manifestation of *sphoṭa* is concerned. The formal difference that is perceptible among these various types of sentences is said to be simply due to *upādhi*, namely, the operation of the vocal organs employed in the production of sound and so on.[1] *Sphoṭa* has also its internal aspect or the vital side in which form it is not at all verbal but purely intellectual. The *intellectual assimilation* as showing the internal form of a sentence means that a sentence, so far as it is related to the internal world of thought, remains essentially intellectual in its origin before it is materialised into audible sound. It is *nāda* or sound, says Bhartṛhari, that turns such intellectually assimilated ideas into concrete expression or a sentence.[2]

In conformity with the interpretation of *khaṇḍa-pakṣa*, a sentence is either a verb, a kind of order or succession, a collection of words, the first inflected word, or inflected words having mutual expectancy with one another. Four out of these five definitions have been more or less considered in the previous pages.

1 यस्तु भेदप्रतिभासः सोऽसावुपाधिकृत एवेत्यर्थः—
Puṇyarāja under Vākya., 2.19.

2 यदन्तः शब्दतत्त्वं तु नादैरेकं प्रकाशितम्।
तदाहुरपरे शब्दं तस्य वाक्ये तथैकता ॥—Vākyapadīya, 2.30.

The definition that still awaits our consideration is the second one of this series, namely, one that tends to make a sentence a particular kind of *krama* (order). The word *krama* generally implies a property of time as *priority* and *posteriority* (*paurvāparya*).[1] But its particular use in grammar is thus explained by Bhartṛhari and Puṇyarāja : every inflected word in a sentence has got some special signification, as that of *karmatva, kartṛtva, etc.*, which comes to our notice in a successive or well-marked order together with similar meanings (*viśeṣa*) denoted by other words.[2] If we decide to bring out the sense of a sentence like *Devadatto grāmaṃ gacchati* (Devadatta is going to the village) in a strictly grammatical method, we are apt to express it in the following way: *the act of moving which has Devadatta as its agent and the village as its object.* Here the idea of *karmatva*, etc., which adds a special feature to the meaning obtained severally from each inflected word, is called *viśeṣa* that becomes comprehensible in a fixed or definite order.[3] This definite order in which the additional

1 क्रमो हि धर्मः कालस्य तेन वाक्यं न विद्यते ।—*op. cit.*, 2.51.

2 सन्त एव विशेषा ये पदार्थेषु व्यवस्थिताः ।
ते क्रमादनुगम्यन्ते न वाक्यमभिधायकम् ॥—*op. cit.*, 2.50.

3 कर्मत्वमित्यादयो विशेषाः सन्त एव पदेभ्यः क्रमेण प्रतीतेभ्योऽवगम्यन्त इति क्रम एव वाक्यम्—Puṇyarāja under Vākya., 2.50.

signification becomes intelligible to us is regarded as the main factor of a sentence or, in other words, as the sentence proper. It is further stated that there can be no sentence made up of words alone, if it happens to be devoid of such an order.[1] According to this view, a sentence is intrinsically a particular order in which words are combined together in such a way as to express the intended sense.[2]

The definitions of sentence that are conformable to the so-called *khaṇḍa-pakṣa* are, again, capable of being divided into two classes on the basis provided by the two well-known schools of the Mīmāṃsā system, namely, *Bhāṭṭa* (Kumārila) and *Guru* (Prabhākara). The doctrine that found favour with Kumārila and his followers is known as *abhihitānvayavāda* and that with Prabhākara as *anvitābhidhāna-vāda*. In accordance with the former view, a sentence should be explained either as a combination of words (*saṃghāta*) or as an order (*krama*), and according to the latter, it is a verbal form (*ākhyāta*), or the first inflected word (*ādyam padam*), or inflected words possessing mutual expectancy

1 क्रमव्यतिरेकेण शब्दात्मकं न वाक्यमभिधायकमस्तीत्युच्यते—*loc. cit.*

2 क्रम एव वाक्यमिति पदक्रमो वाक्यमुक्तम्—

Puṇyarāja under Vākya., 2,52.

(*sarvapadam sākāṅkṣam*) that go to constitute a sentence.[1]

These two views, strictly speaking, refer to the meaning expressed by a sentence. It is really a difficult thing to determine what a sentence exactly means. As there is much controversy regarding the constitution of a sentence, so there is great divergence of opinion in regard to the signification of a sentence. To a *sphoṭavādin*, as we have pointed out, the meaning of a sentence is *pratibhā* or intuition.[2] To one who defines sentence as a *verbal form*, it is action (*kriyā*) that is denoted by a sentence.[3] Those who advocate the *abhihitānvayavāda* (*i.e.*, define sentence as a combination of words or as a particular order) are inclined to make *association* (*saṃsarga*) as the meaning of a sentence.[4] The word *association* is not used here in its literal sense. It means that a sentence acquires some special feature, or import (*tātparyārtha*) as we may call it, in the

1 अत्रापि सङ्घातः क्रम इत्यभिहितान्वयपक्षे लक्षणद्वयम्—

Puṇyarāja under Vākya., 2.1 ; and

आख्यातशब्दः पदमाद्यं पृथक् सर्वपदं साकाङ्क्षमित्यन्विताभिधानपक्षे लक्षणत्रयमिति विभागः—*loc. cit.*

2 तत्राखण्डपक्षे त्रिष्वपि लक्षणेषु प्रतिभा वाक्यार्थः—*loc. cit.*

3 आख्यातशब्दो वाक्यमित्यस्मिन् पक्षे क्रिया वाक्यार्थः—*loc. cit.*

4 सङ्घातपक्षे क्रमपक्षे च संसर्गो वाक्यार्थः—*loc. cit.*

course of its denoting the intended sense.[1] To make it more clear, when the meanings of different words in a sentence are correlated with one another, there arises invariably some additional signification, distinct from those of the constituents, that is to say, the sense that is evolved from such *anvaya* or correlation of meanings is something more than a mere totality of them.[2] It is what is called by Jagadīśa *vilakṣaṇo bodhaḥ* or special signification resulting from the correlation of meanings. The *anvitābhidhānavādins* hold, on the contrary, that the meaning of a sentence is for all purposes the same as is signified by its component parts.[3] What is *special signification* or import to the adherents of the former view is considered by them to be nothing more than those that are denoted by individual words themselves.[4]

It will not be unprofitable at this stage to

[1] पदानां परस्परान्वये पदार्थवशादाधिक्यं संसर्गः स वाक्यार्थः—

Puṇyarāja under Vākya., 2.41.

सम्बन्धे सति यत्त्वन्यदाधिक्यमुपजायते ।

वाक्यार्थमेव तं प्राहुरनेकपदसंश्रयम् ॥—Vākyapadīya, 2.42.

[2] पदार्थानां समन्वये तात्पर्य्यार्थो विशेषवपुरपदार्थोऽपि वाक्यार्थः समुल्लसतीत्यभिहितान्वयवादिनां मतम्—Kāvyaprakāśa, 2.7.

[3] पदार्थं एव वाक्यार्थः—Puṇyarāja. वाच्य एव वाक्यार्थ इत्यन्विताभिधानवादिनः—Kāvyaprakāśa, 2.7.

[4] पूर्वमते यो वाक्यार्थः स वाच्यान्तर्गत एवेत्यर्थः—

discuss, by way of comparison and contrast, the view held by the great Greek thinker, Aristotle. With him a sentence is one of those significant parts in which a language may be broken up. 'Language in general,' he holds, 'includes so many parts as Letter, Syllable, Connecting Word, Noun, Verb, Inflexion or Case, Sentence or Phrase.'[1] Of these, letter, syllable and connecting word are called non-significant, *i.e.*, they have no signification properly assigned to them. The rest are significant by themselves. 'A sentence or phrase,' according to Aristotle, 'is a composite significant sound, some at least of whose parts are in themselves significant; for not every such group of words consists of verbs and nouns—but it may dispense even with the verb.'[2] It is clear from this definition that Aristotle's conception of sentence is almost analogous to that of *saṃghāta*, that is to say, a sentence is a combination of parts (words) and is significant by itself. The last portion of Aristotle's definition, *i.e.*, *it may dispense even with the verb*, compares favourably with the view of the Naiyāyikas who, as we have observed, do not insist on the presence of the verb as the indispensable requisite of a sentence. What he meant by non-significant parts is, to the Indian grammarian,

[1] Aristotle's Poetics, XX, Butcher's ed., p. 71.

[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 75.

upasarga and *nipātas* which, of course independently of nouns and verbs, are not grammatically treated as *significant*. In the so-called division of speech we find that it is nouns and verbs alone (that are primary parts of speech) of which the signification is recognised by all grammarians.

The same *oneness of sense* (*arthaikatva*) as well as the *association of meaning* (*saṃsarga*), as we have found in the Mīmāṃsaka interpretation of sentence, is also noticeable by a strange coincidence in the Aristotelian conception of sentence. Regarding the meaning of a sentence, Aristotle has in the same strain spoken of the unity of sense, as is denoted by a sentence in its composite entirety.[1] This unity is not, however, visible only in a sentence, but it is what links together the whole framework of a piece of composition. Viewed in this light, 'the *Iliad* is one by the linking together of parts.'[2] To the Indian grammarian a unity in this broader sense, binding together all sentences in a literary work by a natural but close tie of mutual relationship, will sound like the extreme theory (*grantha-sphoṭa*) of the *sphoṭavādins*, according to which a whole treatise

[1] 'A sentence or phrase may form a unity in two ways,—either as signifying one thing, or as consisting of several parts linked together.'—Poetics, XX, p. 77.

[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 77.

may be looked upon as an indivisible unit (*śphoṭa*).

In view of the facts placed before us it can be maintained without any fear of contradiction that Indian teachers were far in advance of the Greek thinkers, particularly in respect of linguistic and grammatical speculations. So far as the constitution and signification of a sentence is concerned, Aristotle does neither speak anything about expectancy and consistency, nor does he seem to have any idea of the evolution of additional sense from a sentence—a thesis so ingeniously worked out by the Indian grammarian.

CHAPTER VI

PARTS OF SPEECH

Speech originally undivided—Indra as the first analyser or grammarian—artificial method of grammar—grammar as an art—grammatical analysis as a criterion for distinguishing Sanskrit from *apabhraṃśas*—Yāska's classification of speech—different views on the number of parts of speech—omission of pronoun and adverb from the list of Yāska—grammatical dictum regarding the particular gender and *kāraka* of adverbs—*sambodhanapadas* treated as adverbs—meaning of noun, verb, preposition and particle.

Reference has already been made to the passage of the *Taittirīya Saṃhitā* where speech is said to have been originally undivided into parts. The same passage continues to say that it was Indra who, in response to an appeal made by the gods, attempted for the first time to break up speech into its component elements. Thenceforward it is known as *vyākṛtā vāk* or analysed speech.[1] The importance of analysis on a grammatical line was thus felt at an early period of the history of linguistic development. Such a method of analysis, whether emanating from a divinity or a mortal being, marks the real beginning of grammar. The credit of being

[1] वाग्वै पराच्यव्याकृतावदत्ते देवा इन्द्रमब्रुवन्निमां नो वाचं व्याकुर्विति। तामिन्द्रो मध्यतोऽवक्रम्य व्याकरोत्तस्मादियं व्याकृता वागुद्यते।—

Tait. Saṃ., VII., 4.7.

the first analyser or grammarian goes, however, to Indra. However incredible it may sound, the statement of the *Saṃhitā*, even if we set aside the explanation offered by Vidyāraṇya, has been strengthened by the evidence of the Mahābhāṣya where a tradition is recorded to the effect that Indra made a thorough study of words under the tutorship of Bṛhaspati—the divine teacher.[1] The order in which the study of grammar was transmitted from Brahman to the Brahmins is stated in the *Ṛk-tantra-vyākaraṇa* the authorship of which is popularly attributed to Śākaṭāyana.[2] Further, the name of Indra is also traceable in the list of eight grammarians mentioned by Vopadeva.[3] Unfortunately we have no access to the system of grammar founded by Indra as such. We do not know whether it would be a truism or a positive mistake to ascribe the authorship of the so-called *Aindra Vyākaraṇa* (which is held by some to be the work of Indragomin) to a divine personage like Indra. According to Dr. Burnell,

[1] एवं हि श्रूयते बृहस्पतिरिन्द्राय दिव्यं वर्षसहस्रं प्रतिपदोक्तानां शब्दानां शब्दपारायणं प्रोवाच—Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 5.

[2] इदमक्षरं छन्दो वर्णशः समनुक्रान्तं ब्रह्मा बृहस्पतये प्रोवाच। बृहस्पतिरिन्द्राय, इन्द्रो भरद्वाजाय, भरद्वाज ऋषिभ्यः, ऋषयो ब्राह्मणेभ्यः—

Ṛk.-tantra-Vyākaraṇa.

[3] इन्द्रश्चन्द्रः काशकृत्स्नापिशली शाकटायनः।
पाणिन्यमरजैनेन्द्रा जयन्त्यष्टादिशाब्दिकाः ॥—Kavikalpadruma.

Aindra was the oldest type of Sanskrit grammar which is supposed to have supplied the foundations on which stand the *Prātiśākhyas* in general and the *Kātantra* system of grammar in particular.[1]

Again, if we can persuade ourselves to believe that philosophy was in heaven and Socrates brought it down to the earth for the diffusion of 'divine knowledge' among mortals, there is no wonder that the conception of an analytical grammar might have first originated from a divine being. Because another tradition, popularly current among the followers of the Pāṇinīya school, goes to show that Pāṇini received the first fourteen *sūtras* (the so-called *pratyāhāra-sūtras*) from the Lord Śiva and that they are still known as '*Māheśvara sūtras*.' Nandikeśvara, in his *Kāśikā*,[2] has narrated how on the pretext of beating his drum the Lord (Śiva) revealed to his favourite disciples the fundamental formulæ out of which Pāṇini is said to have got the nucleus of his famous *Aṣṭādhyāyī*.

[1] Essay on the Aindra School of Grammarians. References to Aindra grammar are made by Durga and Upamanyu (commentator on the *Kāśikā* by Nandikeśvara). They are 'अर्थः पदम्' (Durga) and 'अन्त्यवर्णसमुद्भूता धातवः परिकीर्त्तिताः' (Upamanyu).

[2] नृत्तावसाने नटराजराजो ननाद ढक्कां नवपञ्चवारम् ।
उद्धर्त्तुकामः सनकादिसिद्धानेतद्विमर्शे शिवसूत्रजालम् ॥–

Kāśikā, 1.

The author of the *Pāṇinīya-śikṣā* has also referred to the same account in course of offering his salutation to Pāṇini.[1] There is another tradition which also makes Maheśa (Śiva) the author of an ocean-like grammar out of which Vyāsa is said to have gathered many words and in comparison with that huge system of grammar the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* of Pāṇini was even considered insignificantly small.[2]

Particularly in language, the stage of synthesis seems to have been prior to that of analysis. The grammarians have had to face a unique difficulty while they engaged themselves in the task of analysing speech. Language with all its diverse forms appears to be such a complex phenomenon that the first and foremost duty of a grammarian had always been to divide it into a number of constituent parts, his aim in doing so being obviously to facilitate the study of language.

But the grammatical mode of analysis is not absolutely free from imperfection and the grammarians could hardly save themselves from

[1] येनाक्षरसमाम्नायमधिगम्य महेश्वरात् ।
कृत्स्नं व्याकरणं प्रोक्तं तस्मै पाणिनये नमः ॥—

Pāṇinīya-śikṣā.

[2] यान्युज्जहार माहेशाद्व्यासो व्याकरणार्णवात् ।
तानि किं पदरत्नानि सन्ति पाणिनिगोष्पदे ॥—

Gopal Chakravarti's commentary on Caṇḍī.

the cudgel of attack. In accordance with the strict interpretation of the doctrine of *sphoṭa*, as we had occasion to observe, the analytical method, though adopted by the grammarian as the central pivot, is liable to be rejected for being purely artificial. But we cannot afford to minimise the importance of this time-honoured grammatical procedure for what the *sphoṭavādins* might have said against it. The theory of *sphoṭa*, we should frankly admit, does not appeal so much to one's reason, for it stands unique in its interpretation of *śabda* by subordinating one's experience to the invisible and, to a certain extent, incomprehensible working of the internal region of the body.[1] There is no denying the fact that the Indian *vaiyākaraṇas*, like all other grammarians of the ancient world, had had no other alternative open to them than to take up this principle of dissolving sentences and words into their constituent elements, as the only scientific way of getting into the meaning of words, individually and severally.

Grammar is an art—an useful art in the Aristotelian sense of the term. Like painting and poetry, it is also an *imitation* or reproduction of nature. The principles on which the

[1] See the author's Philosophy of Sanskrit Grammar, Chapter IV.

science of grammar is based have their correspondence with nature and popular usage as well. The way in which *dadhi+atra* is transformed into *dadhyatra* in course of euphonic combination is the true copy of a tendency that is nothing but natural. The generalisations (*paribhāṣā*) of grammar throw further light on this point. The grammatical maxims, such as *parjanyavallakṣaṇapravṛttiḥ* (the rules of grammar are like the downpour from clouds), *ekadeśavikṛtamananyavat* (a thing does not become something else on account of its deformity in one particular part, *e.g.*, a dog with its tail cut off does not change its identity), and *prakṛtivadanukaraṇam bhavati* (an imitation corresponds with the original), have their origin in nature or are framed in exact imitation of what we actually find in nature. Actually in *de Mundo* 'an illustration has been taken from grammar to show the mode in which art works out harmonious results by imitating the diversity of nature.'[1] By adopting the logical method of *anvaya* (agreement) and *vyatireka* (difference) the Indian grammarians have also found out wonderful harmony in the stupendous diversity of verbal forms.[2] It is the scientific methodology of grammar

[1] Aristotle's Poetics, S. H. Butcher, p. 117.

[2] सिद्धं त्वन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्याम्—Vārttika 9 under Pāṇ., 1.2.45.

to formulate such rules as would apply to a vast majority of words. The standpoint from which Bhartṛhari and others of his way of thinking have declared grammar as an art or an artificial mode of analysis is different. To them grammar is an imaginary method of reproducing truth—an artificial way of representing what is real by its very nature.[1] Just as a man outlines the picture of an elephant on a piece of canvas, so the grammarian splits up words into parts for the understanding of the unintelligent people.[2]

This kind of analysis does not only stand on a scientific basis but has served one great purpose from the orthodox point of view. The grammatical way of dividing a word into parts, namely, *prakṛti* and *pratyaya*, has been a criterion with Indian grammarians for the purpose of distinguishing correct words of pure Sanskrit origin from corrupt words or *apabhraṃśas*. To draw a line of distinction between these two classes of words current in ancient societies was the first and foremost business of *Vyākaraṇa* or, more

[1] अबुधबोधनाय पदविभाग: कल्पित इति—

Puṇyarāja under Vākyapadīya, 2.57.

[2] रेखागवयन्याय:—Śabdakaustubha.

रेखागवयन्यायेनापि शास्त्रमुपाय इत्यप्याहु:—

Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa, 69.

properly, of *Śabdānuśāsana*. Words that conform to the principle of analysis enunciated by the Sanskrit grammarian are called *sādhu-śabda* as opposed to *apaśabda*. It is thus stated in the *Mahābhāṣya*: while the use of correct words like *gauḥ*, etc., is attended with religious felicity, the use of corrupt forms such as *gāvī*, *goṇī*, etc., on the other hand, is considered to be a religious demerit, specially on the part of a Brahmin. The thing is that the study of grammar was intimately associated with the religious life of ancient India and grammar was consequently affiliated to the sacred literature of *Smṛti* and *Āgama*.

We first meet with a scientific division of speech in Yāska's *Nirukta* which forms the *magnum opus* of the *Nirukta* literature. There are, according to Yāska, four parts of speech (*padajātāni*), namely, noun (*nāman*), verb (*ākhyāta*), preposition (*upasarga*) and particle (*nipāta*).[1] This classification, both exhaustive and comprehensive at the same time, seems to have been the result of a thorough-going study of the structure of the Vedic language, carried on by the etymologist. It is, however, difficult to say if Yāska was the first to make such a classification, because in the *Brāhmaṇas* we already come across the following grammatical

[1] चत्वारि पदजातानि नामाख्याते चोपसर्गनिपाताश्च—Nirukta, I. 1.

terms, namely, *dhātu*, *ākhyāta*, *nāman*, *prātipadika*, *vibhakti* (case-ending) and so on.[1] What is, then, more than problematic and nearer the truth is that Yāska found such well-marked divisions already in existence, either amongst the grammarians or etymologists who are supposed to have preceded him. He has first put *nāman* and *ākhyāta* under one group and next made a separate compound comprising *upasarga* and *nipāta*, the priority of order being obviously due to the relative importance of the noun and the verb from both grammatical and etymological points of view.[2] The superiority of the noun and the verb lies in the fact that they constitute significant elements of speech by themselves, that is to say, they possess innate signification which they do not lose even when they are used independently.[3] But prepositions and particles seem to have no meaning when they are detached from nouns and verbs.[4]

Both in the Greek and Indian speculations on language, we find some controversy concerning the exact number of parts of speech.

[1] ओंकारं पृच्छामः। को धातुः, किं प्रातिपदिकम्, किं नामाख्यातम्—Gopatha-Brāhmaṇa (first section), R. L. Mitra's ed., p. 12.

[2] अत्र नामाख्यातयोः पूर्वमभिधानं प्राधान्यात्—
Durga under Nirukta, I. 1.

[3] उभे अपि नामाख्याते निपातोपसर्गनिरपेक्षे अपि सती स्वमर्थं ब्रूतः—
loc. cit.

[4] न तूपसर्गनिपातानां नामाख्यातनिरपेक्षाणामर्थोऽस्ति—*loc. cit.*

There is no consensus of opinion as to whether they are four, three, two or simply one in number. The force of the expression *catvāri padajātāni*, says Durga, is that the parts of speech are strictly four in number. To make it more clear, the word *catvāri* precludes the possibility of either increasing or reducing the number of parts of speech which are almost fixed as four. Though he could not adduce any plausible arguments for adhering to such a fourfold classification, Durga has distinctly done one great service by referring to the various theories on the subject, particularly one that reminds us of a long-lost system of grammar. We owe it to Durga that the *Aindra* school of grammar recognised only one kind of *pada* (*i.e.*, *padas*, as significant elements of speech, fall under one category).[1] *Padas* are, again, said to be of two kinds, according as they are formed by the two distinct classes of formative elements or inflexions (*vibhakti*), namely, *sup* and *tiṅ*. On the basis supplied by the rule Pāṇ. 1. 4. 14, the majority of grammarians has divided *padas* into two classes, namely, *subanta* (words ending in *sup*-termination) and *tiṅanta* (words ending in *tiṅ*-termination), or, in other words, nouns and verbs. There are others who have raised the number to five and six by adding respectively *gati* and

[1] नैकं पदजातं यथार्थ: पदमैन्द्राणाम्—*loc. cit.*

karmapravacanīya to the list already enunciated by Yāska.

Having shown the artificial character of the grammatical analysis as well as the useful purpose that is served by the principle of *apoddhāra* in breaking up a sentence into parts, Bhartṛhari opens the third section of his *Vākyapadīya* with a classification of *padas*.[1] Some grammarians, he points out, speak of only two parts of speech, namely, noun and verb ; some have recognised two more elements of speech, *viz.*, preposition and particle ; others, again, have made a fivefold division of *padas* by adding *karmapravacanīya* to the aforesaid list. Thus, we see that Bhartṛhari and Durga have practically followed the same principle of classification.

But when we carefully dissect a sentence from the grammatical point of view, it comes to our notice that a sentence contains mainly two parts, namely, the noun or *kāraka* (case) and the verb or *kriyā* (action), the rest being connected with either of them as mere adjuncts or subordinate parts.[2] Helārāja has drawn our

[1] द्विधा कैश्चित् पदं भिन्नं चतुर्धा पञ्चधापि वा ।
अपोद्धृत्यैव वाक्येभ्यः प्रकृतिप्रत्ययादिवत् ॥—Vākyapadīya, 3.1.

[2] तत्र चांशांशिकल्पनयापोद्धारे कारकात्मा क्रियात्मा च प्रविभागाहे इति सिद्धसाध्यलक्षणांशद्वयविषयः पदापोद्धारो द्विविधो नामाख्यातरूपः—

Helārāja under Vākyapadīya, 3.1.

attention to the fact that these five parts of speech are, on a closer examination, reducible to two, *i.e.*, noun and verb, since *particles* that indicate only the special signification of nouns might be included within the same category (noun), and *prepositions* and *karmapravacanīyas*, as they usually qualify the action denoted by a verbal root, are fundamentally the same as verbs.[1] Quite in keeping with the statement of the Mahābhāṣya,[2] he goes on to say that the indeclinables like *hiruk* and *pṛthak*, which denote actions, may be treated as a particular kind of verbs.[3] He has further justified the inclusion of this class of words within the wider scope of verbs by holding that *ākhyāta* does not only mean *tiṅanta* or word ending in *tiṅ*, but comprehends all those words in which the implication of *action* seems to be dominant.[4]

Compared with those of Aristotle and other Greek thinkers, Yāska's classification of speech is in no way less comprehensive and does not lack scientific precision. The omission of *sarva-nāman* (pronoun) in the list does not constitute

[1] सिद्धार्थाभिधायि नामपदमिति तदर्थगतं विशेषं द्योतयन् निपातास्तत्रैवान्तर्भवन्ति, and अत एवोपसर्गकर्मप्रवचनीयपदान्याख्यातपदमेव साध्यार्थविशेषद्योतनात्—*loc. cit.*

[2] हिरुक् पृथगिति क्रियाप्रधानम्—Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 95.

[3] ये तु हिरुगादयः क्रियाप्रधानास्तेषामाख्यातेऽन्तर्भावः—Helārāja under Vākya. 3.1.

[4] न हि तिङन्तमेवाख्यातं क्रियाप्रधानस्य सर्वस्यैव तल्लक्षणत्वात्—*loc. cit.*

any serious defect, for *sarvanāman*, as the very term implies, is a special class of *nāman* or noun. Though it does not actually occur in the *Nirukta* distinctly as a technical term of grammar, the word (*sarvanāman*) has been derived by Yāska in a way that compares favourably with grammatical interpretation.[1] His derivation, if it has any grammatical significance at all, is intended to imply that pronouns belong to a class of words that can be used instead of all denominations of nouns. Moreover, he has mentioned one typical pronoun (*adas*) which is generally used for the sake of denoting a mass of things.[2]

Bhartṛhari had evidently in view Yāska's observation while he explained *dravya* (matter) as an entity for which a pronoun might be used as a distinctive mark (*upalakṣaṇa*).[3] Pronouns have generally an adjectival force, and a thing is ordinarily characterised by such pronominal attributes as 'this' and 'that' (*idam* and *tat*). Helārāja, the commentator, has attempted to offer here a philosophical interpretation. He

[1] सर्वाणि नामानि यस्य, सर्वनामानं गणः, एतेन सर्वनाम्ना, and प्रकृति सार्वनाम्न्यात् ।—Nirukta. सर्वत्वेन नाम सर्वनाम—Durga.

[2] अद इति सत्त्वानामुपदेशः—*op. cit.*

[3] वस्तूपलक्षणं यत्र सर्वनाम प्रयुज्यते ।
द्रव्यमित्युच्यते सोऽर्थो भेद्यत्वेन विवक्षितः ॥
Vākyapadīya, 3.3.

begins with the bifurcation of pronouns, according as they denote things in general and things in particular.[1] Pronouns like *sarva* (all) and *viśva*, when used as adjectives, simply denote things as they are in their totality but do not bring out any of their qualities like ordinary adjectives. On the other hand, pronouns like *anya*, *itara*, for instance, do not signify objects, pure and simple, but those that possess particular meaning such as *otherness*, etc.[2] The distinction between these two classes of pronouns is as follows: while objects in their generality, that is, as stripped of their inherent properties, are usually denoted by *sarva*, *viśva*, etc., particular objects with their special signification are expressed by pronouns like *anya*, *anyatara*, *itara*, etc. Pronouns have thus obtained an adjectival function in their simple way of characterising objects (*vastūpalakṣaṇa*). In view of this characterisation which is at best general and indefinite, Helārāja has attempted to define *dravya* (object) as what is generally indicated by the pair of pronouns in a typical expression like 'this is that' (*idam tat*).[3] Similar uses of

[1] इह सर्वनाम्नां द्वयी गतिः। वस्तुमात्राभिधायिनः केचिद् यथा सर्वादयः। विशिष्टवस्तुवाचकास्त्वन्ये यथान्यतरादयः—Helārāja under Vākya., 3.3.

[2] विशिष्टवस्तुवाचकास्त्वन्ये यथान्यतरादयः—*loc. cit.*

[3] तथा ह्येदं तदिति सर्वनामप्रत्यवमर्शयोग्यं द्रव्यम्—*loc. cit.*

pronouns are not rare in Sanskrit. The passage of the Upaniṣad, namely, *tat-tvamasi* (thou art that) with which all Vedāntins are familiar, furnishes an example in which two pronouns (*tat* and *tvam*) stand respectively for the infinite and the finite. Pronouns of this class are frequently used for making generalisations of an indefinite nature (cf. *sarvaṁ khalvidam Brahma*). There is, however, some difference between the logical connotations of the two pronouns, *viz.*, *idam* and *tat*. While *this* is used with reference to objects which are before one's eyes or perceptible, *that* means those that are more or less imperceptible (*parokṣa*).[1] These two pronouns, like a couple of contradictory terms of Logic, are in a sense sufficient to denote the entire world of perception and inference. Helārāja has carefully touched upon the vital point as to why an indefinite pronoun like *adaḥ* (*ada iti sattvānāmupadeśaḥ*) has been selected by Yāska as the best way of denoting objects in their general aspect.

The world presents itself to our knowledge as a great museum containing divergent objects too numerous to be labelled by different names and distinguished by features peculiar to each of them. Each object is an integral

[1] इदमिति प्रत्यक्षार्थवाचकम्, तदिति प्रमाणान्तरावगतपरोक्षार्थाभिधानम्—*loc. cit.*

part of nature. There is nothing that is unconnected or detached in the huge order of the universe. Even a leaf or a drop of water is as much of nature as the solar system in its infinite dimension. An attempt to bring out exhaustively the exact nature of a thing, particularly with reference to the unerring system with which it is linked together, is thus surely doomed to failure.[1] Everything in its association with the world presents a phenomenon, so full of possibilities and potentialities, that it is indefinable in terms of language. Objects being thus individually and universally indefinable by their very nature, pronouns like *this* and *that* are ordinarily used as the popular way of characterising them in a simple and general way.[2]

Only a few words are required to show why adverbs were lost sight of by Yāska in his classification of parts of speech. While we admit that the conception of adverbs is almost as old as that of verbs in the history of language, it can be maintained with authority that the omission of adverbs, like that of pronouns, does not in any way impair the validity or logical precision of Yāska's classification. The explanation is this. To the Indian grammarian

[1] प्रतिपिण्डस्वभावरूपतया स्वभावो द्रव्याणामशक्यो लक्षयितुमिति—*loc. cit.*

[2] सर्वद्रव्यसाधारणलक्षणमेवमुच्यते, वस्तुरूपतायाः सर्वत्र भावादेतदेव निरुक्तकारेणाप्युक्तम्—*loc. cit.*

adjectives, whether qualifying nouns or verbs, do not constitute a separate part of speech by themselves. As indicating various degrees and modes of action, adverbs are mere adjuncts to the verb and consequently they hardly deserve to be treated as intrinsically distinct from verbs, if they are considered from a wider point of view. Moreover, so far as Sanskrit grammar is concerned, prepositions discharge a function which is analogous to that of adverbs.[1] Commenting on the *vārttika*, '*kriyāviśeṣaka upasargaḥ*'[2] (prepositions serve to specify the action denoted by verbal roots), Patañjali rightly observes that the form *pacati* (cooking) in *prapacati* gives the idea of action which is simply specified by the preposition *pra*.[3] Their identity in grammatical application is clearly established by the above *vārttika*. The expression *kriyāviśeṣakaḥ*, which is a Sanskrit equivalent of adverb, is used here by Kātyāyana as an epithet of prepositions.

According to the popular usage of Sanskrit grammar, there is some restriction regarding the gender, case (*kāraka*) and number of

[1] Lakshman Sarup: *The Nighaṇṭu and the Nirukta*, p. 66.

[2] *Vārttika* under Pāṇ. 1.3.1.

[3] पचतीति क्रिया गम्यते तां प्रो विशिनष्टि—Mahābhāṣya.

adverbs.[1] Adverbs, as a rule, are always used in the neuter gender, objective case and singular number. Like ordinary adjectives which qualify nouns, they have *sāmānādhikaraṇya* (common substratum) with the verbs that are qualified by them.[2] Puṇyarāja has tried to account for their particular gender and case (*kāraka*) with direct reference to the grammatical mode of interpretation. His line of argument is as follows : while adverbs in general are found to qualify action which is other than substance (*asattvabhūta*), they cannot properly have any gender in the strict consideration of sex.[3] But we find that a particular gender (neuter) has been assigned to them by the popular usage of grammar. They have particularly that gender which is usually available in the sense of *sāmānya* (generality) by the force of the grammatical dictum *sāmānye napuṃsakam*, that is to say, whenever a word is such as it cannot legitimately claim to have any definite gender, the neuter gender is one that is generally obtained in such cases by the grammarian. As regards the case (*kāraka*), Puṇyarāja states

[1] क्रियाविशेषणानां कर्म्मत्वं नपुंसकलिङ्गता चेति।—

Puṇyarāja under Vākyapadīya, 2.5.

[2] क्रियायाश्च विशेषणं कदाचित् सामानाधिकरण्येन भवति।—*loc. cit.*

[3] एवं चासत्त्वभूतायाः क्रियाया विशेषणमित्यसत्त्वप्रधानत्वाल्लिङ्गसंख्यानाम्ना नपुंसकेन योगः।—*loc. cit.*

that adverbs are treated as *karma-kāraka* (objective case) in relation to the *kriyā* (action) that is in the way of fruition or capable of being accomplished by the effort (*nirvarttya*).[1] In the sentence *śīghram gacchati* (he is moving quickly), for instance, the quickness of motion is, logically speaking, *kriyāsādhya*, *i.e.*, accomplished by physical effort. In consequence of this fact there is no grammatical bar to take adverbs as regular instances of *karma-kāraka*.

There is some difficulty in determining the particular part of speech to which *sambodhana-padas* (words used in personal address) grammatically belong. Of course they are treated as nouns with a fixed case-termination (*vibhakti*)[2] and generally used for the purpose of drawing the attention of a person or thing.[3] But their relation in a sentence seems to be somewhat peculiar. We call it *peculiar* because *sambodhana-padas* are neither treated in Sanskrit grammar as grammatical cases (vocative cases), nor are their meanings regarded as *prātipadikārtha* (the meaning denoted by the crude form of a word). The *vārttika*[4] to which we have already referred in connection with the definition

[1] क्रियायाश्च निर्वर्त्यत्वात् कर्मत्वमिति न्यायसिद्धमेव कर्मत्वम् ।—*loc. cit.*

[2] संबोधने च ।—Pāṇ., 2.3.47.

[3] सिद्धस्याभिमुखीभावमात्रं संबोधनं विदुः ।

[4] आख्यातं साव्ययकारकविशेषणं वाक्यम् ।—Vār. 9, under Pāṇ., 2.1.1.

of sentence does not strictly apply to an expression as *vrajāni Devadatta* (Devadatta, I should go), since *sambodhana-padas* do not come under the category of either indeclinable (*avyaya*) or case (*kāraka*) with qualifying adjuncts. While the definition of sentence, as referred to above, stands thus open to the logical fallacy of *avyāpti* (*i.e.*, too narrow to comprehend all possible varieties of sentences), Bhartṛhari has maintained the validity of the dictum by declaring in clear terms that *sambodhana-padas* are virtually adverbs qualifying the action.[1] There is, therefore, nothing that is inconsistent in the definition formulated by the author of the *vārttika*. It should be particularly noticed here that adverbs, like ordinary adjectives, are not only found to have co-existence (*sāmānādhikaraṇya*) with the verbs that are qualified by them[2] but there are instances in which adverbs might be used even in the sense of non-co-existence (*vaiyadhikaraṇya*), that is to say, when adverbs and verbs are not grammatically in agreement with one another.[3] Bhartṛhari asserts that *sambodhana-padas*, adverbially used

[1] संबोधनपदं यच्च तत् क्रियाया विशेषकम् ।
व्रजानि देवदत्तेति निघातोऽत्र तथा सति ॥—Vākyapadīya, 2.5.

[2] क्रियायाश्च विशेषणं कदाचित् सामानाधिकरण्येन भवति—
Puṇyarāja under Vākya., 2.5.

[3] वैयधिकरण्येनापि विशेषणं भवति यथा व्रजानि देवदत्तेति ।—*loc. cit.*

as they are, form grammatical examples of this description. It is quite evident that in *vrajāni Devadatta* one does not find *co-existence* between the vocative word (Devadatta) and the verb (*vrajāni*).[1] The expression simply means the movement of a man after addressing Devadatta, and this movement in particular is necessarily qualified by the act of calling Devadatta.[2] This interpretation, we should remember, is based on the more comprehensive definition of the sentence as incorporated by Patañjali under the *vārttika* in question.[3]

With reference to this particular statement of the *Vākyapadīya*, the author of the *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa* has explained *sambodhana* as a kind of words having relation to action (*kriyā*).[4] Though he has referred to *sambodhana* and *kriyā* in terms of subject (*anuvādya*) and predicate (*vidheya*), he has tried to make it clear that *vibhakti* (case-ending) added to *sambodhana-padas*

[1] अत्र हि देवदत्त व्रजानीति देवदत्तस्य व्रजनक्रियायाश्च सामानाधिकरण्यं नास्ति।
—*loc. cit.*

[2] केवलमामन्त्र्य व्रजत्यसाविति देवदत्तामन्त्रणविशेषिता केवला या विलक्षणा व्रजनक्रियेत्याख्यातं सविशेषणमेवेति।—*loc. cit.*

[3] अपर आह। आख्यातं सविशेषणमित्येव।—
Mahābhāṣya under *Vārttika*, 9.

[4] सम्बोधनान्तस्य क्रियायामन्वयः।—Under Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa, kār., 16.

enters into relation with, or is in agreement with, *kriyā*.[1]

The Naiyāyikas also have construed *sambodhana* as adjective, though not one (adverb) that qualifies the action denoted by a root. Gadādhara does not justify the recognition of *sambodhana* as a kind of noun.[2] He has explicitly stated in his discourse on *sambodhana* that *sambodhana* appears to qualify the noun or pronoun that is used in an instance of addressing as the nominative case in relation to the verb. The example he had in contemplation is as *Devadatta tvam gaccha* (Devadatta, you go) in which Devadatta is construed as an adjunct to the personal pronoun (*tvam*).[3]

The Vedic passage *catvāri vāk parimitā padāni*[4] (speech admits of four kinds of *padas*) has been variously explained by Indian teachers from their respective standpoints. But among these, as recorded in the *Nirukta-pariśiṣṭa*,[5] no

[1] सम्बोधनविभक्तेरनुवाद्यविषयत्वादनुवाद्यस्य विधेयसाकाङ्क्षत्वाद्विधेयस्य च क्रियारूपत्वात् क्रियान्वयोऽर्थायात: ।—*loc. cit.*

[2] सम्बोधनविभक्त्यन्तप्रकृत्यर्थस्यान्यत्र विशेषणतयान्वयात् सम्बोधनस्य विशेष्यतया भानं निर्युक्तिकमिति ।—Vyutpattivāda.

[3] प्रथमार्थताद्दश्येच्छाया विषयतासम्बन्धेन प्रकृत्यर्थविशेषणतया भानम् ।—*loc. cit.*

[4] Ṛgveda, 1.164.45.

[5] कतमानि तानि चत्वारि पदानि ? ओंकारो महाव्याहृतयश्चेत्यार्षम् । नामाख्याते चोपसर्गनिपाताश्चेति वैयाकरणा: । ऋचो यजूंषि सामानि चतुर्थी व्यावहारिकीति नैरुक्ता: ।—Nirukta-pariśiṣṭa, 13.9.

interpretation is more acceptable to the grammarian than what Yāska has dealt with. After the scientific way in which Yāska has divided the parts of speech, we feel no hesitation in saying that his classification is marked by both comprehensiveness and precision. His fourfold division is linguistically more comprehensive and grammatically more accurate than that of Aristotle and other Greek thinkers. We must say that Aristotle's division of Language or Diction refers more to the art of poetry than to the actual grammatical method.

Now we turn to the meaning of these parts of speech. We have already stated in these pages that *nāman* and *ākhyāta* are decidedly the most important elements in the fourfold division of speech.[1] While all grammarians have acknowledged the noun and the verb as the significant parts of speech, we shall come to see later on that it is more or less a doubtful problem of grammar whether prepositions and particles have got innate signification of their own.[2] Yāska in his remarkable passage defines the verb as a word which denotes *action* (*bhāva*) and the noun as what involves the idea

[1] अत्र नामाख्यातयोः पूर्वमभिधानं प्राधान्यात् ।—

Durga under Nirukta, 1.1.

[2] चतुर्विधपदेष्वत्र द्विविधस्यार्थनिर्णयः ।

क्रियते संशयोत्पत्तौ नोपसर्गनिपातयोः ॥

साक्षान्न तेषामर्थाभिधानशक्तिरस्ति ।—Durga.

of *substance* (*sattva*).[1] The word *bhāva*, we should remember, is in its ordinary sense synonymous with *karman*, *kriyā* and *dhātvartha*.[2]

Philosophically speaking, *bhāva* represents a stage of manifestation from the unmanifest (*avyakta*), or it is the *summum genus* (*mahāsattā*) that permeates the entire world of existence. This *bhāva*, though essentially one and indivisible, is found to reveal itself in six different aspects, namely, production, existence, transformation, growth, decay and destruction.[3] We should not, however, fail to bear in mind that there lies an unchangeable reality behind these various stages of modification (*vikāra*). He who was declared by the sages of old as 'one and without second' (*ekamevā-dvitīyam*) and considered to be essentially inseparable from his infinite activities (*śakti*) appears differentiated (*bhinna*) to our naked eyes, because we are unable by our very nature to unveil the screen of ignorance so as to get a glimpse of the *reality* lying behind the vast panorama of nature.[4] The upholder of the absolute

[1] भावप्रधानमाख्यातं सत्त्वप्रधानानि नामानि ।—Nirukta, 1.1.

[2] भाव: कर्म क्रिया धात्वर्थ इत्यनर्थान्तरम् ।—Durga.

[3] षड् भावविकारा भवन्तीति वार्ष्यायणि र्जायतेऽस्ति विपरिणमते वर्धतेऽपक्षीयते विनश्यतीति ।—Nirukta, 1.2.

[4] एकमेव यदाम्नातं भिन्नं शक्तिव्यपाश्रयात् ।
अपृथक्त्वेऽपि शक्तिभ्य: पृथक्त्वेनेव वर्त्तते ॥—Vākyapadīya, 1.2.

non-dualism will say that the activity and the active principle are one and the same (*śakti-śaktimatorabhedaḥ*),[1] there being only a difference without any distinction. Bhartṛhari not only explains this diversity in unity as due to *kālaśakti* (efficiency of time) which is irresistible and eternal in its continuity, but speaks of this sixfold modification as resulting from the eternal power of the *infinite*.[2] This *infinite* power which is not at all conditioned either by time or space is what we normally express in terms of *priority* and *posteriority* or as *abhūt* and *bhaviṣyati*.[3] This *kālaśakti* or eternal power of time, as we may describe it, is identical with the supreme godhead[4] or the *absolute* of the philosopher.[5] The supreme cause or *bhāva* to which all these modifications

[1] शक्तिभ्यो ब्रह्मणोऽपृथक्त्वेऽपि आरोपितः पृथक्त्वावभास इत्यर्थः ।—

Puṇyarāja under Vākya., 1.2.

[2] ब्रह्मण एकत्वेऽपि शक्तिभेदनियामकमाह—

अव्याहताः कला यस्य कालशक्तिमुपाश्रिताः ।

जन्मादयो विकाराः षट् भावभेदस्य योनयः ॥—Vākyapadīya, 1.3.

[3] एवं च अभूत् भविष्यतीति अपूर्वापरस्य पौर्वापर्य्यव्यवस्था विकल्पे सति जन्मादयो विकाराः षट् परिणामाः ।—Puṇyarāja under Vākya., 1. 3.

[4] न चान्तर्न बहिर्यस्य न पूर्वं नापि चापरम् ।

पूर्वापरं बहिश्चान्तर्जगतो यो जगच्चयः ॥—Bhāgavata, X. 9.13.

[5] का सा कालशक्तिरत आह—

एकस्य सर्वबीजस्य यस्य चेयमनेकधा ।

भोक्तृभोक्तव्यरूपेण भोगरूपेण च स्थितिः ॥—Vākyapadīya, 1.4.

are ultimately reducible is the all-powerful Being functioning as the factor of creation.[1]

In a wider sense *bhāva* is not distinguishable from *sat* or *sattā* (transcendental existence) which forms one of the trinity of attributes generally assigned to Brahman.[2] *Bhāva* and *sat* are so intimately correlated with each other that we cannot conceive of any *bhāva* (thing) that may come out of *asat* (non-existent).[3] This statement has its exact parallel in the dictum *ex nihilo nihil fit* (nothing comes out of nothing).

The six different modifications, as enumerated by Vārṣyāyaṇi, are not unconnected with one another, but they seem to be linked together in a chain by close relation. *Jani* or *janman* (production), for instance, comprehends in itself the idea of existence,[4] because it is well known to all that what is non-existent is not likely to come into being.[5] The well marked order according to which all these modifications have been scientifically arranged with direct reference to both time

1 कारणात्मनि भावे सर्वे एते भावविकाराः सन्ति। सर्वार्थप्रसवशक्तित्वात्तस्य
—Durga.

2 'सन्मात्रं भावलिङ्गं स्यात्'—
Quoted by Durga under Nirukta, I. 9.

3 नासतो विद्यते भावो नाभावो विद्यते सतः—Gītā.

4 जनिशब्दवाच्ये भावविकारेऽस्तेरप्यर्थोऽस्ति विद्यमानता—
Durga under Nirukta, I. 2.

5 न ह्यविद्यमानो जायते—*loc. cit.*

and space[1] represents, so to speak, the successive stages through which every thing is liable to pass from its very origination (*ātmalābha*) to its final destruction.

In course of dealing with the grammatical interpretation of *kriyā* (action) Patañjali has also referred to the remarkable dictum of Vārṣyāyaṇi.[2] He has, however, made an important observation here. One finds it really difficult to explain *sthiti* (cessation of motion) as a mode of *bhāva*, not because it remains outside the scope of the sixfold modification stated by the revered teacher of antiquity, but because *sthā* (to stay) is a root which does not grammatically mean action (*bhāva*) but denotes absolute cessation of action (*gatinivṛtti*).[3] If we accept *bhāvavacano dhātuḥ* as the correct definition of a verbal root, that is to say, that a root indicates *bhāva* or action, *tiṣṭhati* will have no claim to be regarded as a *bhāvavikāra* in the strict sense of the term (like *asti* and *jāyate*), since it implies cessation of *action* and is not explicitly included in the list of modifications enumerated by Vārṣyāyaṇi.[4] While each modification is indicative of a particular action, *tiṣṭhati* seems

1 पौर्वापर्यं हि देशकालकृतम्—*loc. cit.*

2 Mahābhāṣya under Vārttika II (Pāṇ. 1.3.1).

3 सर्वथा स्थित इत्यत्र धातुसंज्ञा न प्राप्नोति—*loc. cit.*

4 बाह्यो ह्येतेभ्यस्तिष्ठति—*loc. cit.*

to be an anomaly by denoting, as it does, discontinuity of action (*kriyānivṛtti*). Patañjali holds that in the case of *tiṣṭhati* we find how an action tends to indicate the cessation of another action.[1] He also goes to remark, further, that the divisions of time such as present, past and future are effected by *kriyā* and that the same purpose is served by verbs like *asti*, *jāyate*, etc.[2]

While defining *ākhyāta* and *nāman*, Patañjali seems to have reproduced in essence, though not verbatim, Yāska's remarkable dictum only with this difference that he has used *kriyā* instead of *bhāva*, and *dravya* in the place of *sattva*. To use his own language,[3] *kriyā-pradhānamākhyātam*, i.e., *ākhyāta* belongs to a class of words in which the implication of action is dominant, and *dravyapradhānaṃ nāma*, i.e., *nāman* has substance as its main denotation. In one place he has, however, made use of the word *bhāva* in order to show what is precisely signified by a verbal root.[4]

Kriyā, according to Patañjali, is not only destitute of forms, invisible and comprehended

1 एवं तर्हि क्रियायाः क्रिया निवर्त्तिका भवति—*loc. cit.*

2 नान्तरेण क्रियां भूतभविष्यद्वर्त्तमानाः काला व्यज्यन्ते। अस्त्यादिभिश्च भूतभविष्यद्वर्त्तमानाः काला व्यज्यन्ते—*loc. cit.*

3 Mahābhāṣya under the rule Pāṇ. 5.3.66.

4 भाववचनो धातुः—*op. cit.*

by means of inference, but it is essentially one and knows no difference in its real nature.[1] The apparent duality and plurality in the forms *pacataḥ* and *pacanti* are not strictly due to the corresponding number of *kriyā* (cooking), but pertain to that of *kāraka* or the agent of action.[2]

So far as the grammatical interpretation is concerned, there is, however, no material difference between *bhāva* and *dravya*. Considered from the dynamic point of view, everything has its inherent activity which is often explained in terms of utility or capacity for doing work (*arthakriyākāritva*). As synonymous with *vyāpāra* (action in general), *kriyā* represents the most vital part of all things or, in other words, everything may be looked upon as an aggregate of the aforesaid activity. This activity manifests itself in a two-fold aspect, namely, *bhāva* and *dravya*: one as functioning and the other as accomplished action. To Bhartṛhari everything is thus made up of the subtle element of *śakti* (active force).[3] Grammarians have explained the circumstances under which *bhāva* (action) gets

1 एका च क्रिया—*op. cit.* and भाव: पुनरेक एव—

Mahābhāṣya under the rule Pāṇ. 3.1.67.

2 नैतानि क्रियापेक्षाणि। किं तर्हि? साधनापेक्षाणि—*op. cit.*

3 Vākyapadīya, 3.2. (Sādhanasamuddeśa).

itself materialised into *dravya*.[1] When it is predicated (*abhihita*) by a *kṛt*-suffix (as in *pākaḥ*) and the completion of action is denoted thereby, a *bhāva* necessarily crystallises into *dravya* (being), and is grammatically treated as if it were a noun or substance (rather than action) having number, gender and case-terminations.[2] *Dravya* and *kriyā* seem to be interdependent or convertible with each other. Durga has clearly shown how *kriyā* is indirectly traceable in all forms of *nāman* (noun) and how, on the other hand, *kriyā* also carries with it an idea of substance as well.[3] What, then, makes the difference between the two? It is stated in clear terms that we have *ākhyāta* when stress is laid on *action* and *nāman* when the idea of substance comes into more prominence. Apart from the intention of the speaker (*vivakṣā*), says Durga, there is, therefore, no other criterion to mark the difference between the two.

We do not think it worth our while to discuss other definitions in this connexion,

[1] कृदभिहितो भावो द्रव्यवद्भवतीति—
Mahābhāṣya under Pāṇ. 5.4.19.

[2] क्रियाभिनिर्वृत्तिवशोपजातः कृदन्तशब्दाभिहितो यदा स्यात्।
संख्याविभक्त्यव्ययलिङ्गयुक्तो भावस्तदा द्रव्यमिवोपलक्ष्यः॥
Bṛhaddevatā, I.44.

[3] यथैव ह्याख्याते विद्यमानमपि द्रव्यमविवक्षितमेवमिहापि विद्यमानापि क्रियाविवक्षिता द्रव्यपरत्वात् सत्त्वशब्दस्य—Durga on Nirukta, I. 1.

because they do not materially differ from those of Yāska and are couched almost in the very same language.[1] We should carefully remember here one thing that what is called *prātipadika* by Pāṇini is not at all distinct from *nāman* as such.[2]

It will not be irrelevant here to consider Aristotle's exposition of noun and verb. In his definition of the noun Aristotle seems to have given rather undue prominence to the idea of time without taking notice of the more fundamental notion of action which is so intimately associated with the conception of verb in general.[3] No doubt verbs in their various forms are found to connote different phases of time (present, past and future), or to state the same in other words, *kriyā* and *kāla* are inseparably connected with each other. But we can hardly eliminate the idea of action from that of the verb without striking

[1] शब्देनाच्चारितेनेह येन द्रव्यं प्रतीयते ।
तदक्षरविधौ युक्तं नामेत्याहुर्मनीषिण: ॥—Bṛhaddevatā, I.42.

तन्नाम येनाभिदधाति सत्त्वं तदाख्यातं येन भावं स धातु:—
Ṛk-Prātiśākhya, XXII. 5.

वस्तुवाचीनि नामानि and स्याद्यन्तमिह नामेष्टम्—
Kātantra-Vyākaraṇa.

[2] यत् प्रातिपदिकं प्रोक्तं तन्नाम्नो नातिरिच्यते ।—
Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā, 14.

[3] A Verb is a composite significant sound, marking time, in which, as in the noun, no part is in itself significant. *Poetics*, XX. 6-11, Butcher's ed., p. 75.

at the very life of it. Aristotle's definition of noun also appears to be defective from the Indian grammatical point of view, because it is not only negative in form but also virtually incomplete to the student of grammar.[1]

Now we turn to the interpretation of *upasarga* and *nipāta*. In the *Ṛk-Prātiśākhya* we find the definitions of four parts of speech put together within the short compass of a single verse.[2] As regards prepositions, Yāska had to quote the authority of Śākaṭāyana that 'prepositions have no signification apart from that of nouns and verbs to which they are attached,' *i.e.*, when detached from nouns and verbs *upasargas* are found to have no meaning of their own.[3] In their isolated forms prepositions are as meaningless as letters separated from a composite word. Prepositions as well as particles are not generally considered to be significant by themselves.[4] This view was,

[1] A Noun is a composite significant sound, not marking time, of which no part is in itself significant.—*Op. cit.*

[2] क्रियावाचकमाख्यातमुपसर्गो विशेषकृत् ।
सत्त्वाभिधायकं नाम निपातः पादपूरणः ॥
—Ṛk-Prātiśākhya, XII. 8.

[3] न निर्बद्धा उपसर्गा अर्थान्निराहुरिति शाकटायनः—Nirukta, I. 3.

[4] साक्षान्न तेषामर्थाभिधानशक्तिरस्ति पृथग्विरचितानामित्यभिप्रायः। यथा वर्णानां पदगतानामर्थाभिधानशक्तिर्नास्ति एवमेतेषामपि नामाख्यातवियोगेऽर्थाभिधानशक्तिर्नास्ति—Durga under Nirukta, I. 3.

however, contradicted by Gārgya who holds, on the contrary, that prepositions, even when they are disintegrated from nouns and verbs, are found to possess various meanings.[1] Yāska probably expresses his own view, consistently with that of the grammarian, when he goes to maintain that the main function of prepositions is to specialise the meaning of nouns and verbs, or, in other words, prepositions should be regarded rather as indicative (*dyotaka*) than denotative (*vācaka*).[2] This *indicative* character of prepositions has been unanimously maintained by all grammarians.[3] The distinction between the meaning of verbs and prepositions has been clearly pointed out by Durga. While some particular kind of action, says he, is indicated by prepositions, action in general is denoted by the verb.[4] With a view to show that prepositions are significant by themselves, Yāska has mentioned a list of twenty prepositions, such as are generally found in grammar, together

[1] उच्चावचाः पदार्था भवन्तीति गार्ग्यः—Nirukta, I. 3.

[2] नामाख्यातयोस्तु कर्मोपसंयोगद्योतका भवन्ति—Nirukta, I. 3.

[3] क्रियाविशेषक उपसर्गः—Mahābhāṣya under Pāṇ. 1.3.1.
सम्भवाद्द्योतकोऽपि वा—Vākyapadīya, 2.190.
उपसर्गाणां विशेषद्योतकत्वमुच्यते—Puṇyarāja under Vākya.,2.189.
उपसर्गास्त्वर्थविशेषस्य द्योतकाः—Bhaṭṭoji under Pāṇ. 8.4.18.
द्योतकाः प्रादयो येन निपातारचादयस्तथा—Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa, 42.

4. तस्मादुपपन्नमुपसर्गस्य क्रियाविशेषोऽर्थः क्रियासामान्यमात्रमाख्यातस्येति—Durga under Nirukta, I. 3.

with their particular meanings.[1] These prepositions come under the purview of the rule Pāṇ., 1. 4. 58. From what we have learnt from the decision arrived at by Gārgya,[2] it is not altogether improbable that most of these prepositions were once used as independent words and had their particular meanings sanctioned by popular usage.

Upasargas, according to Pāṇini, belong to a more comprehensive class, namely, *nipāta*, which denotes something other than substance.[3] It is evident from the rule Pāṇ., 1.4.93, that Pāṇini used to recognise prepositions as significant with the exception of *adhi* and *pari* which by special sanction of grammar are treated rather as *karmapravacanīya*. Speaking from a grammatical point of view, words like *pra*, *parā*, etc., are first *nipāta* (particle) and get the designation of *upasarga* only when they are joined with the verbal root, or to state it more clearly, it is particularly the conjunction with the verb that confers upon a number of *nipātas* this special designation of *upasarga*.[4] The dictum that, 'prepositions indicate the special meaning of nouns and verbs' is not grammatically a

[1] Nirukta, I. 3.

[2] तत्र यदुक्तमनर्थकाः पृथगवस्थिता उपसर्गा इत्येतदयुक्तम्—Durga.

[3] प्रादयोऽसत्त्ववचना निपातसंज्ञा भवन्ति। तत उपसर्गाः क्रियायोग इति—
Mahābhāṣya under Pāṇ. 1.4.59.

[4] उपसर्गाः क्रियायोगे—Pāṇ. 1.4.59.

correct statement,[1] because *upasargas*, as a rule, are never joined with nouns but with verbs. It is only indirectly, says Durga, that a preposition, functioning as a part of the verb, comes to be associated with nouns.[2]

Grammarians have subscribed to the view that a verbal root admits of several meanings.[3] They are not, therefore, prepared to assign any particular meanings to prepositions as such. This view has also been supported by a mode of inference.[4] What we usually explain as the special meanings of prepositions (perfection, proximity, etc.) are said to be denoted by roots in their pure and simple forms. The difference of sense, so to speak, between *tiṣṭhati* and *pratiṣṭhate* is not held to be due to the presence of *pra*. The root *sthā* is supposed to have both the meanings. On the strength of this decision Patañjali has clearly stated that *tiṣṭhati* alone, without being conjoined with the necessary *upasarga* (*pra*), is capable of denoting both motion as well as stoppage of motion.[5]

[1] अत्र नाम्नः कर्मोपसंयोगद्योतका भवन्तीत्येवं न गृह्यते। 'उपसर्गाः क्रियायोगे' इति प्रसिद्धो ह्युपसर्गाणां क्रियापदेन योगो न नाम्ना—

Durga under Nirukta, I. 3.

[2] उपसर्गा हि क्रियाङ्गत्वेनैव नामान्यास्कन्दन्तीति—*loc. cit.*

[3] बह्वर्था अपि धातवो भवन्ति—Mahābhāṣya under Pāṇ. 1.3.1.

[4] धातुश्च सामान्यतोदृष्टेनानुमानेनानेकार्थः—

Puṇyarāja under Vākya., 2.191.

[5] तिष्ठतिरेव व्रजिक्रियामाह तिष्ठतिरेव व्रजिक्रियायां निवृत्तिम्—

Mahābhāṣya under Pāṇ. 1. 3. 1.

Following in the wake of his predecessors Bhartṛhari has not only maintained the indicativeness (*dyotakatva*) of prepositions but has shown how certain prepositions, as *pra* in *pratiṣṭhate*, may be viewed as directly expressive of sense (*vācaka*), and others as auxiliary (*sahakārī*) enlarging the denotative power of the roots.[1] Puṇyarāja has made mention of a *kārikā* which roughly corresponds with this threefold characteristic of prepositions.[2] He has at last come to a conclusion in concurrence with Bhartṛhari and put a stop to all controversy as to whether prepositions are independently significant or play the subordinate part by bringing out the inherent signification of verbal roots.[3] It is said that in cases of verbs joined with prepositions the meaning is derived usually from a harmonious combination of *dhātu* and *upasarga* and not from any one of them severally.[4] Now the conclusion that forces itself upon us is that *upasargas* co-operate with *dhātus*

[1] स वाचको विशेषाणां सम्भवाद्योतकोऽपि वा ।
शक्त्याधानाय धातोर्वा सहकारी प्रयुज्यते ॥—Vākyapadīya, 2.190.

[2] धात्वर्थं बाधते कश्चित् कश्चित्तमनुवर्त्तते ।
तमेव विशिनष्ट्यन्य उपसर्गगतिस्त्रिधा ॥—
quoted by Puṇyarāja under Vākya., 2.190.

[3] Vākyapadīya, 2, 192.

[4] धातूपसर्गौ सम्भूयैवार्थविशेषं ब्रूत इति धातोरर्थाभिधाने सहकारिण उपसर्गाः—
Puṇyarāja under Vākya., 2.192.

so as to bring out the intended sense, and thus serve as accessories to the verbal root.

In some cases prepositions and roots seem to have been blended together so inseparably that one finds it difficult to discriminate the radical element from the composite form. The root *saṃgrām* is an instance of this type.[1] On the evidence of this and similar other cases Bhartṛhari has been compelled to admit that a *dhātu* comprehends in itself those *upasargas* with which it has a natural affinity, *i.e.*, the designation of *dhātu* is assigned to the compound or united form (*upasarga* + *dhātu*).[2] It is only for the sake of grammatical operation (such as the augment *aṭ*) that we differentiate a root from the preposition which forms an integral part of it, but we should bear in mind that the meaning is expressed by the whole composite word.[3] Moreover, a verb is related to a *kāraka* together with the preposition, as, for instance, *anubhūyate* has got a transitive use in the passive voice, although the simple form *bhavati* is intransitive.[4]

[1] तथा हि सङ्ग्रामयतेः सोपसर्गाद्विधिः स्मृतः ।—Vākyapadīya, 2.183.

[2] सोपसर्गाणामेव धातुत्वम्—Puṇyarāja under Vākya., 2. 182.

[3] अडादीनां व्यवस्थार्थं पृथक्त्वेन विकल्पनम् ।
धातूपसर्गयोः शास्त्रे धातुरेव तु तादृशः ॥—Vākyapadīya, 2. 182.

[4] साधनैर्याति सम्बन्धं तथाभूतैव सा क्रिया ।—*Op. cit.*, 2. 184.
उपसर्गविशिष्टैव कारकसम्बन्धमुपगच्छति । एवं चानुभूयते इति कर्मणि लकारः सिध्यति—Puṇyarāja.

Upasargas have their position fixed, *i.e.*, they are prefixed to verbs. The word 'preposition' seems to be really significant in this respect. But no such restriction regarding their position was strictly observed in the early period of the Vedic language when prepositions are supposed to have been used as independent words and not as merely subordinate parts of verbs. Apart from the question of position, there arises another controversial problem in regard to their grammatical relation. There is, however, some difficulty in ascertaining if a root is first joined with a preposition and is then associated with *kārakas* or *vice versa*. Under the rule Pāṇ. 6. 1. 135, Patañjali has referred to two theories :[1] (*i*) a root is first joined with a preposition and afterwards gets itself connected with a *kāraka* ; (*ii*) a root is first related to a *kāraka* and next to a preposition. This is purely a question pertaining to order (*krama*). The second dictum, though preferable to the first,[2] is not entirely free from defect. Because those who support it are likely to be faced with a difficulty, as Patañjali points out, in explaining the transitive use of the root *ās* as in the

[1] पूर्वं हि धातुरुपसर्गेण युज्यते पश्चात् साधनेनेति। नैतत् सारम्। पूर्वं धातुः साधनेन युज्यते पश्चादुपसर्गेण—Mahābhāṣya.

[2] साधनं हि क्रियां निर्वर्तयति तामुपसर्गो विशिनष्ट्यभिनिर्वृत्तस्य चार्थस्योपसर्गेण विशेषः शक्यो वक्तुम्—*loc. cit.*

expression *upāsyate guruḥ* (the teacher is worshipped).[1] The first one has, therefore, been more acceptable than the other from the grammatical point of view.[2]

Yāska derives *nipāta* as a word that exhibits several meanings.[3] He then goes to divide particles into three classes:[4] the four particles, namely, *iva*, *na*, *cit* and *nu*, are generally used to imply 'comparison;' *vā*, *ca*, etc., indicate 'collection of meanings;' and *kam*, *im*, *it* and *u*, though meaningless by themselves, are used for the sake of completing the part of a numbered verse. What is linguistically interesting here is that Yāska has taken notice of both the popular (*bhāṣā*) and the Vedic language (*anvadhyāya* or *chandas*) in course of illustrating the use of particles falling under the above groups. The particle *na*, he observes, is only negative in the *bhāṣā*, whereas it is both negative and comparative in the *chandas*.[5]

According to the opinion of Pāṇini, *nipātas* beginning with *ca* belong to a class of words which denote something (*samuccaya*,

1 *Loc. cit.*

2 साधनैर्याति सम्बन्धं तथाभूतैव सा क्रिया ।—Vākyapadīya, 2. 184.

3 निपाता उच्चावचेष्वर्थेषु निपतन्ति—Nirukta, I. 4.

4 उपमार्थोऽपि कर्मोपसंग्रहार्थोऽपि पदपूरणाः—*loc. cit.*

5 नेति प्रतिषेधार्थीयो भाषायामुभयमन्वध्यायम्—*loc. cit.*

sādṛśya, etc.) other than substance.[1] *Upasargas*, as we have already pointed out, form only a subdivision of *nipāta* with this special characteristic that they are joined with verbs and not with nouns.[2] *Nipātas*, again, in a wider sense, fall under the scope of *avyaya* (indeclinable) which is regarded as the highest genus.[3]

Particles generally fall under two distinct categories, namely, indicative (*dyotaka*) and denotative (*vācaka*).[4] Particles are neither indicative nor denotative in an absolute sense so far as their uses are concerned. There are particles which, like prepositions, serve only to indicate the meaning of nouns or discharge a subordinate function ; and there are others which are really denotative, *i.e.*, have the natural power of denoting the sense.[5] But this denotative power is not so prominent and innate with particles as to turn them into significant words capable of independent use. As a matter of fact, the grammarian

[1] Pāṇ. 1. 4. 57.

[2] उपसर्गाः क्रियायोगे—Pāṇ. 1. 4. 59.

[3] Pāṇ. 1. 1. 37.

[4] निपाता द्योतकाः केचित् पृथगर्थाभिधायिनः ।
आगमा इव केऽपि स्युः सम्भूयार्थस्य वाचकाः ॥

—Vākyapadīya, 2. 194.

[5] तेषामुपसर्गवत् द्योतकत्वं क्वचित् यथा वृक्षश्च प्लक्षश्चेत्यादौ । चादीनां केवलानां च केषांचित् पृथगर्थाभिधायित्वं वाचकत्वमेव सिद्धमिति—Puṇyarāja.

has treated particles as only *indicative*, but has not adequately emphasised their *denotative* aspect. The line of argument whereby Bhartṛhari has finally rejected their expressiveness is as follows: the capacity for independent use is a criterion of denotativeness (*vācakatva*). Judged by this logical standard, particles, like suffixes, seem to have no signification inherent in them, since they are not capable of being used independently of other words.[1] One is not allowed, for instance, to use *śobhanaḥ ca* in the sense of a 'beautiful collection,' though the particle *ca* is generally explained as meaning *samuccaya* (collection).

What gave rise to much dispute between the Naiyāyikas and the grammarians is the question whether particles are denotative or indicative. The ground for contention is that while the Naiyāyikas have drawn a specific line of distinction between particles and prepositions by including the former within the category of *sārthaka* (significant words),[2] and treating the latter only as *dyotaka*, the grammarians did not make such an unwarrantable distinction. To the grammarian both

[1] चादयो न प्रयुज्यन्ते पदत्वे सति केवलाः ।
प्रत्ययो वाचकत्वेऽपि केवलो न प्रयुज्यते ॥—Vākyapadīya, 2. 196.

[2] शब्दान्तरमपेक्ष्यैव सार्थकः स्वार्थबोधकृत् ।
प्रकृतिः प्रत्ययश्चैव निपातश्चेति स त्रिधा ॥—Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā, 6.

particles and prepositions are *indicative.*[1] The principle, argues the author of the *Vaiyākaraṇa-bhūṣaṇa,* whereby the indicativeness of prepositions has been evidently established is practically the same as what goes to prove the indicative character of particles, there being nothing to account for their differential treatment.[2]

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[1] द्योतकाः प्रादयो येन निपाताश्चादयस्तथा ।

—Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa, 42.

[2] प्रादयो द्योतकाश्चादयस्तु वाचका इति न्यायमते स्थितं वैषम्यमयुक्तं युक्ति-साम्यात्—*op. cit.*

CHAPTER VII

Division and Denotation of Words

Analysis of words into stems and suffixes—method of agreement and difference—division of words according to denotation—class-theory of the Mīmāṃsakas—the view of Pāṇini—conception of *padārtha* as in the old and new schools of Logic—Bhartṛhari on the question of *jāti* and *vyakti*—necessity of *adhyāropa*—*dravya-vāda* and the epistemological explanation—Vaiśeṣika categories and the Vedāntic monism—the Buddhist doctrine of *apoha*—rhetorical and logical ways of classifying words—primary and secondary signification—the etymological classification of words.

The analysers of speech, as is quite evident, did not stop only with the classification of speech, but proceeded a step further to analyse these parts of speech into their ultimate elements, *viz.*, stems and formative suffixes. This kind of analysis, etymologically known as *saṃskāra*,[1] is what forms the fundamental principle of Sanskrit grammar and accounts for the popular designation *saṃskṛta*, as applied to the sacred language of the Indo-Aryans. The formation of a word by the harmonious combination of *prakṛti* and *pratyaya* is termed *śāstrakṛto yogaḥ* (grammatical conjunction) by Yāska.[2] The science of grammar derives its

[1] Nirukta, 1. 12.

[2] *Op. cit.*, 1. 2.

importance from the fact of its enunciating such principles as would show the process of both combination and disintegration of the various parts of words. Patañjali by using the expression *śabdānuśāsana* instead of the popular term *vyākaraṇa* has infused a deeper significance into it. It is sufficiently clear that the first and foremost duty of the Hindu grammarian had always been to draw a line of demarcation between the refined and vulgar (Sanskrit and *Apabhraṃśa*) speech by showing that only words of purely Sanskrit origin (recognised by the *śiṣṭas*) are capable of being grammatically analysed into the so-called *prakṛti* and *pratyaya*. Corrupt or distorted forms (as we find in *Prākṛta*) do not, on the contrary, generally come under the cognisance of the grammatical rules of derivation. The two primary parts of speech, namely, nouns and verbs, are dissolvable into *prakṛti* and *pratyaya* which are said to be permanently related to each other.[1] In consequence of this innate relationship, neither the stem nor the formative element is allowed to have independent application; and though their separate meanings have been shown by the grammarian, it is necessarily the whole composite word—*prakṛti* and *pratyaya* in their united form—that is

[1] नित्यसम्बन्धावेतावर्थौ प्रकृतिः प्रत्यय इति—
Mahābhāṣya under Pāṇ. 1. 2. 45.

popularly used to express the intended sense.[1] By 'significant word' Patañjali understands a combination of both *prakṛti* and *pratyaya* and not any one in its isolation.[2] Jagadīśa explains the relation that subsists between *prakṛti* and *pratyaya* as one of interdependence, because *prakṛti* invariably requires to be conjoined with *pratyaya* before it is said to be significant (*sārthaka*) and *vice versa*.[3]

It may be asked here : how words are broken up into their integral parts, namely, stems and suffixes, and how their respective meanings are determined by the grammarian. Much discussion has been carried on about these questions, but no solution seems to have been more scientific and accurate than what Patañjali has offered. It is by the principle of agreement and difference, says Patañjali, that the radical and formative parts of a word are separated together with their respective meanings.[4] He

[1] अर्थवत्ता नोपपद्यते केवलेनावचनात्—Vār. 7 under Pāṇ. 1. 2. 45. and समुदायस्यार्थे प्रयोगादवयवानामप्रसिद्धिरिति—

Mahābhāṣya under Pāṇ. 1. 2. 45.

[2] न केवलेन वृचशब्देनार्थो गम्यते। केन तर्हि ? सप्रत्ययकेन—*loc. cit.* again, नहि केवलेन प्रत्ययेनार्थो गम्यते। केन तर्हि ? सप्रकृतिकेनेति—

Mahābhāṣya under Pāṇ. 5. 1. 22.

[3] शब्दान्तरमपेक्ष्यैव सार्थकः स्वार्थबोधकृत्।—Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā, 6.

[4] सिद्धमेतत्। कथम् ? अन्वयाद्व्यतिरेकाच्च।—

Mahābhāṣya under Pāṇ. 1. 2. 45.

has clearly indicated the process in which bases might be distinguished from suffixes[1]: When the base of *vṛkṣaḥ* is uttered, we have a sound that ends in *a* and to which *sa* or *visarga* has been added for the sake of denoting oneness (*ekatva*). Now the meanings denoted by *vṛkṣa* and *sa* are respectively (*i*) a thing having roots, stem, branches and fruits and (*ii*) oneness. Again, when the word *vṛkṣau* is uttered, we generally find by comparing the two forms that the previous sound (*sa* in *vṛkṣaḥ*) has disappeared and a new sound, *i.e.*, *au* has made its appearance in the place. What should be particularly observed here is that the sound *vṛkṣa* (the crude form) remains unaffected in the course of above changes. Similarly, there are also absence and appearance of something so far as the meaning is concerned. The form *vṛkṣau*, for instance, does not give the idea of oneness but that of duality, while the same idea of tree is present in both the forms. Grammarians have assigned particular meanings such as oneness, duality, plurality as well as *karmatva*, etc., to that class of *pratyayas* which is generally known as *vibhakti*. What we have particularly learnt by examining the two forms, *viz.*,

[1] इह वृक्ष इत्युक्ते कश्चिच्छब्दः श्रूयते वृक्षशब्दोऽकारान्तः सकारश्च प्रत्ययः। अर्थोऽपि कश्चिद् गम्यते मूलस्कन्दफलपलाशवानेकत्वं च। वृक्षावित्युक्ते कश्चिच्छब्दो हीयते कश्चिदुपजायते कश्चिदन्वयी। सकारो हीयते औकार उपजायते वृक्षशब्दोऽकारान्तोऽन्वयी।—*loc. cit.*

vṛkṣaḥ and *vṛkṣau*, is that there are practically two parts in every word—one permanent or unmodified and the other that undergoes changes both in form and signification. The changing elements such as *sa* and *au* are called *pratyaya* (terminations), while the unmodified parts like *vṛkṣa*, etc., are known as *prakṛti* (stem). The inflexional parts with the exception of *bahuc* and *akac* are, according to the general rule of Sanskrit grammar, always used after bases.[1] The author of the Mahābhāṣya has, however, tentatively stated that *pratyayas*, as the very term implies, are significant by themselves. The etymological interpretation (*artham pratyāyayatīti*), we should remember, does not hold good in the case of the majority of *pratyayas* and is, therefore, not worthy of acceptance.[2] But Patañjali has rightly observed that there are *pratyayas* like *dvayasac*, *mātrac* and *tithac* which are not only significant but also capable of independent uses as well (without being added to other bases).[3] Here the philosopher-grammarian has hit upon a vital problem of the linguistic science. On the strength of these instances, though few in number, one is easily

[1] Pāṇ. 3. 1. 1. and 3. 1. 2.

[2] यदि प्रत्याययतीति प्रत्ययोऽविकादीनां प्रत्ययसंज्ञा न प्राप्नोति—
Mahābhāṣya under Pāṇ. 3. 1. 1.

[3] द्वयसजादीनां च केवलानां प्रयोगो दृश्यते। किमस्य द्वयसम्? किमस्य मात्रम्? काद्य तिथीति?—*loc. cit.*

inclined to believe that what are now called *pratyayas* and have their position fixed might have been once current as independent words in some remote period of the history of language.

We have repeatedly stated in these pages that the grammatical method of analysing words into their stems and suffixes has been declared as artificial by the upholder of *sphoṭavāda.* A word, according to the doctrine of *sphoṭa,* is an 'indivisible compact' and consequently knows no division into parts. Bhartṛhari has, however, admitted that the so-called division of words into *prakṛti* and *pratyaya,* though inconsistent with the strict interpretation of *sphoṭavāda,* is not absolutely unnecessary, because it helps the student of grammar to get into the meaning of words with less difficulty.

In consideration of objects denoted by words, the author of the Mahābhāṣya has classified words into four groups, namely, words denoting class, quality, action and personal names (*saṃjñās*).[1] This classification, as Nāgeśa rightly points out, is based on the distinction in regard to things for the signification of which words are used (*pravṛtti-nimitta*).[2] It should be carefully remembered

[1] चतुष्टयी शब्दानां प्रवृत्तिः—जातिशब्दा गुणशब्दाः क्रियाशब्दा यदृच्छाशब्दाश्चतुर्थाः—Mahābhāṣya, 1. 1. 2.

[2] शब्दानामर्थे या प्रवृत्तिः सा प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तभेदात् प्रकारचतुष्टयवतीत्यर्थः ।
—Pradīpoddyota.

here that this fourfold division does not really apply to things but to their attributes (*upādhi*) which are broadly divided into four classes as shown above. So far as the view of Patañjali is concerned, words signify these varieties of attributes (*tadupādhāveva saṃketaḥ*). Daṇḍin also made a similar classification but with a slight difference, adding 'substance' in the place of personal names (*yadṛcchāśabda*).[1] This was, however, adversely criticised by Jagadīśa on account of the fact that the division of Daṇḍin was not extensive enough to comprehend such privative terms as *jaḍa* (inert), *mūka* (dumb), *mūrkha* (stupid) and words like *anya* (other) and *śūnya* (void).[2] The Naiyāyikas and the rhetoricians have their distinct ways of dividing words, to which reference will be made later on.

We are confronted with an equally controversial point when we proceed to enquire whether words are denotative of class (universal) or individual. This is a problem over which Indian teachers have differed among themselves, supporting either of the standpoints.[3] A

[1] शब्दैरेव प्रतीयन्ते जातिद्रव्यगुणक्रियाः ।
चातुर्विध्यादमीषान्तु शब्द उक्तश्चतुर्विधः ॥

[2] तदेतज्जड़मूकमूर्खादीनामन्यशून्यादीनां च शब्दानामपरिग्रहापत्त्या परित्यक्तमस्माभिः ।—Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā under *kār*. 18.

[3] पदार्थानामपोद्धारे जातिर्वा द्रव्यमेव वा ।
पदार्थौ सर्वशब्दानां नित्यावेवोपवर्णितौ ॥—Vākyapadīya, 3. 2.

dispute relating to this question has been recorded in the Mīmāṃsā-sūtras (1. 3. 30-35). Having set aside all arguments advanced in favour of the *individualistic* theory of words, the Mīmāṃsakas have shown the plausibility of the view that all words without exception denote class or community.[1] The word *gauḥ* (cow), for instance, does not mean only an individual cow, but brings with it the idea of a community to which it belongs (*gotva*). While they supported the class-theory of words with all vigour, the Mīmāṃsakas did not fail to recognise the invariable connection that exists between the universal and the individual. The relation between the two is one of interdependence (*avinābhāva*), one being necessarily implied by the other in the very nature of things. The view held by Vājapyāyana in respect of the denotation of words is in agreement with that of the Mīmāṃsakas.[2] Vyāḍi was, however, an adherent of the opposite view.[3] The obvious argument in justification of his position is as follows: as a positive element directly concerned

[1] आकृतिस्तु क्रियार्थत्वात्—Mīm. sūtra, 1. 3. 33.
सर्वेषां शब्दानां जातिरेव प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तम्—Kāvyaprakāśa, 2.

[2] *Vār*. 35 under Pāṇ. 1. 2. 64.
वाजप्यायनाचार्य्यमतेन सार्वत्रिकी जातिपदार्थव्यवस्थोपपद्यते—
Helārāja under Vākya. 3. 2.

[3] द्रव्याभिधानं व्याडिः—*Vār*. 45 under Pāṇ. 1. 2. 64.

with action, the individual should be considered as the proper denotation of all words.[1] It is the pot (*ghaṭa*), so to say, which serves the purpose of fetching water, but the genus (*ghaṭatva*) has nothing to do with the action in question. This point of view is also untenable on the face of it. The *individualistic* theory, though more adaptable to our experience, is exposed to the fallacies of *endlessness* and *vagueness*.[2] What it means is this : if the individual were the denotation of words, one would have found it really difficult to determine the actual thing whereto *saṅketa* (convention) should properly be applied, because there are too many individuals to be simultaneously denoted by the utterance of a single word. All cow-individuals are, for instance, nowhere found in a body so that one might denote all of them at a time by the word *gauḥ*. Moreover, the denotation of the word *gauḥ* is not so comprehensive in its application as to include all those individuals to which no such *saṅketa* was actually restricted. Thus, if we accept this standpoint without any qualification, the exact denotation of a word will ever remain both vague and uncertain.

1 व्याडिमते तु सर्वशब्दानां द्रव्यमर्थस्तस्यैव साचात्क्रियासमन्वयोपपत्तेः—
Helārāja under Vākya, 3. 2.

2 यद्यप्यर्थक्रियाकारितया प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तियोग्या व्यक्तिरेव, तथाप्यानन्त्याद्व्यभिचाराच्च तत्र संकेतः कर्त्तुं न युज्यते—Kāvyaprakāśa, 2.

The view of Pāṇini, as explained by Patañjali, is that both the class and the individual are meant by words.[1] Patañjali has mentioned two aphorisms from the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* in order to show how the celebrated grammarian succeeded in combining the two conflicting theories as expounded by Vyāḍi and Vājapyāyana, by taking both *jāti* and *vyakti* as the proper denotation of words.

Now we turn to the Naiyāyikas who have rather given a more comprehensive definition of *padārtha*.[2] Before arriving at a definite conclusion in the midst of discordant views, Gotama seems to have carefully scrutinised both the class and the individual theories, pointing out the untenable features associated with each one of them. His arguments may be summed up in the following words: the class-theory, as formulated by the Mīmāṃsakas, does not form in itself a sufficient explanation. A class, pure and simple, *i.e.*, dissociated from individuals, is far from being the denotation of a word, since the very conception of a class invariably comprehends both the individual as well as the particular

[1] किं पुनराकृतिः पदार्थ आहोस्विद्द्रव्यम्? उभयमित्याह। कथं ज्ञायते? उभयथा ह्याचार्य्येण सूत्राणि पठितानि—Mahābhāṣya, 1. 1. 1. and पाणिनिदर्शने जातिद्रव्ये शब्देनाभिधीयेते—Helārāja under Vākya., 3.2.

[2] व्यक्त्याकृतिजातयस्तु पदार्थः—Nyāya-sūtra, 2. 2. 65.

physical arrangement (*ākṛti*) whereby those individuals are distinguished from others.[1] The individual-theory is, as we have already observed, vitiated by stupendous anomaly (*anavasthānāt*),[2] because an individual without its correlation to the particular class is nowhere denoted by a word.[3] It is not an unqualified individual that is ever denoted by a word, or, in other words, what is denoted by a *śabda* is an individual having relation with the genus to which it belongs. As each of these two views has proved to be insufficient and unsatisfactory on a closer examination of facts, Gotama has finally stated that *padārtha* (denotation of word) comprehends three elements, namely, individual as well as form and class which are connected with one another by interdependence (*avinābhāva*). No one of these is singly denoted by a word. It is the combination of these three elements that goes to constitute *padārtha* in its intrinsic aspect. When we consider the meaning of a word, what we generally understand is an individual pertaining to a particular class and possessing certain physical features peculiar to itself.[4]

[1] *Op. cit.*, 2. 2. 64.

[2] *Op. cit.*, 2. 2. 60.

[3] न द्रव्यमात्रमविशिष्टं जात्या विनाभिधीयते—
Vātsyāyana-bhāṣya under Nyāya-sūtra, 2. 2. 60.

[4] Nyāya-sūtra, 2. 2: 58.

The exponents of the new school of Logic have practically maintained the same position. It is, they hold, neither the class nor the individual alone that is denoted by a word, but what is really signified is the individual conditioned or qualified by the genus.[1] As the class-theory tends to make the cognition of an individual almost impossible,[2] they find it more reasonable to restrict the so-called *saṅketa* to the 'individual characterised by the genus.' The difference between the two schools is not, however, very great. The addition of *ākṛti* in the conception of *padārtha* is, to speak the truth, quite immaterial in view of the inseparable relation that exists between an individual and its particular form. All individuals belonging to a class are marked by a distinct arrangement of their physical structure. A class, according to Patañjali, is determined by *ākṛti*, that is, by the particular form of the individuals that go to constitute it.[3]

We can ill afford to close this discussion without referring to the Vākyapadīya. Bhartṛhari has given an elaborate discourse in two sections (*jātisamuddeśa* and

[1] जातिमान् शब्दार्थः। शक्तिर्जात्याकृतिविशिष्टव्यक्तौ विश्राम्यति—
Muktāvalī.

[2] जातिमात्रे हि सङ्केताद्व्यक्तेर्भानं सुदुष्करम्।—
Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā, 19.

[3] आकृतिग्रहणा जातिः—Mahābhāṣya under Pāṇ. 4.1.63.

vyaktisamuddeśa) that are particularly devoted to the various issues involved in the question of *jāti* and *vyakti*. He has not only brought together different views on the subject and presented them in a logical way, but has finally arrived at a position which seems to be more philosophical than grammatical. The class-theory comes first for consideration. But the difficulty with which one is confronted in following this theory in its rigid form is that *jāti* is nowhere directly related to the action (*kriyā*), as denoted by the main constituent of a sentence (verb). *Kriyā* is, as in *gāmānaya*, connected with *kāraka* (case) and not with the class (*gotva*). It is needless to say that the class is distinct from what is grammatically known as *kāraka*. The advocates of the class-theory seem to have been divided in their ways of meeting these arguments: the one holding class (*jāti*) as *upalakṣaṇa*, *viz.*, a characteristic mark of the power of denotation (*śaktyupalakṣaṇa*), the other maintaining that *jāti* itself is denoted by the force of implication.[1] The former lays stress on association (*sāhacarya*) and the latter on implication (*tātparya*).[2] *Association* here means that a

[1] केषां चित्साहचर्य्येण जातिः शक्त्युपलक्षणम्—Vākyapadiya, 3. 3.

[2] इह केषांचिज्जातिवादिनामेकार्थसमवायाच्छक्तेः प्रतिपादने जातिरुपलक्षण-मुपाय इति मतम्। अन्येषां पुनस्तात्पर्य्येण जातिरेव शब्देन प्रतिपाद्यते।—Helārāja.

class comprises a good many individuals which are naturally associated with the very idea of that class. It is to be noted here that the Indian philosophers have in this connexion recognised more than one kind of *jāti* such as *svā-jāti*, *śabdatva-jāti*, *artha-jāti*, etc. Bhartṛhari proceeds to say that every word, as a rule, first denotes a *jāti* which is not only uncommon (*asādhāraṇa*) but intimately connected with it, and then indicates the community of objects (*artha-jāti*) by means of transference (*adhyāropa*).[1] The word *gauḥ* gives, for instance, the idea of a class like *go-śabdatva*, that is to say, a class pertaining to all *go-śabdas*. What a *word in its own form* (*śabdasvarūpa*) usually implies is this kind of *jāti* which is characterised by the particular form of the word itself. This is, however, distinguished from the class generally known as *śabdatva* which inheres in all varieties of words and not confined to any specific group only.[2]

Now the question arises: how to bring together *śabda-jāti* and *artha-jāti* into a close correlation? It should be premised at the outset that they are not convertible with

1 स्वा जातिः प्रथमं शब्दैः सर्वैरेवाभिधीयते ।
ततोऽर्थजातिरूपेषु तदध्यारोपकल्पना ॥—Vākyapadīya, 3. 6.

2 स्वा आत्मीया गोशब्दात्मिका, न तु सकलशब्दसाधारणी शब्दत्वादिः—Helārāja.

each other but remain distinct for all practical purposes. We need not refer here to the Vedāntic doctrine of *Śabda-Brahman*, as expounded by Bhartṛhari just in the opening verse of his philosophical treatise on grammar, for it transcends all human knowledge by making the material world a modification resulting from the *eternal Verbum*.[1] While the meaning, Helārāja rightly observes, seems to be understood at once from the utterance of a word by virtue of the supposed identity between *śabda* and *artha*, we should not forget that succession of time actually intervenes between the two.[2] What happens is that a word first gives the idea of its own class (*svā-jāti*) and denotes the intended object only afterwards.[3] But, in spite of the wide difference between the two, *śabda-jāti* and *artha-jāti* are rendered convertible with each other through the mode of transferring one to the other (*adhyāropa*). This sort of transference (*āropa*) is what lends an appearance of identity between *śabda* and *artha*. We have recourse to such an *āropa* whenever an attempt is made on our part to discern the relation of a word

1 विवर्त्ततेऽर्थभावेन प्रक्रिया जगतो यतः ।—Vākyapadīya, 1. 1.

2 अर्थस्य झटित्येव शब्दस्वरूपाभेदेनावबोधेऽपि यथाप्रतिपादितक्रमाश्रयेण—
Helārāja under Vākya. 3.6.

3 स्वजातिप्रत्यायनादनन्तरमर्थजातीनां गोत्वादीनामात्मसु तस्याः शब्दजातेः समारोपस्य कल्पना—*loc. cit.*

with its meaning. A similar case of *āropa* is found in the oft-quoted expression *gaurvāhīkaḥ* (the Vāhīka is like an ox) where stupidity pertaining to the bovine species is attributed to a Vāhīka by the transference of properties. This process of transference, which has been in abundant use from the very dawn of the poetic activity of man, forms the basic principle of the so-called *rūpakālaṃkāra* and as such finds much favour with the poets in all ages.

The adherents of the *jāti-vāda* have thus tried to prove, though not without the risk of being misunderstood, that *jāti* forms the denotation of all words. They have not only gone to the indefensible extent of holding that proper names (*saṃjñā-śabda*) are also significant of class,[1] but have made an unphilosophical remark that there is no bar to a class being included in another class.[2] To an unsophisticated critic it is almost inconceivable how a class, say *gotva*, may be capable of having another class (as *gotva-tva*) as its substratum. The well-considered decision of the majority of philosophers, that is, *a class cannot have another class*,[3] has thus been overridden by a school of grammarians who have taken such an

[1] एवं च संज्ञाशब्दानामपि जातिवादिमते जातिशब्दत्वमित्येकैव शब्दानां प्रवृत्तिः—Helārāja under Vākya., 3. 12.

[2] जात्याभिधायिनो जात्यादिशब्दा अपि जातिवाचिन एव—*loc. cit.*

[3] निःसामान्यानि सामान्यानीति—*loc. cit.*

extreme view of the *jāti-vāda*.[1] One will be surprised to see how this theory, absolutely untenable in its extreme form, has been accompanied by a number of misconceptions. According to the dictum, that a thing denoted by a word is nothing but a class, even quality and action are liable to be considered as *jāti* for the simple reason of their being signified by their corresponding words.[2]

The *dravyavādins*, with whom *dravya*, or more properly the properties of *dravya*, is the meaning of all words, were not less vigorous in defending their own position, *viz.*, all that is denoted by words is essentially the property pertaining to *dravya*.[3] According to this doctrine which is equally persistent like the former one, quality, action, number, class and gender all might be looked upon as inherent properties of matter.[4] In spite of the apparent difference between the two standpoints, one does not, however, fail to trace some features

1 वैयाकरणानां शब्दार्थोऽर्थ इति जातिष्वपि जातिरविरुद्धा—*loc. cit.*

2 तथा चान्वयिरूपेण गुणोऽप्यभिधीयमानो जातिरेव। एवं क्रियाप्यभेदेनाभिधीयमाना जातिः—*loc. cit.*

3 द्रव्यधर्मा पदार्थे तु द्रव्ये सर्वार्थं इष्यते।
द्रव्यधर्माश्रयाद द्रव्यमतः सर्वार्थं इष्यते॥—Vākyapadīya, 3. 13.

4 शब्दैः प्रतायमाना गुणादयो द्रव्यधर्माणः। सर्वोऽर्थो द्रव्यरूपेणाभिधीयते।—Helārāja.

common to both. Whether the meaning is either *jāti* or *dravya*, we cannot help having recourse to *upacāra* or *adhyāropa* (transference of sense), to which we have already referred.[1] Just as in the former case things other than *jāti* are also treated as such by means of *upacāra*, so in the latter class, quality, action, etc., have been interpreted as properties of matter on the strength of the same principle.

The grammatical dissertations in Sanskrit are not confined merely to the question relating to the formation and analysis of words, but have sometimes comprehended in their scope such problems as are more or less epistemological in character. While dealing with so important and comprehensive a subject as the relation between sound and meaning, grammar has had to come in close touch with most of the departments of knowledge. There is hardly any knowledge that is not capable of being expressed in language. To the Naiyāyikas all that is knowable is also expressible by words (*sarvaṃ vācyaṃ jñeyatvāt*). The science of grammar has been, therefore, rightly called the 'companion of all branches of learning.'[2] It is well known to the student of grammar that

[1] तथा ममापि जातिवादिनो मुख्यां जातिमभिदधति केचिदुपचरितामन्य इति मतद्वयेऽपि साम्यम्—*loc. cit.*

[2] सर्ववेदपारिषदं हीदं शास्त्रम्—Mahābhāṣya under Pān. 6.3.14.

the author of the Mahābhāṣya and its powerful exponent were highly philosophical in their treatment of grammatical problems. Their speculative mind was, as we often find, at work upon the true psychology of language. Bhartṛhari has carefully shown how the problem of *padārtha*, specially that of class as the denotation of words, might also be approached from an epistemological point of view.[1] First, that the meaning of a word is exactly the same as is denoted by it, is in agreement with the tenet of the *vijñānavādins*.[2] It is said that the use of words at once gives rise to a kind of intelligence with a definite form which generally corresponds to the object of our experience.[3] What actually comes to our knowledge whenever we hear the sound *gauḥ* is, for example, the particular form in which the individual in question makes its impression on the mind. A *dravya* (thing) is, according to this philosophy, not necessarily a material object but an intellectual image or form as we may call it.[4] A thing, denoted

[1] इदानीं विज्ञानवादिनापि पदार्थव्यवस्थामाह—
Helārāja on Vākya., 3. 19.

[2] सर्वपार्षदं हीदं शास्त्रमिति शब्दार्थोऽर्थ इति वा पदार्थव्यवस्था—*loc. cit.*

[3] अनुप्रवृत्तिरूपां यां प्रख्यातामाकृतिं विदुः ।
केचिद्व्यावृत्तिरूपां तु द्रव्यत्वेन प्रचक्षते ॥—Vākyapadīya, 3. 19.

[4] व्यावृत्ताकारबुद्धिसन्निवेशित्वादाकारोऽत्र दर्शने द्रव्यमिति प्रसङ्गादुक्तम्—
Helārāja.

as it is by a word, is more intellectual than material. Now, what is primarily denoted by a word is the sense that has its origin in intellect (*bauddhārthasya vācyatvam*), the world of objects being only a copy of mental states.[1] To the *vijñānavādins* the whole world of thought is at best conceptual; all universals and individuals have their existence in the mind with or without correspondence to the material object perceptible by our sense-organs.[2] The light this view throws upon the determination of meaning is that along with the utterance of a word a definite intellectual image is formed or roused within the mind, and that it is this particular image which one usually understands as the denotation of words.[3] It does not matter much whether this image has or has not a corresponding embodiment in the world of realities,[4] because there is scarcely any rule to the effect that whatever is intellectually denoted by a word must have its objective equivalent or counterpart in all cases. Moreover, it is

1 अन्तःकरणधर्मस्य भागा बहिरवस्थिताः—Vākyapadīya.

2 विज्ञाननये सर्वमेव प्रत्ययात्मकमङ्गीकृतम्—*loc. cit.*; अन्तस्थ एवायं सर्वव्यवहारो न विज्ञानव्यतिरिक्तो बाह्योऽर्थोऽस्तीति—Śaṅkara under Brahmasūtra, 2.2.28.

3 शब्दादुच्चरितात्तदाकारवती बुद्धिरुत्पद्यते इति तदाकारस्यैव शब्दार्थत्वं न बुद्धेः—Helārāja under Vākya., 3. 19.

4 स ह्याकारो बाह्योऽस्तु न वा, शब्दवाच्यत्वस्य न काचित् क्षतिः—*loc. cit.*

not altogether impossible to picture before our mind a purely subjective world of concepts apart from the one we are familiar with ; and a school of Buddhist philosophers (*yogācāra*) has actually done so. Their standpoint is that there is no external world composed of atoms apart from the internal knowledge. We should bear in mind that this doctrine of pure idealism stands unique in its interpretation of an extra-material world made up of ideas and ideas alone.[1] The external world, if it has any permanent and sensuous existence, ought to be considered as mere copies of mental impressions.

While his natural bias for subtle thinking and his power of bringing together all that is interconnected are remarkably visible in all phases of his grammatical discourses, Bhartṛhari seems to be always at his best when he finally winds up all discussions with reference to Vedāntic monism. The non-dualistic philosophy has been one in which all disputes and doubts find their ultimate but harmonious solution—' where the voice of the heart's pain is silenced.' The question of *jāti* (universal) and *vyakti* (particular) could not stand in the face

[1] As it is contrary to human experience, the Sāṃkhya and other systems of Hindu philosophy have refused to attach any importance to this theory (*cf.* 'न विज्ञानमात्रं बाह्यप्रतीतेः'—Sāṃkhya-sūtra, 1.42. 'नाभाव उपलब्धेः'—Brahma-sūtra, 2.2.28, and Nyāya-sūtra, 4.2.30).

of all-eliminating non-dualism as maintained by the Vedāntins. In spite of the difference created by attributes (*upādhi*) such as time and space, all things, emanating as they are from a common source, are said to have unity in themselves.[1] The apparent manifoldness is only due to illusion (*adhyāsa*). It is the difference of attributes which is responsible for the seeming distinction between class and individual. As we cannot visualise a thing in its own and real form, that is, as destitute of its accidental attributes, nothing that is somehow or other dissociated from *upādhi* is generally comprehended by us.[2] Proceeding to his conclusion Bhartṛhari has stated that there is only one Supreme Thing, residing far beyond the limitation of time and space and possessing all activity by its very nature, which knows neither division nor distinction of any kind.[3] The categories (*padārtha*) enunciated by the Vaiśeṣikas are not accordingly different objects of thought but virtually represent the various

[1] ननु वस्तूनां देशकालादिनिमित्तो भेद इति तदनादरेणाभिन्नान्येव तानि सिद्धानीति—

भिन्ना इति परोपाधिरभिन्ना इति वा पुनः।

भावात्मसु प्रपञ्चोऽयं संसृष्टेष्वेव जायते॥—Vākyapadīya, 3. 20.

[2] निरुपाधिनो वस्तुनोऽव्यवहार्यत्वात् सर्व एव परोपाश्रयो व्यवहारः—
Helārāja.

[3] सर्वशक्त्यात्मभूतत्वमेकस्यैवेति निर्णयः।

भावानामात्मभेदस्य कल्पना स्यादनर्थिका॥—Vākyapadīya, 3. 22.

types of activity (*śakti*) belonging to one and the same thing.[1] From an insight into this mystic philosophy it becomes quite evident that the division of *padārtha* into class and individual is more formal or imaginary than real.[2] But this division, however imaginary and far from the truth, is not altogether uncompromising with the essence of *advaita* (non-dualistic) philosophy. No grammarian seems to have gone further in detail than Bhartṛhari, particularly in an enquiry leading to the ultimate nature of *jāti* and *vyakti*. The *real* and *unreal* elements, he continues, subsisting in all phenomenal entities, indicate respectively class and individual.[3] While individuals are of short duration and limited by nature, the class is a reality whereof the essence or identity cannot be blotted out by any means. Moreover, individuals suffer distortions and mutations of various kinds, whereas *jāti* remains above all these and keeps its identity absolutely unchanged. *Jāti* not only forms the life-giving essence of a thing but shines in its own form, detached from individuals, when all accidental modifications

[1] तस्माद् द्रव्यादयः सर्वाः शक्तयो भिन्नलक्षणाः ।
संसृष्टाः पुरुषार्थस्य साधिका न तु केवलाः ॥—*op. cit.*, 3. 23.

[2] अस्मिन् मते सर्वत्रैव जातिव्यक्तिप्रविभागः कल्पितः—Helārāja.

[3] सत्यासत्यौ तु यौ भावौ प्रतिभावं व्यवस्थितौ ।
सत्यं यत्तत्र सा जातिरसत्या व्यक्तयः स्मृताः ॥—Vākyapadīya, 3. 32.

are removed on the revelation of a true perspective.[1] The *ṛṣis* of the Upaniṣads, with their inward vision open, assigned reality to the earth and declared its modifications like *ghaṭa*, etc., as unreal.[2] Patañjali has similarly taken the example of gold and its various *vikāras* (modifications) so as to bring out the difference between reality and unreality.[3] The exponent of *Āgamika* philosophy has identified *jāti* with the ultimate reality or primordial matter *(parā prakṛti)* which is an eternal flow of pure consciousness undisturbed from outside.[4] This is what is called by the grammarian (*āgamika*) Highest Being or great universal (*summum genus*), that gives the loftiest notion of a class one can conceive of. It is finally said that this *mahā-sattā* or *mahā-sāmānya* permeates the entire universe and appears in multifarious forms through all the multitude of individuals ; it is to be regarded as the *summum genus* which is ultimately denoted

[1] विकारापगमे सत्यं सुवर्णं कुण्डले यथा।
विकारापगमे सत्यां तथाहुः प्रकृतिं पराम् ॥—*op. cit.*

[2] वाचारम्भणं विकारोनामधेयं मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यम्—Chāndogya, 6. 4.

[3] सुवर्णं कयाचिदाकृत्या युक्तं पिण्डो भवति। पिण्डाकृतिमुपमृद्य रुचकाः क्रियन्ते। आकृतिरन्या चान्या च भवति द्रव्यं पुनस्तदेव—
Mahābhāṣya, 1. 1. 1.

[4] अन्त्या परा प्रकृतिः सत्या सर्वविकारानुयायिनी प्रशान्तकल्लोला चिदेकघना ब्रह्मेत्यागमविदः—Helārāja under Vākya, 3.32.

by all words, *Prātipadikas* (crude forms), verbal roots and suffixes like *tva* and *tal*.[1] All words, whether denoting a class or an individual, intrinsically refer to this all-pervading *sattā* or 'Highest Universal' which, as Vārṣyāyaṇi has observed, reveals itself through six different forms.[2] All activity exhibited by the world should be considered as revelation of *sattā* (*sattā-vivarta*).[3] One will really feel surprised at the far-reaching meaning that has thus been attached to *jāti* in the light of Vedāntic mysticism. *Jāti* as pertaining to numerous individuals is considered to be eternal.

A question is, however, raised against the eternality of *jāti*.[4] How can *jāti* retain its identity unimpaired when everything is doomed to perish in the event of utter annihilation (*mahāpralaya*)? In answer to this puzzling question some say that individuals which form the substrata of a class are not likely to be

[1] सम्बन्धिभेदात् सत्तैव भिद्यमाना गवादिषु ।
जातिरित्युच्यते,तस्यां सर्वे शब्दा व्यवस्थिताः ॥
तां प्रातिपादिकार्थं च धात्वर्थं च प्रचक्षते ।
सा नित्या सा महानात्मा तामाहुस्त्वतलादयः ॥—

Vākyapadīya, 3. 33-34.

[2] सेव भावविकारेषु षड़वस्थाः प्रपद्यते ।—*op. cit.*, 3. 36.

[3] समग्रः क्रियाकलापः सत्ताविवर्त्तः—Helārāja.

[4] ननु महाप्रलये सर्वेषां विनाशादाश्रयाभावात् कथं जातयोऽवतिष्ठन्ते—

loc. cit.

destroyed altogether.[1] Some ancient teachers as well as the Mīmāṃsakas could not (harmoniously with their doctrine of eternality of the Vedas and of atoms), conceive of a state of such absolute dissolution.[2] Like atoms, individuals wherein a class inheres are not capable of being effaced in their totality. Moreover, it is beyond one's comprehension that all individuals might be destroyed at a time—all that exists will vanish in a moment by the strange touch of a magical wand. Utter annihilation is thus a sheer impossibility. Further, the Hindu teachers used to believe in the existence of more than one universe.[3] This belief should not be rejected as a purely mythological one, but it has a scientific background. 'One can hardly determine,' it is said, 'the actual number of worlds moving in the limitless space;'[4] and even if one of them is destroyed by chance there will be many others surviving the wreckage of time. Those who have faith in absolute dissolution are expected to argue

[1] अनुच्छेद्याश्रयामेके सर्वां जातिं प्रचक्षते ।
न यौगपद्यं प्रलये सर्वस्येति व्यवस्थिता: ॥—Vākyapadīya, 3. 42.

[2] The author of the *Kusumāñjali* has, however, acknowledged the possibility of *pralaya*.

Cf. 'प्रमाया: परतन्त्रत्वात् सर्गप्रलयसम्भव: ।'—2. 1.

[3] यद्वा ब्रह्माण्डान्तरे विनष्टेऽपि ब्रह्माण्डान्तरसम्भवाद् युगपत् प्रलयो नास्ति—Helārāja.

[4] अण्डादीनामीदृशानां परिसंख्या न विद्यते ।—quoted by Helārāja.

that *jāti* will find its substratum finally in the primordial matter (*prakṛti*) with all differences of names and forms and accidental features blown away.[1] *Jāti* is thus held to be indestructible and eternal.

The theory of *dravya* (*viz.*, words denote things as opposed to class) similarly received a highly philosophical explanation at the hands of Vyāḍi and his followers. We need not dwell upon it here more elaborately. Under the *vārttika* running as *siddhe śabdārtha-sambandhe*, Patañjali has made a clear case for assigning eternality to *dravya* (*dravyam hi nityam*). This eternal entity constitutes the meaning of all words. *Dravya* in its ultimate form is said to be an undeniable reality—a reality as stern and imposing as the Supreme Being.[2] Bhartṛhari has also taken *dravya* in a wider sense, as is evident from his enumeration of its several synonyms.[3] Thus, whether the denotation of a word happens to be a class or an individual, we are urged to have our belief unshaken that all that we feel and express

[1] प्रकृतौ प्रविलीनेषु भेदेष्वेकत्वदर्शिनाम् ।
द्रव्यसत्त्वं प्रपद्यन्ते साश्रया एव जातयः ॥—Vākyapadīya, 3. 43.

[2] तदेव ब्रह्मरूपं सत्यम् and आत्मैवेदं सत्यमिति हि श्रुतिः—Helārāja.

[3] आत्मा वस्तु स्वभावश्च शरीरं तत्त्वमित्यपि ।
द्रव्यमित्यस्य पर्य्यायास्तच्च नित्यमिति स्मृतम् ॥—
Vākyapadīya, 3. 1 (Dravya-samuddeśa).

is nothing but a manifestation of the Eternal—the imperishable entity that is ultimately signified by all words and comprehended by human intelligence. The abdication of reason to deeper experience is necessary for understanding a mystic phenomenon like this.

It will not be out of place to give here a short account of the Buddhist doctrine of *apoha* ('the negation of the contrary') in connection with the denotation of words. The Buddhist philosophers, specially the *kṣaṇabhaṅgavādins*, refused to recognise the eternality of anything, whether class or individual. Nothing is, they contend, constant and lasting in the continuous flux of changes. Neither class nor individual is, therefore, denoted by a word, for the very question of their reality is literally open to a great controversy. The class-theory cannot stand, because there is much doubt as to the existence of a constant thing like class; the other theory is also similarly refuted on account of the momentary character of individuals.[1] What, then, is denoted by a word? *Apoha*, *i.e.*, the act of distinguishing one thing or species from those that are distinct from it, is said to be the denotation of all words.[2] To clarify this

1 क्षणभङ्गवादिनः स्थिरसामान्याभावादित्यर्थः—Uddyota.

2 अतद्व्यावृत्तिरपोहः पदार्थ इति क्षणभङ्गवादिनः—Vistārikā.

peculiar standpoint we should say that the word *gauḥ* when uttered necessarily implies the 'differentiation of cow-individuals from non-cows' (*atadvyāvṛtti*). As a stamp or label ordinarily pasted to the thing to be denoted, a word serves the function of distinguishing a thing from the rest by virtue of its inherent power of differentiation. This view has, however, been set aside by the Mīmāṃsakas and the Naiyāyikas.[1]

In treatises on *Poetics* we meet with a different way of classifying words. The much disputed question of class and individual does not come within the purview of literary criticism. *Poetics*, in ordinary sense, is mainly concerned with the implication of words which may sometimes be rendered so striking as to lend a peculiar excellence to a piece of composition. On the basis of this implication words have been divided into three classes, namely, *vācaka* or denotative words, *i.e.*, words that exactly denote the same tning as is fixed by the volition of God (*saṅketä*); *lākṣaṇika* or words with secondary signification; and *vyañjaka* or words that express the suggested sense.[2] The meanings conveyed by these three kinds of words are called respectively *vācya*, *lakṣya*

[1] See the refutation of *Apohavāda* in the *'Slokavārttika*.

[2] स्याद्वाचको लाक्षणिकः शब्दोऽत्र व्यञ्जकस्त्रिधा—Kāvyaprakāśa, 5.

and *vyaṅgya.* We should particularly take notice of the fact that this threefold division pertains more to the designation or attributes than to the object so designated.[1] There is consequently no definite group of words as such ; and what we actually find is that the same word, as *Gaṅgā* in the expression *gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ* (a village of milkmen on the Ganges), might be used as *denotative, indicative* and *suggestive* according to the context and propriety of sense. It is also to be noted that *vyañjanā* (suggestiveness), which forms the very life of poetic art, is nowhere recognised as a *vṛtti* except in poetry. No systems of Indian philosophy seem to have accepted *suggestiveness* in its poetical sense which, according to logical interpretation, is either unnecessary or comes under the wider scope of *lakṣaṇā.* Later grammarians such as Bhartṛhari and Nāgeśa have strongly emphasised the desirability of recognising *vyañjanā* from the standpoint of grammar.[2]

We have already stated that the old school of Logic understood *padārtha* as a trinity of objects, namely, class, form and individual. In accordance with the logical classification, words, or more properly nouns, may come under

[1] अतोपाधीनामेव त्रित्वं न तूपाधेयानाम्—Sārabodhinī.

[2] वैयाकरणानामप्येतत्स्वीकार आवश्यकः—Mañjūṣā, p. 160.

four distinct groups : (*i*) words with conventional meanings assigned to them (*rūḍha*), (*ii*) words with secondary signification (*lakṣaka*), (*iii*) words having both primary or conventional and derivative meanings (*yoga-rūḍha*), (*iv*) and words possessing derivative or analytical meaning alone (*yaugika*). To the first group belong such words as *gauḥ*, etc., which have their respective meanings fixed by *saṅketa* or popular usage. The characteristic feature of words falling under this class is that the meanings obtained by analysing such words into stems and suffixes do not correspond with their popular or innate signification. The word *gauḥ*, for instance, derived as it is from the root *gam* to go, would radically or analytically mean a *moving being* and not necessarily an animal furnished with dewlap, hoofs, horns and so on. The derivative sense, so to speak, does not count much in the case of such words. Words of this description are generally called *saṃjñā*.[2] The word Gaṅgā, as in *Gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ*, forms an example of *lakṣaka*, because the original or primary signification, *viz*., current of water, is here found unsuitable to

[1] रूढ़ं च लक्षकं चैव योगरूढ़ं च यौगिकम् ।
तच्चतुर्धा परे रूढ़यौगिकं मन्यतेऽधिकम् ॥—

Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā, 16.

[2] सैव संज्ञेति कीर्त्यते—*op. cit.*

the context. It is impossible to think of a village of milkmen situated on the current of water. So far as the above expression is concerned, the word *Gangā* is, therefore, taken to indicate the 'bank of the Ganges' in order to render the sense compatible. The *yoga-rūḍha* class comprises such words as *paṅkaja*, etc., which combine in themselves twofold signification—conventional as well as derivative. The word *paṅkaja* means accordingly 'lotus' by the force of convention (*saṅketa*), and also implies analytically 'mud + production + agent' (*paṅku-jani-kartṛtva*), that is, 'a thing that grows in mud.'[1] What should strike one's attention here is that the sense derived from the so-called parts (*avayava-śakti*) has coincidence with what is conveyed by the same as a whole (*samudāya-śakti*).[2] The *yaugika* or simple words (such as *kāraka*, *pācaka*, *pāṭhaka*, etc.) are those that denote the same meanings as are signified by their component parts in which those words might grammatically be analysed.

Some are of opinion that there is an additional class of words to be known as

[1] यन्नाम स्वावयववृत्तिलभ्यार्थेन समं स्वार्थस्यान्वयबोधकत् तन्नाम योगरूढ़म्, यथा पङ्कज-कृष्णसर्पाधर्मादि—Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā, 26.

[2] योगरूढ़न्तु पङ्कजादिपदमवयववृत्त्या रूढार्थमेव समुदायशक्त्या चावयवलभ्यार्थमेवानुभावयति न त्वन्यम्—*loc. cit.*

rūḍha-yaugika. This class has some degree of likeness as well as considerable difference with *yoga-rūḍha.* As an illustration of *rūḍha-yaugika,* we may take the word *maṇḍapa* which has got two distinct meanings, namely, 'house' and 'one who drinks gruel,' the one following from the word as a whole and the other from its etymological interpretation.[1] Words of this type are but very few in number. The fundamental point in which *yoga-rūḍha* differs from *rūḍha-yaugika* is as follows: while the meanings denoted by the former mutually correspond with each other, the two meanings are quite distinct in the latter, that is to say, the meaning of the whole seems to be altogether different from that of the parts.

The term *rūḍha* or *nirūḍha* meaning literally 'current in popular usage (*prasiddha*)' has long been in use in Sanskrit as an epithet of a class of words. *Rūḍhi* is synonymous with *saṃjñā* (personal names). The ancient grammarians as well as the etymologists are found to have recognised words of this type. These words do not generally admit of regular grammatical analysis, and even if they are dissolved into *prakṛti* and *pratyaya* on the analogy of

[1] मण्डपमहारजतादि कदाचिदवयववृत्त्या योगार्थमेव' कदाचिच्च समुदायशक्त्या रूढ्यर्थमेवाभिधत्ते—*loc. cit.*

similar words, their derivative meanings hardly agree with those that are current. Every language has got a sufficient number of such words which are not only more familiar but represent the early stock of a language. The *rūḍha-śabdas* seem to have their meanings rigidly fixed or restricted either by divine *saṅketa* or the usage of *śiṣṭas* who are supposed by Patañjali to have been the authority on the application of words.[1] Despite their ungrammatical character in some cases, Patañjali did not, therefore, question the validity of such words.[2]

The use of certain words in a secondary sense has been not only taken notice of by the Mīmāṃsakas and the Naiyāyikas but also by the grammarians. Patañjali has explained the conditions that necessitate the recognition of *lakṣaṇā* as a process of transference of one's attribute to another. The various examples of *lakṣaṇā* cited by him under the rule Pāṇ. 4. 1. 48 (*mañcā hasanti*=people on the couch are laughing ; *Gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ*=a village of milkmen situated on the bank of the Ganges ; *yaṣṭīḥ praveśaya*=let the people with sticks in their hands come in) seem to be so well-chosen and typical that they have been

1 शिष्टा: शब्देषु प्रमाणम्—Mahābhāṣya under Pāṇ., 6. 3. 109.

2 नैगमं रूढिभवं हि सुसाधु—*op. cit.* under Pāṇ., 3. 3. 1.

frequently quoted by the majority of later teachers.

A few words more about the so-called conventional (*saṅketa*) and indicative sense. We have already noticed that words may have both primary or innate and secondary or indirect meanings. The primary signification, which is also called *śakti*, is precisely the same as has been assigned to a word by a popular convention from time immemorial; it is to this sense, naturally connected with a word, that one looks for the real denotation. *Śakti* or conventional meaning is determined from different sources.[1] *Saṅketa* or convention, says Bhartṛhari, may be of two kinds:[2] one eternal (*ājānika*) and the other of comparatively modern origin (*ādhunika*). The former includes within its scope words like *ghaṭaḥ*, *gauḥ*, etc., the meanings of which are considered to be eternal or permanent in this sense that they are not supposed to have been imposed by any man and that they have been current in human society from a period of

[1] शक्तिग्रहं व्याकरणोपमानकोशाप्तवाक्याद्व्यवहारतश्च ।
वाक्यस्य शेषाद्विवृतेर्वदन्ति सान्निध्यतः सिद्धपदस्य वृद्धाः ॥—
quoted by Jagadīśa.

[2] आजानिकश्चाधुनिकः सङ्केतो द्विविधो मतः ।
नित्य आजानिकस्तत्र या शक्तिरिति गीयते ॥
कादाचित्कस्त्वाधुनिकः शास्त्रकारादिभिः कृतः ।—Vākyapadīya.

time of which history does not keep any reliable record. The technical terms (*saṃjñā*), used with their specialised sense in most of the treaties on science and art, afford instances of the latter (*ādhunika-saṅketa*). The indirect sense is called secondary because it has no such direct or necessary connection with the word.

Now we should try to see how a word comes to acquire a secondary meaning, and how in respect of certain words the secondary sense has turned into a conventional one. In the sentence *mañcā hasanti* (*cf.* the English idiom 'an address from the chair,' *i.e.*, president), 'the idea of laughing' is found incompatible with that of a couch, and we are therefore forced to suggest in the fitness of things that the word *mañca* should be understood as indicating 'people sitting on a couch.' Now what happens in the course of this transference of meaning is that the word (*mañca*) has had to give up its original sense (couch), and has come to indicate a thing which does not naturally follow from it but is obtained either from the context or the idea of consistency This is why *lakṣaṇā* is called *jahat-svārthā* (one that loses its own meaning), that is, a mode of transference in which words are bound to lose their original meaning, either partly or wholly. It will be highly interesting to point out here that there are some words

which seem to have entirely lost their original sense and are now frequently used in their indirect signification. In such cases the usual sense is not virtually indirect any longer, but has become as good as the conventional one. We may take, for instance, words like *kuśala* and *pravīṇa* which are no longer used respectively in the sense of 'grass-chopper' and 'skilful in playing on lyre,' but have obtained currency and popular approval with regard to their secondary meaning, *viz.*, *expert*. Accordingly, one expert in grammar is usually called *ayaṃ vyākaraṇe kuśalaḥ or pravīṇaḥ*. *Udāra* and *nistriṃśa* meaning respectively 'noble' and 'cruel' are instances of this type.[1] It is what is known in *Semantics* as the 'widening of meaning.' The sense of 'expert' is more general and wider than that of 'grass-chopper.' But one should not consider these two meanings as totally dissimilar. What we should particularly notice in such cases is that the secondary meaning is not absolutely unconnected with, or detached from, the direct sense, inasmuch as none but the skilful can cut sharp *kuśa*-grass as well as play on lyre with a masterly hand.

The author of the *Sāhityadarpaṇa* has, however, raised an objection apparently against

[1] Durga under Nirukta, II. 1.

the decision of Mammaṭa and others, because he is not inclined to take words like *kuśala* and *pravīṇa* to be correct illustrations of *lakṣaṇā*. To him these words are as good as ordinary *vācaka-śabdas* (words with conventional meanings) with their meanings (*e.g.*, expert) restricted by social sanction. The popular usage has so strongly solidified their current meanings that it is nothing but futile to look into their derivative meanings. When one says *kuśala*, for instance, nobody is likely to take it in the sense of 'grass-chopper.' Viśvanātha argues further that the derivative meaning should not be the only criterion in deciding the direct or popular meaning of a word (*mukhyārtha*). Because the two types of meanings do not agree with each other in all cases. Words, as a rule, are not always used strictly in their derivative sense.[1] If the derivative meaning is considered to be the direct signification of a word, one will find it imperative to treat the expression *gauḥ śete* (a cow is lying down) as constituting an instance of *lakṣaṇā*, simply because the idea of lying down is not consistent with the derivative meaning of the word *ga* (a moving being).[2]

The etymologists have their distinct method of classification, based not so much on the

[1] अन्यद्धि शब्दानां व्युत्पत्तिनिमित्तमन्यच्च प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तम् ।—
Sāhityadarpaṇa, 2.

[2] व्युत्पत्तिलभ्यार्थस्य मुख्यार्थत्वे 'गौः शेते' इत्यत्रापि लक्षणा स्यात्—*loc. cit.*

general meaning denoted by words but on the direct and indirect implication of action (*kriyā*). With *kriyā* as the sole criterion, they have divided words into three classes, namely, *pratyakṣa-vṛtti, i.e.*, words in which the idea of action is implicit, *parokṣa-vṛtti, i.e.*, words in which *kriyā* is not at once or directly perceptible, and *atiparokṣa vṛtti, i.e.*, words that are either without any element of action, or require a good deal of straining to find it out.[1] The three forms in which the word *nighaṇṭu* has been analysed by the etymologists, *viz.*, *nigamayitāraḥ*, *nigantavaḥ* and *nighaṇṭavaḥ* answer respectively to the three types mentioned above. It should be remembered here that the Indian etymologists devoted a greater amount of attention and labour to the derivation of words coming under the last group (*atiparokṣa*).[2] A classification of words on so whimsical a line had not the approval of those who could neither reduce all words to roots nor could justify the so-called fanciful interpretations of the etymologists.

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[1] त्रिविधा हि शब्दव्यवस्था । प्रत्यक्षवृत्तयः परोक्षवृत्तयः अतिपरोक्षवृत्तयश्च—
Durga under Nirukta, I. 1.

[2] अतिपरोक्षवृत्तिषु शब्देष्वेव निर्वचनाभ्युपायः—*loc. cit.*

CHAPTER VIII

ROOTS

Analogy between *dhātu* and *prakṛti*—*dhātu* as the final element—nature and number of Sanskrit roots—*dhātupāṭha*—various ways of classifying roots—primary, secondary, reduplicated and compound roots—roots and prepositions—Pott's theory as to the amalgamation of roots with prepositions—meaning of roots—action and result—views of the Mīmāṃsakas and of the Naiyāyikas—grammatical interpretation—accomplished and unaccomplished action—meanings of *pratyayas*—the doctrine of Śākaṭāyana and the root-period—the principle of etymology—grammarians on the derivability of words from roots—derivable and underivable words—words formed with *uṇādi*-suffixes.

Just as in the Sāṃkhya system *prakṛti* is held to be the primordial matter out of which the entire world has come into existence in the course of evolution, so in the science of grammar *dhātus* are called *prakṛti* or the ultimate elements wherefrom all forms of words are supposed to have evolved. Though this analogy between the philosophical and grammatical conceptions of *prakṛti* is quite apparent, Jagadīśa has warned us not to confound the so-called elements of grammar with the *prakṛti* of the Saṃkhyaites, which is evidently explained as the material cause of the world.[1] But the grammarians

[1] निरुक्ता न तु सांख्यानामिव जगदुपादानभूता—
Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā, 14.

have their justification for adopting the very same term, because what they are accustomed to call *prakṛti* in a restricted sense might well be interpreted as the positive elements out of which the world of words is created. These elements or 'phonetic types' linguistically represent the origin of all verbal forms we are acquainted with. The importance of these roots has been equally great both to the grammarian as well as to the etymologist, since roots are not only considered as 'the last result of linguistic analysis,' but as what constitute the real foundation of all words. Roots in their relation to words are the same as life to an organic being. Like atoms of chemistry, roots do not admit of further decomposition ; they are what have supplied the *Nairuktas* with the starting-point in all their attempts at etymological interpretations. The roots of a language have been happily compared to those of a tree possessing various branches and offshoots.[1] The history of words really begins with such living germs of speech or *word-stuff* to which the Indian grammarians had appropriately assigned the designation of *dhātu* (vital essence), and traced the origin of all words. The analytical method whereby sentences were broken up

[1] Sayce: The Science of Language, Vol. II, p. 3.

into parts seems to have been followed further so as to dissolve such parts again into their finer elements, namely, radical and inflexional, with the result that roots were discovered as forming the real basis of the majority of words. For *prakṛti* or remote origin of words, we should, therefore, look to roots alone and not to any other forms. To divide *prakṛti* into two classes, *viz.*, nouns and roots, is not strictly correct,[1] because, on a minute examination of facts, nouns too are found to be derivable from roots. Words have one *prakṛti* and that is no other than roots.

But the evidence in the hands of linguists tells an altogether different tale. It is held, on the contrary, that there is no wide gulf of difference between nouns and verbs. Prof. Sayce has stated in clear terms that 'the Aryan verb was originally a noun.'[2] 'Perhaps the truest account that can be given of the relation between verb and noun is that both go back to the same stem. It was after a considerably longer period that the verb could be treated as a separate part of speech under the influence of analogy or assimilation.

1 निरुक्ता प्रकृतिर्द्वेधा नामधातुप्रभेदत:।—Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā, 14.

2 Sayce: The Science of Language, Vol. I. Preface to the second edition, p. xxviii.

'Most verbs,' to quote his own language, 'presuppose a noun, that is to say, their stems are identical with those of nouns.'[1] In most cases verbs represent only decayed forms of nouns, that is, the verb *gacchati*; for instance might be supposed to have developed from such nouns as *gama*, *gamī* or *gāmī*.

Like other families of languages, Sanskrit has got its own stock of roots. These roots, though significant, are not necessarily verbs. 'Modern philologists have, however, brought a serious charge against the Indian grammarians that they confused these roots with verbs. But we do not know why. The difference between *bhū* and *bhavati* is not such as was unknown to the ancient grammarians of India. While to Sayce it is the verb and not the root that implies the action, the Indian grammarians committed a mistake possibly by taking roots alone as denotative of action. The thing is that a root does not become capable of use unless it develops into a verb (*kriyāpada*) in association with a suffix. But what we can accept without any contention is the statement that 'every root is the undeveloped sentence of primitive man.' Because it is not a new discovery to the Indian teachers who, as we have already pointed out,

[1] *Op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 150.

long ago came to the following conclusion : 'the force or implication of a sentence is traceable in every word.' Patañjali has elucidated this point further by showing how a word like *śrotriya* stood for the sentence as *chando'dhīte* (one who reads the Vedas). The Sanskrit *ad-mi* may as well be looked upon as the shortened form of a sentence, namely (*ahamadmi*) 'I am eating.' In the opinion of philologists a root is a 'phonetic type' that represents the common element in a group of cognate words. *Bhavati, bhavāmi, bhaviṣyāmi* are, for instance, not only similar in form, but have a common origin (*bhū*) from which they have come into existence with the help of different *prātyayas* (suffixes). Similarity with regard to form and sense does not always give us a clue for discovering the common element, for words with different origin, or with superficial likeness may also look just like allied words and may 'come,' as M. Bréal has rightly observed, 'to be united in a common term.' Moreover, it is not even improbable that what is really substantive in sense might have sometimes passed for a root by the result of false derivation. There is a number of roots, *e.g.*, *dhana, jana, badha, māna, kāla, gaveṣa, kumāra*, etc., which exactly look like substantive in form. The dialectical variations in Sanskrit afford us several instances where we find

that what is substantively used in one part of the country may obtain currency in another as a verbal root. While *śavati* as a verbal form with the sense of '*going*' was in vogue among the Kambojas, the Aryans retained only the noun-form, *i.e.*, *śava*, denoting a dead body.[1]

While a root in the Semitic tongues is the union of three consonants, the Sanskrit roots are generally monosyllabic, and a large number of words is found to have evolved out of a single root. It is only rarely that we meet with such tri-consonantal roots as *cakās*, *kumāra* and the like. There are also roots like *bukka*, *kuṭṭa*, *aṭṭa*, *ghaṭṭa*, *etc.*, which contain double consonants. One cannot say with certainty whether the roots of the 'parent-tongue' were monosyllabic or polysyllabic. Whitney's remark, that 'Indo-European language descended from an original monosyllabic tongue,'[2] is no longer accepted as a correct statement of facts. There are, as enumerated in the list of roots (*dhātupāṭha*), about two thousand roots in Sanskrit, apart from those that occur in the Vedas only. It must be, however, admitted that all these roots are not traceable in our extant literature; the number of roots authenticated by use is roughly calculated to be more

[1] Nirukta, II. 2.

[2] Language and the Study of Language, p. 256.

than one thousand. Most of these roots are read in the *dhātupāṭha* with some *anubandhas*, and they admit of more than one meaning. There is a large number of homophonous roots in Sanskrit. We have *kṛti*, to cut, as well as *kṛti*, to surround,[1] *kṛṣ*, to plough and *kṛṣ*, to attract; *car*, to move and *car*, to doubt, and so on.

Objects of thought are so numerous and varied and the advance of human knowledge has brought with it so many things unknown to the primitive age of mankind that no language can rightly claim to have a stock of roots sufficient enough to cope with the ever-growing number of ideas. Sanskrit, which ceased to be a spoken tongue since the advent of Christianity, shared the fate of a dead language and consequently became considerably defective in its range of roots. There are ideas for the denotation of which suitable roots are not always available in our language. But compared with its sister languages, Sanskrit seems to be rather wider in its range so far as the stock of roots is concerned. Pāṇini has left us a long and comprehensive list of roots (*dhāṭupāṭha*) with their respective meanings. But Fick had no word

[1] *Cf.* 'thus we have a root *kar*, 'making' (Latin *creare*), another root *kar*, 'mingling,' and a third root *kar*, 'cutting.' (Latin *cernere*). Sayce: The Science of Language, Vol. II, p. 11.

of admiration for Pāṇini as the author of the *Dhātupāṭha*, but rather accused him on account of his 'empty clatter of roots and suffixes.' Mādhava's *Dhātuvṛtti* is an excellent commentary on the *Dhātupāṭha*. He has not only taken notice of the roots available in the *Dhātupāṭha*, but has also treated of other roots such as *pratyayānta*, etc. This work was certainly not the first of its kind. Attempts were made from time to time to give an exhaustive exposition of these roots with copious illustrations drawn from the extant literature. From frequent references to such treatises (dealing with roots) as *Dhātupārāyaṇa*, *Taraṅginī*, *Dhātupradīpa*, etc., there is every likelihood that works of the same type as the *Dhātuvṛtti* were already in existence. The *Kavikalpadruma* of Vopadeva, though not mentioned by Mādhava, is undoubtedly an authoritative work in the same line, to which Jagadīśa has referred more than once in his *Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā*. Vopadeva's *Dhātupāṭha* is based on a fourfold classification of roots.[1]

These roots surveying a vast field of study have been variously classified from different standpoints of grammar. Roots are first divided into two classes according as they

[1] धातवः पठिताः पाठसूत्रलोकागमस्थिताः ।—Kavikalpadruma, 4.

consist of one and more vowels (*ekāc* and *anekāc*). They are divided further on the basis of conjugation, *i.e.*, according as they belong to the so-called *ātmanepada* or *parasmaipada* classes. There are, again, roots (called *ubhayapadī*) which might be used in both the ways. A root of this denomination generally takes *ātmanepada* when the fruit resulting from the action (meaning of the root) accrues to the agent. In accordance with the principle of grammatical conjugation, roots have been broadly grouped under ten distinct classes (*bhvādi*, *adādi* and so on), each group beginning with a typical root such as *bhū*, *ad*, *tan*, etc., and characterised by some sort of operations (*vikaraṇas*) peculiar to the roots belonging to it. This is not all. Roots have, again, been divided under three heads :[1] (*i*) simple or primary roots, that is, roots as are generally found in the *dhātupāṭha* ; (*ii*) *sautra* (roots) as are available only in the rules of grammar ; and (*iii*) *pratyayānta* or secondary roots which usually end in some suffixes. This threefold division of roots has been linguistically, as we shall see later on, of greater importance than the rest. The so-called causative (*ṇijanta*),

[1] मूलधातुर्गणोक्तोऽसौ सौत्रः सूत्रैकदर्शितः ।
योगलभ्यार्थको धातुः प्रत्ययान्तः प्रकीर्त्तितः ॥
—Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā, 58.

frequentative (*yaṅanta*), denominative (*nāmadhātu*) and desiderative (*sannanta*) roots come under the category of the last group (*pratyayānta*). These roots are called secondary because they essentially differ from roots proper, but are virtually treated as such only by a special sanction of grammar.[1] The *nāmadhātu* gives us an interesting case for study. There are certain *gaṇa-sūtras*, mentioned by Pāṇini, which show how a noun (*prātipadika*) may grammatically change into a verbal root, and get all necessary functions of the same.[2] Thus, we have *paṭayati* (from the noun *paṭu*) in the sense of 'one behaving like an expert,' and *aśvayati* (from *aśva*) in the sense of 'one travelling on a horse.' Roots ending in suffixes like *san*, *kyac*, etc., also get the designation of *dhātu* and give such forms as *putrakāmyati* (wishes for a son), *jigamiṣati* (wishes to go), and so on. The number of *sautra* roots is very small. We meet with only twenty such roots in the aphorisms of Pāṇini. Vopadeva has mentioned only four, namely, *stambha*, *stumbha*, *skanbha* and *skunbha*. In his fourfold classification of roots, Vopadeva has not only made

[1] Pāṇ. 3. 1. 32.

[2] प्रतिपादिकाद्धात्वर्थे बहुलमिष्ठवच्च। तत्करोति तदाचष्टे। तेनाक्रामति। धातुरूपं च। आख्यानात् कृतस्तदाचष्टे कृल्लुक् प्रकृतिप्रत्यापत्तिः।—The last one is cited as a *Vārttika* under Pāṇ. 3. 1. 23.

room for the Vedic roots (under the title *āgama*) yielding such forms as *jagāti*, *ciketi*, etc., but has enunciated a special group called *laukika* (popular), which includes such roots as *hindola*, *āndola*, *preṅkhola* and the like.[1] These roots are distinctly of recent growth and mostly found in the writings of modern poets. The root *hindola* is supposed to have originated from a festival of the same name connected with the life of Kṛṣṇa. The division of roots into simple and secondary is in agreement with that of the philologist. But this division is not, strictly speaking, a hard-and-fast one. There are instances in Sanskrit in which primary roots may also become secondary in so far as their significance is concerned. The three primary roots, namely, *kṛ*, *bhū* and *as*, are liable to be treated as secondary when they are added to roots containing long vowels and followed by *ām*.[2]

Though there is no separate class of roots approved of by the Sanskrit grammarians as reduplicated, the roots *daridrā*, *didhī*, *vevī* and the like may be linguistically treated as reduplicated. Generally roots get reduplicated in *liṭ* and when they are followed by *ṣan* and *yaṅ*.[3] The

[1] हिन्दोलान्दोलादे र्लौकिकस्यापि सत्त्वाच्चतुर्विध एव धातुरिति वोपदेवः—
Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā.

[2] Pāṇ. 3. 1. 40.

[3] Pāṇ. 6. 1. 9.

roots with *ṇic* and those belonging to the *curādi* class are reduplicated in the aorist. As we have elsewhere pointed out there are some roots such as *gad*, *garj*, *kard*, *kal*, *bharj*, etc., which may be supposed to have originated from the imitation of natural sounds. The division of roots into simple and compound, as is recognised by the western philologists,[1] does not commend itself to the Indian grammarians. Reference has already been made to simple roots such as *bhū*, *sthā*, *ci*, etc., and the possibility of deriving secondary roots as are usually formed by the addition of suffixes like *kyaṅ*, *kyac*, etc. But there is nothing like compound roots in Sanskrit, except those that are known as *pratyayānta* roots. The Indian grammarians never tried to show that the root *yudh* (to fight) was evidently a combination of two simple roots, namely, *yu* (to join) and *dha* or *dhā* (to place).[2]

We do not find any plausible ground for accepting Pott's theory *in toto* regarding the amalgamation of roots with prepositions. On the evidence of a single root like *saṁgrām* one is not sufficiently justified to hold that 'a large number of roots were compounded with prepositions.' We have in the previous chapter alluded to the couple of dicta as to the conjunction of

[1] Sayce: The Science of Language, Vol. II, p. 17.

[2] *Op. cit.*

prepositions with roots. Prepositions are nowhere inseparably amalgamated with roots. We cannot derive *piñj* from *api* and *añj* with the initial vowel dropped. *Piñjati* and *piñjayati* are regular forms which are not supposed to have compounded with prepositions. *Śrat*, *antar* and *marut*, as often conjoined with verbs, are grammatically treated as prepositions.[1] While *śraddhā*, *pidhāna* or *apidhāna* and *antardhā* have been more frequently used in the sense of 'belief,' 'covering,' and 'disappearance' respectively, the simple forms *dhāna* and *dhatte* are not supposed to have lost their applications altogether. It is true that certain roots as *iṅ* (to read),[2] *śās* (to desire),[3] and *ana* (to breathe) are in most cases found to be preceded by *adhi*, *ā* and *pra* respectively in order to yield such forms as *adhīte*, *āśāste* and *prāṇiti*. But one cannot necessarily maintain that these roots are not at all capable of independent uses. In the *Saṃhitās* we rather find laxity of the relation between prepositions and verbal forms, words being allowed to intervene between them. Moreover, the prepositions are carefully kept separate from being amalgamated with roots, since the grammatical operations, namely, the

[1] अदन्तरोरुपसर्गवद्वृत्तिः—Vārttika.

[2] इङ् अध्ययने। नित्यमधिपूर्वः—Bhaṭṭoji.

[3] आङः शासु इच्छायाम्। आङ्पूर्वत्वं प्रायिकम्—*op. cit.*

augment (*aṭ*) and reduplication have nothing to do with the prepositions, but they only pertain to the roots detached from prepositions. The prepositions exercise, however, some influence upon the verbal forms to which they are prefixed. They do not only bring about a special signification to the majority of roots, but their presence in some cases serves to change dental nasals and dental sibilants to their corresponding lingual forms.[1] A number of roots is turned into *ātmanepada* on account of its connection with certain prepositions. Again, it is enjoined by the rules of grammar that a root ending in *ā* and the roots *śri*, *nī* and *bhū* should get respectively *ka* and *ghañ* when they are not preceded by any prepositions.[2]

Now what do these crude germs of speech signify? Roots are said to be significant sounds, since they always give the idea of some sort of action. There is no root in Sanskrit which may be explained as substantive in sense. By the meaning of roots (*dhātvartha*) the Indian grammarian necessarily understands *kriyā* (action). There is, however, difference of opinions as to the exact signification of roots. Every action brings with it some kind of result,

[1] Pāṇ. 8. 3. 75.
Pāṇ. 8. 3. 70.

[2] आतोऽनुपसर्गे कः—Pāṇ. 3. 2. 3.
श्रिणीभुवोऽनुपसर्गे—*op. cit.*, 3. 3. 24.

and an action that does not produce any result is not considered to be an action at all. The main point at issue is whether a root implies action or the result following from it. The separation of action from its consequent effect has given rise to some discordance. According to the Mīmāṁsakas, 'result' (*phala*) alone is the meaning of roots, action (*vyāpāra*) being denoted by the terminations as *tiṅ*.[1] The root *gam* means, accordingly, conjunction resulting from movement, and not simply movement.[2] Some, again, hold, on the contrary, that action alone is denoted by roots, and that the idea of 'result' follows necessarily from the suffixes. Of these two contradictory theories, the former, namely, that 'result alone is denoted by roots,' has been vehemently criticised by Gaṅgeśa, the founder of the new school of Logic. As result is invariably preceded by action in consequence of the causal connection subsisting between them, Gaṅgeśa laid greater stress on action and interpreted the meaning of roots in general as 'action favourable to the result.'[3] Gadādhara has raised an objection against the other view on the ground that if roots were held to be expressive of action alone,

[1] अत्र मण्डनमिश्राः—फलमात्रं धात्वर्थः, व्यापारः प्रत्ययार्थः। Mañjūṣā, and धात्वर्थः फलमिति मण्डनाचार्य्याः—Tattvacintāmani (dhātuvāda).

[2] गमेरुत्तरसंयोगोऽर्थो न तु तत्फलजनकः स्पन्दः— *loc. cit.*

[3] फलानुकूलो व्यापार एव धात्वर्थः—*loc. cit.*

then the verbal forms *pacati* and *gacchati*, for instance, would have no additional significations apart from those of 'cooking' and 'going.'[1] It is universally admitted that a sentence, whether consisting of one or more words, is vested with some special implication. We must remember that with the Naiyāyikas the form *gacchati* is not only an isolated word, but as good as a sentence meaning 'a thing in motion,' or a person as the substratum of an action that leads to conjunction. As the import of a sentence (*śābdabodha*) is always something more than what is individually signified by words, one can hardly justify the view that roots denote action without any qualification. Some, therefore, maintaining a balance between the two opposite sides, hold that the root *gam* means 'movement qualified by such result as conjunction,'[2] and not movement stripped of its necessary result. This view was supported by later logicians and grammarians.

By the rule *bhūvādayo dhātavaḥ*,[3] Pāṇini has implicitly shown what should properly be designated as roots. The word *kriyā*, which gives the sense denoted by roots in general, occurs several times in the aphorisms of Pāṇini

[1] धातोर्व्यापारमात्रवाचित्वे ··· अविलक्षणबोधप्रसङ्गः।

Vyutpattivāda, p. 37.

[2] नव्यास्तु संयोगादिरूपफलविशेषावच्छिन्नस्यैव गम्याद्यर्थः—*loc. cit.*

[3] Pāṇ. 1. 3. 1.

as well as in the *vārttikas.* As we have already pointed out, Patañjali has defined roots as those forms of words which express action (*kriyāvacano dhātuḥ*). He has not only suggested one or more definitions of *dhātu* (*bhāvavacano dhātuḥ*), but has given a number of synonyms to clarify the intrinsic idea of action. With him *kriyā* essentially implies effort, whether physical or intellectual. By way of illustration we should say that while *gacchati* indicates some sort of bodily effort on the part of one that moves from one place to another, *smarati* (to remember) and *cintayati* (to think) are mental efforts, that is, efforts that pertain to the activity of the mind. What, he asks, is meant by *kriyā* ?[1] It is *īhā* (from the root *īha,* to endeavour). What, again, is *īhā* ? *Ceṣṭā* (effort). What is *ceṣṭā* ? It is the same as *vyāpāra* (function or activity). *Vyāpāra,* as we have already seen, is the term frequently used by the Naiyāyikas and other Indian philosophers in most of their discussions concerning the meaning of verbal roots. One may, however, find fault with this method followed by Patañjali in bringing out the precise meaning of action by means of putting together a list of synonyms in succession. It is not just sufficient

[1] का पुनः क्रिया ? ईहा। का पुनरीहा ? चेष्टा। का पुनश्चेष्टा ? व्यापारः
—Mahābhāṣya under Pāṇ. 1. 3. 1.

to explain the full import or significance of a word by the help of its synonyms, without reference to the definite object that is actually meant by it. Patañjali seems to have been fully alive to his awkward position, because he found it extremely difficult to give a more concrete notion of *kriyā*—to invest an invisible and immaterial reality with a tangible shape.[1] *Kriyā* is such as can hardly be explained like a positive entity. He has, therefore, frankly admitted that *kriyā* is absolutely invisible and is consequently incapble of determination.[2] It is comprehended by means of inference alone.[3] Now, what is that particular mode of inference which leads to the cognition of *kriyā*? This is as follows: though all the requisites of cooking, namely, pot, fire, fuel and the cook, may be actually present, we are not sometimes allowed to say *pacati*, until and unless there is a particular effort indispensably necessary for setting everything to work.[4] This kind of effort (*sādhana*), without which nothing can be

[1] सर्वथा भवाञ्शब्देनैव शब्दानाचष्टे न किंचिदर्थजातं निदर्शयत्येवंजातीयिका क्रियेति—*loc. cit.*

[2] क्रिया नामेयमत्यन्तापरिदृष्टा। अशक्या क्रिया पिण्डीभूता निदर्शयितुम्—*loc. cit.*

[3] साऽसावनुमानगम्या। कोऽसावनुमानः?—*loc. cit.*

[4] इह सर्वेषु साधनेषु सन्निहितेषु कदाचित्पचतीत्येतद्भवति कदाचिन्न भवति। यस्मिन् साधने सन्निहिते पचतीत्येतद्भवति सा नूनं क्रिया।—*loc. cit.*

accomplished, is called *kriyā*. A *kriyā*, like *pacati*, consequently consists of many parts all of which, intellectually considered as an undifferentiated whole, tend to produce the desirable result in their harmonious combination.[1] How are we to know that roots like *pac*, etc., are all denotative of action ? It is well understood from their *sāmānādhikaraṇya* (co-existence) with *karoti* (doing), that is to say, the idea of 'doing' is found common to all varieties of *kriyā*.[2] There is no verb that cannot be explained in the term of *karoti* (*gacchati = gamanaṃ karoti*, *paṭhati = pāṭhaṃ karoti* and so on). When one says *pacati* in answer to a question as *kiṃ karoti* (what is he doing ?) it is quite evident that *karoti* and *pacati* or more properly, *pākaṃ karoti*, are almost identical in sense. How profoundly this view has affected the later grammarians is evident from the popular dictum that, 'the meanings of all verbal roots are intimately related to that of *karoti*.'[3]

In philosophical language *kriyā* is identical with the activity (*śakti*), as is exhibited by all

[1] गुणभूतैरवयवैः समूहःक्रमजन्मनाम्। बुद्ध्या प्रकल्पिताभेदः सा क्रियेत्यभिधीयते।
—Vākyapadīya.

व्यापारसन्तानः क्रिया तद्वाचको धात्वर्थः—Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa.

[2] कथं पुनर्ज्ञायते क्रियावचनाः पचादय इति ? यदेषां करोतिना सामानाधिकरण्यम्।—Mahābhāṣya under Pāṇ. 1.3.1.

[3] सर्वो धात्वर्थः करोत्यर्थेनाभिसम्बध्यते।

things, particularly when they are at work. *Kriyā* or *śakti* is an inborn power that inheres in all things and its existence synchronises with that of its substratum (*yāvaddravyabhāvinī*).[1] Taking an intensive and far-reaching view of this *śaktivāda*, the author of the *Vākyapadīya* has tried to visualise the whole world as moulded in the subtle elements of *śakti*.[2] So far as the etymological interpretation goes *kārakas* (*kriyāṃ karotīti kārakam*), might be explained as different manifestations of *kriyā* or *śakti*.[3] One can hardly deny that there lies a stupendous *śakti* at the bottom of all things.[4] It is the beginning as well as the end of all we perceive. The shining sun and the blazing fire, the falling meteors and the glowing stars, all that are animated with pulsations of life and diffuse energy and vigour, and all that is active and productive are but manifestations of *śakti*. Time may come when electrons and protons like atoms will prove inefficient to explain the ultimate nature of things, and the world of scientists will once awake to the supreme importance of *śakti* as the sole factor of creation. The advance of machine-made materialism has

[1] सर्वत्र सहजा शक्तिर्यावद्द्रव्यमवस्थिता ।—Vākyapadīya, 3. 28. (Sādhana-samuddeśa).

[2] शक्तिमात्रासमूहस्य विश्वस्यानेकधर्मणः—*op. cit.*, 3. 2.

[3] नित्याः षट् शक्तयोऽन्येषां भेदाभेदसमन्विताः—*op. cit.*, 3. 35.

[4] अतः सर्वेषु भूतेषु ज्ञातव्या शक्तिरेव हि ।—Devī-Bhāgavata, 1.8.51.

narrowed the horizon of our spiritual vision, and we are unable to realise that all that we see with our eyes is but the distribution of *śakti* that sends particles of energy in all directions like sparks of fire.

The Mīmāṃsakas have defined the verb as words the utterance of which does not present before us the object that is denoted.[1] They have also spoken of two kinds of action, namely, primary and secondary.[2] Action may be further classified into accomplished (*siddha-svabhāva*) and unaccomplished (*sādhya-svabhāva*). To the former class belong such verbal nouns as *pāka*, *pakti* and *pacana* which have gender, case and number ; to the latter belong such unaccomplished or incomplete actions as *karoti*, *kariṣyati*, etc. All words may be viewed as symbols of action. Nouns too have action inherent in them.[3] *Kriyā*, Bhartṛhari rightly observes, is a thing which, whether accomplished or unaccomplished, is predicated by words as if it were accomplishable through the aid of effort.[4] The author of the

[1] Mīm. sūtra, 2. 1. 4.

[2] *Op. cit.*, 2. 1. 6.

[3] धातुश्च पुनः क्रियावचनः स च नाम्नि विद्यते इति—
Durga under Nirukta, I. 1.

[4] यावत्सिद्धमसिद्धं वा साध्यत्वेनाभिधीयते ।
आश्रितक्रमरूपत्वात् क्रियेति व्यपदिश्यते ॥—Vākyapadīya.

Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa has tried to reconcile the two opposite views by holding that a root denotes both action as well as result, and that substratum (*āśraya*) is signified by terminations (*tiṅ*).[1] Some hold that action, time, number and *kārakas* are all denoted by the verbal suffixes. It is significant to note that 'from the first the Aryan verb seems to have denoted time as well as mood and action.' So far as the personal terminations are concerned (as *ti*, *si*, *mi*, etc.), it is held by Fick and Sayce that 'they are either old dative infinitives or infinitival nouns furnished with the ordinary nominal suffixes.'

From the grammatical analysis of words into stems and suffixes we are led to the question as to whether nouns or words of all descriptions are ultimately reducible to roots in the course of disintegration. Yāska has recorded a controversy that had once been raised between Śākaṭāyana and etymologists on the one hand, and Gārgya and grammarians on the other, with regard to the derivability of words from roots. Śākaṭāyana's main thesis to which the etymologists subscribed is that 'all words, without any exception, have evolved out of roots.'[2] Gārgya and the majority of

[1] फलव्यापारयोर्धातुराश्रये तु तिङः स्मृता ।—
Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa, 2.

[2] नामान्याख्यातजानीति शाकटायनो नैरुक्तसमयश्च—Nirukta, I. 12.

grammarians could not, however, accord their consent to the pernicious doctrine expounded by the stalwart grammarian Śākaṭāyana to whom the authorship of the *uṇādi-sūtras* is popularly ascribed. And they raised a strong voice of opposition that all words, as a rule, were not derivable from roots.[1] The arguments on their side may be summarised as follows:[2] If all names or nouns were derivable from roots, then whoever performed the same action might have received the same designation, as, for instance, one passing through the road would be called *aśva* in accordance with the meaning of the particular root (*aśū*); and anything that pricks like a thorn would be called *tṛṇa* (from *tṛdir* or *tṛha*, to injure). But this is contrary to popular usage. Further, if names were suggested by actions, an individual might have as many names as there are actions associated with it, that is, a pillar (*sthūṇā*) would be called *daraśayā* (lying in a cavity) and *sañjanī* (attached to a piece of bamboo)[3] on account of its association

[1] न सर्वाणीति गार्ग्यो वैयाकरणानां चैके—*op. cit.*

[2] अथ चेत् सर्वाण्याख्यातजानि नामानि स्युर्यः कश्च तत् कर्म कुर्य्यात् सर्वं तत्सत्त्वं तथाचक्षीरन्, यः कश्चाध्वानमश्नुवीताश्वः स वचनीयः स्याद्यत् किंचित्तृन्द्यात्तृणं तत्—*op. cit.*

[3] अथापि चेत् सर्वाण्याख्यातजानि नामानि स्युर्यावद्भिर्भावैः संप्रयुज्यते तावद्भ्यो नामधेयप्रतिलम्भः स्यात्तत्रैवं स्थूणा दरशया वा सञ्जनी च स्यात्—*op. cit.*

with different actions. Again, if names were really derivable from roots, we might be allowed to use the regular grammatical forms, such as *puriśaya* (dwelling in the subtle body), *aṣṭa* (one that moves on the road) and *tardana* (act of pricking) instead of *puruṣa*, *aśva* and *tṛṇa* respectively, so as to render the sense more clear and free from confusion.[1] If actions are what precede and determine the names, how could the earth get such a designation as *pṛthivī* before it was actually extended?[2] These are the arguments with which Yāska was confronted. But he was not wanting in counter-arguments, and we are astonished to see how cleverly he refuted these objections one after another and finally supported the theory of Śākaṭāyana, every syllable of it. This theory, as one philologist has pointed out,[3] seems to have left its unwholesome effect behind. On the meagre evidence provided by it people were falsely led to believe in the existence of 'a language of roots.' To picture before the mind a primitive language consisting of nothing but roots is only an illusion in these days of ours.

1 अथापि य एषां न्यायवान् कार्मनामिकः संस्कारो यथा चापि प्रतीतार्थानि स्युस्तथैवान्याचक्षीरन् पुरुषं पुरिशय इत्याचक्षीरन्नष्टेत्यश्वं तर्दनमिति तृणम्—*op. cit.*

2 प्रथनात् पृथिवीत्याहुः क एनामप्रथयिष्यत् किमाधारश्च—*op. cit.*

3 Sayce: The Science of Language, Vol. II, p. 4.

The principle of etymology, as formulated by Yāska, has undoubtedly a scientific character—a fact which reflects much credit upon so ancient a teacher as Yāska who with a single language under his survey eminently succeeded in giving us valuable information on the science of meaning. His work has been an epoch-making production opening a new vista for the student of *Semantics*. But we are constrained to assert that he carried the theory of Śākaṭāyana to such an extent as to render some of his etymological interpretations simply ludicrous and fanciful. As positive data were not always available for the determination of meanings, Yāska had to depend more or less on imagination in some cases. What may be said in his favour is that he was born at a time when the exact meanings of the Vedic hymns were almost forgotten, and so far as the derivation of words was concerned, the only course open to him was to suggest a number of roots that might furnish some clue as to the proper understanding of the sense. Thus, while deriving the word *nighaṇṭu*, he has pointed out *gam*, *i* and *hṛ* as the possible roots out of which the particular form might have evolved.[1] This shows that he could not vouchsafe the validity of his own explanations, or was not

[1] Nirukta, I. 1.

definitely sure of the interpretation he offered. When we follow the way in which Śākaṭāyana has derived the word *satya* from a couple of roots, namely, *as* (to be) and the causal of *i* (to go),[1] we cannot but say that this method of derivation does scarcely appeal to one's reason. Durga has, however, corroborated the view of Śākaṭāyana and tried to show that the etymological explanations of *rūḍha-śabdas* are not rare in the *mantras*; as, for instance, 'what moves or spreads' is called *sarpiḥ*, and 'what is taken when it is fresh' is called *navanīta* (butter) in the Vedic literature.[2] He has attempted further to prove that the derivation of a single word from a number of roots was not absolutely of Yāska's invention, but this practice was already in vogue in the Brāhmaṇa literature. He has referred to a passage of the Śatapatha[4] where the three letters (*hṛ*, *da* and *ya*) constituting the word *hṛdaya* (heart) are said to have evolved

[1] *Op. cit.*, I. 13.

[2] अपि च रूढिशब्दव्युत्पत्तिर्मन्त्रेष्वपि दृश्यते। यदसर्पत् तत् सर्पिरिति मन्त्रो यन्नवमेव नीतमभवदिति मन्त्रः—under Nirukta, I. 14.

[3] अपि च ब्राह्मणेनाप्यनेकधातुजान्येव कृत्वा निरुच्यन्ते तत्र मन्त्राभिधानानि—*loc. cit.*

[4] तदेतत् त्र्यक्षरं हृदयमिति। हृ इत्येकमक्षरमभिहरन्त्यस्मै। द इत्येकमक्षरं ददत्यस्मै। यमित्येकमक्षरमेति स्वर्गं लोकं य एवं वेद इति।—Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, XIV. 8. 4. 1.

out of the three different roots, namely, *hṛ*, *dā* and *iṇ*. One can only characterise this sort of interpretation as exciting childish curiosity. What is still more strange is that Yāska even tried to give etymological explanations of proper names, such as Śāntanu, Pijavana, Cyavana, Viśvāmitra, Kamboja, etc., making it abundantly clear that no word is incapable of being derived from roots. As the idea of action seems to be traceable in the signification of all words, Durga has divided words into three distinct classes, namely, *pratyakṣa-kriya* (where action is readily perceived, *e.g.*, *kāraka*, *hāraka*, etc.), *prakalpyakriya* (where action is to be surmised, *e.g.*, *go*, *puruṣa*, etc.), and *avidyamānakriya* (where the very idea of action is absent, *e.g.*, *arvāṅ*, *candra*, etc.). It is, in fact, only the last two classes of words that were seriously taken up by the etymologists for derivation. We find it curious enough that they found immense scope for the display of their ingenuity so far as the interpretation of words belonging to the last group was concerned. Yāska is quite right in laying greater stress on the meaning than on the formal side of words in all his etymological interpretations. But there is hardly any guarantee that words of the same meaning should have the same etymologies everywhere.[1]

[1] समानकर्माणि समाननिर्वचनानि—Nirukta, II. 7.

We should not forget that grammarians were not unanimous with Sākaṭāyana and the etymologists in regard to the reducibility of words to roots. Sākaṭāyana, as is evident from the rules of Pāṇini[1] and the references of the Mahābhāṣya,[2] was undoubtedly a celebrated grammarian to whom is attributed the authorship of the so-called *uṇādi-sūtras*. The system of Pāṇini has recognised two classes of words (*prātipadikas*), namely, derivable (*vyutpanna*) and underivable (*avyutpanna*). First of all, what is defined as *saṃvijñāta* by Yāska is almost the same as *vyutpanna*.[3] Derivable words are those whose accent, stems, suffixes as well as the radical elements can regularly be determined with reference to the rules of grammar. Underivable words are, on the other hand, just the opposite. What Pāṇini intends to impress upon us by the rule *uṇādayo bahulam*[4] is that underivable words or words formed with the so-called *uṇādi* suffixes cannot be made conformable to the general principles laid down in grammar. They are in most cases

[1] Pāṇ. 8. 4. 50.

[2] वैयाकरणानां च शाकटायन आह धातुजं नामेति—Mahābhāṣya under Pāṇ. 3. 3. 1 and see under Pāṇ. 3. 2. 115.

[3] तद् यत्र स्वरसंस्कारौ समर्थौ प्रादेशिकेन गुणेनान्वितौ स्यातां संविज्ञातानि तानि—Nirukta, I. 12.

[4] Pāṇ. 3. 3. 1.

so rigid and varied that no grammatical rule or rules might be formulated on the scientific basis of generalisation so as to govern them all. Here we find the justification why the author of so vast and comprehensive a system of grammar as the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* did not think it worth his while to set himself the task of bringing those words under the scope of his scientific system. The word *bahulam* in the aforesaid rule has been explained by Patañjali as implying the comparatively small number of words to which the *uṇādi* suffixes are added.[1] But Kaiyaṭa's interpretation is different. He has taken it as indicative of the validity of such words as are formed with the *uṇādi* suffixes. We should be careful to notice here one fundamental thing. Though the scope of his aphorisms was not extensive enough to comprehend the *rūḍha-śabdas*, usually derived by *uṇādi* suffixes, Pāṇini never questioned the authenticity and acceptability of such words, but unhesitatingly took them to be as good as derivable words. We find elsewhere that words like *pṛṣodara*,[2] etc., in spite of their ungrammatical forms, are also taken to be correct by Pāṇini on the ground of their being used by *śiṣṭas* who, as Patañjali

[1] बहुलवचनं किमर्थम् ? तन्वीभ्यः प्रकृतिभ्य उणादयो दृश्यन्ते न सर्वाभ्यः—
Mahābhāṣya under Pāṇ. 3. 3. 1.

[2] Pāṇ. 6.3.109.

observes, were regarded as the authority on the use of words with or without any knowledge of grammar.[1] Patañjali has stated in plain terms that the Vedic words (*naigama*) and *rūḍha* words ending in suffixes like *uṇa*, etc., should be regarded as correct.[2] He has said further that in the derivation of words (coming under this class) whereof the sense is not obtained by the usual way, sometimes bases and sometimes formative elements should be supplied, as the case may demand, on the analogy of stems and suffixes recognised by grammar.[3] Just as it is impossible on the part of a man, as Patañjali tells us,[4] to read every word in a language with the due care and attention it requires, so it is equally impossible for a grammarian to frame such rules as would take cognisance of all words. The rules of grammar, however extensive and comprehensive they may be, are bound to be anything but exhaustive and all-embracing, for in every language a large number of words is found to lie outside the jurisdiction of grammar. The reason is very obvious. No system of grammar could ever

1 शिष्टाः शब्देषु प्रमाणम्—

Mahābhāṣya under Pāṇ. 6. 3. 109.

2 नैगमरूढिभवं हि सुसाधु—*op. cit.* under Pāṇ. 3. 3. 1.

3 यन्न विशेषपदार्थसमुत्थं प्रत्ययतः प्रकृतेश्च तदूह्यम्—*loc. cit.*

4 तस्मादनभ्युपायः शब्दानां प्रतिपत्तौ प्रतिपदपाठः—*op. cit.*, 1. 1. 1.

keep pace with the ever-increasing number of words. This reminds us of a beautiful couplet,[1] probably composed by the renowned grammarian Durgasiṃha. It bears testimony to the fact that even grammarians of the calibre of Patañjali and Durga, with their extensive study and sharp intellect, failed to reach the shore of ‘the ocean of words.’

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[1] अहं च भाष्यकारश्च कुशाग्रैकधियावुभौ ।
नैव शब्दाम्बुधेः पारं किमन्ये जडबुद्धयः ॥

CHAPTER IX

The Sanskrit Language

Recapitulation--origin of speech—doctrine of inspiration—evolution of speech from songs—music and its power—original home of the people speaking the primitive language—different theories—*Chandas* and *bhāṣā—saṃskāra* or purification—why Sanskrit is so called—admixture of sacred tongue with *Prākṛta-Apabhraṁśa*—evolution of grammar—Sanskrit literature —Vedic and Classical—spoken language of the Vedic age and the oldest form of *Prākṛta*—pre-Vedic language—distinctive features of the Vedic language—Sanskrit as a spoken tongue.

The speculations, with which we were dealing in the previous chapters, though out of date to a great extent and also out of touch with the general trend of linguistic thought abroad, have been fruitful in preparing the ground for making some general observations on the Sanskrit language. The results obtained from these speculations may be at variance with modern researches on language, yet we are bound to say that they are genuine and provide valuable material for the real and thorough study of linguistic philosophy. We shall have to recapitulate here what we have already stated.

Language is an expression of human thought. It came into existence and became a communicative medium that is infinitely

superior to gestures and echoes. It is really doubtful whether man could have been what he is now, if there were no such vehicle of communication as language. The power of speech has been a kind of differentia which marks off man from other animals. Language has not only vocalised our thoughts, but has practically systematised the process of thinking. Moreover, the world would have ever remained a complexity too bewildering to be grasped, if it were incapable of clarification and differentiation by means of various names and forms. Daṇḍin has put the idea more beautifully and poetically: the world is liable to be blind through darkness but for the light of words that illuminates the whole.[1] But we must not forget that there are 'thoughts too deep for words' and that thinking without words is not absolutely impossible.

The origin of speech is a problem that takes us back to a far-off past, that is, to the unknown period of the advent of mankind on the face of the earth. It is very difficult to answer the how and why of it. Speculative or purely theological as it may appear, there is little doubt that

[1] इदमन्धं तमः कृत्स्नं जायेत भुवनत्रयम् ।
यदि शब्दाह्वयं ज्योतिरासंसारं न दीप्यते ॥—Kāvyādarśa, I. 4.

speech is a thing inspired. Speech has its real origin in the emotional inspiration of the heart. The great God (*maho devaḥ*), that makes His presence felt by the unbeaten sound (*anāhata-dhvani*) or the pulsation of life, is speaking within us in a measured language.[1] The *ṛṣis* of the Upaniṣads have traced the origin of the four Vedas to the vivacious inspiration (breath) of the Supreme Being.[2] It is further said that the germs of speech first originated in the spatial region of Brahman's heart.[3] When Brahman was absorbed in deep meditation, the eternal sound (*praṇava*) or the sacred song is said to have come out of the fulness of his heart. The two primordial sounds, namely, *om* and *atha*, are considered to be auspicious on account of their flowing through the throat of Brahman. This is not absolutely mystical and does not altogether lie beyond the range of human comprehension. One can have a faint idea of this subtle sound, which is always at work within, by restraining the function of auditory organs.[4] The *Purāṇas*

[1] Ṛgveda, IV. 58. 3.

[2] अस्य महतो भूतस्य निःश्वसितमेतत्—Bṛhadāraṇyaka, II. 4.10.

[3] समाहितात्मनो ब्रह्मन् ब्रह्मणः परमेष्ठिनः ।
हृदाकाशादभून्नादो वृत्तिरोधाद्विभाव्यते ॥—Bhāgavata, XII. 37.

[4] यः कर्णपुटपिधानेन श्रोत्रवृत्तिनिरोधादस्मदादिष्वपि विभाव्यते वितर्क्यते—
Śrīdharasvāmī.

have made out a beautiful legend of cosmogony out of this material. Brahman is described in the *Purāṇas* as a four-faced god and as the progenitor of all beings. His four mouths, it is further said, brought forth the four Vedas which embody the eternal music of the heart. The truth that is inculcated by the Vedas is said to have flashed forth into his heart as a divine inspiration, and he proved the best medium for its revelation.[1] Brahman is, therefore, rightly called the first poet (*ādi-kavi*) or the first singer, seated on a red lotus, who gave tune to the internal chord of harmony and thus animated the whole world by its rapturous melody. This is particularly true of the Sāma Veda which, as the very name implies, is pre-eminently a Veda of songs or chants.[2]

The theory[3] as to 'the evolution of speech from songs' (*i.e.*, as those of birds) appeals at once to the Indian mind. There is a grain of truth in the statement that 'men sang out their feelings long before they were able to speak their thoughts.' Primitive men were made to sing partly by the influence of nature

[1] तेने ब्रह्महृदा य आदिकवये मुह्यन्ति यत् सूरयः ।—Bhāgavata, I. 1.

[2] गीतिषु सामाख्या—Sāyaṇa.

[3] O. Jespersen: *Language, its Nature, Development and Origin*, p. 436.

and partly by the pressure of inspiration they felt within. These songs or natural outbursts of the heart were the crude beginning of language. The earliest form of human language seems to have been more poetical and musical than prosaic. This is more or less true of all ancient speeches, and we find the cultivation of poetry invariably preceding the period of monotonous prose. So far as the case of primitive Indian speech is concerned, the beautiful poetry of the *Saṃhitās* came into existence long before the appearance of the Brāhmaṇas.

To the Hindus music is endowed with the creative power. While the world is believed to have arisen from harmony (*sama*), it is not unlikely that it will one day break down to pieces when that internal harmony or unity of atoms will be disturbed by a discordant tune (*viṣama*). Time may come when science will be in a position to demonstrate this truth to the great wonder of us all. How the creation of the cosmic world was effected by the principle of supreme harmony may be shown by a reference to the Sāṅkhya doctrine of *prakṛti*. *Prakṛti* or primordial matter, as a state of equilibrium (*sāmyāvasthā*) or harmonisation,[1] is held to be the ultimate cause of the world. There lies harmony or a state of concordance at the basis

[1] सत्त्वरजस्तमसां साम्यावस्था प्रकृतिः—Sāṅkhya-sūtra.

of all creations. All that comes into being or moves either in the higher or lower spheres of existence is bound to follow this harmonious order—the great principle of natural evolution. The whole universe is, in short, linked together by harmony or strict regularity. The power of music is well illustrated by the mythological account of Orpheus who is said to have charmed Pluto by his miraculous flute to such an extent that he was allowed to get back his wife from the infernal region. The Pythagorians, as we know, also believed in the existence of 'heavenly music.' This music of the spheres is said to have unified the chaotic elements and given birth to the cosmic world.

Eminent historians and philologists have tried their level best to find out the original home of the Aryans or people speaking the primitive language to which the name 'Aryan' or 'Indo-European' has been given. But there has been as yet no consensus of opinions on this question. Baffled stand the attempts of both ethnologists and historians to locate the home of the first race of man with a sufficient degree of certainty. What we generally learn from their investigations is that these Indo-European people first found themselves somewhere in central Asia or in the Indus valley before they had migrated to the different parts of Europe, Persia and India. This theory, which was once

prevalent among scholars, has been subsequently given up. According to the theory, enunciated by Latham and supported by Poesche and Penka, the original home of the Aryans should not be traced to Asia, but to the Baltic provinces and northern Germany. Some have pointed to 'vast areas in Iran, Asia Minor, and North-west India' as the early home of Indo-European tribes.[1] Other theories based on the anthropological and geological evidence indicate Southern Asia as this primaeval home—the so-called 'Paradise,' and 'the cradle of the human race.' Haeckel is of opinion that 'there are a number of circumstances which suggest that the primaeval home of man was a continent now sunk below the surface of the Indian ocean'—a continent to which the name 'Lemuria' has been given by Scalter.[2] It remains to be pointed out that the Indo-European family with its seven or eight prominent branches is not sufficiently wide as to comprise all languages now known to the world of philologists. The Semitic and the Chinese, though they do not fall under the Indo-European group, are not inferior to the aforesaid stock in point of antiquity. No designation, whether Indo-European, Indo-Germanic or Aryan, consequently seems to be

[1] Keith: A History of Sanskrit Literature, p. 1.

[2] E. Haeckel: The History of Creation, Vol. II, p. 437.

comprehensive enough. Rightly or wrongly, Sanskrit was once considered to be the mother of all tongues, specially of the Asiatic branches of the Aryan family, and 'the land of five rivers' is supposed to have seen the glorious dawn of human civilization. This view, though still defended by the orthodox Indian scholars, does no longer command respect of the authorities on the subject. Indeed, Sanskrit is one of the oldest but it is far from being *the* oldest language known to us.

The Sanskrit term corresponding to language is *bhāṣā* which is derived from the root *bhāṣ*, to speak. The term was, however, restricted to the current or popular speech, as distinguished from the sacred language of the Vedas. There is ample evidence both in Yāska's *Nirukta* and Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī* that a distinction was early made between the literary language of the Vedas and the then spoken tongue, the former being known as *chandas* or *naigama*, and the latter as *bhāṣā* or *laukika*.[1] Patañjali has referred to this well-marked distinction just in the beginning of his *Śabdānuśāsana*, and has adduced necessary illustrations from both the types of language. He has not only retained the word *laukika* as a

[1] Nirukta, I. 4, I. 5, and II. 2.
Pāṇ., 3. 1. 108.

more significant one for the sake of denoting this popular speech, but has said elsewhere that while the Vedic words are either stereotyped or should be learnt from the Vedas, the popular words are to be taken from the current usage.[1] So much about the distinction between the sacred or more or less literary language and the language in which the majority of people used to speak in those primitive days.

But the question that remains persistent is how and under what circumstances this popular language came to have the designation *Saṃskṛta*—a designation which prevailed upon others so strikingly in later times. The answer to this question will embrace a vast range: it will not only bring us back to an important event in the history of Sanskrit language, but will also throw some conspicuous light on the evolution of Sanskrit grammar. The word *saṃskṛta* comes from *saṃskāra* which has more than one meaning in our literature. So far as it relates to a language, *saṃskāra* does neither mean 'sacraments' nor 'deep-rooted impressions,' but refers particularly to the grammatical method of analysing words. Though he has not used the very word *saṃskṛta*, Yāska has more than once mentioned

[1] वेदान्नो वैदिकाः सिद्धा लोकाच्च लौकिकाः—Mahābhāṣya, 1. 1. 1.

saṃskāra undoubtedly in this restricted sense.[1] It shows that the act of purification or grammatical analysis which won for the ancient language the respectable epithet *saṃskṛta* had taken place long before the advent of Yāska who is generally supposed to have flourished at a time not later than the fifth century B.C. The earliest mention of the word *saṃskṛta*, as an epithet of language, is to be found in the Rāmāyaṇa.[2] As is evident from the Nirukta itself, different systems of grammar, as those of Śākaṭāyana, Gārgya and others, were already in existence before the time of Yāska, and their sole object was to mark off the 'divine language' from the language of the mass, that is, Prākrit. The purity of the ancient language was at stake on account of its frequent intercourse with those of lower people, and it is not improbable that a large number of Prākrit forms might have crept into Sanskrit and become naturalised in course of time.[3] A vigorous attempt was necessarily made by the orthodox grammarians to keep the pristine sanctity of their language free from the constant possibility of corruption. The result was the outcome of several systems of grammar

[1] Nirukta, I. 12.

[2] द्विजातिरिव संस्कृताम्—Sundarākāṇḍa, XXIX. 16. 17.

[3] See my Philosophy of Sanskrit Grammar, p. 17.

in Sanskrit making by themselves a wide branch of literature which has no parallel in any language of the world. Strict religious injunctions were also laid down preventing a Brahmin from using corrupt words,[1] so much so that a priest was liable to perform the expiatory rite, called *sārasvatī*, if he happened to use a corrupt word (*apaśabda*), specially at the time of sacrifice.[2] Thus, the ancient language of India, came to receive the designation *saṃskṛta* from the fact that it was purified or refined, that is to say, purged of, or freed from, all corrupt elements. It need not be said that the language in question obtained such *saṃskāra* at the hands of orthodox grammarians at a much later stage. This purification was brought about by the formation of strict rules of Sanskrit grammar. Thenceforward the term *saṃskṛta* has been used as a criterion to distinguish the sacred language from more or less vulgar tongues.

Judging from the number of literary productions, both ancient and comparatively modern, the Sanskrit language seems to be decidedly the richest of all members of the so-called Indo-European family. Similarly, when we consider the number of roots and inflexions as well as

1 न म्लेच्छितवै नापभाषितवै—

2 आहिताग्निरपशब्दं प्रयुज्य प्रायश्चित्तीयां सारस्वतीमिष्टिं निर्वपेत्—

Mahābhāṣya, 1. 1. 1.

the extensive systems of grammar, Sanskrit appears to have almost no rival in the ancient stock of languages. Sanskrit is rightly called 'the language of science' It is a language which contains all that a man should endeavour to know. No language can boast of having given to the world more departments of ennobling studies and having widened the bounds of human knowledge to a greater extent The list of the different branches of knowledge, as enumerated in the Brāhmaṇas, Upaniṣads, Mahābhārata and the Mahābhāṣya, will go to show the range of studies which was provided by this sacred language of the Aryans.[1] At least by the orthodox Hindus, Sanskrit is still regarded as the most original of all tongues. The Hindu grammarians have tried to show that *Prākṛta* and *Apabhraṃśa* dialects are not descended from a different source but have

[1] Keith: History of Sanskrit Literature, p. 8.

ऋग्वेदं भगवोऽध्येमि यजुर्वेदं सामवेदमाथर्वणं चतुर्थमितिहासपुराणं पञ्चमं वेदानां वेदं पित्र्यं राशिं दैवं निधिं वाकोवाक्यमेकायनं देवविद्यां ब्रह्मविद्यां भूतविद्यां क्षत्रविद्यां नक्षत्रविद्यां सर्पदेवजनविद्यामेतद्भगवोऽध्येमि—

Chāndogya, VII. 1. 2.

महान् हि शब्दस्य प्रयोगविषयः। सप्तद्वीपा वसुमती, त्रयो लोकाश्चत्वारो वेदाः साङ्गाः सरहस्या बहुधा विभिन्ना एकशतमध्वर्युशाखाः सहस्रवर्त्मा सामवेद एकविंशतिधा बाह्वृच्यं नवधाथर्वणो वेदो वाकोवाक्यमितिहासः पुराणं वैद्यकमित्येतावाञ्-शब्दस्य प्रयोगविषयः—Mahābhāṣya, 1. 1. 1.

Sanskrit as their common origin.[1] It is not for us to make here the bold attempt to prove that Sanskrit is the mother of all languages, nor to explain the structural resemblances of Sanskrit with Greek and Latin as strengthening the same conclusion. The part played by Sanskrit in the history of Comparative Philology has already been pointed out in the introductory pages; and we may be permitted to say that this new science to the evolution of which the main impetus was given by the study of Sanskrit has now assumed great proportions. Transmitted orally from generation to generation, the ancient Indian literature has had to suffer a good deal, numerous important works on various subjects being irrecoverably lost for ever. Very few languages have been so fertile and creative as Sanskrit and fewer still that have suffered so enormous a loss through the destructive hand of time. But notwithstanding such loss and mutilation wrought by time and carelessness on the part of those who were custodians of Indian culture, Sanskrit literature, as it has come down to us, does not fail to show a continuous line of development in thought-process as well as in language.

It requires to be stated at the outset that the ancient language of India has two

[1] शब्दप्रकृतिरपभ्रंश इति संग्रहकारोक्तेरपभ्रंशो नाम न स्वतन्त्रः कश्चन विद्यते—Puṇyarāja under Vākya., 1.149.

well-marked divisions, namely, Vedic (*chandas*) and classical (*laukika*). The former differs from the latter in more than one respect. The earliest specimen of the sacred tongue is preserved by the Vedas, specially by the *Ṛgveda*, where we meet with a language of beautiful poetry in which the religious invocations or prayers of our ancient forefathers found an exuberant expression. 'The Vedas are beyond dispute the earliest we possess, the most complete representation which has been preserved to modern times of that primitive lyrical poetry which theory assumes as the earliest in the literary history of every people.'[1] In these natural and simple hymns are recorded the history of Aryan civilisation in its primitive character and the religious life of India in its original form. This lyrical poetry of the *Saṃhitās* was followed by the extensive prose style of the Brāhmaṇas. A point that is specially significant for our linguistic study is that in the transitional period between lyrical poetry and prose, many words seem to have undergone changes both in their formal and logical aspects, and that a number of new words and expressions actually came into existence. The Vedic language in its last phase is represented by the Upaniṣads and the ancient *Sūtras*. Some have, however,

[1] Whitney: The Vedas, p. 5.

found three distinct periods in the development of the Sanskrit language.[1] The period beginning with the Brāhmaṇas and closing with Pāṇini is called the 'period of middle Sanskrit.' Yāska stands midway between the Vedic and classical periods, his work representing the classical Sanskrit in the making. A continuous development is thus traceable during the different stages through which Sanskrit had to pass before it was stereotyped by the strict rules of grammar.[2] When the elaborate and verbose prose style of the Brāhmaṇas had come to a close, there arose a more artificial style, known as *Sūtra,* characterised by extreme brevity and conciseness which evidently found much favour with the grammarians and philosophers. The extent to which brevity was followed by the Indian grammarians is best shown by a *paribhāṣā.*[3]

The typical language preserved in the Vedas is literary, as distinguished from the spoken, and in consequence of the usual difference between the two, one may be allowed to suppose

[1] R. G. Bhandarkar: Wilson Philological Lectures, p. 30.

[2] 'From the language of the *Ṛgveda* we can trace a steady development to classical Sanskrit, through the later Saṁhitās and the Brāhmaṇas.'

Keith: History of Sanskrit Literature, p. 4.

[3] अर्द्धमात्रालाघवेन पुत्रोत्सवं मन्यन्ते वैयाकरणाः ।

that the poetical or literary language of the *Saṁhitās* was in certain features different from the language which was generally spoken by men in those primitive days. In the absence of any positive evidence it is almost impossible to say anything definitely as to the real nature of such a language, and the extent to which this popular language influenced the poetical language of the Vedas. This language, if it were at all spoken, seems to have been either older than, or co-eval with the Vedic language, and was current more or less among all classes of people. The identification of this language is, however, very difficult. It is supposed by some to have been the oldest form of Prākṛta. With those who, like Vākpati, assign greater originality and antiquity to it, Prākṛta is not an offshoot of Sanskrit, that is, the relation in which Sanskrit stands to Prākṛta is not one of mother and daughter. Contrary to the derivation of the orthodox grammarians, Prākṛta is said to have an independent origin of its own. According to this view, what we now call Sanskrit or a purified language might be supposed to have developed out of Prākṛta, which means 'natural' as opposed to artificial.

In point of antiquity the Vedas, specially the *Ṛgveda*, stand at the head of Sanskrit literature, and may be viewed as the oldest literary record of the Aryan culture. According to the orthodox

Hindu belief, the Vedas are not of human origin (*apauruṣeya*), but exist from eternity. To some they embody the infallible utterance of the Supreme Being[1]; and to some they represent the ancient stock of wisdom that has been traditionally transmitted to us through a long line of teachers (*guruparamparā*). They are, again, held to be the eternal truth that shone upon the ancient sages in moments of sacred meditation. But as far as our linguistic vision is permitted to proceed, the language represented by the Vedic hymns, both beautiful as well as poetical in form, does not seem to have embodied the first articulate utterance of mankind. From both evolutionary and linguistic points of view, it is difficult to assume that the first intellectual unfolding of the primitive mind could have found expression in so beautiful and rhythmical a language as that of the Vedas. What is nearer the truth is that we meet with a language in the Vedas that seems to have left its cruder stage far behind, and received refinement and poetical embellishment to a considerable degree—a fact that goes to strengthen the view that the Vedic language, as it has come down to us, has been the result of a long course of linguistic development. It is obvious that the ancient language had undoubtedly made

[1] तद्वचनादाम्नायस्य प्रामाण्यम्—Vaiśeṣika-sūtra, 1.1.3.

some progress before it could produce such literary works as the Vedas. The hymns are consequently far from being the first and the most original of their kind, for the artistic descriptions, pantheistic ideas and the worship of gods, as they are embodied in the Vedas, point to a different state of things, *i.e.*, the hymns had developed out of some older and cruder form of speech and ideas. The hymns presuppose a long history of linguistic development that covers a considerable period of time, but we are not in the possession of any positive data to form any definite idea of it. Judged by the standard of civilisation as revealed in the Vedas, the hymns appear to portray the history of a highly religious people (or of priestcraft as some have opined) who appear to have made considerable advance in certain departments of culture and were familiar with some social and political institutions.

The hymns, it must be borne in mind, have preserved the polished literary language as contrasted with the current or spoken tongue, the former being more artistic and rhetorical than the latter.[1] In order to get an idea of this imaginary 'pre-Vedic' language, we have only to picture before our mind the existence of a language—cruder in form, simpler in style and wanting in metaphor—which had ultimately developed

[1] Macdonell: The History of Sanskrit Literature, p. 20

into the poetical language of the Vedas. The structural resemblances noticeable in Sanskrit, Āvestā, Greek and Latin have led most of the modern philologists to trace the origin of all prominent languages to one common stock to which the name 'Parent-tongue' has been fitly given. By comparing a number of forms, as, for instance, SK. *pañca*, GK. πευτε, Lat. *quinque* Goth. fimf and Lith. penki, the philologists have postulated a form like 'penqwe' as the oldest and most original one. Now, this original tongue, whether identical with the 'pre-Vedic' language, as referred to above, or with any other imaginary language that has left no record behind, is supposed to be the mother of all languages. In the opinion of Vākpati, it is Prākṛta that deserves such a glorious designation.[1] Among the modern scholars some are of opinion, not without some amount of justification, that the Vedic language as well as Sanskrit is but literary forms of an old or 'primary' type of Prākṛta. One finds it, however, extremely difficult to arrive at any definite conclusion as to the real identity of such a 'Parent-tongue.'

While a harmonious continuity is traceable in all phases of transition in the course of which the ancient language passed into classical Sanskrit, the evidence of a remarkable difference

[1] Gauḍavaha, 93.

between the two well-marked types of language is also clear and overwhelming.[1] Though we do not fully agree with the statement that 'Classical Sanskrit presents the appearance of an artificial product,' we cannot but say that the rigid principles of Sanskrit grammar seems to have counteracted the development of Sanskrit to a great extent, and made classical Sanskrit somewhat stereotyped.[2] The *chandas* differs from the *laukika* or spoken Sanskrit in general tone, vocabulary, and to a certain extent, in its meaning or logical aspects also. In the Vedic language greater attention was paid to the phonological side. *Samāsas* (compounds) were, for instance, usually determined by accents. These sorts of phonetic niceties were particularly observed in the recitation of the Vedic hymns. The extent to which importance was attached to proper accentuation is illustrated by a legend which tells us that the expression *Indra-śatruḥ* turned fatal on the part of the sacrificer himself on account of a slight error in the accent.[3] In the Vedas we meet

1 'The former differs from the latter on the whole about as much as Homeric from classical Greek, or the Latin of Salic hymns from that of Vario.'

Macdonell: The History of Sanskrit Literature, p. 20.

2 *Op. cit.*, p. 22.

3 मन्त्रो हीनः स्वरतो वर्णतो वा मिथ्याप्रयुक्तो न तमर्थमाह ।
स वाग्वज्रो यजमानं हिनस्ति यथेन्द्रशत्रुः स्वरतोऽपराधात् ॥

Pāṇinīya Śikṣā, 52.

with a large number of words and peculiar grammatical terminations which have entirely disappeared making room for new ones in the later phase of the ancient language. We propose to give below some peculiar features of the Vedic language.

In the Vedic language we find intervocal *ḍ* sometimes changed into *l*, *e.g.*, *agnimīḍe* is convertible into *agnimīle*. We have both the forms *gonām* and *gavām* (genitive plural of *go*), while the former has become obsolete in classical Sanskrit.[1] Similarly, we have double terminations in the nominative plural, namely, *asas* as in *janāsaḥ*, and *as* as in *devāḥ*.[2] Again, in the accusative singular of words ending in *u*, we find two forms as *tanvam* and *tanuvam* and *prabhvam* and *prabhuvam*.[3] In contrast with the affixes *ina* or *ṭā* as in later Sanskrit, the instrumental singular was often formed by the addition of *ā* or *yā*, as in *urūyā*, *madhvā* (instead of *uruṇā* and *madhunā*), *bāhavā* and *nāvayā* (in the place of *bāhunā* and *nāvā*), *svapnayā* (instead of *svapnena*) and so on.[4] The instrumental plural of words ending in *a* often retains *bhis* or *ebhis* as in *rudrebhiḥ*, *pūrvebhiḥ*, and sometimes takes *ais* as in

[1] Pāṇ., 7.1.57.

[2] Pāṇ., 7.1.50.

[3] Pāṇ., 6.4.86. तन्वादीनां छन्दसि बहुलम्—Vār.

[4] Pāṇ., 7.1.39. आङ्याजयारामुपसंख्यानम्—Vār.

rudraiḥ.[1] It should be noted here that the affix *bhis* or *ebhis* (as in *rudrebhiḥ*) has analogy with the instrumental plural of the pronoun *idam*. The locative singular affix is sometimes dropped, as in *parame vyoman* (instead of *vyomani*), and it is sometimes changed to *ā*, as in *nābhā* for *nābhau*.[2] The nominative plural of words in neuter gender and ending in *a* is frequently changed to *ā*, as we find *viśvā dhanāni* for *viśvāni dhanāni*. In the Vedic hymns we have *janitā* for *janayitā*, *śamitā* for *śamayitā*,[3] *vidmā* for *vidmaḥ*, *evā* for *eva*,[4] *tmanā* for *ātmanā*,[5] *aṣṭāpadī* for *aṣṭapadī*.[6] and so on. For the archaic Vedic forms like *atāriṣat*, *patnyayaḥ*, *pītvī*, *snātvī*, *iṣṭvīnam*, *pṛtsuṣu* (double suffixes) and *śṛṇota* we have in later Sanskrit *tarayatu*, *patnyaḥ*, *pītvā*, *snātvā*, *iṣṭvā*, *pṛtsu* and *śṛṇuta*. It is particularly to be remembered that the Vedic subjunctive (as in *pra ṇa āyūṃṣi tāriṣat* (Ṛgveda, X. 186.1.), called *leṭ* in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, is not traceable in classical Sanskrit.[7] The infinitive in Sanskrit is usually formed by the affix *tum*, but in the Vedic.

[1] Pāṇ., 7.1.10.
[2] Pāṇ., 7.1.39.
[3] Pāṇ., 6.4.53-54.
[4] Pāṇ., 6.3.136.
[5] Pāṇ., 6.4.141.
[6] Pāṇ., 6.3.126.
[7] एषु पञ्चमो लकारश्छन्दोमात्रगोचरः—Bhaṭṭoji.

language we meet with a number of peculiar infinitives, often with the sense of a dative singular, as *jīvase, hantave, mlecchitavai, kartave, dātavai, pibadhyai,*[1] etc. Pāṇini has observed that in the *chandas* the compound of the words, namely, *pitṛ* and *mātṛ* yields such a form as *pitarāmātarā*,[2] the root *sah* (to bear) gives two forms in *ktvā* such as *sāḍhvai* and *sāḍhvā*,[3] and that the augment *ya* is sometimes found after *ktvā* as in *gatvāya* (for *gatvā*).[4] Pronouns like *tva* and *tya* are but rarely to be found in later Sanskrit. The Nighaṇṭu enumerates such verbal forms as *gamati* and *iṣati* which have probably changed respectively into *gacchati* and *icchati* in classical Sanskrit. All these peculiarities or characteristics of the Vedic language have been clearly shown by Pāṇini in the so-called *Vaidika Prakaraṇa*, and what we have stated above forms only an insignificant part of his highly comprehensive system. Unlike other systems of grammar known to us, Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī* has taken notice of both the Vedic and classical Sanskrit, and has thus justly merited the glorious designation of *Vedāṅga*.

With regard to meaning, we notice that certain Vedic words have changed their

[1] Pāṇ., 3.4.9.

[2] Pāṇ., 6.3.33.

[3] Pāṇ., 6.3.113.

[4] Pāṇ., 7.1.47.

meanings in classical Sanskrit. The word *kavi*,[1] as explained by Yāska and Sāyaṇa, was originally used in the Vedas in a general sense to denote 'one who has seen the last extremity of the nature of a thing,' *i.e.*, one possessing keen intellectual vision, but it came to be used in a restricted sense, namely, the writer of metrical verses. The word is frequently found in the former sense in the early Upaniṣads.[2] The word *mṛga* was a general name for animals,[3] and not strictly restricted to a species, *e.g.*, 'deer.' The word *paśu* occurs in the Ṛgveda as a general name for all animals including men.[4] The Tāntrik texts have also retained the term *paśu* in this wider sense (*cf. pati*, *paśu* and *pāśa* in the *Trika* doctrine) and they have named the 'Lord of beings' as *paśupati*. The word *vrata* originally meant *karman*, *i.e.*, action in general or *anna* (rice), but in classical Sanskrit it denotes particular religious rites and ceremonies.[5] Patañjali has taken this word as meaning what is taken for food.[6] The word

1 अग्निर्होता कविक्रतुः—Ṛgveda, I. 1.1.

2 दुर्गं पथस्तत् कवयो वदन्ति—Kaṭha, 2.4.14.

3 मृगो न भीमः कुचरो गिरिष्ठाः—Ṛgveda, X. 180.2.

4 तां विश्वरूपाः पशवो वदन्ति—Ṛgveda, VIII. 100. 11.

5 व्रतमिति कर्मनाम (as in 'अथा वयमादित्य व्रते तव')
अन्नमपि व्रतमुच्यते यदावृणोति शरीरम्—Nirukta, II. 13.

6 व्रतं च नामाभ्यवहारार्थमुपादीयते—Mahābhāṣya, 1. 1. 1.

vasu, denoting originally 'necessaries of life,' is now frequently used to signify 'wealth' alone.

The Brāhmaṇas and the earlier Upaniṣads also present some peculiar forms which are no longer found in classical Sanskrit.[1] In the Chāndogya we find the words *hiṃkāra*, *prastāva* and *pratihāra* in an entirely different sense. The particles *ha vai* were generally used in the Upaniṣads to denote antiquity, and the form *āsa* (instead of *babhūva*) is also sometimes found (Kaṭhopaniṣad). Even in Yāska's Nirukta we find many archaic words and expressions which became obsolete in later Sanskrit. The words *karman* and *upekṣā* or *upekṣitavya* are used by Yāska respectively in the sense of 'signification' and 'observation,'[2] and the words *pradeśa* (name) and *upajana* as signifying 'action' and 'augment' respectively.[3] Yāska has not only used *yatho* as well as *yathā* but has in one place put together four particles, namely, *yatho*, *hi*, *nu* and *vai* probably for the sake of giving emphasis to his statements.[4] This is not, however, allowed

[1] Bhandarkar: Wilson Philological Lectures, pp. 20-21.

[2] कर्मोपसंयोगद्योतका भवन्ति—Nirukta, I. 3.

उच्चावचानर्थान् प्राहुस्त उपेक्षितव्याः—*op. cit.*

[3] प्रादेशिकेन गुणेनान्वितौ स्याताम्—*op. cit.* I. 12.

प्रदेशाभिधायिना च धात्वाख्येन—Durga.

[4] यथो हि नु वा एतद्—Nirukta, I. 14.

in later Sanskrit. He has made use of a number of words, such as *bilma* (difference or division), *āṭṇāra* (wandering), *damūnā* (having the power of control),[1] *nāmakaraṇa*[2] (termination) which are rarely to be met with in later Sanskrit. In the *smṛti*-texts, *nāmakaraṇa* means a kind of ceremony (baptising a child with names). Expressions like *kārmanāmikaḥ saṃskāraḥ* (grammatical analysis pertaining to names formed according to action), *arthanityaḥ* (the same as *arthapradhānaḥ*), *śiśikṣa rājyena* (gave repeated instructions on the governance of kingdom) and *yuddhavarṇa* (as if it were a fight) occur in the Nirukta. There are, again, some old and antiquated Vedic forms which are no longer used in classical Sanskrit. The verbal forms *uṣa*, *tera*, *cakra*, *peca*, etc., seem to have been obsolete even at the time of Kātyāyana. Patañjali observes that these words have lost their application and have been replaced by such forms as *uṣitaḥ*, *tīrṇaḥ*, *kṛtavān*, and *pakvavān* respectively.[3] These forms are, however, available in the Vedas.[4]

[1] Nirukta, I. 14.

[2] नामकरणः प्रत्ययः—Durga under Nirukta, II. 5.

[3] Mahābhāṣya, 1. 1. 1, under the Vārttika 'अप्रयोगः प्रयोगान्यत्वात् ।'

[4] एतेषामपि प्रयोगो दृश्यते । क्व ? वेदे । यद्वो रेवती रेवत्यं तदूष । यन्मे नरः श्रुत्यं ब्रह्म चक्र—*op. cit.*

Now we are going to launch upon a disputed problem. What has been the subject of a great controversy is : whether Ṣanskrit had ever enjoyed the dignity of a spoken tongue, or had been simply a literary language in which the sacred books of the Hindus were composed. The majority of Western scholars have, however, denied the possibility of Sanskrit having been ever a spoken language of the people at large. Their contention is based on the ground that a language guided by such rigid rules of grammar and phonetics is not likely to have been current as a spoken language, specially among the masses. And what is all the more possible is that a language, more akin to Prākṛta than Sanskrit, was the general medium of communication. Without going into further details at present, we will only remark that the uneducated mass which formed, as it still forms, the bulk of society was prevented by natural disabilities from having Sanskrit as its mother-tongue. It needs hardly be said that the correct pronunciation of Sanskrit words, apart from the question of grammar, requires a good deal of training in which ordinary people are always lacking. Sanskrit, if it had been at all a spoken language, was the language of the cultured people. In the fertile period of its literary development, Sanskrit was, we are inclined to believe, undoubtedly a spoken language, though

its currency was possibly limited to the educated section of the upper classes. There was admittedly a class of people, mainly composed of the Brahmins, that had Sanskrit for its mother-tongue. The three upper classes popularly known as the 'twice-born' (*dvijāti*), *i.e.*, those allowed to make a study of the Vedas, are supposed to have been Sanskrit-speaking people. It is clear from the evidence of the Upaniṣads that the Kṣatriyas used to take a leading part in all philosophical discussions of the day, specially in the court of Janaka. There is no doubt that these discussions, like the ancient method of teaching, were carried on in Sanskrit. People other than Brahmins but holding dignified position in life were also competent to speak Sanskrit. In the Rāmāyaṇa Hanumān is said to have delivered his message to Sītā in genuine Sanskrit just like a 'twice-born' (*dvijātiriva saṃskṛtam*). A demon named Ilvala is also described as capable of speaking Sanskrit.[1] More striking is the evidence available in the Mahābhāṣya. Patañjali narrates a controversy in which a charioteer (*sūta*) not only speaks in Sanskrit, but ably discusses the derivation of the word *prājitṛ* with a grammarian.[2]

[1] इल्वलः संस्कृतं वदन्—Rāmāyaṇa.

[2] एवं हि कश्चिद् वैयाकरण आह। कोऽस्य रथस्य प्रवेतेति? सूत आह—आयुष्मन्नहं प्राजितेति—Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 488.

There is overwhelming evidence, both internal and external, which tends to prove beyond any shadow of doubt that Sanskrit was current as a spoken language before the beginning of the Christian era. The term *bhāṣā*, derived as it is from the root *bhāṣ*, to speak, is in itself an indication that Sanskrit was at one time as good a spoken language as Latin or Greek. No one can possibly deny that a language, possessing such a vast literature that covers almost all departments of human knowledge, was once prevalent as a living language. It is by no means improbable that the people—whose religious texts, moral and legal codes, spiritual ideas, poetry, songs, prayers, history and even folk-tales and fables are all preserved in Sanskrit—inherited that language as their mother-tongue. Moreover, one can, as a matter of fact, express himself freely or give adequate expression to all his ideas only when he happens to speak in his own mother-tongue. Now, the clear way in which Vyāsa, Vālmīki and Patanjali, to mention only a few, have expressed themselves all throughout their respective works shows not only their command over language, but makes it abundantly clear that Sanskrit was undoubtedly a spoken language with them. The ease with which Kauṭilya composed the science of Politics (*arthaśāstra*) and Vātsyāyana wrote his famous work on erotics

(*kāmaśāstra*) may also be adduced as further evidence in support of our view.

The frequent references to *bhāṣā*, as they occur in the Nirukta, unmistakably testifies to the fact that Sanskrit was current as a living language at the time of Yāska. The existence of Sanskrit as a spoken tongue is made clear by Yāska when he expressly states that in deriving certain Vedic words (*kṛdanta*) he had to make use of some verbal roots directly taken from the *bhāṣā* or the language current at that time.[1] Further, he has taken notice of some provincial or dialectical variations of Sanskrit as a spoken tongue. While the verbal form, Yāska observes, namely, *śavati*, meaning 'moving' (*gacchati*) is used by the Kambojas, the nominal form *śava*, denoting 'a dead body,' was in vogue among the Aryans. Similarly, the people of eastern provinces used the verbal form *dāti* in the sense of 'cutting,' and the noun-form *dātra* (a cutting instrument) was used by the northerners.[2] The word *laukika* whereby Patañjali denotes the current or spoken tongue is also to be found in the Nirukta. Patañjali has not only referred to the important observation of Yāska but has added

[1] भाषिकेभ्यो धातुभ्यो नैगमाः कृतो भाष्यन्ते—Nirukta, II. 2.

[2] शवतिर्गतिकर्मा कम्बोजेष्वेव भाष्यते, विकारमस्यार्येषु भाषन्ते शव इति। दातिर्लवनार्थे प्राच्येषु दात्रमुदीच्येषु—*loc. cit.*

some other examples of provincial variations in Sanskrit. While *hammati*, he continues, is used among the Surāṣṭras and *raṃhati* (both denoting 'movement') among the eastern and central countries, the Aryans used only *gam* or *gacchati*.[1]

The difference between the spoken Sanskrit of the northern and eastern peoples has also been carefully pointed out by Pāṇini. He has particularly taken notice of the fact that the northerners used such forms as *hāriṣeṇi*, *lākṣaṇi*, etc., with the suffix *iñ* and not *hāriṣeṇya* and *lākṣaṇya* by virtue of the termination *ṇya*.[2] They used *āmraguptāyani* in the place of which the easterners had *āmragupti*. Again, the feminine forms like Gārgyāyaṇī, etc., formed with *ṣpha*, were current among the easterners.[3] There was also some amount of difference regarding accents between the eastern and southern countries. This is noticed by Pāṇini in the rule Pāṇ., 6.2.74.

From Yāska we come to Pāṇini whose work on grammar is regarded by scholars as a great landmark in the field of Sanskrit literature. There is convincing evidence to the effect that Sanskrit was a spoken

[1] हम्मतिः सुराष्ट्रेषु रंहतिः प्राच्यमध्येषु गमिमेव त्वार्याः प्रयुञ्जते—
Mahābhāṣya, 1.1.1.

[2] उदीचामिञ्—Pāṇ., 4.1.153.

[3] प्राचां ष्फ तद्धितः—Pāṇ., 4.1.17.

language at the time of Pāṇini whose reputation as a grammarian reached the southernmost extremity of India, *i.e.*, the Cape Comorin.[1] A huge system of grammar, as that of Pāṇini, could not have practically come into existence, if Sanskrit had not been current as a spoken tongue at that time (fifth century B. C.). Pāṇini had in view both the Vedic and classical forms, and the language for which he formulated the rules of his *Aṣṭādhyāyī* was certainly a living language with him.[2] As a large number of the Vedic forms had already become obsolete, Pāṇini had to make a number of rules exclusively for them. He has laid down that certain suffixes, as *kvasu* and *kānac*, are used equally in the Vedic and *laukika* Sanskrit in the place of *liṭ* (perfect).[3] He has sanctioned the optional use of *liṭ* in the *bhāṣā* so far as the roots *sad*, *vas* and *śru* are concerned.[4] Here *liṭ* is invariably followed by

1 आकुमारं यशः पाणिनेः—Mahābhāṣya under the rule Pāṇ., 2.4.89. This expression may also mean that Pāṇini's name was familiar even to children.

2 Keith has rightly observed: "Pāṇini has rules which are meaningless for anything but a vernacular, apart from the fact that the term Bhāṣā which he applies to the speech he teaches has the natural sense of a spoken language."

—A History of Sanskrit Literature, p. 9.

3 Pāṇ., 3.2.106-107.

4 भाषायां सदवसश्रुवः—Pāṇ., 3.2.108.

kvasu and we get such forms as *sedivān*, *uṣivān* and *śuśruvān*. He has also made provision in the *bhāṣā* for such peculiar Vedic forms as *upeyivān*, *anāśvān* and *anūcāna*.[1] The root *iṇ* (to go), preceded by the preposition *upa* and followed by *kvasu* together with the augment *iṭ*, is frequently available in classical Sanskrit.[2] Similarly, the root *aś*, preceded by the negative particle and followed by *kvasu* without the augment *iṭ*, is also found in later Sanskrit. References to *bhāṣā* have also been made elsewhere. In a sentence that is used for the purpose of determination (*vicāra*), *e.g.*, as to whether a thing is a snake or a rope, it is held that the last vowel of the first word should be prolonged, as *ahirnu rajjurnu* (it is either a snake or a rope).[3] The three Vedic words formed with the suffix *kvasu*, namely, *dāśvān* (from *dāś* to give or injure), *sāhvān* (from *sah* to bear) and *mīḍhvān* (from *mih* to give)' are traceable also in classical Sanskrit. These forms are called peculiar (*nipātana*), because they get neither reduplication nor the augment *iṭ*. The use of the root *dāś* along with those of *ri*,

[1] उपेयिवाननाश्वाननूचानश्च—Pāṇ., 3.2.109.

[2] उपपूर्वादिणो भाषायामपि भूतमात्रे लिड्वा तस्य नित्यं क्वसुः। इट्। उपेयिवान् नञ्पूर्वादश्नातेः क्वसुरिडभावश्च। 'धृतजयधृतेरनाशुषः' इति भारविः॥

Bhaṭṭoji.

[3] पूर्वं तु भाषायाम्—Pāṇ., 8.2.98.

kṣi, etc., occurs usually in the *chandas*.[1] Out of these, *kṣi* alone has been allowed to be used in *bhāṣā*.[2]

The poets claimed a freedom of their own and could not always fetter themselves by the strict rules of grammar, and they exercised a considerable amount of license in the use of words. This is why they are often styled *niraṅkuśa* (*i.e.*, moving freely like an elephant without the fear of a goad). Kālidāsa has used *prabhaviṣṇu*[3] though the form, specially with the preposition, is not at all sanctioned in *bhāṣā*.[4] He has also used *āsa* (from *as*, to be), in spite of the fact that the root *as* yields only *babhūva* in *liṭ*. The form *kāmayāna*[5] (instead of *kāmayamāna*) cannot be supported by the rules of grammar. By the expression *prabhraṃśayāṃ yo nahuṣaṃ cakāra*,[6] Kālidāsa has violated the principle of grammar to an unpardonable extent. The so-called ungrammatical forms or *ārṣa-prayogas*, as we often meet with in the Mahābhārata and the Rāmāyaṇa, have a history of their own. Though they do not conform to the

1 यदङ्ग दाशुषे त्वमग्ने भद्रं करिष्यसि—Ṛgveda, I. 1.6.
क्षेना जिगति दाशुषे—*op. cit.*

2 क्षि भाषायामित्येके। 'न तद् यशः शस्त्रभृतां क्षिणोति' (रघुवंश)—Bhaṭṭoji.

3 Sakuntalā, 2.

4 भुवश्च—Pāṇ., 3.1.138.

5 Sakuntalā, 3.

6 Raghuvaṃśa, 13.

ordinary rules of grammar, we are not strictly allowed to treat them as absolutely ungrammatical or unacceptable. We do not question their validity generally for two reasons : they were either used by *seers* of respectable antiquity who, like the *śiṣṭas* as described by Patañjali, were regarded as authority in respect of the application of words, or they might be supposed to have been correctly formed in accordance with a system of grammar (pre-Pāṇiniyan) which is no longer accessible to us.

Another evidence is afforded by the ancient manner of salutation. In the rules that determine the prolongation or prolation of vowels (*pluta*), we find the clear indication of a spoken language. Pāṇini has formulated a rule to the effect that in a sentence used for returning salute (*pratyabhivādana*) to a non-*śūdra* the last vowel (*ṭi*) should be a prolated as well as a high-pitched (*udātta*) one, as, for example, *āyuṣmānedhi Devadatta* (O you long-lived Devadatta, come).[1] Kātyāyana has made improvement upon it by holding that it is not so in the case of a woman.[2] In setting forth the motives that are served by the study of grammar, Patañjali has quoted a verse which emphatically declares that an uneducated man,

[1] प्रत्यभिवादेऽशूद्रे—Pāṇ., 8.2.83.

[2] स्त्रियां न—Vārttika.

who does not know how to prolong a name in responding to a salutation, should be treated like a woman.[1] Is it possible that such a practice could ever be in vogue if Sanskrit had been anything but a spoken language? Our answer is emphatically in the negative.

Sanskrit had been not only a spoken language in the time of Yāska and Pāṇini, but we have sufficient evidence to believe that it continued to be so even at a much later period, we mean that of Kātyāyana and Patañjali. Kātyāyana's *Vārttikas*,[2] which are in most cases improvement upon the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, took notice of the growing or new forms not anticipated by the rules of Pāṇini. In this improvement and elaboration Kātyāyana certainly succeeded in bringing his wider outlook on language to bear upon the problems of grammar. Pāṇini had only *dvitīyāya* in the dative singular of *dvitīya*, but Kātyāyana, acquainted as he was with new forms and expressions of a spoken language, made an additional rule to the effect that words ending in *tīya* (in both masculine and feminine) should be optionally declined like *sarvanāman* (pronoun) in the dative, ablative, genitive and

1 अविद्वांसः प्रत्यभिवादे नाम्नो ये न प्लुतिं विदुः ।
कामं तेषु तु विप्रोष्य स्त्रीष्विवायमहं वदेत् ॥
Mahābhāṣya, 1. 1. 1.

2 उक्तानुक्तदुरुक्तार्थव्यक्तिकारि तु वार्त्तिकम् ।

locative singular,[1] and we have consequently *dvitīyasmai*, *dvitīyasmin* and *dvitīyasmāt* as well as *dvitīyāyai* and *dvitīyasyai* and so on.[2] Too many are the innovations brought about by the author of the *Vārttikas* to be exhaustively stated within this short compass. On the strength of the *Vārttikas* we have feminine of *vadhūṭa* with *ṅīp* or lengthened *i* as *vadhūṭī* meaning 'youthful,'[3] a dative case in *patye śete* (lying down for her husband)[4] and ablative in *pāpāt viramati*[5] (abstaining from sin) and so on. The last *Vārttika* has been, however, set aside by Patañjali on the assumption of 'intellectual separation' (*buddhisthāpāya*).

Both Pāṇini and Kātyāyana employed some words and expressions which are scarcely to be found in later Sanskrit. *Upasaṁkhyāna*[6] in the sense of 'supplementary addition,' *vyavāya* in the sense of 'interposition,'[7] *anvavasarga* in

[1] The rule Pāṇ., 7. 3. 115, is thus overthrown by the *Vārttika* 'वाप्रकरणे तीयस्य ङित्सूपसंख्यानम्'।

[2] विभाषाप्रकरणे तीयस्य ङित्सूपसंख्यानम् ।—Vār.

[3] वयस्यचरम इति वाच्यम्—Vār.

[4] क्रियया यमभिप्रैति सोऽपि संप्रदानम्—Vār.

[5] जुगुप्साविरामप्रमादार्थानामुपसंख्यानम्—Vār.

[6] प्रकृत्यादिभ्य उपसंख्यानम्—Vār.

[7] अट्कुप्वाङ्नुम्व्यवायेऽपि—Pāṇ., 8. 4. 2. The word *vyavāya* now means 'sexual intercourse.'

the sense of 'free order' (*kāmacārānujñā*), *atyantasaṁyoga*[1] as denoting 'close connection' or *vyāpti*, *apavarga* in the sense of 'attainment of result' (as distinct from the attainment of final emancipation), are very rarely used in later Sanskrit. An expression like *śiva-bhāgavataḥ*[2] meaning 'one worshipping Śiva as the highest godhead' is also rare.

Next we come to Patañjali. The Mahābhāṣya contains some passages which show that Sanskrit had not ceased to be a spoken tongue even at the time of Patañjali. Just in the very beginning of his commentary, Patañjali has spoken of two different kinds of speech,[3] namely, *vaidika* or *chandas* and *laukika* or *bhāṣā*, the latter undoubtedly refers to the current or spoken language of his time. Both Kātyāyana and Patañjali have shown their close acquaintance with southern India or the Deccan which, like Āryāvarta as defined in the Mahābhāṣya and elsewhere, was a great centre of Brahmanic culture. While commenting on the Vārttika *yathā laukika-vaidikeṣu*, Patañjali has observed that

[1] कालाध्वनोरत्यन्तसंयोगे—*op. cit.*, 2. 3. 5. 'अत्यन्तसंयोग' was probably the earliest name for logical *vyāpti* or invariable concomitance.

[2] Mahābhāṣya under Pāṇ., 5.2.76.

[3] केषां शब्दानाम् ? लौकिकानां वैदिकानां च—Mahābhāṣya, 1.1.1.

the people of the Deccan are naturally fond of using words ending in *taddhita* or derivative terminations; as, for instance, they are found to use *laukike* and *vaidike* instead of *loke* and *vede.*[1] What is stated here does not apply to a dead language; and we can reasonably assume that Sanskrit was current, though in a limited sphere, as a spoken language up to the second century before the Christian era. The aphorisms such as *lokato'rthaprayukte śabdaprayoge śāstreṇa dharmaniyamaḥ*, *sarve deśāntare*, etc., distinctly speak of a language that was nothing but spoken. Patañjali has further remarked that the use of correct words in consonance with the rules of grammar is alone attended with religious merits, although correct and corrupt forms are found to be equally expressive in ordinary parlance.[2] Patañjali has said elsewhere that great lakes (*saraḥ*) are called *sarasī* in the Deccan.[3] He has given us another valuable piece of information that it was not necessarily the educated Brahmins alone who had Sanskrit as their

[1] प्रियतद्धिता दाक्षिणात्या यथा लोके वेदे चेति प्रयोक्तव्ये यथा लौकिक-दिकेष्विति प्रयुञ्जते—*op. cit.*

[2] समानायामर्थगतौ शब्देन चापशब्देन च धर्मनियमः क्रियते शब्देनैवार्थोऽभिधेयो नापशब्देनेत्येवं क्रियमाणमभ्युदयकारि भवतीति—*op. cit.*, 1.1.1.

[3] दक्षिणापथे हि महान्ति सरांसि सरस्य इत्युच्यन्ते—

Mahābhāṣya under Pāṇ., 1.1.19.

spoken tongue, but there was also a class of people known as *śiṣṭas* who with or without any knowledge of grammar were naturally competent to speak correct Sanskrit. They were, so to speak, the authority so far as the use of words was concerned. Their usages or applications (as *pṛṣodara*), though sometimes contrary to the rules of grammar, were accepted by the grammarians without a word of objection. Just as we can speak our mother-tongue without knowing a syllable of grammar, even so were these *śiṣṭas* able to speak correctly without having any knowledge of grammar. This faculty was either intuitive on their part or a divine grace bestowed upon them.[1]

A question may be raised here as to the people with whom Sanskrit was a spoken language. We have already touched upon this point in our preliminary observation. It was admittedly in the traditionally cultured community of the Brahmins, and to a certain extent, in that of the ruling race, that Sanskrit prevailed as a spoken language. Sanskrit was once so popular a language in the whole of the Āryāvartta that it could be spoken even by people belonging to the lower strata of society; and this fact becomes more than clear from a reference in the Mahābhāṣya (where a charioteer is found discussing

[1] नूनमस्य दैवानुग्रहः स्वभावो वा योऽयं न चाष्टाध्यायीमधीते ये चात्र विहिताः शब्दास्तांश्च प्रयुङ्क्ते—Mahābhāṣya under Pāṇ., 6. 3. 109.

with a grammarian in Sanskrit). In the dramatic literature of Sanskrit we find a still more convincing proof, *i.e.*, while noble and aristocratic persons are speaking Sanskrit, the uneducated people as well as females have different forms of Prākṛta as their spoken language. Though there is, however, no entire absence of drama written absolutely in Sanskrit, the evidence drawn from the dramatic works in general lends colour to the view that Sanskrit, as a spoken language, was in all probability confined to the area of Brahmanical culture, and that certain forms of Prākṛta were, on the other hand, current among the uneducated mass. The Sanskrit-speaking Brahmins were, however, familiar with the dialects of the neighbouring people, since they had many occasions to come in touch with them. Though with them Sanskrit was evidently a spoken language, Kātyāyana and Patañjali seem to have been familiar with Prākṛtas, as is evident from their using such forms as *āṇapayati*, *vaḍḍhati*, *vaṭṭati*, *gāvī*, *goṇī*,[1] etc. (the Sanskrit equivalents of which are respectively *ājñāpayati*, *varddhate*, *varttate* and *gauḥ*).

Recent investigations in central Asia, China, Japan, Tibet, Ceylon as well as various

[1] भूवादिपाठः प्रातिपदिकाणपयत्यादिनिवृत्त्यर्थः—

Vār. 12 under Pāṇ., 1.3.1.

islands in the Indian ocean, have brought to light such convincing and interesting materials that we can now state without any fear of contradiction that Sanskrit and the culture which lies at its back were not only confined to the so-called Āryāvartta or the land of the *śiṣṭas*, but spread far and wide to make its influence felt by other countries at present geographically detached from India. The civilisation of India is so organically connected with the ancient language of the land that the diffusion of Indian culture abroad necessarily meant the spread of Sanskrit. Even on the side of language, Sanskrit did not lag behind in exercising its stupendous influence over the nighbouring countries of India, and traces of Sanskritic names as well as evidences of the cultivation of Sanskrit are still available in Java, Campā, Cambodia and other far-off countries. The spirit of religion embedded in Sanskrit was not less powerful and active in penetrating into the heart of various nations so as to make them what they are in matters religious and social. 'Half the world,' in the estimation of an Indian thinker, 'moves on independent foundations which Hinduism supplied. China and Japan, Tibet and Siam, Burma and Ceylon look to India as their spiritual home.'[1]

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1 S. Radhakrishnan: The Hindu View of Life, p. 12.

CHAPTER X

PRĀKRIT AND APABHRAṀŚA

Classification of main Indian languages—derivation and varieties of Prākrit—origin of Apabhraṁśa—corruption of speech due to various causes—admixture of Sanskrit with Prākrits and foreign tongues—foreign and Dravidian elements in Sanskrit—the question of religion involved in the use of correct words—the views of the Mīmāṁsakas—Aryan and Mleccha usages of words—signification of Apabhraṁśa—Bhartṛhari and Gaṅgeśa on the power of denotation of Apabhraṁśa.

We have already taken notice of the fact that there were, side by side with Sanskrit, other languages current in India under the common name Prākṛta, or Prākrit, as the word has been distorted like *Sanskrit* by the majority of scholars. These dialects, which in course of time became more popular than Sanskrit, were no doubt used over a wider area, and they seem to have been generically related to Sanskrit. Whatever may the origin of the Prākrits prove to be on examination of linguistic facts, one can hardly ignore their importance as a typical speech which has not only retained the genuine spoken language of the mass, but has got its own literature, and specially several systems of grammar.

The languages of India have been mainly divided into three classes, namely, Sanskrit, Prākṛit and Apabhraṁśa. We can review

this classification from two different standpoints; we may either agree with the orthodox school of thought and look upon the Prākrit and Apabhraṁśa as possessing blood-relationship with Sanskrit, or we may, in agreement with the modern view-point, assume them to be distinct from, and independent of, Sanskrit. Daṇḍin,[1] Bhāmaha[2] and Bhojarāja[3] have all recognised this threefold classification. Rudraṭa has, however, raised the number to six by the addition of Māgadhī, Śaurasenī and Paiśācī.[4] This division is not strictly logical, because Māgadhī, Śaurasenī and Paiśācī, like Mahārāṣṭrī and others, are but different forms of Prākrit with slightly different features.

Māgadhī, as the very name implies, was the dialect of Magadha. It is generally known as

[1] The division of *Kāvyas* on the basis of languages is thus shown by Daṇḍin:—

'तदेतद् वाङ्मयं भूयः संस्कृतं प्राकृतं तथा।
अपभ्रंशश्च मिश्रश्चेत्याहुरार्य्यास्चतुर्विधम् ॥'—Kāvyādarśa, 1. 32.

[2] 'शब्दार्थौ सहितौ काव्यं गद्यं पद्यं च तद्विधा।
संस्कृतं प्राकृतं चान्यदपभ्रंश इति त्रिधा ॥'—Kāvyālaṁkāra, 1. 16.

[3] 'संस्कृतेनैव कोऽप्यर्थः प्राकृतेनैव चापरः।
शक्यो वाचयितुं कश्चिदपभ्रंशेन वा पुनः ॥'
—Sarasvatīkaṇṭhābharaṇa.

[4] 'प्राकृत-संस्कृत-मागध-पिशाचभाषाश्च शूरसेनी च।
षष्ठोऽत्र भूरिभेदो देशविशेषादपभ्रंशः ॥'—Kāvyālaṁkāra, 2. 12.

the Māgadhī of the Sanskrit dramas, and its characteristics are preserved in such grammatical treatises as the Prākrit-prakāśa of Vararuci and the work of Hemacandra. It is to be differentiated from a still earlier dialect, known by the same name and derived immediately from the Vedic Prākrit. For want of a proper name, this dialect has been given the designation of Old Māgadhī, which differs to a certain extent from the Māgadhī of the grammarians. This Old Māgadhī seems to have been represented in a fairly comprehensive manner in what is known as the Pāli (which has also preserved other forms of the older Prākrits) and in some of the Aśoka inscriptions.

Pāli represents a stage in the development of the Indo-Aryan language when the spoken dialect was approaching standardisation,—the stage known as the Middle Indo-Aryan period. The literature of the orthodox school of Buddhism, *i.e.*, of the Theravādins, is preserved in Pāli, which is regarded as the earliest literary form of the Prākrit.

There is some difference of opinion with regard to the derivation of the name *Prākṛta*. The orthodox as well as the most widely accepted view makes Prākrit a language that is immediately derived from the *Prakṛti*, *i.e.*, Sanskrit. The author of the *Saṃgraha* (Vyāḍi) is said to have been in favour of

such a derivation.[1] From the various definitions suggested of the name Prākrit, it is quite clear that all Prākrit dialects have Sanskrit as their real origin. But there were others who used to look upon Prākrit as a natural language, *i.e.*, one that has come directly from nature. In a sense the Prākrits are less artificial than Sanskrit. While Sanskrit has derived its name from *saṁskāra*, the Prākrits have kept their genuine character intact and have come down to us without any material change of form. Prākrit was generally so-called inasmuch as it was the language of ordinary people (*prākṛtajanānāṁ bhāṣā*). Daṇḍin had evidently the former derivation in view when he narrated the different varieties of the Prākrits as *tadbhava* (Prākrit words as directly derived from Sanskrit), *tatsama* (Prākrit having likeness with Sanskrit) and *deśī* (Prākrit dialects, as used in different parts of the country, which have no similarity with Sanskrit).[2] An exactly similar view was also

[1] 'शब्दप्रकृतिरपभ्रंश इति संग्रहकारोक्तेरपभ्रंशो नाम न स्वतन्त्रः कश्चन विद्यते—
Puṇyarāja under Vākya. 1. 149.

It should be particularly noticed here that languages other than Sanskrit were generally termed *apabhraṁśa* (corrupt forms) in preference to Prākrit by most of the Hindu teachers. *cf.* 'शास्त्रेषु संस्कृतादन्यदपभ्रंशतयोदितम् ।'—
Kāvyādarśa, 1. 36.

[2] तद्भवस्तत्समो देशीत्यनेकः प्राकृतक्रमः ।—Kāvyādarśa, 1. 33.

entertained by Bhartṛhari and other grammarians in respect of the evolution of the Prākrits and Apabhraṁśa from Sanskrit.[1] The extent to which the Prākrit is allied to, and has borrowed from, Sanskrit is best illustrated by the so-called *tatsama* Prākrit. Some Sanskrit works contain verses to illustrate the use of *bhāṣā-sama*. The thirteenth canto of the *Bhaṭṭi-kāvya* has been written in this typical Prākrit form. 'Śaurasenī shows greater adhesion to Sanskrit than other forms of Prākrit.'

Sir George Grierson is, on the other hand, one of those who have not only ascribed greater antiquity to the Prākrits but have made them even precursor of the Vedic language. In contradiction to the orthodox view, Prākrit is now being held as a popular language of independent origin and not necessarily an offspring of Sanskrit. The supposition is slowly gaining ground that the oldest or 'Primary' Prākrit was not posterior to the ancient literary language of the Vedas, but was current as the spoken language of the masses, side by side with the latter. What is still more striking is that Sanskrit is held to have developed out of the materials supplied by the Prākrits in their oldest form. Further, the Prākrit continued to be a spoken tongue even when Sanskrit had become a dead language.

Vākyapadīya, 1, 149-156.

The inscriptions of Aśoka give us a specimen of the Prākrit of the third century B.C., and this dialect is conveniently called Aśokan Māgadhī. The most important varieties of Prākrit are Mahārāṣṭrī, Śaurasenī, Māgadhī and Paiśācī. The first is spoken of by Daṇḍin as the best form of Prākrit in which 'great poems' like *Setubandha, Gauḍavaho* and others were written.[1] Śaurasenī, probably originated in Śūrasena, modern Mathurā, is 'more markedly akin to Sanskrit than Mahārāṣṭrī,' and ordinarily used by females in Sanskrit dramas.[2] Paiśācī [3] was a vulgar speech, used by non-Aryans or low-class people, in which Guṇāḍhya narrated the well-known tale *Bṛhatkathā*.[4] 'Paiśācī,' says Prof. Keith, 'though practically unknown in the extant dramas, enjoyed, it appears, a considerable vogue in the popular tale, as a result doubtless, of the fame of the *Bṛhatkathā*.' Hemacandra has treated of Paiśācī and its particular division as *cūlikāpaiśācikā* (sūtra 325). Beside these, there are other Prākrit

[1] महाराष्ट्राश्रयां भाषां प्रकृष्टं प्राकृतं विदुः ।
सागरः सूक्तिरत्नानां सेतुबन्धादि यन्मयम् ॥—Kāvyādarśa, 1. 34.

[2] शौरसेनी प्रयोक्तव्या तादृशीनां च योषिताम् ।—Sāhityadarpaṇa, 6.

[3] Sir George Grierson has identified Paiśācī with the north-western dialect of the Aśoka inscriptions and the modern dialects of the north-west.

[4] भूतभाषामयीं प्राहुरद्भुतार्थां बृहत्कथाम् ।—Kāvyādarśa, 1. 38.

dialects and vernaculars mentioned by Lakṣmīdhara and Śeṣacandra.

The word Apabhraṁśa literally means distortion of, or deviation from, the original, and, so far as it applies to a language, it means a distorted form of speech presenting a corruption of Sanskrit. Apabhraṁśa is the same as *apaśabda*. Patañjali has used both the terms *apaśabda* and Apabhraṁśa so as to indicate the corruption of Sanskrit, and has particularly shown how one correct word may give rise to a large number of Apabhraṁśas.[1] Words like *gāvī*, *goṇī*, etc., which represent corrupt forms of the Sanskrit *gauḥ*, are generally known as *apaśabda* or Apabhraṁśas.[2] As they are formally nothing but corruption in relation to Sanskrit, the Prākrits too, in the above sense, fall under the category of Apabhraṁśa. Thus, to the Hindu grammarians languages other than Sanskrit or those that were derived from it have the general name 'Apabhraṁśa.'[3] The general term, *i.e.*, Apabhraṁśa, as used by the grammarians, is significant, because the outstanding feature of the corrupt speech is that it represents only the

[1] एकैकस्य हि शब्दस्य बहवोऽपभ्रंशाः। तद्यथा—गौरित्यस्य शब्दस्य गावी गोणी गोता गोपोतलिकेत्येवमादयोऽपभ्रंशाः:—Mahābbāṣya, 1. 1. 1.

[2] शब्दसंस्कारहीनो यो गौरिति प्रयुयुक्षिते।
तमपभ्रंशमिच्छन्ति विशिष्टार्थनिवेशिनम् ॥—Vākyapadīya, 1. 149.

[3] शब्दप्रकृतिरपभ्रंश इति संग्रहकारोक्तेः—Puṇyarāja.

perverted or distorted form of Sanskrit. Daṇḍin has observed that in the interpretation of orthodox Hindu scholars dialects other than Sanskrit are termed Apabhraṁśa.[1] He says further that the language of the Ābhīras and other low-class people, as we find in Sanskrit dramas, generally goes by the name of Apabhraṁśa.[2] Rudraṭa, whose sixfold division of languages we have already referred to, is of opinion that Apabhraṁśa has more than one type according to the province over which it was in vogue.[3] Namisādhu, the commentator on Rudraṭa's *Kāvyālaṁkāra*, has pointed out some peculiarities of Apabhraṁśa.[4] Hemacandra in his *Prākṛta-Vyākaraṇa* has taken notice of Apabhraṁśa and has devoted more than one hundred rules (329-448) to bring out its peculiar features. The last aphorism states that 'the rest corresponds to Sanskrit (*śeṣaṁ saṁskṛtavat siddham*). Rudraṭa has given one verse in Apabhraṁśa by way of illustration.[5]

1 शास्त्रेषु संस्कृतादन्यदपभ्रंशतयोदितम् ।—Kāvyādarśa, 1. 36.

2 आभीरादिगिरः काव्येष्वपभ्रंश इति स्मृतः ।—*op. cit.*

3 षष्ठोऽत्र भूरिभेदो देशविशेषादपभ्रंशः ।—Kāvyālaṁkāra, 2. 12.

4 यथा न लोपोऽपभ्रंशेऽधोरेफस्य। यथा प्रखरभ्रायरवन्ने चेत्यादि। तथोदन्तस्य दकारो भवति। यथा—गोवुगंजिद्रुमलिदुचारितु इत्यादि।

5 धीरागच्छदुमे हतमुदुङ्कर वारिसदःसु।
अभ्रमदप्रसराहरणुरविकिरणा तेजःसु॥
Kāvyālaṁkāra, 4. 15.

There is, however, a controversy regarding the real signification of Apabhraṁśa. There are some who identify Apabhraṁśa with the vernaculars, and an attempt was made by Sir G. Grierson to derive the modern vernaculars from the various local Apabhraṁśas. But this view is refuted by Prof. Keith. He states emphatically that 'the vernacular (*deśabhāṣā*) is a different thing' from Apabhraṁśa which in his opinion 'was never a literary language.' [1]

The grammarians have clearly shown how and under what circumstances distortion or corruption of sacred speech might have taken place. The uneducated or ordinary people were either naturally unfit or careless so far as the use and utterance of correct Sanskrit forms were concerned. It is to such innate inaptitude and careless imitation that the author of the Vākyapadīya[2] has traced the origin of Apabhraṁśas which, according to the interpretation of the grammarians, have Sanskrit as their origin. Apabhraṁśa, as Vyāḍi maintains, is that form of speech which has Sanskrit as its origin. It does not, therefore, constitute a language of independent growth but represents the refined tongue only in a perverted form.[3] These

[1] Keith: A History of Sanskrit Literature, p. 33.

[2] Vākyapadīya, 1. 149.

[3] अपभ्रंशो नाम न स्वतन्त्रः कश्चन विद्यते। सर्वस्य ह्यपभ्रंशस्य साधुरेव प्रकृतिः—Puṇyarāja.

mutilations and corruptions of Sanskrit words were due to both natural unfitness and wrong imitations on the part of ordinary people.[1] Imitation, as is well known to all students of Comparative Philology, played an important part in the formation of language. Having close intercourse, both social and commercial, with the cultured community in which Sanskrit was a spoken language, the uneducated people tried to imitate Sanskrit words as they often heard, but could not do so successfully for reasons already mentioned. The inevitable result of such intercourse was that dialects of perverted forms consequent upon false imitation of Sanskrit had gradually grown up which ultimately gained widespread popularity among the masses. The expression *aśaktijānu-karaṇa* (imitation due to inability), as it occurs in the *Vārttika*,[2] has been explained by Patañjali as referring to the natural incompetence for exact imitation which is generally displayed by females and low-class people. He has observed further[3] that a female uses *ḷtaka*

[1] गौरिति प्रयोक्तव्ये अशक्त्या प्रमादादिभिर्वा गोण्यादयस्तत्प्रकृतयोऽपभ्रंशाः प्रयुज्यन्ते—*loc. cit.*

[2] ऌकारोपदेशो यदृच्छाशक्तिजानुकरणप्लुत्याद्यर्थः—

Vār. II under Śiva-sūtra, 2.

[3] अशक्तया कयाचिद् ब्राह्मण्या ऋतक इति प्रयोक्तव्ये ऌतक इति प्रयुक्तम्—

Mahābhāṣya under the above Vārttika.

on account of her physical inability to pronounce the correct form *ṛtaka*. We have already pointed out that Patañjali has expressly stated that forms like *gāvī*, *goṇī*, etc., have all grown up as corruptions from *gauḥ*. He has also taken notice of such Prākrit verbs as *āṇapayati*, *vaṭṭati*, *vaḍḍhati*, etc., which had evolved from such corresponding Sanskrit forms as *ājñāpayati*, *varttate*, *varddhate* and so on. The enumeration of roots like *bhū*, etc., says Kātyāyana,[1] is not without a purpose; it has served the object of preventing Prākrit and Apabhraṁśa forms from creeping into Sanskrit. The author of the Mīmāṁsā-sūtras has also referred to such 'inability to pronounce the correct form' as the real cause that accounts for the verbal corruptions. It is frequently found that the corrupt form *gāvī* is uttered by a man who is physically unable to pronounce the sound *gauḥ*. Here the correct and the corrupt words have some degree of formal resemblance which makes them express the same thing.[2] We now see that many causes were in operation to bring about the corruption

[1] भूवादिपाठः प्रातिपदिकाणपयत्यादिनिवृत्त्यर्थः—

Vārttika 12 under Pāṇ., 1. 3. 1.

[2] तदशक्तिश्चानुरूपत्वात्—Mīm.-sūtra, 1. 3. 28.

गोशब्दमुच्चारयितुकामेन केनचिदशक्त्या गावीत्युच्चारितम्। अनुरूपो हि गाव्यादिर्गोशब्दस्य।—Śabara.

of Sanskrit. We have referred to physical defect, idleness, carelessness and economy of effort as the various causes that were responsible for the transformation of Sanskrit into such a degraded form. Sanskrit words which could be easily pronounced and properly imitated were accommodated in the Prākrit without any formal change (*tatsama*). Some Prākrit forms have again undergone such a high degree of corruption that they baffle all attempts at finding out the original Sanskrit forms of which they are wrong imitations. These belong to the class of *deśī-Prākrit.*

The uneducated people could either understand Sanskrit, even though they were incompetent to speak it, or people in higher grade of society while speaking with them had to talk in Prākrit or Apabhraṁśa as the case demanded. Frequent contact between these two classes of people in the ordinary affairs of life was, however, fraught with an unwholesome possibility, that is, a possibility of Sanskrit being somewhat mixed with Prākrit and Apabhraṁśa. It is no longer a mere possibility but an examination of Sanskrit words has made it more than probable. Numerous words, as we shall see later on, are found in Sanskrit which cannot be explained as of purely Sanskrit origin. Something more is also likely to have taken place. The rise of Buddhism, as it was attended with

the growing popularity of the Prākrit dialects, urged the Hindu grammarians to analyse sentences and words so as to save their sacred language from being polluted by close touch with the Prākrits. But while we speak so highly of the parts played by the Hindu grammarians, we cannot shut our eyes to the undesirable effect that has resulted from such rigidity of grammatical rules. Bound by strict rules of grammar, Sanskrit had its further development checked by an irresistible force so that it finally shared the fate of a dead language. As in the early days of their settlement in India the Aryans had some amount of contact with the black-skinned non-Aryans, some of whom were even aryanised for their ready adaptability to the Aryan manners and customs, it is not unlikely that a number of words and expressions of non-Aryan origin might have the possibility of being naturalised into the traditionally sacred language of the Brahmins. The language that developed out of this intimate relation between the Aryan and non-Aryan tongues is by some said to be the original form of the Prākrit.[1] Dr. Garbe is of opinion that the words *ghora* and *tambala*, as they occur in the *Śrauta-sūtra* of Āpastamba, have had their origin respectively in the Hindi and the Dravidian languages. There is no doubt that Sanskrit had close touch with the Prākrits

[1] Vidhuśekhara Śāstrī: *Pālīprakāśa*, Introduction, p. 36.

and Apabhramśas ; and this intimate relation might have terminated in the Sanskritisation of a number of Prākrit forms. While *raṇaraṇaka, dohada,* etc., are supposed to have crept into Sanskrit from the Prakrits, words like *hora* (from *horos*), *pika, nema, tāmarasa,* etc., are considered to be of foreign origin. Along with the commercial intercourse of India with the far West, there were, if we are allowed to assume it, both export and import of words. *Dīnāra* (denarius) meaning coins, *yavanānī* (Assyrian alphabets), *yavanikā* (theatrical screen) and *niska* (gold coin) are foreign elements in the Sanskrit language.[1]

The Hindu teachers have not only taken notice of the introduction of foreign words into Sanskrit, but have discussed at length the question of religion involved in the use of those words. The Mīmāṁsakas have dealt with this problem with supreme seriousness, for the obvious reason that they could not indifferently look upon the admission of such words into the refined body of their sacred language. To the Mīmāṁsakas, as we know, words, or more properly scriptural words, were a kind of Divinity as imposing and sacred as a corporeal

[1] The treatises on Indian astronomy have borrowed many foreign words, such as *leya* (*leo* = lion), *tāburi* (*taurus* = bull), *kaurpa* (*karkinos* = scorpio), *jyāmitra* (*diametron* = geometry) and so on.

one. What Śabara and Kumārila have observed under the Mīm.-sūtras 1. 3. 8-10, will throw sufficient light on the naturalisation of foreign words in Sanskrit.[1] When a word denotes one thing among the Aryans and another among the Mlecchas, one naturally finds himself in a dubious position so as to decide which of them should be perferred to the other. A difficulty arises with words like *yava* (barley-corn), *varāha* (boar), *pilu* (a kind of tree) and *vetasa* (a kind of creeper growing in water) which are used among the Aryans as well as among the Mlecchas, of course with a difference of sense.[2] In Mleccha countries the aforesaid words are used in the following senses : *yava*=*kangu* (long pepper), *varāha*=*vāyasa* (crow), *pilu*=elephant, *vetasa*=a river or blackberry. Now the question is: which of these two sets of meanings are more authoritative and acceptable from the orthodox point of view? The answer from the side of the Mīmāṁsakas is that the meanings sanctioned by the holy scriptures, *e.g.*, the sense in which these words

[1] तत्र केचिद्दीर्घशूकेषु यवशब्दं प्रयुञ्जते, केचित् प्रियङ्गुषु। वराहशब्दं केचित्सूकरे, केचित् कृष्णशकुनौ। वेतसशब्दं केचिद् वञ्जुलके, केचिज्जम्ब्वाम्। तत्रोभयथा पदार्थावगमाद्विकल्पः।—Śabara.

[2] Śaṅkara has also referred to these words under Chāndogya, 2.23. Commenting on the Bhāṣya 'ऋष्यार्यम्लेच्छानां यथाकामं शब्दप्रयोगोऽर्थप्रत्यायनाय,' Vācaspati has alluded to the difference of meanings in which the vord *yava* is used by the Aryans and the Mlecchas.

have been used in the Vedas, should be regarded as more authoritative than those of the Mlecchas.[1] The Mīmāṁsakas, like Patañjali, have laid greater emphasis on the usage of the *śiṣṭas*.[2] They are said to be the unquestionable authority so far as the determination of sense (with regard to both the Vedic and *smṛti* texts) is concerned. As it is sanctioned by the Vedas and is supported by the *śiṣṭas* as well, the former set of meanings has been accepted by the orthodox teachers in preference to the latter.

Moreover, the meanings of these words, as current in the countries beyond the bounds of the Āryāvartta, were only similar to those that obtained popularity among the Aryans. This similarity tends to make those meanings indirect when compared to those that are supported by the *śiṣṭas*. This is another reason why the meanings ascertained by the time-honoured scriptures and the *śiṣṭas* have a more authoritative character than others. The difficulty does not end here. But we are confronted with a greater one in the subsequent stage. We find it really embarrassing when we are asked to give our verdict in the case of those words which have

[1] शास्त्रस्था वा तन्निमित्तत्वात्—Mīm. sūtra, 1. 3. 9.

[2] के शास्त्रस्थाः ? शिष्टाः। तेषामविच्छिन्ना स्मृतिः शब्देषु वेदेषु च। तेन शिष्टा निमित्तं श्रुतिस्मृत्यवधारणे—Śabara.

no usage among the Aryans, that is, words that were actually borrowed from other countries.[1] There are words like *pika* (cuckoo), *nema* (half), *sata* (wooden vessel) and *tāmarasa* (lotus) which, though sometimes used by the Aryans, were undoubtedly of foreign origin.[2] Here the Hindu teachers with their unbounded faith in the purity of the scriptures have had to face a delicate question—a question striking at the very root of their religious belief. Now, two alternatives are open to us :[3] (*i*) we may get into the sense of these words either by deriving them from Sanskrit roots in accordance with the principles of grammar and etymology, or (*ii*) we may unhesitatingly accept the sense in which these words are used by the Mlecchas. The first view, as it is quite in tune with the orthodox standpoint, had obtained the support of the Mīmāṁsakas.[4] A position more adaptable to their peculiar idea of religion could not be

[1] चोदितं तु प्रतीयेताविरोधात् प्रमाणेन—Mīm. sūtra, 1. 3. 10.

ये शब्दा न प्रसिद्धाः स्युरार्य्यावर्त्तनिवासिनाम् ।
तेषां म्लेच्छप्रसिद्धोऽर्थो ग्राह्यो नेति विचिन्त्यते ॥

Tantravārttika.

[2] अथ यान् शब्दान् आर्य्या न कस्मिंश्चिदर्थे आचरन्ति, म्लेच्छास्तु कस्मिंश्चित् प्रयुञ्जन्ते, यथा पिक-नेम-सत-तामरसादिशब्दास्तेषु सन्देहः—Śabara.

[3] किं निगमनिरुक्तव्याकरणवशेन धातुतोऽर्थः कल्पयितव्यः ? उत यत्र म्लेच्छा आचरन्ति स शब्दार्थ इति—*loc. cit.*

[4] निरुक्तव्याक्रियाद्वारा यस्त्वर्थः परिगम्यते ।
पिकनेमादिशब्दानां स एवार्थो भविष्यति ॥

Tantravārttika.

conceived of by the Mīmāṁsakas. It needs hardly be said that when these words have once been mixed up with Sanskrit and are being freely used as such, we are neither allowed to call them foreign words any longer nor justified in leaving them aside as words the use of which is likely to entail religious demerit on the part of the speaker. There is practically no harm if we accept the sense in which these words are used by the Mlecchas. It is now absolutely useless to ask anything about the history of their introduction into Sanskrit. But in cases of doubts regarding the meaning of such words one is particularly forbidden to depend upon the usages of the Mlecchas. What the Mīmāṁsakas were really afraid of is that this sort of dependence on the non-Vedic or Mleccha usages might one day undermine the very foundation of their religion which, as is well known, rests upon the authority of the Vedas. But no amount of precaution and rigorous injunctions proved sufficient enough to prevent the influx of foreign words into Sanskrit—the sacred and carefully nurtured language of the Aryans. We do not exactly know how many foreign words were allowed to merge into Sanskrit since the primitive days of her association with other languages of the world.

So long we were dealing with the interpretation of Śabara, but now we shall try to follow the author of the Vārttika. Kumārila's

position is this:[1] as words like *pika*, *nema*, etc., have the same meanings in Sanskrit and the Mleccha languages, there should be no objection in accepting the signification in which these words are used by the Mlecchas. But attention should always be paid to the fact that these meanings are in no way incongruous with those of the Vedas. The usage of the Mlecchas is not always unauthoritative and untrustworthy. It was not infrequent in the Vedic age that people belonging to the lower rank of society were sometimes allowed to take part in matters religious. The best illustration of this practice is provided by the Vedic injunction *niṣādastha-patiṁ yājayet* (the sacrifice should be performed with the help of an architect of the *niṣāda* class). The implications of certain Vedic injunctions are such as we cannot help seeking the authority of people other than Brahmins. Kumārila has expressly stated that the meanings of some words, namely, *loma* and *kūṭa*,[2] should be learnt from low-class people as 'butchers' and 'dealers in coins.' While we admit that the Vedic usage is more authoritative than the Mleccha one, we find no reason why we should reject the Mleccha usages altogether, specially when they happen to be entirely absent in the Vedas. What is really

[1] Tantravārttika on Mīm. sūtra, 1. 3. 9.

[2] लोमादयः पश्ववयवा वेदे चोदिताः। यथा च निषादेष्वां कूटं दचिणेति—*op. cit.*

astonishing here is that Kumārila seems to have an accurate knowledge regarding the introduction of foreign words into Sanskrit. Śabara, the author of the *Bhāṣya*, has also mentioned such Apabhraṁśas as *gāvī*, *goṇī*, *gopotalikā*, *pāṇar* (hand), etc., and has said that the forms *gauḥ* and *pāṇiḥ* alone are correct, while the rest is only corruptions. He has laid particular stress on the fact that one should not minimise the significance of the Mleccha usages simply on the ground of their being current among non-Brahmins, because words like *patrorṇa* (silken cloth) and *vārabāṇa* (armour),[1] though actually borrowed from foreign languages, are being unhesitatingly used by the Aryans. Thus, in spite of all attempts that were made to maintain the purity of Sanskrit, a number of foreign words was consciously or unconsciously imported into the proverbially sacred language.[2]

[1] पत्रोर्णं वारवाणादि यच्च तद्देशसम्भवम् ।
तैरेवाकथितं नाम तच्च को वेदितुं चमः ॥
तस्मान्न तेषां व्यवहारप्रसिद्धौ दौर्बल्यम्—*op. cit.*

[2] Kumārila has frankly admitted that the Aryans used to pick up some words from foreign languages and changed them into Sanskrit with necessary alteration.

cf. 'आर्य्यास्तु म्लेच्छभाषाभ्यः कल्पयन्तः स्वकं पदम् ।
पदान्तराचरोपेतं कल्पयन्ति कदाचन' ॥

Tantravārttika.

Sanskrit is highly indebted to the Dravidian dialects for many of its words and expressions. It is more than problematic that the Aryans absorbed all that was best in the aboriginals whom they conquered, and thus imbibed some of the non-Aryan practices, both social and religious, only to make them an integral part of their wider culture. Kumārila has rightly observed that the Aryans also favoured the practice of borrowing words from other dialects and transforming them into Sanskrit by necessary grammatical and phonetic alterations. In doing so they were really guided by formal resemblance. He has referred to the usual practice of transforming the Dravidian words such as *cor*, *atar*, *pāp*, *māl* and *vair* into their corresponding Sanskrit forms, namely, *cauraḥ* (thief), *ataraḥ* (impassable), *pāpam* (sin), *mālā* (garland) and *vairī* (enemy).[1] Further, he observes that if the Aryans could exercise their liberty of changing the Dravidian words into Sanskrit in so arbitrary a way, one cannot conceive the grotesqueness

[1] Sridhara and Jayantabhaṭṭa (the author of the Nyāyamañjarī) have also shown the difference of meanings with which some words were used in different parts of the country. The word *caura*, they observe, is used by the southerners in the sense of rice and not in that of thief.

cf. क्वचिद्देशविशेषे कश्चिच्छब्दो देशान्तरप्राप्तप्रसिद्धमर्थमुत्सृज्य ततोऽर्थान्तरे वर्त्तते। यथा चौरशब्दस्तस्करवचन ओदने दाक्षिणात्यैः प्रयुज्यते—

Ṅyāyamañjarī, 4.

they would exhibit in Sanskritising the words taken from the Persian, Yavana, Roman and other foreign languages.[1]

As regards the signification of Apabhraṁśas, we have already stated in these pages that correct (Sanskrit) and corrupt words are equally potential in denoting the intended sense.[2] The word *gāvī* is, for example, as significant as the form *gauḥ*. Corrupt words or Apabhraṁśas may also claim to have permanent relation with their respective meanings. The question of religion, as raised by the Mīmāṁsakas and the grammarians concerning the use of correct words, is a different thing altogether. But an objection has been taken to the direct signification of Apabhraṁśas. The form *gauḥ* and not its corruptions in vernaculars, hold the Mīmāṁsakas, should be regarded as correct and really denotative of sense.[3] Apabhraṁśas, significant though they are in ordinary parlance, express their meanings only indirectly, that is to say, by virtue of their resembling the corresponding correct forms (*tadanurūpatvāt*). In the opinion of

[1] तद्द यदा द्राविडादिभाषायामीदृशी स्वच्छन्दकल्पना, तदा पारसीववंरयवन-रौमकादिभाषासु किं विकल्प्य किं प्रतिपत्स्यन्त इति न विद्मः:—

Tantravārttika.

[2] Mīmāṁsā-sūtra, 1. 3. 24.

[3] *Op. cit.*, 1. 3. 28.

Bhartṛhari, Apabhraṁśas are not significant by themselves, but their apparent expressiveness rests upon the inference of correct words which alone are held to be endowed with the power of denotation.[1] What he likes to impress upon us is that to a Brahmin who has Sanskrit as his mother-tongue, a corrupt word (like *gāvī*) may also convey the intended sense only by reminding him of the correct Sanskrit form (*gauḥ*) of which it is a corruption. This is how Apabhraṁśas become significant in the estimation of the orthodox Hindu teachers. Another argument that has been put forward against the direct signification of Apabhraṁśas is as follows: if Apabhraṁśas were as directly significant as correct words, one might have used them as synonyms of the latter.[2] But this is far from being the actual state of things. Though there is materially no difference in regard to their signification, a clear distinction between the use of correct and corrupt words has been made on the flimsy ground of religious merits and demerits.[3]

[1] ते साधुष्वनुमानेन प्रत्ययोत्पत्तिहेतवः ।
तादात्म्यमुपगम्येव शब्दार्थस्य प्रकाशकाः ॥—Vākyapadīya, 1. 151.

[2] न शिष्टैरनुगम्यन्ते पर्याया इव साधवः ।
न यतः स्मृतिशास्त्रेण तस्मात् साक्षादवाचकाः—*op. cit.*

[3] असाधुरनुमानेन वाचकः कैश्चिदिष्यते ।
वाचकत्वाविशेषे वा नियमः पुण्यपापयोः ॥—*op. cit.*, 3. 30.

We have already pointed out that Apabhraṁśa does not, according to the Sanskrit grammarians, constitute a separate language of independent origin.[1] It should be, however, carefully remembered that Apabhraṁśas like *gāvī*, *goṇī*, etc., are not absolutely corrupt or incorrect. One cannot question their correctness (*sādhutva*) when they are used to denote different things.[2] The word *gāvī*, for instance, though apparently an Apabhraṁśa in the sense of cow, may be etymologically interpreted in such a way as to turn it into a correct Sanskrit word meaning 'one competent to please Gaṇapati—the god of success.'[3] Forms as *asva* and *goṇī* are treated as Apabhraṁśas only when they are disorted by people from *aśvaḥ* and *gauḥ*, but they are said to be really correct when they denote respectively 'one deprived of wealth' and 'vessel' (*āvapana*).[4] What we find here

[1] सर्व्वस्य ह्यपभ्रंशस्य साधुरेव प्रकृतिः—
Puṇyarāja under Vākya., 1. 149.

[2] अर्थान्तरे तु प्रयुज्यमानाः केचित् साधव एव विज्ञायन्ते—*loc. cit.*

[3] गावीशब्दोऽपि कयाचिद् व्युत्पत्त्या क्वचित् साधुरिति—
Tattvacintāmaṇi (Śabdakhaṇḍa).

एवं गावीति गं गणपतिं अवितुं प्रीणयितुं शीलमस्येति गावीशब्देऽपि साधुता क्वचित्—Tattvacintāmaṇyāloka by Jayadeva Miśra.

[4] अश्वगोण्यादयः शब्दाः साधवो विषयान्तरे ।—Vākyapadīya, 1. 150.
गोणी आवपनं चेत् । गोणान्या ।—
Bhaṭṭoji under Pāṇini, 4.1.42.

आवपने गोणीति स्ववियोगाभिधाने च अश्व इति साध्वेव—Puṇyarāja.

is that nothing can be definitely said about the correctness or incorrectness of Apabhraṁśas.[1] The same word may be correct in one sense and turn to be Apabhraṁśa or *apaśabda* in another. It is particularly the sense that determines the correct or incorrect use of a word.

Bhartṛhari has also referred to the view, probably current among the non-Brahmin section of the people, that ascribed denotativeness (*vācakatva*) only to Apabhraṁśas.[2] Though he has not given us sufficient information as to the identity of these people who invested Apabhraṁśa with such natural power of denotation, it is quite obvious that Apabhraṁśa or the popular language of the mass was once considered to be more genuine than Sanskrit, and used more widely than the sacred language of the Brahmins. This view is quite in agreement with the definition of Prākrit as 'the language that has come directly from nature.' What we now call Prākrit or Apabhraṁśa in relation to the purified language of the Brahmins has every reason to be regarded as a more simple and natural language than Sanskrit. Further, those who advocated this unorthodox view found Apabhraṁśa not

[1] न त्वेषां नियतं साधुत्वमसाधुत्वं वा व्यवस्थितमस्ति—*loc. cit.*

[2] केषांचित्त्वसाधुरेव साक्षाद्वाचक इत्याह—

पारम्पर्यादपभ्रंशा निर्गुणेष्वभिधातृषु ।

प्रसिद्धिमागता ये तु तेषां साधुरवाचकः ॥—Vākyapadīya, 1. 155.

only more popular than Sanskrit, but went so far as to question the significant character of the so-called 'purified speech.'[1] With them Apabhraṁśas were naturally endowed with immediate sense, and no one had to look for their signification to their corresponding forms in Sanskrit. The orthodox position was thus overthrown, for Apabhraṁśa was held as a really significant speech with an independent development of its own. Vain were the pleadings of those who degraded the position of the Prākrits and Apabhraṁśas by making them dependent on Sanskrit for the very reason of their denotation (*vācakatā*). The old tradition, to which Puṇyarāja has referred, is that in ancient times human speech, or more properly, the sacred language of the Brahmins, was as free from all impurities as it was purged of all Apabhraṁśa elements.[2] But what we actually find reverses the orthodox standpoint to a considerable extent. A total eradication of Apabhraṁśa elements from the body of sacred tongue was an impossible task, and we find, on the contrary, that a large number of Prākrit and foreign words has been unconsciously grafted to Sanskrit.

[1] ते तमेवासाधुं प्रत्यक्षपक्षेण वाचकं मन्यन्ते । साधुं त्वसाध्वनुमानेनेत्यर्थः—Puṇyarāja.

[2] श्रूयते हि पुराकल्पे स्वशरीरज्योतिषान्मनुष्याणां यथैवानृतादिभिरसङ्कीर्णा वागासीत् एवं सर्वैरपभ्रंशैः—*loc. cit.*

There was no doubt a school of thinkers (*anityavādin*) that supported the natural origin of speech (in direct opposition to the eternality of speech as persistently maintained by the Mīmāṁsakas and the Vaiyākaraṇas). The *anityavādins* had but scanty regard for the view which tells us that the use of correct words (*sādhu-śabda*) is accompanied by religious felicity.[1] We are not, therefore, prepared to say that Apabhraṁśas are meaningless by themselves, and that their apparent denotation is only a matter of inference. An Apabhraṁśa is as much associated with what it signifies as a correct word is with its sense.

Gaṅgeśa has discussed the point as to how Apabhraṁśas or corrupt forms, not sanctioned by the *śiṣṭas*, have come to be significant like correct words in ordinary usages. The fundamental question is : whether their power of denoting the sense is innate or purely conventional. In the opinion of Gaṅgeśa corruption (*asādhutva*) is not simply due to mistaken notions or want of adequate knowledge, because in that case the utterance of a man not conversant with grammar would be treated as anything but intelligible.[2] An Apabhraṁśa, he

[1] अनित्यवादी तु स यः साधूनां धर्मंहेतुत्वं न प्रतिपद्यते । स हि सर्वंशब्दानां समूहं स्वाभाविकमाचष्टे—Puṇyarāja under Vākyapadīya, I. 156.

[2] असाधुत्वं च न भ्रमादिजन्यत्वं अनाप्तोक्ते असाधुत्वापत्तेः, शुकाद्युदीरिते ग्रामगामादौ भ्रमाद्यजन्यत्वाच्च—Tattvacintāmaṇi (Śabdakhaṇḍa), p. 627.

continues to say, is that form of a word which cannot be supported by the rules of grammar recognised by the *śiṣṭas*.[1] *Sādhutva* is, on the other hand, a kind of *vṛtti* (power of denotation), *i.e.*, a relation between sound and sense as is necessary for presenting the image of the thing before the mind of the listener.[2]

In conformity with the usual method of Hindu philosophers, Gaṅgeśa has first given a series of arguments (in favour of the denotative character of Apabhraṁśa) which he has got to refute afterwards. He begins with the statement that Apabhraṁśas possess the power of denotation (*śakti*), because meanings are as regularly denoted by them as by the so-called correct words.[3] No one can deny that *gauḥ* and *gāvī* express the same thing. Again, there is no justification for taking Apabhraṁśas as only *indicative* of sense (as opposed to denotative), since their primary signification is never found to be inconsistent.[4] It is not even plausible to say that Apabhraṁśas appear to be significant

1 किन्तु महाजनपरिगृहीतव्याकरणस्मृतिनिषिद्धत्वं तदपरिगृहीतत्वं वेति—*loc. cit.*

2 पदस्य साधुत्वं वृत्तिरेव, वृत्तिश्च शाब्दबोधहेतुपदार्थोपस्थित्यनुकूलपदपदार्थयोः सम्बन्धः—*loc. cit.*

3 नन्वेवं पङ्कजपदस्येवापभ्रंशानामपि शक्तिस्ततो नियमेनार्थप्रतीतेः, व्यवहाराधीनव्युत्पत्तेरविशेषात्—*loc. cit.*

4 न च लक्षणा, मुख्यार्थाबाधात्—*loc. cit.*

only by recalling the corresponding correct words which are alone considered to be naturally endowed with sense, because uneducated people who have nothing to do with Sanskrit are also found to derive the usual meaning from such Apabhraṁśas.[1] Lastly, on the absence of any logical criterion, we are not allowed to assume that their signification is consequent upon their imposed power of denotation.[2] How, then, are we to account for their acquisition of meaning? Undeniable as is the fact that correct and corrupt words are equally expressive of sense, one is not entitled to make any distinction between these two classes of words in so far as the power of denotation is concerned. There is, however, some difficulty in taking both of them to be equally significant. Their equality in respect of denotation will tend to invalidate the division of words into correct and corrupt, and will at the same time reduce the force of the Vedic injunction which forbids one to speak incorrect words and utter Apabhraṁśas at the risk of committing a sin.[3] Gaṅgeśa found himself in such an

[1] न चापभ्रंशेन स्मारितसाधुशब्दादन्वयबोधः, साधुशब्दमजानतामपि पामराणां ततोऽर्थप्रतीतेः—*loc. cit.*

[2] शक्त्यारोपात्ततोऽर्थप्रत्यय इति चेन्न, मानाभावात्—*loc. cit.*

[3] ननूभयोः शक्तत्वे साध्वसाधुविभागाभावात् तद्व्यवहारविरोधः साधुभिर्भाषितव्यं नापभ्रंशितवै न म्लेच्छितवै इत्यादिवैदिकविधिनिषेधानुपपत्तिश्चेति—*loc. cit.*

embarrassing situation before he could make his way out. Though in ordinary usage, he continues, correct and corrupt words seem to be significant without any differentiation, it is more logical to assign the power of denotation only to correct words, which are, according to the Naiyāyikas, related to things by the volition of God (*saṅketa* expressed in the following terms: 'let this word be denotative of this sense'). Moreover, grammarians like Pāṇini and others have studiously maintained the correctness of Sanskrit words but they have never dealt with Apabhraṁśas in the same way.[1] As it involves nothing but redundancy to assign *śakti* to both these types of words, Gaṅgeśa found it much more reasonable to take *sādhu* or Sanskrit words as the only significant forms of speech. He says further that the apparent denotative power of Apabhraṁśas is the result of imposition (*āropa*) or false attribution.[2] He refers to the aphorism of Jaimini[3] and strongly insists on the fact that the assumption of *śakti* in respect of more than one word of the same meaning has no logical justification. *Śakti* really pertains

[1] शक्तत्वाविशेषेऽपि तदभियुक्तेन्द्रपाणिन्यादिप्रणीतव्याकरणोपगृहीतानामेव संस्कृतानां साधुत्वमस्तु, न ह्यपभ्रंशे तैः साधुत्वं स्मर्यते—*loc. cit.*

[2] एकत्र शक्त्याप्यन्यत्र तदारोपात्तदर्थप्रतीत्युपपत्तावेकत्रैव शक्तिर्लाघवात्—*loc. cit.*

[3] अन्याय्यश्चानेकशब्दत्वम्—Mīm. sūtra, 1. 3. 26.

to the Sanskrit words alone. The reason is quite obvious. A Sanskrit word has the same form in all parts of the country. whereas Apabhraṁśas have got variant forms in different provinces.[1]

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[1] सा च शक्तिः संस्कृत एव सर्वदेशे तस्यैकत्वात् नापभ्रंशेषु तेषां प्रतिदेश-मेकवार्थे भिन्नभिन्नरूपाणां तावच्छक्तिकल्पने गौरवात्—*loc. cit.*

CHAPTER XI

SOUND AND SENSE

The Science of meaning—contributions of Western scholars—crude beginning in the Brāhmaṇas and Niruktas—the importance of lexicography—psychological side of language and the biography of words—the relation between word and object—the Greek and German speculations on the subject—the dual aspect of mind and speech in the Upaniṣads—inseparable connection between speech and thought—different interpretations of the relation—word and knowledge—the trinity of things presented by words—natural, conventional (*saṅketa*), interchangeable and inseparable relation—the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika standpoints and the absence of conjunction and inherence (*samavāya*) between word and meaning—the Mīmāṁsā doctrine of eternal relation—views of the grammarians, *Tāntrikas* and Buddhist philosophers—means of comprehending *saṅketa—śabda* as an independent source of knowledge—the method of deriving *śābdabodha* (verbal cognition).

Studies in the Science of meaning are now receiving more and more encouragement from students of Comparative Philology. But one has sufficient reason to complain that in comparison with the care and devotion 'shown for the form and clothing of language' very little has been done towards the more important aspect of language, *i.e.*, 'its substance and soul.' There are hopeful signs in sight. Attempts have already been made by a number of competent scholars to systematise the relevant facts deduced from the investigation of meaning in such a way as to constitute a scientific branch

of study which is essentially connected with Philology. Whatever may be the value of this new science to other departments of knowledge, there is no gainsaying the fact that the Science of meaning forms an indispensable part of Comparative Philology.[1] The field of study made open by this infant science is as vast as it is complicated. Eminent linguists[2] have from time to time made valuable contributions to the subject by starting enquiries in different aspects of the science of meaning. But the greater part of the work—we mean a synthetic treatment of the whole problem—has been yet reserved for the future. 'The Science of meaning' was the subject of a lecture delivered by Prof. J. P. Postgate in 1896, and M. Bréal's illustrious work (*Essai de Sémantique*) on Semantics made its appearance in the subsequent year. These two eminent scholars have rendered conspicuous service in this particular branch of study. While the former complained of the dearth of suitable materials in his juvenile attempt, the latter seems to have succeeded in

[1] 'The investigation of meaning is, as I shall hope to show, of considerable importance to other branches of knowledge; but to Comparative Philology it is vital.'
J. P. Postgate, Inaugural Address at University College, London.

[2] Brugmann, Bechtel, Heerdege,. Paul and Sweet.

discovering sufficient data so as to give a comprehensive outline of the subject.

The investigation of meaning has been carried on through a strictly scientific method, and, in accordance with the fundamental notion of science, it has tried to postulate the 'intellectual laws of language,' 'how the meaning of words is determined,' and how Analogy and Metaphor work in the domain of meaning-change. We do not exaggerate when we say that the results obtained from these investigations into one of the most 'difficult branch of human inquiries' have been quite satisfactory. But we must not forget to say that the study of Sanskrit with particular attention directed towards its different stages of development is also calculated to provide valuable materials for constructing the Science of meaning. No language is more resourceful than Sanskrit in this respect. The central problem of the Science of meaning, *e. g.*, the relation between sound and sense, was nowhere taken up so seriously as in India. Sanskrit, though no longer a spoken language, shows clearly in many cases 'strange contrasts and even contradictions between the past and present meanings of words.' Studies in the meaning of words did not, in short, entirely escape the attention of Indian teachers. A crude beginning of the Science of meaning is to be found in the Brāhmaṇas where

attempts were first made to give etymological justifications of names. The question as to how a particular word always means a particular thing led the thinking mind to search after and examine such a concept associated in the very same word as would justify its inseparable relation with the thing in question The Brāhmaṇas have thus shown the way in which one should proceed in order to construct the real biography of words. In the next stage, the Nighaṇṭu and the elaborate etymological interpretations of the Niruktas made further advance in the investigation of meaning. The Nighaṇṭu (generally ascribed to Śākalya) which shows the earliest specimen of Indian lexicography gives us a collection of the Vedic words[1] arranged in several groups according to their meanings. A number of words denoting the same sense (*samāna-karmāṇaḥ*) has been placed in one group and we have several groups of this type. It has also been particularly noticed that a single word may have more than one meaning, and, again, many words may also denote the same thing.[2] This is an important fact to which the author of the Mahābhāṣya has also drawn our

[1] निरूढा ह्येयमेतस्मिञ्छब्दसमुदाये संज्ञेत्यभिप्रायः—Durga.

[2] एकार्थमनेकशब्दमित्येतदुक्तम्। अथ यान्यनेकार्थान्येकशब्दानि तान्यतोऽनुक्रमिष्यामोऽनवगतस्वरसंस्कारांश्च निगमान्। तदैकपदिकमित्याचक्षते—Nirukta, IV. 1.

attention.[1] The importance of lexicography for the study of meaning is now recognised by all. In Sanskrit we have different types of lexicons and dictionaries that help us largely in the determination of meaning in general and synonyms in particular. Even the Tāntrik literature contains several lexicons (*koṣa*), such as *Mantrābhidhāna*, *Bījanighaṇṭu*, *Ekākṣarakoṣa*, *Mātṛkānighaṇṭu*, etc., the sole purpose of which was to show the proper signification and potentiality of the *varṇamālā* (collection of letters). 'A model lexicon providing us with a complete biography of every word' is still a contemplation. But Prof. Postgate has outlined the essential features that an ideal dictionary of the above description should possess.[2]

We do not fully agree with those who leave aside Etymology in their studies of meaning, and accordingly adhere to the doctrine that Etymology has nothing to do with the Science of meaning.[3] Indeed, etymological explanations of words are sometimes misleading

[1] बहवो हि शब्दा एकार्था भवन्ति। तद् यथा, इन्द्रः शक्रः पुरुहूतः पुरंदरः। एकश्च शब्दो बह्वर्थः। तद् यथा, अक्षाः पादाः माषा इति।—

Mahābhāṣya under the Vār. 6. (Pāṇ. 1. 3. 1.)

[2] Appendix to Semantics, p. 332.

[3] 'Etymology was planted and has thriven without it' (the Science of meaning).—*o. cit.*

and fanciful, but that is no reason why we should ignore them altogether as inefficient to render us any help in the enquiry of meaning. The science of Etymology, at least as it was worked out by the Indian *Nairuktas*, seems to have been based on the proper and radical investigation of meaning. When Yāska finds in the word *devara*[1] the reminiscence of an ancient social custom (*dvitīyo varaḥ*), explains the words *vārāha*[2] and *puṣkara* as the shortened forms of *varāhāra* and *vapuṣkara*, and brings out the meaning of the word *kitava* (*kiṁ tavāsti*), showing the characteristic trait of a gambler, no one will venture to say that he could not foresee the important intellectual canons of language as we now possess. Similarly, in Durga's dissertations on the words *kuśala* and *pravīṇa* we come across positive instances of how the intellectual principle of generalisation works in the expansion of meaning. Examples may be multiplied to show other laws of meaning and the general tendency of words to meaning-shifting, but we propose to deal with them in a separate section.

Language, as an organic body, has both physical and psychological aspects. It has sound for its body, and thought for its soul, or, in other words, the relation between the body

1 Nirukta, III. 15.

2 Similarly, *valāhaka* has come from *vārivāhaka*.

and the soul is the same as that which connects a word with its sense. Thoughts that rise in our mind find their audible expression through sounds that are produced by vocal organs. All sounds do not, however, constitute words, but sounds that directly signify objects are only popularly known as *śabdas* (words). Patañjali has rightly observed that the expression of thought is the sole purpose that is served by the use of words ;[1] and when there is no idea to be communicated to others, no necessity is felt to exercise the vocal apparatus. Language is an art of clothing our thoughts ; and an undercurrent of thoughts running throughout the entire structure of a language is sufficiently clear. *Semantics* or the Science of meaning deals with this internal or psychological aspect of language, and shows, among other things, how particular things are denoted by particular words, how things are named, and how meanings are widened as well as specialised in the course of development of a language. The Indian etymologists have given greater importance to this psychological side in their principles of derivation. It is expressly stated by Yāska that in deriving words, specially those

[1] अर्थगत्यर्थः शब्दप्रयोगः। अर्थं संप्रत्याययिष्यामीति शब्दः प्रयुज्यते—Mahābhāṣya under Vār. 15 (Pāṇ. 3. 1. 7) ; and 'सर्वो हि शब्दोऽर्थ-प्रत्यायनार्थं प्रयुज्यते'—Tantravārttika under Mīm. sūtra, 1. 3. 8.

that do not give the usual sense by mere grammatical mode of analysis, greater attention should be paid to their meanings than to their outward forms.[1] Based as it is on the physical analysis of words, the science of grammar is more concerned with the formal side, whereas Etymology (Nirukta), as a potent help in the determination of meaning, is particularly related to the psychological background of language. The investigation of meaning has brought with it a peculiar interestin the historical study of language. It is one thing to deal with mere forms of words, and quite another thing to get into the meaning of them; still more, to trace the growth and diffusion of meaning in the light of its history. Though it is often regarded as a supplement to grammar, the science of Etymology has got an independent character as well as a special interest of its own.[2] A distinction is, however, made by Durga: while grammar has laid down principles which apply only to the external side of language, the science of Etymology has taken upon itself the more arduous task of bringing

[1] अथानन्वितेऽर्थेऽप्रादेशिके विकारेऽर्थनित्यः परीक्षेत केनचिद्वृत्तिसामान्येन—

Nirukta, II. 1.

अर्थो हि प्रधानं तद्गुणभूतः शब्दः—Durga.

[2] तदिदं विद्यास्थानं व्याकरणस्य कार्त्स्न्यं स्वार्थसाधकं च—

Nirukta, I. 15.

out the meaning of words.[1] But what we really want in a treatise on the scientific investigation of meaning is not etymological interpretations, reached somehow or other by conjectures and omission of those features which are so intimately connected with the real history of words, but a principle or principles showing the way in which words acquire new signification and change their meanings in different stages of the development of a language. It may be stated here that the science of Etymology did not develop in India as 'the science of falsehood and guess-work,'[2] but one will really find in it, on the contrary, a scientific attempt, though not always accompanied by good results, to 'ascertain the true origin of words' (*Ετυμολογία*). It is not, therefore, too much to say that Yāska's Nirukta, which alone from among the vast literature of its kind has come down to us in a complete form, is a more genuine work than the 'Etymologicum Magnum' of the Greek author, specially as described by the majority of philologists.[3]

We now come to the most vital problem of the Science of meaning, *e. g.*, the relation of a word with its meaning. Before entering upon

1 तस्मात् स्वतन्त्रमेवेदं विद्यास्थानमर्थनिर्वचनम्। व्याकरणं तु लक्षणप्रधानमिति विशेषः—Durga.

2 Sayce: The Science of Language, Vol. I, p. 7.

3 *Op. cit.*

the question from the standpoint of Indian thinkers, we think it desirable to introduce the subject with a short summary of the Greek speculations relating to the connection between language and thought. The first Greek thinkers who felt the impulse to inquire into this relation were the two robust philosophers, namely, Herakleitus and Demokritus: 'the one the advocate of the innate and necessary connection between words and the objects they denote, the other of the absolute power possessed by man to invent or change his speech.'[1] The view to which Herakleitus gave currency is somewhat analogous to that of the Mīmāṃsakas who, as we shall see later on, strongly maintained the natural (eternal) relation between *śabda* and *artha.* The other view has its counterpart in the Naiyāyika doctrine which has made words the product of human effort. But so far as the relation between a word and concept is concerned, the position taken up by the Naiyāyikas seems to have been more theological than linguistic, because they were forced to drag in the question of Divine Will (*saṅketa*) to which we are asked to look for the determination of meaning (*śakti*). Plato was not only conscious of the resemblance of Greek to other dialects, but pointed out by means of examples

[1] Sayce: The Science of Language, Vol. I, p. 6.

that 'many Greek words were borrowed from abroad.' He also seems to have been an advocate of the natural origin of speech. Aristotle, who was more realistic than his tutor, did not favour the idea of creating an 'ideal speech' so as to bring out this natural connection in a fairly remarkable way, but explained the origin of language with reference to the social convention. A language, to make his position clear, has to depend upon popular agreement before it could become a significant vehicle of communication. 'Words,' he holds, 'have no meaning in themselves; this is put into them by those who utter them, and they then become so many symbols of the objects signified.'[1] But objection has been taken to this theory 'by showing the laughable absurdity of a gathering or "convention" of speechless men, discussing and voting the adoption of spoken designations.'[2] 'A society,' to speak the truth, 'never met together to make a language.' The theory of *social contract*, though popular in political science, cannot satisfactorily solve the origin of language.

[1] *Op. cit.*

[2] Whitney: 'On the Present State of the Question as to the Origin of Language' (Lecture delivered at the American Philological Association).

The relation between language and thought proved to be such a fundamental problem of the scientific study of language that it called forth serious deliberation from eminent linguists such as Bleek, Schleicher, Humboldt, Steinthal and others. While surveying 'the present state of the question as to the Origin of Language,' in course of which he discussed the physical and psychological theories of Schleicher and Steinthal respectively, Prof. Whitney has summed up the difference of views on this important subject. The question, he holds, relating to the relation between language and thought naturally comes to this : language and thought, or *concept* and *word* of Aristotle, are either actually identical (interchangeable terms), or language is what helps the process of reasoning and thus becomes an 'instrument of thought.' Of these two sets of discordant opinions, the former has been reduced to the assumption that 'the idea without the word is an impossibility.' In this connection the distinguished Professor has also raised another important question as to whether 'the first impulse to speech came from within, or from without.' Language, to the Hindu teachers, has been as much an expression of thought as a suitable vehicle of communication. The desire felt within for the communication of ideas is the natural antecedent or primary motive that is

wholly responsible for bringing forth the verbal expression or the popular use of words. This is the emotive side of language.

Turning to the manifold aspects in which the problem under review presented itself to the searching mind of Indian thinkers, what attracts our notice first of all is the unnecessary stress that has been laid upon the internal side of the question, making the whole thing more metaphysical than linguistic. They approached the problem of relation between concept and word from all possible points of view, namely, theological, spiritual, grammatical and philosophical, and their labours which have been enshrined in well-known treatises speak of the genuine interest that was evoked by it. The Indians, like the ancient Greeks, used to look upon language as 'an embodiment and crystallisation of thought,' or still more, as an expression or manifestation of internal Consciousness.[1] A constant and invariable association of word with sense is quite obvious. Whenever a *particular* word is uttered, a *particular* sense is understood at once. For every thing there is a word naturally competent to signify it.[2] 'Man is a

1 प्रत्यक्चैतन्यस्यान्तःसन्निविष्टस्य परबोधनाय शक्तिरभिस्यन्दते—
Puṇyarāja under Vākya., 1. 1.

2 यावदर्थं वै नामधेयशब्दाः, तैरर्थसंप्रत्ययः, अर्थसंप्रत्ययाच्च व्यवहारः—
Vātsyāyana on Nyāya-sūtra, 1. 1. 4.

speaking animal,' but who has ever asked himself as to what he is giving out to others in course of his speaking? We may be ignorant of the process which we unconsciously follow, but it is true that our ignorance or indifference does not in any way lessen the significance of the actual fact. The question may be put in the following way: how a sound is related to a thing, or how the word uttered by one becomes so powerful and active as to convey the intended sense to the listener? A satisfactory answer to this riddle cannot be given unless we can sufficiently prove the existence of some kind of relationship between the two.

The first manifestation of the *Indeterminate* is said to be the dual aspects of mind and speech, *śabda* and *artha*, or, in other words, Consciousness first splits itself up into the categories of subject and object.[1] The Upaniṣads have stated in unequivocal terms that thought and speech are interchangeable. The mind finds itself fully expressed in speech and speech has its seat in the mind.[2] In order to show that all modifications finally resolve into their ultimate causes, Śaṅkara has pointed out the subservience of speech to the mind.[3] *Śruti* declares that when a man dies,

[1] स मनसा वाचं मिथुनं समभवत्—Bṛhadāraṇyaka, 1. 2. 4.

[2] वाङ् मे मनसि प्रतिष्ठिता मनो मे वाचि प्रतिष्ठितम्—
Aitareyopaniṣad.

[3] Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya under Vedānta-sūtra, 4. 2. 1.

his activity or power of speech sinks into that of the mind, and the mind gets itself extinguished in *prāṇa* and so on.[1] What is really implied by it is that speech (*vāk*) is the product of the mind.[2] The absorption of a thing into its ultimate reality, *i. e.*, wherefrom it springs, is the law of nature,[3] and there is, therefore, no incongruity in the phenomenon of speech merging into the mind.[4]

Puṇyarāja has quoted a *śruti* which not only speaks of a subtle form of speech (*vāk*) inherent in the Soul or Pure consciousness, but makes it undivided with the meaning.[5] Inseparable is the relation in which speech and thought have mingled together. This undivided character of *śabda* and *artha* comes to one's comprehension only in a stage of higher spiritual cultivation when all forms of dualism disappear or merge into the unity of the *Infinite*. Pure consciousness, in the terms of

[1] पुरुषस्य प्रयतो वाङ्मनसि संपद्यते—Chāndogya, 6. 8. 6.

[2] न च मनसो वागुत्पद्यते इति किंचन प्रमाणमस्ति—
Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya under Ved.-sūtra, 4. 1. 2.

[3] यस्य हि यत उत्पत्तिस्तस्य तत्र प्रलयो मृदिव शरावस्य—*loc. cit.*

[4] According to the Tāntrik interpretation, everything is ultimately reduced to its atomic or protoplasmic form (*baindavarūpa*) at the time of dissolution.

[5] सूक्ष्मामर्थेनाप्रविभक्ततत्त्वामेकां वाचमभिस्यन्दमानाम्। उतान्ये विदुरन्यामिव च पूतां नानारूपामात्मनि संनिविष्टाम्—Puṇyarāja under Vākya., 1. 1.

theological interpretation, presents itself to us in two different modes of internal and external experience. This is why it has been said that *śabda* and *artha* are but different aspects of one and the same thing.[1] When *śabda* and *artha* are reduced to their ultimate nature, the high walls of convention creating such differentiation break down to pieces. Bhartṛhari has, on the basis of this deep-rooted spiritual conviction, postulated a peculiar doctrine of evolution which sought to explain the whole phenomena of the universe as a transformation (*vivarta*) of *śabda-brahman*,[2] or what is called *Logos* in Christian theology. He has not only referred to the view which tends to make all speculations about *śabda* and *artha* more internal than external, but seems to have been an ardent advocate of it on account of the weighty infiuence of the Vedāntic non-dualism which is so conspicuously visible in all his dissertations.[3] To those who maintain speech as a purely internal phenomenon—a manifestation of consciousness that lies within—word and meaning, though virtually undifferentiated, appear to be distinct from each

1 एकस्यैवात्मनो भेदौ शब्दार्थावपृथक्स्थितौ।—Vākyapadīya, 2. 31.

2 अनादिनिधनं ब्रह्म शब्दतत्त्वं यदक्षरम्।
विवर्त्ततेऽर्थभावेन प्रक्रिया जगतो यतः॥—*op. cit.*

3 अर्थभागैस्तथा तेषामान्तरोऽर्थः प्रकाश्यते।—*op. cii.*

other only through the intervention of *māyā* (illusion).[1]

Our first attempt will be to convince ourselves of a connection between a word and its meaning, and then to show the nature of such connection in the light of philosophical judgment. First, every one is more or less conscious of this relation; and the fact we have got to deal with is so transparent that it often hides its depth and significance from our casual observation. That a relation subsists between the sign and the object so signified, in some shape or other, is as true as anything. The existence of this relation, whether natural or conventional, has been clearly brought out by Indian teachers in an imposing and suggestive manner. The philosopher-grammarian, to whom we have been frequently referring in these pages for both light and guidance, has emphatically asserted with all weight *sambandhaḥ samavasthitaḥ*,[2] that is to say, the relation between a word and meaning is by no means such as one can deny. The same position has been strengthened further when he speaks of this relation as fixed by nature. The

[1] तेषामान्तरवाक्यवादिनामाचार्य्याणां मते आन्तर एवात्र वाक्यार्थः। तौ च शब्दार्थावभिन्नावेकस्यान्तरस्य तत्त्वस्य सम्बन्धिनौ वस्तुतः बहिःस्थितौ भेदाविव प्रतिभासते इति बोद्धव्यम्—Puṇyarāja.

[2] Vākyapadīya (sambandhasamuddeśa), 1.

स्वभावत एव निरूढो न तु पुरुषेण निवेशित इत्यर्थः—Helārāja.

existence of a connection is sufficiently borne out by the very nature of a word and its meaning. The simple fact that a word is called *vācaka* (one that denotes the sense) and the thing is termed *vācya* (thing that is denoted) is in itself a strong evidence as to their mutual connection.[1] When we say, for instance, 'this is denoted by this word' and 'this word expresses this sense,' we necessarily understand that there is some kind of connection between the so-called *vācya* and *vācaka*. What Bhartṛhari really implies by the statement *śabdānāṃ yataśaktitvaṃ*[2] is that words by their very nature have the power of denoting the ideas of which they are treated as symbols, and that this potency of words is never exhausted or worn out, but remains practically inherent in them. We are all familiar with the fact that speech is a reflection of the human mind in all its vividness, or, in other words, the workings of the inner self are manifested through the machinery of speech. Our life, to speak the truth,

[1] अस्यायं वाचको वाच्य इति षष्ठ्या प्रतीयते ।
योगः शब्दार्थयोस्तत्त्वमप्यतो व्यपदिश्यते ॥—*op. cit.*, 3. 3.
(Sambandhasamuddeśa).

अस्येदमिति षष्ठीविशिष्टस्य वाक्यस्यार्थविशेषोऽनुज्ञातः—
Vātsyāyana under Nyāya-sūtra, 2. 1. 52.

अस्येदमित्यस्य 'अस्य शब्दस्यायमर्थो वाच्यः' इति—Tātparya-ṭīkā.

[2] Vākyapadīya, 1. 6. शब्दानां यतशक्तित्वं नियतार्थप्रत्यायनसामर्थ्यम्
—Puṇyarāja.

may be intellectually interpreted as expression of a series of thoughts through the medium of language in which we speak. The meaning of a word is, says Bhartṛhari, what is exactly presented to us whenever that word is heard.[1] The utterance of the word *gauḥ* at once gives rise in our mind to the idea of a being possessing dewlap, hump, hoofs and horns. And this is undoubtedly the meaning of it, as is well-known to all.

But to trace the origin of this relation seems to be an impossible task. Word and meaning have been exhibiting their reciprocal connection from time beyond our memory. This relation has its analogy with the functioning of the sense-organs in respect of the objective world. Both are without beginning.[2] Word and meaning are so closely connected with each other that we cannot conceive one without the other. While describing the mystic way in which the Highest Godhead is united with His supreme power—a union which is often represented as the association of *parama-puruṣa* with *paramā prakṛti* or that of *Śiva* and *Śakti*—the 'sweet

[1] यस्मिंस्तूच्चरिते शब्दे यदा योऽर्थः प्रतीयते ।
तमाहुरर्थं तस्यैव नान्यदर्थस्य लक्षणम् ॥—*op. cit.*, 2. 3. 29.

[2] इन्द्रियाणां स्वविषयेष्वनादिर्योग्यता यथा ।
अनादिरर्थैः शब्दानां सम्बन्धो योग्यता तथा ॥—
Vākyapadīya (sambandhasamuddeśa), 3. 29.

swan' of India could not think of a more appropriate similitude than the relation between *śabda* and *artha*.[1] A word has likeness also with knowledge, though this likeness is likely to culminate into unity in the plane of pure idealism. Just as knowledge reveals its own self and at the same time presents before us the object comprehended, so does a word serves a twofold purpose : a word shows its own form as well as that of the idea or thing it brings with it.[2]

What does the utterance of a word bring with it ? When a word is uttered, says Bhartṛhari, three things, namely, the particular word, the intention of the speaker and the object that is denoted, are all comprehended at a time.[3] A sound that does not fulfil this condition, *i.e.*, fails to present before us this trinity of things, is meaningless. Prof. Dittrich has discovered three elements in a statement : the sound, the import and the actual fact. Unless we recognise some sort of connection between the two, we cannot logically account

[1] वागर्थाविव संपृक्तौ वागर्थप्रतिपत्तये ।
जगतः पितरौ वन्दे पार्वतीपरमेश्वरौ ॥—Raghuvaṃśa, I. 1.

[2] आत्मरूपं यथा ज्ञाने ज्ञेयरूपं च दृश्यते ।
अर्थरूपं तथा शब्दे स्वरूपं च प्रकाशते ॥—Vākyapadīya, 1. 50.

[3] ज्ञानं प्रयोक्तुर्बाह्योऽर्थः स्वरूपं च प्रतीयते ।
शब्दैरुच्चरितैस्तेषां सम्बन्धः समवस्थितः ॥—*op. cit.*, 3. 1.

for the derivation of meaning from a word. Bhartṛhari has found in such a relation the fundamental solution of why things are invariably signified by their corresponding words.

Various are the ways in which different schools of Indian thought have sought to explain this relation. Let us first concentrate our attention upon the real issues without going into the details of philosophical criticism. Some hold that the relation between word and thing is permanent or natural,[1] *i.e.*, the aforesaid relation is not the whimsical product of human convention.[2] Their argument is that this relation seems to be eternal, as no author of it is mentioned in the scriptures.[3] There are others who look upon this relation as conventional (*i.e.*, the outcome of *saṅketa*), or as the creation of divine volition.[4] Some, again, are of opinion that the relation between sound

[1] These are the Mīmāṃsakas and the grammarians.

येऽपि मीमांसका वैयाकरणा वा स्वाभाविकं शब्दार्थयोः सम्बन्धमास्थिषत—

Tātparya-ṭīkā (Vācaspati) under Nyāya-sūtra, 2. 1. 55.

[2] अपौरुषेयः शब्दस्यार्थेन सम्बन्धः—Śabara on औत्पत्तिकस्तु शब्दस्यार्थेन सम्बन्धः ।

नित्यो ह्यर्थवतामर्थैरभिसम्बन्धः—Mahābhāṣya.

[3] सम्बन्धस्य न कर्त्तास्ति शब्दानां लोकवेदयोः ।—

A verse from the *Saṃgraha* quoted by Puṇyarāja under Vākya, 1. 26.

[4] The Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas.

and sense is just the same as exists between the cause and the effect, manifestor (*grāhaka*) and manifest (*grāhya*) and so on.[1] Some have made no distinction between speech and thought, *i.e.*, take word and thing as convertible with each other. A reciprocality of causal connection has also been detected between word and meaning.[2] A climax was, however, reached when sound and sense were declared to be essentially the same.[3] They are not only interchangeable, as in the interpretation of Aristotle, but said to be absolutely identical in the final stage. A note of warning is here necessary against the possible misconception to which such a notion of identity may lead in some cases. If word and concept, one may argue, were identical, then the utterance of the sound *agni* (fire) would have been practically accompanied by burning sensation.[4] But this is

[1] शब्दार्थयोः कार्य्यकारणभावसम्बन्ध इत्येके—Puṇyarāja.
ग्राह्यत्वं ग्राहकत्वं च द्वे शक्ती तेजसो यथा ।
तथैव सर्वशब्दानामेते पृथगवस्थिते ॥—*op. cit.*, 1.
प्रकाशकप्रकाश्यत्वं कार्य्यकारणरूपता ।
अन्तर्मात्रात्मनस्तस्य शब्दतत्त्वस्य सर्वदा ॥—*op. cit.*, 2.

[2] शब्दः कारणमर्थस्य स हि तेनोपजन्यते ।
तथा च बुद्धिविषयादर्थाच्छब्दः प्रतीयते ॥—Vākyapadīya, 3. 32 (sambandhasamuddeśa).

[3] एकस्यैवात्मनो भेदौ शब्दार्थावपृथक्स्थितौ—*op. cit.*

[4] अग्निशब्दोच्चारणादपि मुखदाहप्रसङ्गः स्यात्—Śabara; and see Nyāya-sūtra, 2. 1. 53.

far from being the actual state of things. It is evidently from the standpoint of all-devouring non-dualism, wherein all distinctions and manifoldness fade away, that sound and concept are viewed as two undifferentiated aspects of one and the same thing, *i.e.*, Supreme Consciousness. What we learn from this cardinal tenet of the *advaita* philosophy is that one and the same thing gets itself manifested in different forms in which objects are generally comprehended by all beings.[1] There is fundamentally no difference between the two, but they appear to be distinct from each other only in popular usages.[2] This fundamental unity of things is the last word of all sciences and religions.

An attempt is now being made to explain the association between the symbol and the object symbolised from the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika standpoints.[3] We say 'association' and not

[1] एकोऽयं शक्तिभेदेन भावात्मा प्रविभज्यते ।
बुद्धिवृत्त्यनुसारेण बहुधा ज्ञानवादिनाम् ॥—quoted by Puṇyarāja.

[2] शब्दार्थयोरसम्भेदे व्यवहारे पृथक्क्रिया ।
यतः शब्दार्थयोस्तत्त्वमेकं तत् समवस्थितम् ॥—
quoted by Puṇyarāja.

[3] The Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas do not materially differ from each other on this particular issue. Both have agreement in so far as the meaning of a word is determined by *samaya* or *saṅketa* (convention). The point over which they are in opposition is that while the Vaiśeṣikas have included *śābdabodha* (verbal cognition)

particularly 'relation,' because the Naiyāyikas as well as the Vaiśeṣikas do not recognise, as we shall see later on, the possibility of any relation, whether conjunction (*saṃjoga*) or inherence (*samavāya*), between a word and the object it denotes.[1] The author of the Nyāyamañjarī has tried to show that the grounds on which *sambandha* is generally established between a word and its denotation by the Mīmāṃsakas and the grammarians are not strong enough to stand the test of logical criticism.[2]

The Vaiśeṣikas argue in the following strain: Conjunction (*saṃyoga*) is a kind of quality. As it is a quality of ether, *śabda* cannot by its very nature have conjunction with the object

within the category of inference, the Naiyāyikas have strenuously supported the same as an independent source of knowledge. *Cf.* 'तदेवं प्राप्तिलक्षणस्य शब्दार्थसम्बन्धस्यार्थंतुषोऽप्यनुमानहेतुनं भवतीति'—Vātsyāyana ; and 'सोऽयं नियन्त्रितार्थत्वान्न प्रत्यक्षं न चानुमा ।'—Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā.

[1] शब्दार्थावसम्बद्धौ—Vai.-sūtra, 7. 2. 18. तथा चासता घटादिना शब्दस्य न संयोगो न वा समवाय इति भावः—Upaskāra.

पूरण-प्रदाह-पाटनानुपपत्तेश्च सम्बन्धाभावः—Nyāya-sūtra, 2.1.53.

न हि शब्दार्थयोः कुण्डवदरयोरिव संयोगस्वभावः, तन्तुपटयोरिव समवायात्मा वा सम्बन्धः प्रत्यक्षमुपलभ्यते—Nyāyamañjarī, 4. p. 241.

[2] न संश्लेषलक्षणः शब्दार्थसम्बन्धोऽस्माभिरभ्युपगम्यते । तत् किं कार्यकारण-निमित्तनैमित्तिकाश्रयाश्रयिभावादयः शब्दस्यार्थेन सम्बन्धाः । एतेऽपि नतराम् । तत् किं शब्दार्थयोरविनाभावसम्बन्धः सोऽपि नास्ति । कस्तर्हि समय इति ब्रूमः ।—*op. cit.*

denoted by it.[1] It is quite obvious that a quality cannot form the substratum of another quality, *i. e.*, a quality does not possess another quality.[2] Qualities generally inhere in a substance, but qualities themselves are totally devoid of the same. Again, as no action takes place in the way in which things are denoted by words, one cannot find out any connection between the two.[3] Things that are formless (or immaterial) and inactive by nature can never get themselves mutually related to one another without the intervention of any external force. Moreover, in a sentence like 'There is no pot,' one fails to conceive of any conjunction between the word and its meaning which is non-existent at present.[4] What is universally true is that things that are mutually related are found to have co-existence. The word *nāsti* (there is no pot) which is just now uttered does not logically co-exist with the thing of which nothing but negation is predicated. The same line of argument might be put forward to set aside the question of inherent relation (*samavāya-sambandha*) between a word and its denotation.

[1] गुणत्वात्—Vai.-sūtra, 7. 2. 14.

[2] तथा च गुणस्य शब्दस्य गुणः संयोगः कथं स्यात्—Upaskāra.

[3] निष्क्रियत्वात्—Vai.-sūtra, 7. 2. 16.

[4] असति नास्तीति च प्रयोगात्—*op. cit.*

The Naiyāyikas also could not justify the assumption of natural relation, whether interpreted in terms of conjunction or inherence, but advanced arguments to show the hollowness of the standpoint which attempts to turn the relation between a word and its meaning into an identical and eternal one. A connection has been negatived on the ground that no evidence (*pramāṇa*), either perception or inference, is available in support of its existence.[1] A union of the two is impossible, for a word and the object denoted by it do not remain in the same locality. A word has its existence in the vocal apparatus of the speaker, while the object is generally found in a different sphere.[2] But the case would have been entirely different, if the two were intimately related to each other.

One may ask as to what is likely to come out of this anomalous state of things. As there is no possibility of either of the two kinds of relations, one is necessarily forced to the conclusion that words and the objects denoted by them are not connected together in any conceivable

[1] प्राप्तिलक्षणस्तु शब्दार्थयोः सम्बन्धः प्रतिषिद्धः। कस्मात् ? प्रमाणतोऽनुपलब्धेः।
—Vātsyāyana on Nyāya-sūtra, 2. 1. 52.

[2] प्राप्तिलक्षणे च गृह्यमाणे सम्बन्धे शब्दार्थयोः शब्दान्तिके वार्थः स्यात्। अर्थान्तिके वा शब्दः स्यात्। तस्मान्न शब्देनार्थः प्राप्त इति—*loc. cit.*

सुखे हि शब्दमुपलभामहे भूमावर्थम्।—Sabara under Mīm.-sūtra, 1. 1. 5.

way.[1] A sound, to speak the truth, has its origin in the mouth, while the object denoted lies on the earth. They do not occupy the same place. But the entire absence of relationship is also against all popular experience.[2] To deny any kind of relationship between a word and its meaning is to strike at the very root of our knowledge of things. There is, whether real or imputed, some kind of relation between the two. If there were absolutely no connection between the sign and the object signified, all process of thinking and comprehension would have been upset by an anomaly of a serious nature. Any word would have denoted any thing: the word *ghaṭa*, for instance, might have signified some other object than a 'pot.'[3] It passes one's imagination to think

[1] शब्दार्थावसम्बद्धौ—Vai.-sūtra, 7. 2. 18.
'स्वभावतो ह्यसम्बद्धावेतौ शब्दार्थौ, मुखे हि शब्दमुपलभामहे भूमावर्थम्'—Śabara.
शब्दार्थव्यवस्थानादप्रतिषेधः—Nyāya-sūtra, 2. 1. 54.

[2] The advocate of the theory of Symbolism has, however, spoken against such direct relations. 'Between the symbol and the referent (thing),' hold Profs. Ogden and Richards, 'there is no relevant relation other than the indirect one, which consists in its being used by some one to stand for a referent.'—The Meaning of Meaning, p. 11.

[3] वाग्रूपता चेदुत्क्रामेदवबोधस्य शाश्वती ।
न प्रकाशः प्रकाशेत सा हि प्रत्यवमर्शिनी ॥—Vākyapadīya, 1. 125.
अर्थक्रियासु वाक् सर्वा समीहयति देहिनः ।
तदुत्क्रान्तौ विसंज्ञोऽयं दृश्यते काष्ठकुड्यवत् ॥—*op. cit.*

of a state of such irregularity and lawlessness. We find, on the contrary, that the utterance of a word is always accompanied by the comprehension of a thing.[1] There is no knowledge, as we have already stated, that is not associated with its corresponding word.[2] When each and every word is found to denote its particular meaning, one is hardly justified in saying that there is absolutely no connection (*prapti*) between them. The cognition of a thing from a word is in itself a strong evidence as to the existence of some sort of relation.[3] Though they failed to persuade themselves to assume the natural connection between a word and its meaning, the Naiyāyikas did not in any way depreciate the uniformity of cognition as is presented by words in their characteristic way of denoting the sense.[4]

Now it may be asked: if they be unconnected with each other, how, then, is it possible for a word to be, as a rule, denotative

[1] अर्थस्मरणस्यापि शब्दोल्लेखेनैव दर्शनात्—Puṇyarāja.

[2] न सोऽस्ति प्रत्ययो लोके यः शब्दानुगमादृते ।
अनुविद्धमिव ज्ञानं सर्वं शब्देन भासते ॥—Vākyapadīya, 1. 124.

[3] सति प्रत्ययहेतुत्वे सम्बन्ध उपपद्यते ।
शब्दस्यार्थे यतस्तत्र सम्बन्धोऽस्तीति गम्यते ॥
—*op. cit.* 3. 37 (sambandhasamuddeśa).

[4] शब्दः सम्बद्धोऽर्थं प्रतिपादयति प्रत्ययनियमहेतुत्वात् प्रदीपवत्—
Nyāyavārttika.

of sense ?[1] Kaṇāda in concurrence with the Naiyāyikas has come to the conclusion that the cognition of meaning is not due to any connection, but it issues forth from *saṅketa*[2] or the Will of God expressed in the following form: 'Let this meaning be comprehended from this word.'[3] The authorship of such *saṅketa* is attributed to God and not to any convention of men. One that is beyond the limitation of time and space, and created the whole world by His will is the author of *saṅketa*, *i.e.*, His voice was efficient enough to denote the things He intended to signify. This relation between *vācya* and *vācaka* will never come to an end, but continue to be so even in the future state of existence. This is a fact and not a fiction. Vyāsa has referred to this state of things under the Yoga-sūtra, 1. 27.[4] A word naturally expresses that sense

[1] ननु यदि न संयोगो न वा समवायः शब्दार्थयोस्तर्हि केन सम्बन्धेन शब्दो नियतमर्थं प्रतिपादयतीत्यत आह—Upaskāra.

[2] सामयिकः शब्दादर्थप्रत्ययः—Vai.-sūtra, 7. 2. 20.

न सामयिकत्वाच्छब्दार्थसंप्रत्ययस्य—Nyāya-sūtra, 2. 1. 55.

[3] सामयिक इति समयः ईश्वरसङ्केतः 'अस्माच्छब्दादयमर्थो बोद्धव्य' इत्याकारः, यः शब्दो यस्मिन्नर्थे भगवता सङ्केतितः स तमर्थं प्रतिपादयति—Upaskāra.

न सम्बन्धकारितं शब्दार्थव्यवस्थानम्, किं तर्हि ? समयकारितम्। कः पुनरयं समयः ? अस्य शब्दस्येदमर्थजातमभिधेयमित्यभिधानाभिधेयनियमनियोगः—

Vātsyāyana Bhāṣya.

[4] सर्गान्तरेष्वपि वाच्यवाचकशक्त्यपेक्षस्तथैव सङ्केतः क्रियते—under the aphorism 'तस्य वाचकः प्रणवः'।

alone which was assigned to it by the divine volition. This *saṅketa* or the Will of God (*samaya*) is the connection that exists between a word and the object that is symbolised by it. Thus, when both conjunction and inherence were found inadmissible, the Vaiśeṣikas as well as the Naiyāyikas had no other alternative than to look upon the Will of God as the potential factor that brings words and their respective meanings together by a tie of close relationship.[1] This volition on the part of God is what represents the relation and is rightly

[1] From the Nyāya-sūtras and the Bhāṣya thereon it is not sufficiently clear that *saṅketa* exactly means the same as the Will of God. It may also mean the convention of human origin and not necessarily the Will of God. The expression 'प्रयुज्यमानग्रहणाच्च समयोपयोगो लौकिकानाम्' is intended to imply that the apprehension of *saṅketa* follows from the time-honoured usages of elderly people (*vṛddhavyavahāra*). The science of grammar has also largely contributed to the same purpose by analysing words into *prakṛti* and *pratyaya* ('समयपरिपालनार्थं चेदं पदलक्षणाया वाचोऽन्वाख्यानं व्याकरणम्'). Vācaspati and other logicians (Jayanta Bhaṭṭa and Gadādhara) have distinctly referred to the 'Will of God' as the true interpretation of *saṅketa*. *Cf.* 'परमेश्वरेण हि सृष्ट्यादौ यो गवादिशब्दानामर्थे सङ्केतः कृतः सोऽधुना वृद्धव्यवहारे प्रयुज्यमानानां शब्दानामविदितसंगतिभिरपि बालैः शक्यो ग्रहीतुम्'—Tātparya-ṭikā.

'तस्मादीश्वरविरचित-सम्बन्धाधिगमोपायभूत-वृद्धव्यवहार-लब्धतद्व्युत्पत्तिमापेक्षः शब्दोऽर्थमवगमयतीति सिद्धम्'—Nyāyamañjarī, 4, p. 246.

called the real denotating power of words (*śakti*).[1]

Gotama has practically arrived at the same conclusion. He holds that the relation between sound and concept is purely conventional and not at all innate or natural.[2] He has argued further that if it were natural, as maintained by the grammarians,[3] then the same word would have been used by different races of mankind in the same sense, and consequently there might be no varieties of languages at all.[4] The word *gauḥ*, according to this view, has been so fashioned by the Will of God (*saṅketa*) that it always denotes a particular being and not anything else.

How is *saṅketa* generally apprehended? It is held that the cognition of *saṅketa* has been current from time without beginning. We cannot conceive of a time when men were ignorant of the relation between words and their meanings, that is to say, when men did not know how to signify objects by the use of

[1] 'शक्तिरूपः सम्बन्ध इत्युक्तम्'—Nyāyamañjarī, 4. शक्तिश्च पदेन सह पदार्थस्य सम्बन्धः—Muktāvalī.

[2] सामयिकः शब्दादर्थसंप्रत्ययो न स्वाभाविकः। ऋष्यार्य्यम्लेच्छानां यथाकामं शब्दप्रयोगोऽर्थप्रत्यायनाय प्रवर्त्तते—

Vātsyāyana under Nyāya-sūtra, 2.1.56.

[3] सिद्धः स्वाभाविकः शब्दार्थयोः सम्बन्धः—Helārāja.

[4] जातिविशेषे चानियमात्—Nyāya-sūtra, 2.1.56.

words.[1] Udayana has made this point abundantly clear by holding that God played the part of a magician in the beginning of creation so as to bring together words and objects under the relation of *vācya* and *vācaka*.[2] He had to assume the dual forms of the *denotative* and the *denoted* before He could make the first batch of men familiar with the *saṅketa* of His own invention;[3] and it was from these God-favoured apostles that the people of successive generations learnt the meaning of words. It is purely a theological belief that all our knowledge is derived from the mercy of a All-knowing Being.

There are various ways in which *saṅketa* may be understood.[4] First of all, the usage of elderly people is the primary condition that brings home to children the meaning of a word.[5]

[1] न हि शब्दार्थव्यवहाररहितः कश्चित् काल उपपद्यते—
Nyāyamañjarī, 4. p. 242.

[2] वर्षादिवद्भवोपाधिर्न्निरोधः सुषुप्तिवत् ।
उद्भिद्वृश्चिकवद्वर्णा मायावत् समयादयः ॥—Kusumāñjali, 2.2.

[3] ईश्वरोऽपि प्रयोज्यप्रयोजकभावापन्नं शरीरद्वयं परिगृह्य व्यवहारं कृत्वा तदानीन्तनानां शक्तिं ग्राहयति—
Commentary by Haridāsa Bhaṭṭācāryya.

[4] शक्तिग्रहं व्याकरणोपमानकोषाप्तवाक्याद्व्यवहारतश्च ।
वाक्यस्य शेषाद्विवृतेर्वदन्ति सान्निध्यतः सिद्धपदस्य वृद्धाः ॥—quoted by Jagadīśa.

[5] संकेतस्य ग्रहः पूर्वं वृद्धस्य व्यवहारतः ।
पश्चादेवोपमानाद्यैः शक्तिधीपूर्वकैरसौ ॥—Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā, 20.

The logicians as well as the grammarians have clearly illustrated the way in which children first catch the meaning of a word from the usage of their parents. *Saṅketa* or convention has been divided into two classes, namely, *ājānika* (not of human origin, *i.e.*, current from eternity) and *ādhunika* (conventions adopted by modern authors).[1] While the primary signification, generally known as *śakti*, comes under the category of the former, technical terms with their specialised meanings (as *guṇa* and *vṛddhi* in grammar) are examples of the latter.

Having taken a brief survey of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika views regarding the conventional nature of the relationship that subsists between words and their meanings, we now turn to the Mīmāṁsā standpoint. Reference has already been made to the Mīmāṁsā doctrine regarding the eternality of sound. A sound, according to the Mīmāṁsakas, is neither produced by vocal organs nor is liable to disappearance just after the act of utterance is over. But what actually takes place is that the operation of the vocal apparatus serves to manifest (instead of producing) the sound which is ever existent in all beings. To the Mīmāṁsakas the relation between words

[1] आजानिकश्चाधुनिकः संकेतो द्विविधो मतः ।
नित्य आजानिकस्तत्र या शक्तिरिति गीयते ॥
कादाचित्कस्त्वाधुनिकः शास्त्रकारादिभिः कृतः ।—Vākyapadīya.

and their meanings is natural or eternal and not something brought about by convention of human origin.[1] The author of the Bhāṣya has interpreted this relation as *inseparable*, that is to say, words and their corresponding things are not first produced and then get themselves connected with one another. But their reciprocal association is fixed by nature.[2] It seems somewhat strange that Śabara anticipated the whole train of arguments whereby the Naiyāyikas tried to disparage the question of relationship between a word and the object that is denoted by it.[3] He had, however, his logic, not weak and ineffective in any way, in order to set aside the authorship of men or divine agency as postutated by the Naiyāyikas for the sake of comprehension of meaning from a word.[4] In contradiction to the position advocated by the Naiyāyikas one may reasonably argue that it is apparently preposterous to

[1] औत्पत्तिकस्तु शब्दस्यार्थेन सम्बन्धः ।—Mīm. sūtra, I.1.5. अपौरुषेयः शब्दस्यार्थेन सम्बन्धः ।—Śabara.

[2] अवियुक्तः शब्दार्थयोर्भावः सम्बन्धः । नोत्पन्नयोः पश्चात् सम्बन्धः ।
औत्पत्तिकः शब्दस्यार्थेन सम्बन्धः ।—*loc. cit.*

[3] नैव शब्दस्यार्थेन सम्बन्धः, कुतोऽस्य पौरुषेयतापौरुषेयता वेति । कथम् ? स्याच्चेदर्थेन सम्बन्धः, क्षुरमोदकशब्दोच्चारणे मुखस्य पाटनपूरणे स्याताम् । यदि संश्लेषलक्षणं सम्बन्धमभिप्रेत्योच्यते । कार्य्यकारणनिमित्तनैमित्तिकाश्रयाश्रयिभावसंयोगादयस्तु सम्बन्धाः शब्दस्यानुपपन्ना एवेति ।—*loc. cit.*

Cf. Nyāya-sūtra, 2.1.53 and Nyāyamañjarī, 4, p. 242.

[4] तस्मादपौरुषेयः शब्दस्यार्थेन सम्बन्धः ।—Śabara.

conceive of such a designing person who could compose the great body of the Vedas by ingeniously effecting relationship between words and meanings, which were otherwise detached from one another in the beginning.[1] In order to justify the existence of such a natural relation, Śabara has also alluded to the same fact, *i.e.*, the way in which children are apt to learn the denotation of a word from the usage of elderly people.[2] It was quite in keeping with the reverence and indisputable authority as were ascribed to the Vedas, 'whereupon stands the entire fabric of religion and *Brahmavidyā*,' that the orthodox schools of Indian philosophy could not but treat this relation as eternal or natural. The Mīmāṁsakas, as Kumārila holds, were compelled to ascribe eternality to both words and their relation to meanings for the sole purpose of maintaining the unquestionable trustworthiness of the Vedas. Kumārila has in his characteristically elaborate way tried to show the logical justification for assuming this kind of natural relation.[3] Just as, inspite of the ultimate

[1] तस्मान्मन्यामहे केनापि पुरुषेण शब्दानामर्थैः सह सम्बन्धं कृत्वा संव्यवहर्त्तुं वेदाः प्रणीता इति। तदिदानीमुच्यते। अपौरुषेयत्वात् सम्बन्धस्य सिद्धमिति। कथं पुनरिदमवगम्यते 'अपौरुषेय' एष सम्बन्ध इति? पुरुषस्य सम्बन्धुरभावात्। प्रत्यक्षस्य प्रमाणस्याभावात्, तत्पूर्वकत्वाच्चेतरेषाम्।—*loc. cit.*

[2] स्यादेतत्। अप्रसिद्धसम्बन्धा बालाः कथं वृद्धेभ्यः प्रतिपद्यन्ते।—*loc. cit.*

[3] नित्याञ्छब्दार्थसम्बन्धानाश्रित्योक्तेन हेतुना।—Ślokavārttika.

causality of the conjunction of the soul with the mind, the operation of the visual organs is said to be the immediate instrument in regard to the cognition of form (*rūpa*), so the cognition of relation and not the cognition of the word itself is popularly considered as what directly helps one in determining the meaning.[1]

We have already referred to the position of the grammarians concerning the question of relation. The view of Vyāḍi, as alluded to by Puṇyarāja, is that there is no author of the relation that exists between words (both the Vedic and popular) and the objects denoted by them.[2] The grammarians seem to have gone a step further than the Mīmāṁsakas by insisting also on the eternality of meanings. The Mahābhāṣya has started with the dictum that words, their meanings and the relation between them are all permanently fixed, *i.e.* eternal.[3] The eternality of relation has been stated in clear terms by Patañjali.[4] As to how this kind of permanent

[1] शरीरात्ममनोयोगादसाधारणताबलात् ।
विज्ञानासत्तिभावाच्च चक्षुः कारणमिष्यते ॥ 41
तथैवेहापि सम्बन्धज्ञानमङ्गं प्रसिद्धितः ।
गौरवात् करणत्वेन मतं चेत् केन वार्य्यते ॥ 42
Ślokavārttika (Sambandhākṣepavāda).

[2] 'सम्बन्धस्य न कर्त्तास्ति शब्दानां लोकवेदयोः ।'—
quoted by Puṇyarāja under Vākya., 1, 26.

[3] सिद्धे शब्दार्थसम्बन्धे ।—Vār. I. Patañjali has explained the word *siddha* as a synonym of *nitya* (नित्यपर्य्यायवाची सिद्धशब्दः).

[4] नित्यो ह्यर्थवतामर्थैरभिसम्बन्धः ।—Mahābhāṣya, 1. 1. k—

relation comes under one's cognition, it is said that the object for which words are expressly used constitutes in itself a sufficient proof to show that the association between words and their meanings cannot be anything but natural and permanent.[1] If there were no such relation, *i.e.*, if *śabda* and *artha* were incapable of being brought together by a natural affinity, no one would have ever felt the necessity of using words for the sake of communicating his thoughts to others.

It is only a recapitulation to say that to the author of the Vākyapadīya the relation between a word and the object is as without beginning as the functioning of sense-organs in their respective spheres. This relation has been interpreted in various terms. He has not only called this relation unconventional (*akṛtrima*),[2] just like one that subsists between a noun and an adjective, but has gone so far as to say that the relation in which proper names (as *ḍittha*) and technical terms (as *vṛddhi* and *guṇa*) stand to their restricted or specialised sense is also permanently fixed.[3]

He has also shown the mutual causal connection between *śabda* and *artha*. A word, he

1 कथं पुनर्ज्ञायते सिद्धः शब्दोऽर्थः सम्बन्धश्चेति ? लोकतः। यल्लोकेऽर्थमर्थमुपादाय शब्दान् प्रयुञ्जते नैषां निवृत्तौ यत्नं कुर्वन्ति।—*loc. cit.*

2 अकृत्रिमोऽभिसम्बन्धो विशेषणविशेष्यवत्।—Vākyapadīya, 2.370.

3 नित्य एव तु सम्बन्धो डित्थादिषु गवादिवत्।—*loc. cit.*

holds, appears to be the immediate antecedent from which the intended meaning is generally understood ; and, again, a word is comprehended only through the instrumentality of sense that is previously ascertained by the intellect.[1] The meaning of a word is an object that has external existence in the world of experience.[2] It is further stated that *śabda* and *artha* both remain inseparable in our intellect prior to their outward manifestation.[3] Durga has minutely observed that the intellect residing in the spatial region of the heart manifests itself in the two-fold shape of *śabda* and *artha*.[4] This inseparable relation goes to make them convertible or interchangeable with each other.[5] To a conception like this an objection has, however, been taken in the Yoga-sūtra [6] and Nyāyamañjarī. Bhartṛhari

[1] Vākyapadīya, 3.32 (sambandhasamuddeśa).

[2] शब्दार्थौ ह्यर्थौ बहीरूपतयावस्थीयमान: ।—Helārāja.

[3] यथा हि बुद्धौ शब्दार्थयो: पूर्वमभेदेनावस्थानम् ।—*loc. cit.*

[4] शरीरे ह्यभिधानाभिधेयरूपा बुद्धिर्हृदयान्तर्गताकाशप्रतिष्ठिता ।—under Nirukta 1. 2.

[5] शब्दार्थयोरभेदेन सम्बन्धोऽध्यासलक्षण: ।—Helārāja.

[6] A word, its meaning and the cognition produced by it are really different from one another. But in ordinary usage we have made this trinity of things almost identical ; as, for instance, we have no other criterion but the term *go* itself to distinguish the word *go* from its meaning and the cognition. (गौरिति शब्दो गौरित्यर्थो गौरिति ज्ञानं । य एषां प्रविभागज्ञ: स: सर्ववित्—Vyāsa-bhāṣya). In the opinion of the author of the *Yoga-sūtras* this sort of

was a staunch advocate of the natural relationship between *śabda* and *artha*, and considered it as the most plausible explanation that would

false identification or a combination of three distinct elements into one category prevents us from understanding the speech of all beings (Yoga-sūtra, 3.17), just as the operation of *māyā* has hid from us the essential unity of Brahman.

Prof. J. Geyser has also drawn our attention to the distinction of word, meaning and object. He has said: 'Between the *meaning* and *what is meant*, or what it expresses, there exists an *essential relation*, because the *meaning* is the expression of the *meant* through its own content. What is meant lies in the 'object' of the thought of speech. We must therefore distinguish these three—Word, Meaning, Object.'

In the foregoing pages we had, on more than one occasion, referred to the doctrines of *śabdādhyāsa* and *śabdavivartta* as expounded by the philosopher-grammarian Bhartṛhari and maintained by the Tāntrik texts. It is necessary to point out here that these two doctrines could neither evoke any support from the Naiyāyikas nor stand their logical scrutiny. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa has strongly spoken against the interchangeability of word and meaning (*śabdādhyāsavāda*) and in equally strong language refuted the doctrine of the evolution of the world from *śabda* (*śabdavivartavāda*) as an inadequate and irrational explanation of creation.

Cf. सर्वथा न संबद्ध: शब्दाध्यासवाद:। विवर्त्तवादोऽपि न समञ्जस:। इह तु शब्दार्थयोरत्यन्तविसदृशवपुषोराकारसमारोपकारणानवधारणात् कथमितररूपेणेतरस्यावभास: ? अथ शब्दब्रह्मैव सृजति जगन्तीत्ययं विवर्त्तप्रकार. उच्यते सोऽपि न सम्यगचेतनत्वेन शब्दस्येश्वरस्येव स्रष्टृत्वानुपपत्ते:।

appeal to one's reason.[1] He stands strongly opposed to the logical doctrine of *samaya* or *saṅketa* which has unneccessarily brought forward the question of human or divine interference for throwing light upon what is otherwise sufficiently clear from a rational point of view. If words were, he argues, naturally unconnected with their meanings, nobody could ever associate the one with the other in any possible way.[2]

In considering the nature and reciprocality of causal connection between sound and concept one would naturally come to the doctrine of *nāma-rūpa* which, better than anything else, shows us how far the dual aspects of names and forms may answer to the close relation between the symbol and the object symbolised. *Nāman* and *rūpa* (or *saṁjñā* and *saṁjñī*) have striking coincidence with *śabda* and *artha*. The expression *nāmarūpe vyākaravāṇi*, as we find in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad, undoubtedly refers to the division or simplification

शब्दस्यायं विवर्त्तः कथमखिलमिति प्रस्फुरत्तद्विविक्त-
स्वाकारोऽर्थप्रपञ्चः कथमिव विकृतिर्ब्रह्मणो वेदृशी स्यात् ।
तस्मान्नानात्मतत्त्वे परिचितसदसत्कर्मपाकानुसार-
प्रादुर्भूतेश्वरेच्छावशविचलदणुप्रोद्भवो भूतवर्गः ॥

Nyāyamañjarī, pp. 535-536.

[1] सिद्धः स्वाभाविकः शब्दार्थयोः सम्बन्धः—Helārāja.

[2] सामयिकस्तु सम्बन्धो न युज्यते—

नित्येऽनित्येऽपि वाह्येऽर्थे पुरुषेण कथंचन ।

सम्बन्धोऽकृतसम्बन्धैः शब्दैः कर्तुं न शक्यते ॥—Vākyapadīya, 3.38.

of the complex world into names and forms.[1] There are others who have also found in it a distinct reference to the twofold creation, namely, the creation of names and the creation of forms or objects.[2] Having first stated the evolution of the three primary substances, namely, fire, water and the earth, the *ṛṣis* of the Upaniṣads continued to describe how the great God thought of creating the grosser elements with the help of names and forms.[3] This process of creation will remind one of the cosmogonic hymns of the Ṛgveda and those of the Old Testament. Creation is, so to speak, nothing but a manifestation of the unmanifest (*avyakta*) in the shape of the finite—a passage from the *indeterminate* to the *determinate*. But what helps the Creator most in passing from unity to diversity is the art of giving a stamp of name and form to each and every object of thought, so that one might distinguish it from the rest. *Nāman* and *rūpa* were thus correlated to each other from the very beginning of creation. For every object or concept we have a corresponding name. There is no object that

[1] Chāndogya, 6.3.2.

[2] नामरूपे व्याकरवाणीति श्रुतिप्रसिद्धा द्वयी सृष्टिः—Koṇḍabhaṭṭa.

[3] सत्प्रक्रियायां तेजोऽबन्नानां सृष्टिमभिधायोपोदिश्यते—'सेयं देवतैक्षत हन्ताहमिमास्तिस्रो देवता अनेन जीवेनात्मनानुप्रविश्य नामरूपे व्याकरवाणीति'—
Śaṅkara under Ved. sūtra, 2.4.20.

is without a name and no name that does not invariably present before us an object. This is the relation between *śabda* and *artha* or *saṁjñā* and *saṁjñī* or *nāman* and *rūpa.*

We have already referred to the Vedic hymn which informs us that the range of speech is as extensive as the manifestations of all-pervading Brahman. *Nāman* is the body of which *rūpa* is the soul. Sound and sense represent exactly the same relation in which the body stands to the soul. The formal and psychological aspects of speech are thus respectively revealed by *nāman* and *rūpa.* How intimately they are related to each other is illustrated by the *śruti* that runs to the effect that God created the earth after pronouncing the corresponding term *bhū.* Christian theology also bears clear testimony to a similar tradition.

Those who maintain a causal connection between *śabda* and *artha* are prepared to look upon speech as interconnected with thought or objects, *i.e.*, speech, as undifferentiated from meanings, gets itself materialised in the shape of things like cows and others. And objects or external manifestations of Consciousness assume the form of audible sounds or abide in their corresponding words.[1] This is how speech

[1] वागेवाविभागापन्ना गवादिरूपेणावतिष्ठते। गवादयश्च बाह्यार्थविभागाः पुनः श्रुतिरूपत्वेन परिणमन्ते। अत एव शब्दार्थयोः कार्य्यकारणभावसम्बन्ध इत्येके।—
Puṇyarāja under Vākya. I. 12.

and objects, inspite of their conventional difference and apparent duality, are liable to merge into the category of the great One. According to the *śruti* quoted by Puṇyarāja, *nāman* and *rūpa* were held by some to be one and inseparable unit, while others used to make a distinction between the two from the very beginning.[1]

Speech was not a lifeless mechanism to the ancient Hindus. They believed *vāk* to be second to God, but first in the order of creation.[2] She is the great potentiality that dwells in us all.[3] It was through her instrumentality that the Supreme Lord created everything.[4] She has been finally identified with the supreme Brahman.[5] In *vāk* the *ṛṣis* found a positive deity and the Pure Consciousness at work. Speech (*vāk*) has also been described in the Upaniṣads as the product of light (*tejomayī vāk*).[6] Analogous to the threefold divinity of Yāska,[7] there are

[1] 'नामेदं रूपत्वेन च वृत्तरूपं रूपं चेदं नामभावेन तस्थे।
एके तदेकमविभक्तं विभेजुः प्रागेवान्ये भेदरूपं वदन्ति॥'
quoted under Vākya. 1.

[2] तस्य वाग् द्वितीया आसीत्—Kāṭhaka Saṃhitā.

[3] वेदानां मातरं पश्य मत्स्थां देवीं सरस्वतीम्।—Mahābhārata.

[4] स तया वाचा तेनात्मना इदं सर्वमसृजत्—Bṛhadāraṇyaka.

[5] वाग्वै सम्राट् परमं ब्रह्म—*op. cit.*, 4.1.2.

[6] Chāndogya, 6.5.4. तद् येयं वाक् सोऽयमग्निः—
Bṛhadāraṇyaka. 3.1.3.

[7] तिस्र एव देवता इति नैरुक्ताः। अग्निः पृथिवीस्थानो वायुर्वेन्द्रो वान्तरिक्षस्थानः सूर्यो द्युस्थानः—Nirukta, VII. 5.

three luminous bodies with their three different manifestations (*prakāśa*), namely, fire which as vital energy abides in all things, the resplendent Consciousness within, and the all-illuminating *śabda* or Eternal *Verbum*.[1] The last one, *i.e.*, *Śabda* or *Logos* in which abides everything, whether movable or immovable, is the Holy Light of God (*Brahmajyotiḥ*).[2] What we call *nāman* and *rūpa* are only the visible manifestations of Brahman in the language of the Upaniṣads.[3]

A clear reference to the doctrine of *nāma-rūpa* has been made in the Vedānta-sūtra, 2.4.20., where the words *saṁjñā* and *mūrtti* stand respectively for *nāman* and *rūpa* or *śabda* and *artha*.[4] The question that was raised by Śaṅkara in this connection is: whether the creation of names and forms should be ascribed to the activity of men or that of the Supreme God—the Creator of all. The *śruti* as well as the very wording of the said aphorism goes

[1] त्रीणि ज्योतींषि त्रयः प्रकाशाः योऽयं जातवेदा यश्च पुरुषेष्वान्तरः प्रकाशः यश्च प्रकाशयोः प्रकाशयिता शब्दाख्यः प्रकाशस्तत्रैतत् सर्वमुपनिबद्धं यावत् स्थास्नु चरिष्णु चेति—quoted by Puṇyarāja under Vākya. 1.12.

[2] प्राप्तरूपविभागाया यो वाचः परमो रसः ।
यत्तत् पुण्यतमं ज्योतिस्तस्य मार्गोऽयमाञ्जसः ॥—Vākyapadīya, 1.12.

[3] ब्रह्मैतद्धि सर्वाणि नामानि बिभर्ति । ब्रह्मैतद्धि सर्वाणि रूपाणि बिभर्ति ।—Bṛhadāraṇyaka, 1.6.1.

[4] संज्ञामूर्तिक्लृप्तिस्तु त्रिवृत्कुर्वत उपदेशात्—Ved. sūtra. 2.4.20.

to show that no one but the Supreme Lord was powerful enough to be the author of this two-fold creation. The *Infinite* in which we all 'live and move and have our being' is the maker of names and forms.[1] Finite individuals cannot rise above limitations, and are naturally incapable of doing this, *i.e.*, giving names and forms to such complex phenomena as mountains, rivers, oceans and various other things.[2] The conclusion over which all Upaniṣads are unanimous is that all names and forms came from *ākāśa* or the all-pervading Brahman.[3] It is not too much to say that all that we possess comes from the same perennial source.

The doctrine of *nāma-rūpa* has its exact counterpart in Buddhist philosophy.[4] In Pali *sadda* means a sound or a word and *attha* means a concept or matter or, in other words, the former is a sign that signifies the latter. It is maintained further that all physical bodies have

1 सा खलु परमेश्वरस्यैव तेजोऽबन्नानां निर्मातुः कृतिर्भवितुमर्हति—
Saṅkara-bhāṣya.

2 न च गिरिनदीसमुद्रादिषु नानाविधेषु नामरूपेष्वनीश्वरस्य जीवस्य व्याकरणसामर्थ्यमस्ति—*loc. cit.*

3 परमेश्वर एव च नामरूपयोर्व्याकर्त्तेति सर्वोपनिषत्सिद्धान्तः। 'आकाशो ह वै नामरूपयोर्निर्वहिता' (Chānd. VIII. 14. 1) इत्यादिश्रुतिभ्यः। तस्मात् परमेश्वरस्यैव त्रिवृत्कुर्वतः कर्म नामरूपयोर्व्याकरणम्—*loc. cit.*

4 The Pali expression *nāma-rūpa* has been rendered by some as mind and body and not as name and form.

their existence as *paramatta-rūpa* in an ultimate sense.[1] *Paññatti* (Sk. *prajñapti*) which means both name and notion or term and concept is of several kinds. There is a twofold derivation of the term *paññatti*: 'it is either that which makes known or presents the thing denoted before one's mind (*paññapatīti*), or that which is made known (*paññapiyatīti*).'[2] It is, therefore, a term which has combined in itself the double aspects of *pramāṇa* and *prameya* of the Hindu philosophy. It is both the means of knowing and the object knowable. In the Abhidhamma we find two classes of *paññatti*, namely, *sadda-paññatti* and *attha-paññatti*. The former is the same as *nāma-paññatti*. *Sadda-paññatti* is significantly so called inasmuch as it renders the intended sense intelligible to others, and *attha-paññatti* is so called as it becomes cognisable to others by means of a sign or word.[3] What we learn from the correlation or interdependence of these

[1] S. Z. Aung: Compendium of Philosophy, p. 271.

[2] *op. cit.*, p. 4.

[3] According to Buddhist logicians, the meaning of a word is both denotative and connotative. The meaning comprises the particular thing (*dabbattha*) as well as its attributes (*sakattha*). It is to be particularly noticed here that what is called *svārtha* or *śakyārtha* (*i.e.*, *saṅketa* or primary signification) by the Hindu grammarians is materially the same as *sakattha* of Buddhist philosophers:

two kinds of *paññatti* is that a relativity between word and meaning was maintained by Buddhist philosophers.

In the Tantras *vāk* is not only described as the creative potentiality of the Supreme Being, but as one with, or inseparable from, Him. *Vāk* is, again, called the first manifestation of *cit-śakti* that lies dormant in all beings. The production of sound is explained by the Tāntrikas as a kind of movement (*spandana*) in the Consciousness which remains otherwise calm and serene (*aśabda*).

In order to understand the Tāntrik view of *śabda* and *artha* we think it necessary to give here a short analysis of the doctrine of *bindu*. The Prapañcasāra, Śāradātilaka and other *āgamas* (Southern School of Tantras) have dealt with this particular topic with considerable thoroughness.

The word *bindu* is a highly technical term, and we do not know any English word that would exactly correspond to it.

It is said that the creative impulse of *Paraśiva*, inseparably united with *parā śakti*, takes the form of a *bindu* (a subtle point or stress)—the reservoir of energy in the terms of the Tantras (*śaktitattva*).[1] Of the three primordial elements (*śiva*, *śakti* and *bindu*)

[1] सा तत्त्वसंज्ञा चिन्मात्रा ज्योतिषः सन्निधेस्तदा ।
विचिकीर्षुर्घनीभूता क्वचिदभ्येति बिन्दुताम् ॥—Prapañcasāra, 1.41.

recognised by the Tantras,[1] it is *bindu* from which arises, as its first revelation, the subtle form of sound called *nāda*.[2] From this indistinct and indeterminate *nāda-bindu*, which has its origin in the internal part of the body, evolves the intellect with its dual aspects of word and meaning.[3] *Bindu* divides itself into three aspects, namely, gross, subtle and extremely subtle forms answering to the three stages such as *bindu*, *nāda* and *bīja*.[4] When *bindu* splits up by the will of God, a subtle and indistinct sound is produced therefrom.[5] This is the first evolution of sound (the primordial sound=*om*) called *Śabda-Brahman* by the *Āgamikas*.[6] This has been variously termed ;

1 बिन्दु-शक्ति-शिवाख्यानि त्रीणि सिद्धान्तसागरात् ।
समुद्धृत्य सतां धर्त्तुं हृत्कण्ठश्रवणे सदा ॥—Ratnatraya-kārikā.

2 तत्र नादो नामाभिधेयबुद्धिहेतुः बिन्दोः प्रथमप्रसररूपः सूक्ष्मो नादः—

3 अव्यक्तादन्तरुदितात्त्रिभेदगहनात्मकात् ।
महन्नाम भवेत्तत्त्वं महतोऽहंकृतिस्तथा ॥—Prapañcasāra, 1.44.

4 कालेन भिद्यमानस्तु स बिन्दुर्भवति त्रिधा ।
स्थूलसूक्ष्मपरत्वेन तस्य त्रैविध्यमिष्यते ॥
स बिन्दु-नाद-बीजत्वभेदेन च निगद्यते ॥—*op. cit.*

5 बिन्दोस्तस्माद् भिद्यमानाद्रवोऽव्यक्तात्मको भवेत् ।
स एव श्रुतिसम्पन्नैः शब्दब्रह्मेति कथ्यते ॥—*op. cit.*

6 भिद्यमानात् पराद्बिन्दोरव्यक्तात्मा ततोऽभवत् ।
शब्दब्रह्मेति तं प्राहुः सर्वागमविशारदाः ॥—Śāradātilaka, I. 2.

Nāgeśa has elucidated the same view in the following way :—

'अस्माद्बिन्दोः शब्दब्रह्मापरनामधेयं वर्णादिविशेषरहितं ज्ञानप्रधानं सृष्ट्युपयोग्यवस्थाविशेषरूपं चेतनमिश्रं नादमात्रमुत्पद्यते । एतज्जगदुपादानं रवपरादिशब्दैर्व्यवह्रियते—Mañjūṣā, p. 179.

sometimes as *praṇava* and sometimes as *parā vāk*. The meditation on *Śabda-Brahman* is held to be a distinct step towards a still higher realisation. One who has a deeper insight into this mystic form of *vāk* is able to rise from the finite to the infinite and is ultimately blessed with a positive knowledge of the *Absolute*.[1]

We are confronted with some difficulty in defining what *bindu* exactly is. One may identify it with the vital element, with 'the first seed of creation' or simply with the *jīvāṇu*[2] (germ-atom) from a biological point of view. In the language of the Tantras, *bindu* is an extremely subtle entity from which the six pure paths (*adhvā*) follow, and to which they are ultimately reduced.[3] *Bindu* is the last point in the universal chain of causation.

On a minute analysis it is found that whatever we perceive in this material plane has a subtle or *baindava* form. The visible *rūpa* of all objects might be traced to the intrinsic form of *bindu* of which the former is only a gross manifestation. Nothing would have any

1 शब्दब्रह्मणि निष्णातः परं ब्रह्माधिगच्छति ;—Vākyapadīya.

वाग्ब्रह्मणि निष्णातश्चिद्ब्रह्माप्नोति येन कथयन्ति ।—Nādakārikā.

2 Most of the theistic schools of Indian philosophy have characterised *jīva* (beings) as *aṇu* (*i.e.* atomic in form).

3 जायतेऽध्वा यतः शुद्धो वर्त्तते यत्र लीयते ।

स बिन्दुः परनादाख्यो नादबिन्द्वर्णकारणम् ॥—Ratnatraya, 22.

tangible form or beauty, if it were wanting in the same so far as its ultimate cause is concerned. Things that are beautiful and generally attract our vision are supposed to have emanated from a source that is a repository of all beauty. The *ṛṣis* of the Upaniṣads had the spiritual vision of One whose radiant form and exuberant beauty illumine the whole universe.[1] If we intend, for instance, to go back to the origin of the flower smiling before us, we shall ultimately reach a point which is bound to be the same as *bindu*.

Bindu, under the influence of *māyā*, is bifurcated into mind and matter or *śabda* and *artha*.[2] The first product of *bindu* is *nāda*[3] which in turn gets itself divided into the *denotative* and the *denoted* (*i.e.*, word and meaning). *Vācya* and *vācaka* in their mutual conjunction constitute a vivid parallelism to the eternal relation between *para-śiva* and *parā śakti*. The six

[1] तमेव भान्तमनुभाति सर्वं तस्य भासा सर्वमिदं विभाति—

Kaṭhopaniṣad, 2.5.15.

एकस्तथा सर्वभूतान्तरात्मा रूपं रूपं प्रतिरूपो बहिश्च– *op. cit.*

[2] अचिच्छब्देन शब्दार्थोभयसंस्काररूपा अविद्योच्यते—Mañjūṣā.

[3] According to the Śāradātilaka, *nāda* is the first product of the union between *Śiva* and *Śakti* and *bindu* is said to evolve from *nāda* in the next stage :—

'सच्चिदानन्दविभवात् सकलात् परमेश्वरात् ।

आसीच्छक्तिस्ततो नादो नादाद्बिन्दुसमुद्भवः' ॥ '1.7.

paths that proceed from *bindu* have, on the basis of word and its denotation, been divided under two groups: (*i*) *mantra* (incantation), *varṇa* (letter) and *pada* (syllable or inflected word); and (*ii*) *kalā* (power), *tattva* (principle or real entity) and *bhuvana* (world). The former group represents the different varieties of sound, and the latter those of meanings. Every letter or *mantra* is a kind of *śakti* which represents a deity in a subtle form.

In considering the relation between *śabda* and *artha* the question that naturally rises in one's mind is: how the sound uttered by us for the purpose of denoting some object turns out so powerful a symbol as to convey exactly the same sense to others? The question may also be put in a different form: why does a man understand nothing but a pot whenever he happens to hear the sound *ghaṭa*? The answer offered by the Tantras in course of showing the signification of the *mantras* is calculated to throw some light on the solution of the problem under review.[1] The efficacy of *mantras* (as are composed of words or *mātṛkāvarṇas*) constitutes an important, nay the cardinal, teaching of the Tantras. What forms the spiritual background of the Tāntrik worship is primarily

[1] See Sir John Woodroffe's 'The Garland of Letters' (*Varṇamālā*).

an effort to awaken the power or consciousness of the *mantra* (*mantracaitanya*) in order to visualise the deity from inside.

Everything has a particular name or *saṃjñā* whereby it is distinguished from the rest. There is a natural connection between a name and the object so named. A thing or a person has an inseparable relationship with its or his name. No other than the person, for instance, who has got the name *Hari* is likely to respond whenever the same is uttered. This will go to show the nature of kinship between the two. *Nāman* and *nāmin* (name and the person named) are no doubt closely related to each other. The later school of Vaiṣṇavism has laid supreme stress on the importance of *nāman* (or *bījamantra*) making the *devatā* and his name altogether coincident or identical. Some have gone so far as to eulogise *nāman* as of greater efficacy than the deity himself. To a Vaiṣṇava the word *Hari* is nothing short of the deity bearing the same name. It is almost ingrained in all religious consciousness that the name of the God is God Himself. The Tantras have also subscribed to the same view by identifying a *mantra* with its presiding deity (*mantrādhisthātṛdevatā*). In the Tāntrik texts no difference has been made between a *mantra* (or *bīja*) and the *devatā* that it represents in a mystical way. The relation which a *mantra* bears to its deity is the

same as *vācaka-vācya*, *i.e.*, a particular deity is always denoted by a particular *bīja-mantra*. The *mantras* are not lifeless and meaningless syllables but they are full of potentiality. Every one of them, as the Tantras enjoin, is the living symbol of a deity and an inexhaustible source of power. *Mantra* means a kind of meditation upon something (*manana*). It is further stated that a whole-hearted concentration of the mind on a *bīja-mantra* not only serves to reveal the desirable deity before a devotee (*sādhaka*), but enables him in the long run to reach the highest plane of spiritual consciousness.[1]

How does a *mantra* acquire such a superhuman power? The first explanation to offer is as follows: being repeatedly uttered by *devatās* as well as *ṛṣis* from time beyond one's imagination, the *mantras* are supposed to have been so sanctified and powerful that they can make the deity positively appear before a devotee (*sādhaka*), if only they are practised in a spirit of reverence and selfless devotion. Secondly, when a *guru* initiates his worthy disciple into the mysticism of the *mantras*, he infuses inconceivable *śakti* (energy) into the same so as to

[1] The effect of meditation on the *Gāyatrī* is thus shown:—

मननात् पापतस्त्राति मननात् स्वर्गमश्नुते ।
मननान्मोक्षमाप्नोति चतुर्वर्गमयो भवेत् ॥—Gāyatrītantra.

render them all-powerful and living manifestations of the *devatās* concerned. A devotee is called *japasiddha, i.e.*, one who has attained the supreme end by means of *japa*, when he is entitled to be in communion with the deity in consequence of his repeated utterance of the *mantra*. According to the Tāntrik point of view, the relation of *vācya-vācaka*, as exists between a word and its meaning, is clearly understood at the time when meditation upon the *mantra* is accompanied by a visible appearance of the deity from behind the same. A *mantra*, in its intrinsic aspect, is the *rūpa* (form) of the deity. This is why at the time of *japa* a *sādhaka* is required to ponder over the letters of the *mantras* and to think of the person of the deity presiding over it, as an essential condition of *japa-sādhanā*. What are called *bījamantras* in the Tāntrik texts are thus nothing but names and subtle forms of various deities. Just as our life has a far greater significance than the immediate desire for bread and butter, so a *mantra* seems to have a deeper meaning than what it ordinarily signifies to an indifferent reader. Standing firmly on the rock of their religious faith, the *Āgamikas* could not but look upon the *mantra* or *bīja* as a spark of the Divine Fire. It is purely in this light that the author of the Mahābhāṣya has also described the real nature of letters (*varṇas*).

Having shown the constant and natural relation between sound and sense we now proceed to see how meaning is comprehended from a word. The cognition as to the denotating power of words (*śakti*) is generally derived from popular usages. But there are other means which also help us largely in determining the signification of words. These sources are as follows: (1) Grammar[1] (the meaning of a word is sometimes determined by grammatical analysis); (2) Analogy (as the meaning of a word like *gavaya* [gayal] is understood from the knowledge of the similarity of the animal with a

[1] The usefulness of the study of grammar, specially in the determination of meanings, has been shown by Bhartṛhari and Jayanta Bhaṭṭa in clear terms:—

अर्थप्रवृत्तितत्त्वानां शब्दा एव निबन्धनम।

तत्त्वावबोधः शब्दानां नास्ति व्याकरणादृते ॥—Vākyapadīya, 1. 13.

साधुप्रयोगानुचितांश्च शिष्टान्न वेद यो व्याकरणं न वेद।—

quoted by Puṇyarāja under Vākya., 1. 16.

सर्वथा प्रकृतिनिर्मलमत्युदारं व्याकरणाडम्बरमेवंप्रायैः परिवादपांसुपातैर्न मनागपि दूरीकर्त्तुं पार्य्यते इति सिद्धम्। तस्मात् पवित्रात् सर्वस्मात् पवित्रं जनबहुमतमधिगतचतुर्वर्गमग्राम्यमात्मानं कर्त्तुमध्येयं व्याकरणम्।

'रूपान्तरेण देवास्ते विचरन्ति महीतले।

ये व्याकरणसंस्कारपवित्रितमुखा नराः' ॥

मनुना च पङ्क्तिपावनत्वेनाधिगतव्याकरणो मीमांसकश्च स्मृतौ पठितौ 'यश्च व्याकुरुते वाचं यश्च मीमांसते गिरमि'ति।

—Nyāyamañjarī, pp. 425-426,

cow); (3) Lexicon; (4) Testimony[1] (as the meaning of an unknown word is sometimes grasped from the instruction of trustworthy persons); (5) Popular usage (it refers to the way in which children first acquaint themselves with the meanings of words from the usage of elderly people); (6) Contact; (7) Explication of a word by its synonyms; (8) Association with words of known signification.

We often find that the meaning of a word, though unknown, may be well understood either from the context or from its association with other words of the sentence of known import. Bhartṛhari has emphatically stated that meanings do not follow from words alone, but that there are other instruments

[1] आप्तोपदेशसामर्थ्याच्छब्दादर्थसंप्रत्ययः—Nyāya-sūtra, 2. 1. 52.

Vātsyāyana has pointed out that words like *svarga* (heaven), *apsaras* (celestial maiden), *devatā* (god) and *uttarakuru* (a fabulous land) denote objects which are never perceived by ordinary men. But their meanings are generally comprehended from the instruction of reliable authority, *i.e.*, persons who have visualised the real nature of things through the aid of their super-sensuous experience.

Cf. स्वर्गः अप्सरसः उत्तराः कुरवः, सप्तद्वीपाः समुद्रो लोक-सन्निवेश इत्येवमादेरप्रत्यक्षस्यार्थस्य न शब्दमात्रात् संप्रत्ययः। किं तर्हि? आप्तैरयमुक्तः शब्द इत्यतः संप्रत्ययः।—Bhāṣya under Nyāya-sūtra, 2. 1. 52.

न ह्ययं शब्दमात्रात् स्वर्गादीन् प्रतिपद्यते, किन्तु पुरुषविशेषाभिहितत्वेन प्रमाणत्वं प्रतिपद्य तथाभूताच्छब्दात् स्वर्गादीन् प्रतिपद्यते—Nyāyavārttika.

अपूर्वं देवतास्वर्गैः सममाहुर्गवादिषु।—Vākyapadīya, 2. 121.

whereby they are often ascertained. These are as follow[1]: (*i*) sentence (meanings are sometimes understood from the import of the sentence), (*ii*) context (when one at the time of dinner asks for *saindhava*, which has the double meanings of salt and horse, we understand at once from the fitness of occasion that he wants salt and not a horse[2]), (*iii*) sense, (*iv*) propriety, (*v*) place, and (*vi*) time. But difficulty arises with regard to the exact signification when a word having more than one meaning is used in a sentence. In such cases, as Bhartṛhari tells us,[3] we should particularly take notice of the following conditions in order to ascertain the meaning actually intended by the speaker : connection, separation, accompaniment, contradiction, sense, context, gender and proximity with other words.[4]

[1] वाक्यात् प्रकरणादर्थादौचित्याद्देशकालतः ।
शब्दार्थाः प्रविभज्यन्ते न रूपादेव केवलात् ॥—Vākyapadīya, 2. 316.

[2] यथा ग्रामप्रस्तावे सैन्धवानां चोदनमश्वानयनपर्य्यवसायि भवति, भोजनप्रस्तावे तु तदेव लवणप्रतीतिमुपजनयति—Puṇyarāja under Vākya. 2. 316.

[3] संसर्गो विप्रयोगश्च साहचर्य्यं विरोधिता ।
अर्थः प्रकरणं लिङ्गं शब्दस्यान्यस्य सन्निधिः ॥—Vākyapadīya, 2. 317.

[4] It might be profitably remembered here that while the denotative sense (*vācyārtha*) remains the same in all occasions, the suggestive one (*vyaṅgyārtha*) varies in accordance with the intention of the speaker, the person spoken to and so on ; as, for instance, the suggestive meanings of the expression 'the sun is setting' are different, according as the speaker is a pious man, a lover, a thief or a labourer.

The multiplicity of meanings of a single word presents an obstacle in the way of determining the primary signification (*śakti*). There are two courses open to us: we may either accept one meaning as conventional or primary signification and consider the rest as of only secondary importance, or we may look upon all that a word signifies as equally conventional or sanctioned by popular usages. While the Naiyāyikas accepted the second alternative, the Ālaṃkārikas like Mammaṭa and others adopted the first.

A few words more with regard to the plurality of meanings. What is really implied by a word possessing manifold meanings is the laxity of conventional restrictions. When a word denotes more than one object, we generally find that it has somewhat lost its connection with any particular or fixed meaning. In connecting an object with a name, convention or popular agreement, if it is a correct interpretation of the fact, serves to distinguish the same from other objects that have different designations of their own. But the moment a word begins to acquire new meanings along with the advance of language, the conventional or fixed relation (between a word and its meaning) is bound to be relaxed to an appreciable extent. Again, a word does not acquire manifold meanings all at a time: the multiplicity

of meanings shows but different stages of linguistic development. Many causes, such as analogy, metaphor and the expansion of knowledge, are accountable for imparting new meanings to a word. The Sanskrit language is replete with words of manifold significations.[1]

Before proceeding to show the independent character of *śabda* as a source of knowledge, we think it necessary to preface the discourse with a short account of the philosophical interpretations of *pramā* and *pramāṇa*. *Pramā* means correct or true knowledge. Instruments whereby consistent knowledge is usually attained are known as *pramāṇas*.[2] There are necessarily as many *pramāṇas* as there are ways for obtaining trustworthy or uncontradicted knowledge. It is definitely stated that no knowledge is attainable without the instrumentality of *pramāṇas*.[3] *Pramāṇa* holds an important place in the Indian theory of knowledge. As it results from experience and memory, knowledge has been broadly divided into two classes.

[1] The word *hari* may be cited here as a suitable example of various meanings.

Cf. 'यमानिलेन्द्रचन्द्रार्कविष्णुसिंहांशुवाजिषु ।
शुकाहिकपिभेकेषु हरिर्ना कपिले त्रिषु ॥—Amarakośa.

[2] स येनार्थं प्रमिणोति तत् प्रमाणम् ।—Vātsyāyana.

[3] प्रमाणतश्चार्थप्रतिपत्तेः ।—Nyāya-sūtra, 4.2.29.

But we should remember that knowledge of all descriptions comes directly from experience (*anubhava*). What is called *intuition* in Western systems of thought (or *saṃskāra* in Hindu philosophy) is also a kind of experience —a stream of cognition flowing from a series of prior births.

The Mīmāṁsakas have defined *pramāṇa* as that means which makes one acquainted with objects which were previously unknown (*anadhigatārthagantṛtva*). And if it is exactly so, memory (*smṛti*) has no claim to be included within the category of *pramāṇas*, since *smṛti* is always dependent on previous experience.[1] Thus there is no consensus of opinions regarding the independent character of memory as an instrument for the attainment of knowledge. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa has interpreted *pramāṇa* as an accessory which serves to give rise to such a knowledge as is free from doubts and contradictions and is in tune with popular experience.[2] A great amount of divergence is, however, found among the Indian philosophers with regard to the number of *pramānas*. The result has been

[1] न वादृष्टपूर्वं स्मृतिर्भवति—Śabara.

'प्रमिते च प्रवृत्तत्वात् स्मृतेर्नास्ति प्रमाणता'।

—Ślokavārttika (Śabdapariccheda), 104.

[2] अव्यभिचारिणीमसन्दिग्धामर्थोपलब्धिं विदधती बोधाबोधस्वभावा सामग्री प्रमाणम्।—Nyāyamañjari, p. 12.

that each system of philosophy has got its particular number of *pramāṇas* as one of its distinguishing features.[1]

Though the Sāṃkhya[2] and other systems of Indian philosophy, with the exception of the Vaiśeṣika, have in their own way defended the trustworthiness or authoritativeness of *śabda* (*śabda-prāmāṇya*) as a cardinal problem, the preponderance of logical arguments has made us more concerned with the view of the Naiyāyikas than with those of others.[3] *Śabda-prāmāṇya* is a

1 प्रत्यक्षमेकं चार्वाकाः कणादसुगतौ पुनः ।
अनुमानं च तच्चापि सांख्या शब्दं च ते उभे ॥
न्यायैकदेशिनोऽप्येवमुपमानं च केचन ।
अर्थापत्त्या सहैतानि चत्वार्य्याहुः प्रभाकराः ॥
अभावषष्ठान्येतानि भाट्टा वेदान्तिनस्तथा ।
सम्भवैतिह्ययुक्तानि तानि पौराणिका जगुः ॥

2 आप्तोपदेशः शब्दः ।—Sāṃkhya-sūtra, 1.101.
तत् प्रमाणं बादरायणस्यानपेक्षत्वात् ।—Mīm. sūtra, 1.1.5.

3 It should be remembered here that Buddhist philosophers refused to recognise the authoritative character of *śabda* as a source of knowledge. Their view has been referred to by Gaṅgeśa in the following terms:—'ननु शब्दो न प्रमाणं तथा हि करणविशेषः प्रमाणम् । करणं च तत् यस्मिन् सति क्रिया भवत्येव । न च शब्दे सति प्रमा भवत्येवेति नायं शब्दः प्रमाणम्'—

Tattvacintāmaṇi (śabdakhaṇḍa), p. 15.

Śabara has also alluded to a similar view that seeks to neutralise the validity of *śabda*. *Cf.* 'ननु प्रत्यक्षादीन्यन्यानि भवन्तु नाम प्रमाणानि, शब्दस्तु न प्रमाणम् । कुतः ? अनिमित्तं विद्यमानोपलम्भनत्वात् । अनिमित्तमप्रमाणं शब्दः'।

problem that has been adequately dealt with by the Naiyāyikas. According to the Naiyāyikas, knowledge that is derived from experience admits of four varieties, namely, perception, inference, analogy and word.[1]

An attempt is now being made to show briefly how consistent knowledge is generally obtained from these sources and how *śābdajñāna* or verbal cognition particularly differs in essential features from both perception and inference. When we find a flower, or, to use the logical phraseology, when a thing, *e.g.*, a flower, comes in contact with our visual organs, an idea of the object is at once presented before our mind, and we are then supposed to have some knowledge of the thing perceived. The knowledge thus acquired is technically called perception (*pratyakṣa*).[2] The Vedāntin holds that in the evolution of perceptional knowledge *antaḥkaraṇa* (intellect) passes through the doors of sense-organs to the object itself, and assumes the particular form of that object.[3]

[1] प्रत्यचानुमानोपमानशब्दाः प्रमाणानि —Nyāya-sūtra, 1.1.3.

[2] There is also a super-sensuous or supernatural form of perception, commonly known as intuitive or inward insight with which *yogins* are gifted. *Cf.* योगिनामबाह्यप्रत्यचत्वान्न दोषः ।—Sāṁkhya-sūtra, 1.60.

[3] Vedāntaparibhāṣā (*pratyakṣapariccheda*).

Again, on the observation of smoke in some parts of a hill, a cognition as that of a 'hill in fire' is produced by the previous knowledge of the invariable co-existence between fire and smoke. It should be stated here that the knowledge of such *vyāpti* (co-existence of fire and smoke) is the result of previous experience (*pratyakṣa*). This cognition about the existence of fire is called *anumāna* (inference), as opposed to perception. In terms of Logic inference is only a passage from 'known to unknown.'

In the same way, when we hear one uttering the expression 'the lotus is blue,' we at once understand, no matter whether the object spoken of is just present before us or not,[1] the speaker's idea as embodied in the utterance, *i. e.*, non-difference (or identity) of the lotus from something that is blue, or that the lotus forms the substratum in which the quality of blueness inheres. Now this cognition with regard to the blueness of the lotus, as directly gathered from the couple of words, *e. g.*, *blue* and *lotus*, having mutual expectancy, proximity and compatibility, is virtually different from both perceptional and inferential knowledge as

[1] A word invariably gives rise to a cognition, though the object denoted by it is not at all present at the time of speaking.

Cf. अत्यन्तासन्निकृष्टेऽर्थे ज्ञानं शब्दः करोति हि —Vākyapadīya.

शास्त्रं शब्दविज्ञानादसन्निकृष्टेऽर्थे विज्ञानम्।—Śabara-bhāṣya.

we have shown above.[1] Since it follows from words and their logical correlations with one another, this kind of knowledge is called *śābda-jñāna* or *anvayabodha* in the language of the Naiyāyikas. As a valid source of knowledge by itself, *śabda* has thus rightly been included by the Naiyāyikas within the category of *pramāṇas*, side by side with perception and inference. The author of the Nyāya-sūtras has shown the untenability of the view, as held by the Vaiśeṣikas, that goes to interpret *śābdajñāna* as a kind of inference.[2] What categorically differentiates *śabda* from *anumāna* is that the latter involves the knowledge of *vyāpti* as an indispensable condition, while the same is not at all required in drawing cognition from *śabda*. If words are mutually expectant and consistent so far as their meanings are concerned, they are capable enough to express the complete sense without the mediacy of *vyāpti* (invariable concomittance).[3]

¹ साकाङ्क्षशब्दे यो बोधस्तदर्थान्वयगोचरः ।
सोऽयं नियन्त्रितार्थत्वान्न प्रत्यक्षं न चानुमा ॥
—Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā, 2.

² The Mīmāṁsakas have also spoken against the inclusion of *śabda* within the category of inference:—

यत्र धूमोऽस्ति तत्राग्नेरस्तित्वेनान्वयः स्फुटः ।
न त्वेवं यत्र शब्दोऽस्ति तत्रार्थोऽस्तीति निश्चयः ॥—Ślokavārttika

³ न च तत्र सद्यः साकाङ्क्षत्वादिधीमात्रेण व्याप्तिबुद्ध्यादेरप्यधिकस्यापेक्षणात् ।
—Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā.

On the part of the Mīmāṁsakas, as we have pointed out more than once, it was nothing short of a religious duty to maintain the authoritativeness (*prāmāṇya*) of *śabda* on which rests the supreme and unquestionable validity of the Vedas.

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa has in a critical way shown how *śabda* indirectly (*parataḥ*) assumes an authoritative character by giving rise to popular knowledge.[1] More elaborate is the process adopted by Gaṅgeśa for bringing to light the authoritativeness of *śabda*. A word, as he holds, should be treated as an instrument for obtaining valid knowledge on account of the fact that it is always used for no other purpose than the denotation of objects.[2] Though they materially differed from the grammarians by assigning non-eternality to *śabda*, the Naiyāyikas, as one will clearly find, came forward with their burden of logic to support the authoritativeness of *śabda*.

[1] प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणानां तद्द यथास्तु तथास्तु वा।
शब्दस्य हि प्रमाणत्वं परतो मुक्तसंशयः॥

and 'शब्दोऽपि पुरुषेण प्रयोज्यमानः श्रवणपथमुपगतः सत्योऽनृतो वा समन्वितेऽसमन्विते वा सफले निष्फले वा सिद्धे कार्य्ये वार्थे प्रमितिमुपजनयतीति तावदेवास्य रूपम्।'—Nyāyamañjarī, p. 188.

प्रमाणत्वं तु शब्दस्य कथमित्यत्र वस्तुनि।
जैमिनीयैरयं तावत् पीठबन्धो विधीयते॥ *op. cit.*, p. 159.

[2] प्रयोगहेतुभूतार्थतत्त्वज्ञानजन्यः शब्दः प्रमाणम्।
—Tattvacintāmaṇi (Śabdakhaṇḍa).

It is no wonder that the grammarians, as they are justly called *śābdikas*, will accept the authoritativeness of *śabda* more readily than others. To the grammarians *śabda* is a direct source of knowledge and its trustworthiness in respect of denotation of sense is too obvious a fact to require any explanation. The cognition of objects follows, as a rule, from words.[1] Patañjali has often styled grammarians like himself *śabdapramāṇaka*, *i.e.*, those who are used to accept what a word signifies as the best form of evidence.[2] The Vaiśeṣika school, though allied to that of the Nyāya in many respects, did not place *śabda* in a separate category in its classification of *pramāṇas*, but decided rather in favour of its inclusion within the scope of inference.[3]

We have seen how *śabda* constitutes an independent form of evidence by itself. It is as trustworthy a source of knowledge as perception or inference. Let us now endeavour to give an analysis of the situation which leads to the derivation of knowledge from *śabda* (*śābdajñāna*). It should be remembered at

[1] शब्दपूर्वको ह्यर्थे संप्रत्ययः ।—Mahābhāṣya under Vārttika, 2. (Pāṇ., 1.1.68.)

[2] शब्दप्रमाणका वयम् । यच्छब्द आह तदस्माकं प्रमाणम् ।
—Mahābhāṣya under Vār. 5 (Pāṇ. 2.1.1)

[3] एतेन शाब्दं व्याख्यातम् ।—Vai. sūtra, 9.2.3.

the very outest that *śābdabodha* (verbal cognition) does not evolve from a single word or, in other words, what is logically called *śābdabodha* is quite distinct from the meaning of a single word (*śabdārtha*). This will be more clear if we look at it from the philological point of view. Jagadīśa has drawn our attention to the fact that *śābdabodha* or verbal testimony is produced by words only when they are related to one another in such a way as to constitute a logically significant sentence.[1] The reason why he has so pointedly directed us is that the sentence alone, and not any of its constituent parts, should be regarded as the significant unit of speech. This is the fundamental logic of language. According to the doctrine of *sphoṭa*, as we have elsewhere explained, a word has no independent existence apart from the sentence which is an indivisible whole (*akhaṇḍa*). Philologists have also arrived at the same conclusion when they said that all linguistic investigations should start with sentences and not with isolated words.

Śābdabodha is generally derived, for instance, from a sentence like *gaur asti* (there is a cow)

[1] वाक्यभावमवाप्तस्य सार्थकस्यावबोधत: ।
सम्पद्यते शाब्दबोधो न तन्मात्रस्य बोधत: ॥—

Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā, 12.

where the constituent parts, namely, *gauḥ* and *asti*, are mutually related to each other. This is due to the simple fact that the concept 'cow' is not complete unless it is associated with that of existence and the like. The two concepts in their consistent correlation make the sense complete. This is the primary condition of a sentence according to the logical criterion.[1] Viewed from an epistemological standpoint, our knowledge seems to be always relative. We do not practically think of one thing but we think of two, either as subject and predicate or as things and their various aspects and attributes. When there is only a single term (as *vṛkṣa*) corresponding to one concept, we generally add another to it (as *asti*) and then determine the relation between the two. Vyāsa has rightly observed that existence, as a common attribute of all that exists, may be assigned to all objects of thought.[2] We are thus allowed to speak of a thing as existent, even when we happen to know nothing about its other inherent properties.

It should also be noted here that words wanting in correlation among themselves cannot

[1] पदसमूहो वाक्यमर्थपरिसमाप्ताविति—

Vātsyāyana under Nyāya-sūtra, 2.1.55.

[2] न सत्तां पदार्थो व्यभिचरति। वृक्ष इत्युक्ते अस्तीति गम्यते।—

under Yoga-sūtra, 3. 17.

constitute a significant sentence. We may put together a number of unconnected words and make a huge combination, but they would neither form a sentence nor would convey any consistent sense for want of mutual relation. This is the reason why Jagadīśa has so adversely criticised the definition of sentence as suggested by Amara Siṃha.[1] A sentence is a consistent thought. An arbitrary collocation of words that do not possess correlation among themselves naturally fails to give any coherent idea. There are some principles which the mind invariably follows in connecting one concept with another. A regular and logical combination of words is one that exhibits the very same way in which the mind establishes some sort of relation, whether affirmative or negative, between two concepts.

We now turn to the point at issue. Each of those correlated words, namely, *gauḥ* and *asti*, signifies, in ordinary course, its own meaning (a cow-individual and existence) by the force of convention. When these meanings are found consistently correlated, *i.e.*, when existence as an attribute is predicated of the cow, a distinct cognition (*vilakṣaṇa-bodha*) as that of 'a cow having existence'

[1] सुप्तिङन्तचयो नैवमतिव्याप्त्यादिदोषतः ।—

Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā, 13.

is obtained from the association of meanings (*saṃsarga*).[1] The sense that is thus derived from the correlation of meanings brings something more with it than the mere sum-total of the meanings as are individually expressed by each word. This kind of cognition, intrinsically different from both perceptional and inferential knowledge, is called *śābdabodha,* because it is derived from words, and also called *anvayabodha,* as it actually and immediately follows from the correlation of meanings.

It is sufficiently clear that the knowledge we derive from words is not attainable by any other means. Jagadīśa has cited another example, namely, *ghaṭādanya* (a thing distinct from a pot), in order to draw a more marked distinction between the so-called verbal cognition and inference. The knowledge as is drawn from the above expression, *i.e.*, 'a thing (say a mat) qualified by its difference from a pot,' cannot be arrived at by any mode of inference except words.

In deriving *śābdabodha* one should particularly take notice of the following factors: (*i*) a number of words having mutual expectancy, compatibility, etc., (*ii*) the meaning

[1] अस्ति तावद् गौरस्ति-गामानयेत्यादि-साकाङ्क्षशब्देभ्यः स्वस्ववृत्त्या पदार्थाना-मुपस्थित्युत्तरं गवादावस्तित्वादेरन्वयावगाही विलक्षणो बोधः—

—Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā.

of each word, and (*iii*) the correlation of meanings. Viśvanātha has clearly explained the respective functions of these conditions which contribute to the derivation of *śābdabodha*. The knowledge of words is said to be the instrument, the apprehension of objects as the door, the cognition of *śakti* (convention) as an accessory, and *śābdabodha* itself as the final result.[1] The instruments whereby *śābdabodha* is generally produced are held to be four in number : proximity (*āsatti*), expectancy (*ākāṅkṣā*), compatibility (*yogyatā*) and import (*tātparya*).

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[1] पदज्ञानं तु करणं द्वारं तत्र पदार्थधीः ।
शाब्दबोधः फलं तत्र शक्तिधीः सहकारिणी ॥—Bhāṣāpariccheda, 91.

CHAPTER XII

HISTORY OF WORD AND MEANING[1]

History of words is the history of man—reconstruction of ancient civilisation from words—Language cannot keep pace with the progress of knowledge—change of form and meaning—Law of Specialisation—Law of Generalisation—restriction of meaning—loss of signification—deterioration of sense—Analogy and Metaphor—the ultiplicity of meanings—principle of naming—how names are given to things—the principles enunciated by Yāska—the part played by mythology and superstition—history of proper names.

Having shown the correspondence between word and thing, we now pass on to the history of word and its meaning. The history of word is virtually the same as the history

[1] M. A. Darmesteter has a very interesting booklet under the title: 'The Life of Words as the Symbols of Ideas.'

Another interesting book on this subject is 'The Meaning of Meaning' by Profs. Ogden and Richards. This work, as the authors say, is a 'Study of the Influence of Language upon Thought and of the Science of Symbolism.' In it the functions of language have been divided into two classes, namely, the symbolic and the emotive. The theory of Signs or Symbolism, as worked out here, has maintained a peculiar position that goes directly against the view of Indian grammarians. It does not recognise any necessary or permanent relation between a thing and the symbol which stands for it. 'Between the

of the human mind. 'The genealogies of words,' says Pott, 'are the genealogies of concepts.' It is mind that infuses life into a dead mechanism like phonetic utterance. 'It is only when a thinker makes use of *words* that they stand for anything, or, in one sense, have 'meaning.' A sound does not develop into a word unless it is made significant by man. 'Apart from the mind,' it is truly said, 'Language has neither life nor reality.' Sounds that we utter are of no consequence until they become significant symbols of our mental ideas.

Both the material and intellectual advancement of a nation is partly, though not wholly, visible in the growth and development of its language. The mind of a people is well reflected in the mirror of language.[1] The progress and diffusion of a language is almost commensurate with those of the people who speak and think in it. All that we

symbol and the referent' (thing), it is held, 'there is no relevant relation other than the indirect one, which consists in its being used by someone to stand for a referent.'- *The Meaning of Meaning*, p. 11. Again, words are said to be meaningless by themselves. 'It is only when a thinker makes use of them that they stand for anything, or, in one sense, have 'meaning.'

[1] 'Through all the centuries humanity has deposited in Language the acquisitions of material and moral life.'
M. Bréal: Semantics, p. 1.

know and think about is intimately connected with our speech. 'The ideas and beliefs, the struggles and aims of a community are enshrined in the language it speaks.' Words are not merely phonetic types created by men to serve their pressing demands. But in them lie incorporated their intellectual outlook and manifold activity of life. The life of a man really begins whenever he is capable of giving expression to his inner thoughts.

A bold attempt was made by some scholars to construct the Indo-European civilisation from the evidence of language.[1] It is not altogether impossible or as uncertain a task as 'to build a house of cards upon the sand.' The history of primitive people does not seem too difficult to be reconstructed, if the real biography of each individual word of its language might be recorded with due caution and perseverance together with the assistance of historical researches. As true symbols of

[1] Professor O. Schrader: The Prehistoric Antiquities of the Aryan Peoples.

'In the pages of Fick's Dictionary of the parent-Aryan we may read the religion, the morality, the culture and the civilization of rude tribes who lived and died long before the first hymn of the Rig-Veda was composed, long before the first Hellene had reached the shores of Greece, or the first Indo-European word had been written down.' Sayce : The Science of Language, Vol. II, p. 327.

ideas, words may be looked upon as fabrics of history which depict mankind in all its intellectual aspects. 'We must imagine Language,' says Bréal, 'as a vast catalogue in which are recorded all the products of human intelligence.' It is rightly said by others: 'Through language all our intellectual and much of our social heritage comes to us. Our whole outlook on life, our behaviour, our character, are profoundly influenced by the use we are able to make of this, our chief means of contact with reality.'

The glorious days of Vedic India have long merged into oblivion leaving behind a few literary remnants that still speak of the material, social and religious achievements of that primitive age. It is through these records that we can have a glimpse into the dead past. The words *ātman* and *brahman*, for instance, which inspired so many sublime verses from the Vedic seers will show the extent to which Indian mind developed its spiritual vision. Expressions like *na jāyamāno naśate*[1] (nothing that comes into existence is destroyed), *devānāṃ devatamāya*[2] (the God of the gods, *i.e.*, Supreme Being), *ekaṃ sad viprā bahudhā vadanti*[3] (One existent being is called by various names), *ṛtasya panthānamanveti sādhuḥ*

[1] Ṛgveda, I. 165. 9.
[2] *Op. cit.*, II. 24. 3.
[3] *Op. cit.*, I. 164. 46.

(one who is pious follows the path of righteousness), evidently bring out the ancient mind in its relation to the moral and spiritual outlook of life. The word *devaraḥ*,[1] as explained by Yāska, stands as the witness of a social custom that once prevailed in ancient India. What have been particularly of greater value to the historian are the Vedic words like *samiti*[2] (assemby), *rājan* (king), *saptasindhu*[3] (the seven rivers) and so on. Indian tradition is a kind of history. Though it has come down to us mostly by oral recitation, the store-house of tradition has an amount of genuine historical interest at its back.

Some have metaphorically compared language to an organism. A language or, more properly a word, is said to have its birth, continuance as well as death. Viewed from its psychological background, every word has in it a history of its origin, though it is very often difficult for us to trace. Every word, as Prof. Darmesteter has rightly pointed out, is the symbol of an idea. It has been justly observed that 'apart from the human mind, Language has neither life nor reality.' The same idea has been expressed in a more clear way by Prof. Sayce:[4] 'All that the vocal organs

[1] *Op. cit.*, X. 40. 2 (को वां शयुत्रा विधवेव देवरम्).

[2] *Op. cit.*, X. 191. 3.

[3] *Op. cit.*, VIII. 69. 12. and I. 32. 12.

[4] Sayce: The Science of Language, Vol. I, p. 336.

can do is to supply the skeleton into which the mind breathes the breath of life.'

The most ancient words are those that signify objects with which primitive people were first familiar. With the spread of civilisation and expansion of knowledge the number of words begins to multiply. The more civilised a people, the greater becomes the number of its words. The languages of savages contain a comparatively small stock of words just in proportion to their crude and limited number of ideas. But it is none the less true that a language with its rapid strides of development and strong tendency for coining new words could hardly keep pace with the progress of human thought. Thoughts are so innumerable and varied in character that no language seems to be practically sufficient to represent them in a proper and suitable way Sanskrit has long ceased to be a spoken language. Consequently it is particularly wanting in those words which would correspond to things brought before us by the modern phase of civilisation.

We have already seen by instituting a comparison between the Vedic and classical Sanskrit how a large number of words have undergone changes both in their physical and psychological aspects. We ought to crave here the indulgence of the reader for restating

the same illusrtation. Yāska has taken notice of words like *varāha* and *puṣkara* which might be explained as distorted forms of *varāhāra* and *vapuṣkara* respectively. Instances like these will evidently show how people generally shorten a lengthy word by dropping some syllables for the sake of economy. *Valāhaka* (*vārivāhaka*) and *pṛṣodara* (*pṛṣad-udara*) are instances of this type. The word *pratisūryaka* (lizard), as used by Bhavabhūti instead of the more regular form, *e.g.*, *prati-sūryaśayānaka*, illustrates the same principle of economisation. Just as *prathama* has come from *pratama*, so *nūtana* has evolved out of *navatana*.[2] The word *purāṇa*, according to Yāska's interpretation, has its origin in the the combination of two words, namely, *purā* and *nava*.[3]

With regard to the change of signification, the same author tells us that the word *pavitra*, as found in the Vedic hymns, was originally used to mean *mantra* (sacred incantation), rays of the sun, water and gods.[4] But it has come to mean only *pure* in later Sanskrit, probably from the idea of sanctity that is usually associated with those things. This may be cited as

[1] दृष्यद्भिः प्रतिसूर्य्यकैरजगरस्वेदद्रवः पीयते ।—Uttaracarita, 2.

[2] प्रथम इति मुख्यनाम प्रतमो भवति ।—Nirukta, II. 22.

[3] पुराणं कस्मात् ? पुरा नवं भवति ।—*Op. cit.*, VII. 19.

[4] *Op. cit.*, V. 6.

an instance of abstraction of concrete thing. Many causes were at work to bring about such changes which are both phonetic and intellectual. 'Phonetic decay or corruption' played an important part in the transformation of Sanskrit words into Prākrit or Apabhraṃśa. But we must say that we are more concerned here with the intellectual than with the phonological side of language.

The intellectual causes, involved in the transformation of meanings, are so subtle and intricate that no amount of effort proved sufficient to bring them under any general principles. A comparison between the Vedic and Classical Sanskrit shows us not only the extent to which the poetic language of the hymns changed itself in the different stages of transition, but gives us also an idea as to how numerous words have acquired new meanings, some words dropped out of use, and some abstract ideas have passed into concrete things and so on. We propose to give below short accounts of certain intellectual processes by which words usually change their meanings.[1] As Sanskrit is no longer a spoken language, we have no other alternative than to confine ourselves to its important divisions, namely, Vedic and Classical, in order to illustrate the changes of

[1] For much that is contained in this chapter I am indebted to M. Bréal's famous work Semantics.

meanings undergone by some Sanskrit words. They are the main sources from which we have to draw materials for the purpose we have kept in view.

Specialisation,[1] which means narrowing of sense as is consequent upon the prominence given to one aspect of the thing denoted by a word, is an intellectual principle we have got to deal with first of all. The working of this principle is quite manifest. A word or a name denoting a class is sometimes narrowly assigned to a species which belongs to the said class. A name in itself is only suggestive of one of the many qualities of the thing named or, in other words, no name is so designed as to bring out all the properties of a thing at a time. A minute examination of names will sufficiently convince one that a name in its symbolical form cannot signify at once all that is associated with the object designated. A word or name is said to be used in a specialised sense when it connotes only one aspect of a thing.

It should be, however, remembered that in this process whereby general terms are restricted to particular sense, the original meanings do not always altogether disappear. The word *kavi*,

[1] Prof. Whitney has in his Language and the Study of Language prominently mentioned two kinds of changes, namely, Specialisation of general terms and Generalisation of special terms.

for instance, originally meant 'a man of keen intellect'[1] (*krāntadarśī*), but when we turn to later Sanskrit we find that the word has acquired a special sense, *i.e.*, 'poet,' the primary signification being retained to this extent that poets in the early days of history were undoubtedly men of high literary attainments. The rhapsodies of bards were once a source great inspiration to the people at large. Words like *mṛga* (deer) and *paśu* (animal), as we have already pointed out, are instances of specialisation of general terms.

The word *varṇa* in all probability was originally one to signify *colour* before it came to mean caste and letter.[2] Yāska, on the authority of Aupamanyava, has found in the statement *pañca janāḥ*[3] a clear reference to the five different castes.[4] Pāṇini

[1] Patañjali has also used the word in this sense. *Cf.* 'तां जातिं कवयो विदुः' ।—Mahābhāṣya under 4. 1. 63.

[2] The expression 'यो दासं वर्णमधरं गुहाकः' (Ṛgveda, II. 12.4.) probably refers to the black-skinned non-Aryans who were defeated by the Aryans. Yāska has used the word *varṇa* as denoting a similitude. *Cf.* तवोपमार्थेन युद्धवर्णा भवन्ति ।—Nirukta, II. 16. The word may also mean description (*varṇanā*). Durga has explained मन्त्रवर्णं and उपनिषद्वर्णं as intended to signify the description of *mantra* and Upaniṣad respectively (*cf.* उपनिषद्भावेन वर्ण्यंते इति उपनिषद्वर्णः)—under Nirukta, III. 12).

[3] Ṛgveda, X. 53. 4.

[4] चत्वारो वर्णा निषादः पञ्चम इत्यौपमन्यवः ।—Nirukta, III. 8.

has frequently used the word *varṇa* in the sense of colour.[1] That the question of colour was intimately bound up with that of caste is an undeniable fact. The colour of a people was a criterion of its rank in society. A yellowish complexion, as Patañjali tells us, was one of the characteristic physical features of a high class Brahmin.[2]

The word *artha* in the sense of wealth is not traceable in the early Vedic literature. It seems to have acquired this particular meaning from the idea of utility or desirability (*prayojana*) that is intrinsically associated with wealth.[3] Another example is *yauvana* which does not only mean 'youth,' but also signifies 'an assembly of youthful ladies' (*yuvatīnāṃ samūhaḥ*).[4]

[1] वर्णो वर्णेन ।—Pāṇ. 2.1.69. वर्णादनुदात्तात्तोपधात्तो नः ।— Pāṇ., 4. 1. 39.

वर्णाद्ब्रह्मचारिणि ।—Pāṇ. 5.2.134. वर्णे चानित्ये ।—Pāṇ., 5.4.31.

[2] तथा गौरः शुच्याचारः पिङ्गलः कपिलकेश इत्येतानप्यभ्यन्तरान् ब्राह्मण्ये गुणान् कुर्वन्ति ।—Mahābhāṣya under Pāṇ., 5. 1. 115.

[3] Yāska has used the word generally as a synonym of 'meaning' and sometimes as denoting 'desirable things' ('आर्थपत्यमिच्छन्' ;—Nirukta, VII. I), but never in the sense of 'wealth.'

पुरुषार्थ or परमपुरुषार्थ in the philosophical language means the 'highest desirable thing of men' (*summum bonum* of life).

[4] Pan., 6 4.164.

If we turn to certain grammatical forms,[1] we shall find that the principle of Specialisation was not less active there. The part played by the trinity of roots, namely, *kṛ*, *bhū*, and *as* in their subordinate character gives us a suitable example. Though they have retained independent usages as well, the roots *kṛ*, *bhū* and *as* seem to have only a specialised sense when they weld themselves on to principal verbs (as in *edhāmāsa*, *edhāmbabhūva* and *edhāñcakre*) as mere auxiliaries.[2]

The transformation of ancient adverbs into prepositions affords us another example of Specialisation.[3] It is not improbable that what we now designate as prepositions were once regular adverbs, and most of them still retain the same sense. Patañjali has spoken of this adverbial use of prepositions (*upasarga*).[4]

1 Prof. Bréal has shown how numerous and diverse suffixes used in ancient languages for expressing degrees of adjectives have been reduced to simple —*ior* (SK. *īyas*) and *issimus* (SK. *tama*) by the influence of the Law of Specialisation. 'One single word assumes in French (*plus*) the function of all these comparatives (—*ro*, —*tero*, —*ior*) and superlatives (—*mo*, —*timo*, —*issimo*)'. Semantics, p. 14.

2 Pāṇ., 3. 1. 40.

3 'In the Vedic texts, on the contrary, we find words which have since become well-known prepositions, still in the condition of adverbs: *per*, *ob*, *ad*, *sub*, *super*, *ab*'. Semantics, p. 18.

4 क्रियाविशेषक उपसर्गः ।—Vār. 7, under Pāṇ., 1. 3. 1.

Derivatives sometimes deviate from their original bases in respect of meanings, and become more or less special in their signification. *Lāvaṇya*, which has been derived from *lavaṇa* meaning 'salt,' is now used in the sense of beauty or loveliness.[1] The couple of words derived from *dhana* (wealth), namely, *dhanya* (fortunate or praiseworthy) and *dhānya* (paddy) has acquired meanings that differ considerably from that of the original.[2] *Tarpaṇa*, which comes from *tṛp* to please, has long been in use as a particular kind of oblation done for the satisfaction of forefathers alone. *Jaghanya*, derived from *jaghana* (the loin) means 'contemptible'; *mukhya* from *mukha* (face) means 'the greatest'; and *hṛdya* from *hṛt* (heart) means 'beautiful,' 'desirable' or 'dearest.'[3]

Now we come to the principle of Generalisation, or expansion or widening of meaning. Expansion of meaning is also held to be an indication of the progress of thought or of civilisation. The meaning of certain words is sometimes found to embrace a wider sphere. A name

[1] It is supposed that the excess of salty elements gives a charming look to the body. Some derive it from *ramaṇa* or *rāmaṇya* (beauty).

[2] *Dhanyā* (in feminine) means either a nurse or *āmalakī* (a kind of fruit). Grammatically *dhanya* is one who has obtained wealth. धनगणं लब्धा ।—Pāṇ., 4. 4. 84.

[3] अभीष्टेऽभीप्सितं हृद्यं दयितं वल्लभं प्रियम् ।—Amarakośa.

really applicable to particular individuals or to a particular class of things sometimes acquires a greater magnitude of signification. We have already taken notice of the word *kuśala* which has almost given up its original sense, namely, chopper of *kuśa*-grass, and is now used as a general term denoting 'skilful.' Durga has mentioned a few more words of this character. The word *pravīṇa* was originally used as a name of the *gandharvas* (a kind of demi-gods) who are proverbially famous for their superiority in musical attainments. But one will curiously find that this word, like *kuśala*, has been current as a general attribute of persons expert in any sphere of activity. One expert in grammar is called, for instance, *vyākaraṇe pravīṇaḥ*. In the same way, the words *udāra* and *nistriṃśa* are more frequently used respectively in the sense of *highminded* and *cruel* than in those of *horse* and *sword*. This may also be interpreted as an instance of the abstraction of concrete meaning. The meaning of the word *gaveṣaṇā* has considerably been extended. It does no longer mean simply 'search after a lost cow,' but denotes an enquiry or scientific and literary researches.

There are various ways in which meanings of words are enlarged. An action sometimes develops into a quality by the operation of this process. *Vikrama* meant 'walking with long

strides' from which act Viṣṇu got the designation of *trivikrama*.[1] But the meaning was surely extended when the word came to mean 'strength'. This was probably due to the fact that the act of walking with long steps requires a good deal of physical strength. Like its English equivalent (fruit), the word *phala* often means 'result.' The result of an examination is now called *parīkṣā-phalam*.

Expansion as well as restriction of meaning is nowhere so frequent as in the case of verbal roots.[2] The meaning of a great bulk of roots has been either extended or contracted in course of time. That roots admit of more than one meaning has been carefully observed by the Hindu grammarians.[3] Men do not stick to a particular meaning so far as the signification of a root is concerned. It is, therefore, truly said that the meanings, as are generally given in the *Dhātupāṭha*, are only indicative (*upalakṣaka*),[4] and that this fact does not prevent roots from acquiring a large number of significations on account of the various implications

1 इदं विष्णुर्विचक्रमे त्रेधा नि दधे पदम् ।—Ṛgveda, I, 22. 17.

2 'The verb is the part of speech which presents the most numerous examples of Expansion.'—Semantics, p 118.

3 बह्वर्था अपि धातवो भवन्ति ।—Mahābhāṣya ; and
धातवश्चोपसर्गाश्च निपाताश्चेति ते त्रय: ।
अनेकार्था: स्मृता: सर्वे पाठस्तेषां निदर्शनम् ॥

4 सत्ताद्यर्थनिर्देशश्चोपलक्षणम् ।—Bhaṭṭoji under Pāṇini, 8.4.18.

put into them by popular usages. *Bhavati*, holds Bhaṭṭoji, in *yāgāt svargo bhavati* (heaven is attained by the performance of sacrifice) has the sense of 'production' and not that of 'existence only.'[1] How the meaning of a verbal root is extended in Sanskrit by the addition of prepositions is abundantly borne out by many words.[2]

Restriction of meaning is conspicuously visible in all languages. The intention of the speaker (*vivakṣā*) or popular usage is the most dominating factor that causes such restrictions of meaning. A word is generally restricted to a particular meaning whenever its true origin and derivative signification are lost sight of. When a word is once restricted to a thing by popular usage, it becomes practically impossible to restore it to its original sense.[3]

The Sanskrit language gives us numerous examples of restriction (*rūḍhyartha*). The word *go*, for instance, though derived from *gam* (to go), has been restricted to 'cow' and does not mean 'moving beings' in general by virtue of its etymology.[4] In the same way, *paṅkaja* which

1 यागात् स्वर्गो भवतीत्यादावुत्पद्यते इत्याद्यर्थात् ।—*loc. cit.*

2 उपसर्गेण धात्वर्थो बलादन्यत्र नीयते ।
नीहाराहारसंहारविहारपरिहारवत् ॥

3 'Speech would cease if all words had to be restored to the exact meaning which they possessed in the beginning.'—Semantics, p. 121.

4 किंचिन्नाम क्वचिदर्थे रूढमेव यथा गोप्रभृतौ गवादि ।—
Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā. 16.

intrinsically gives the idea of a thing 'that grows in mud' (*paṅka+jani+kartṛtva*) has by popular convention assumed a particular meaning (*i.e.*, lotus). Though it evidently comes from *śraddhā* (reverence or respect), the word *śrāddha* seems to have acquired a special meaning in the *smṛti* texts.[1]

The principle of naming objects also furnishes suitable examples of the restriction of meaning. We see that all those who wander about are not called *parivrājaka*, the designation being restricted to an ascetic only. The same action (*kriyā*) may be performed by different classes of beings, but it is a particular individual or a group of individuals that gets its designation by reason of the same.[2] There is but little justification why a person doing the work of a craftsman by accident should be called a carpenter.[3] Similarly, by *jīvana*[4] one understands the juice extracted from sugarcanes or a kind of herbs and not

[1] सम्बोधनपदोपनीतान् पित्रादीन् चतुर्थ्यन्तपदेनोद्दिश्य हविस्त्यागः श्राद्धम् ।—
Śūlapāṇi : Śrāddhaviveka.

श्रद्धया अन्नादेर्दानं तच्छ्राद्धमिति वैदिकप्रयोगाधीनं यौगिकम् ।—
Raghunandana : Śrāddhatattva.

[2] समानकर्मणां नामधेयप्रतिलम्भमेकेषां नैकेषां यथा तक्षा परिव्राजको जीवनो भूमिज इति ।—Nirukta, I. 14.

[3] तक्षन् कश्चित् तक्षेत्युच्यते । अन्यस्तक्षन्नपि न तक्षेत्युच्यते ।—Durga

[4] The word *jīvana* is also used as a synonym of air and water. *Cf.* 'जीवनं वनम् ।—Amara. 'त्वं जीवितं त्वमसि मे हृदयं द्वितीयम्' is only a figurative use of the word.

everything that gives life or vitality to an organism; and all that grows in the earth could not merit the designation *bhūmija* excepting trees and the planet *Mars*.[1]

All treatises on science have employed a number of words with restricted sense.[2] While the word *dhātu* is used by the grammarian in the sense of verbal root, the science of medicine has taken it for the 'vital elements of the body.' *Vigraha* has one meaning in grammar (analysis of a compound), another in political science (warfare) and a third one (form or figure) to the worshipper of idols. Similarly, *sandhi* means one thing in grammar (euphonic combination of letters) and another in politics (treaty). *Lakṣaṇa* which ordinarily means a sign or a symbol has been restricted to 'definition' or description by the philosopher;[3]

[1] जीवन इक्षुरसः शाकजातिर्वा। भूमिजोऽङ्गारको वृक्षो वा—Durga.

[2] 'Each profession, each state, each class of life contributes to this contraction of words, which is one of the most instructive sides of Semantics.'—Semantics, p. 109.

'Each craft, each industry has its own store of technical words.'—Sayce: The Science of Language, Vol. I, p. 340.

[3] विविधा चास्य शास्त्रस्य प्रवृत्तिः—उद्देशो लक्षणं परीक्षा चेति।—

Vātsyāyana-Bhāṣya.

Pāṇini has more than once used *lakṣaṇa* as denoting a particular sign. *Cf.* लक्षणेनाभिप्रती आभिमुख्ये (Pāṇ., 2.1.14) and लक्षणेत्थंभूताख्यानभागवीप्सासु प्रतिपर्यनवः (Pāṇ., 1.4.90). Patañjali has

parīkṣā is no longer 'observation,' but has come to denote 'an act of examination.' Restriction of meaning has been a sign of cultural advance. To restrict a word to a particular meaning is a method that was much favoured by philosophers and grammarians.

The vaiśeṣikas and the Naiyāyikas have put a restricted sense (convention) into the word *samaya*[1] which ordinarily means 'time.' *Yoga* means generally 'union,' but the word was really used in a contracted sense when it was made to signify only 'the conjunction of the soul with the Supreme Being' or 'restraining of the mental functions.'[2] The term *vyākaraṇa*,[3] no longer signifies only the act of analysing, but used more as the name of a particular branch of science (grammar) which is based on

employed the word as a synonym of 'the rule of grammar' (शब्दो लक्ष्यं सूत्रं लक्षणम् under Vār. 'लक्ष्यलक्षणे व्याकरणम्' and न लक्षणेन पदकारा अनुवर्त्याः).

[1] The word etymologically means a thing that is always in motion (*sam+aya*, to go). As an analogous term with *samiti*, it also signifies a 'gathering' or an assembly of people. A resolution passed by a meeting or a contract is also called *sàmaya*.

[2] योगश्चित्तवृत्तिनिरोधः—Yoga-sūtra, I. 2. 'तां योगमिति मन्यन्ते स्थिरामिन्द्रियधारणाम्'—Kaṭha, II. 6. 11.

[3] In the Vedāntic language the expression is often used in the sense of 'analysis.'

Cf. 'नामरूपे व्याकरवाणि' (Chānd., VI. 3. 2) and 'किं जीवकर्तृकमेवेदं नामरूपव्याकरणम्' (Saṅkara under Ved., 2. 4. 20).

an analytical method. The meanings which the Indian grammarians have assigned to the terms *prakṛti*,[1] *pratyaya* (inflection), *guṇa*,[2] *vṛddhi*,[3] etc., will give one a clear idea of the extent to which restriction of sense may proceed. *Karaṇa*, which is the name of a particular case in grammar (the instrumental case), is generally used to denote sense-organs[4] (*cf.* *antaḥkaraṇa*). *Maryādā* (exclusion) and *abhividhi* (inclusion) have also acquired special meanings in grammar (Pāṇ., 2. 1. 13).

Compound words in certain cases present also instances of restriction. When two words join together in a compound, they are sometimes restricted in their meanings. *Kṛṣṇa-sarpa* does not necessarily mean a 'black serpent,' but only a highly poisonous cobra, no matter what may be its complexion. *Anuśāsana* means a royal command or instruction, but the moment it forms a compound with *śabda*, as in *śabdānuśāsana*,[5] the expression becomes an epithet of the science of grammar.

Manaḥ-śilā (red arsenic) is a compound in which the meaning of the first word has

[1] Nouns and roots and not the *primordial matter* of the Sāṃkhya system.

[2] Pāṇ., 1. 1. 2. [3] *Op. cit.* 1. 1. 1.

[4] 'सन्देशार्थाः क्व पटुकरणैः प्राणिभिः प्रापणीयाः' ।—Meghadūta.

[5] Patañjali has used this expression as a significant equivalent of *vyākaraṇa*.

entirely disappeared. In a figurative compound like *manoratha* (the chariot of the mind) which means 'desire,' the last word seems to have become meaningless to all appearance. The word *mahat* (great) has changed the meaning of a number of compounds: *mahāyātrā* means the 'last journey' (death); *mahānidrā* is the last sleep that knows no awakening (death). Words like *vyāghra* (tiger), *siṃha* (lion) and *puṅgava*, etc., denote 'the best of a kind,' and not particularly those animals, when used as the last members of compounds (*upamita-samāsa*).[1] *Puruṣa-vyāghra* means 'the most powerful among persons' and *nṛsoma* 'the most popular among men' and so on.

There are some words which have either partly or wholly lost the signification which they possessed in the beginning. A close examination will show that both eradication and deterioration of meanings have taken place in the body of a language.[2] While in the Vedic

[1] स्युरुत्तरपदे व्याघ्रपुंगवर्षभकुञ्जराः ।
सिंहशार्दूलनागाद्याः पुंसि श्रेष्ठार्थवाचकाः ॥—Amarakośa.

[2] It is not only meaning but some words too have been totally lost. *Cf.* सन्ति वै शब्दा अप्रयुक्ताः तद्यथा ऊष, तेर, चक्र, पेचेति ।—Mahābhāṣya, 1. 1. 1. In ancient Sanskrit works we come across many words which are no longer used. *Ahura* or *abhura* (air or fire of the stomach), *anardhuka* (not productive of wealth), *ambarīṣa* (a pan for

language the particle *na* is found to possess a double meaning of *negation* and *similarity*, the former has curiously been lost in later Sanskrit.[1] The particles, like inflections, are illustrations of words that have suffered loss of signification. Yāska has particularly mentioned four particles, namely, *kam*, *īm*, *it* and *u*, which have become entirely meaningless.[2] But there was evidently a period in the history of language when these particles were as good as significant words and consequently capable of independent uses.

While dealing with the deviation and loss of meaning, we cannot afford to ignore the fact as to how some words have undergone deterioration in later Sanskrit in respect of their significations. The use of the word *ātman* will give us a clear idea of the degradation of meaning.[3] It is quite manifest from the Vedic literature that the word in question was used to mean exclusively soul or All-pervading supreme Soul.

frying wheat), as they occur in Gobhila's Gṛhyasūtra (2. 10. 29 and 1. 1. 15), have lost their applications altogether.

[1] नेति प्रतिषेधार्थीयो भाषायामुभयमन्वध्यायम्—Nirukta, I. 4.

[2] मिताक्षरेष्वनर्थकाः कामीमिद्विति—*op. cit.*, I. 9.

[3] 'Here we see the inevitable results of a false delicacy ; honourable names are dishonoured by being given to things which are dishonourable.'—
Semantics, p. 101.

But when one turns to the pages of a Sanskrit dictionary, he will find to his great astonishment that the word has been put as synonymous with the body and conduct.[1] The expression *jaghanyātmā*, for instance, is used to mean a person of contemptible character. *Puruṣa* has now come to mean a person only. But the *ṛṣis* of the Upaniṣads found in it a sublime meaning, *i.e.*, 'one that lies in a subtle body' or the Highest Being.[2] The word *dharma*, as used to denote 'property of a thing,' seems to have been deprived of its original meaning which has a more lofty connotation to the Hindus.[3] A slight deviation of sense is perceptible when the word *kṛpaṇa* is used to signify a miser instead of a poor or helpless person. The use of the words *bhūta*[4] and *preta*[5] in the contemptuous sense of 'ghost'

[1] आत्मा देहे धृतौ जीवे स्वभावे परमात्मनि ।—Amarakośa.

[2] परात्परं पुरिशयं पुरुषमीक्षते ।—Praśnopaniṣad, V. 5.

अङ्गुष्ठमात्रः पुरुषोऽन्तरात्मा सदा जनानां हृदये सन्निविष्टः ।—

Kaṭhopaniṣad, II. 6. 17.

पुरुषान्न परं किंचित् सा काष्ठा सा परा गतिः ।—*op. cit.* I. 3. 11.

[3] The English equivalents, namely, religion or virtue, are far from being sufficient to bring out the exact connotation of *dharma* as conceived by the Hindus.

[4] *Bhūta* means 'elements,' as five great elements are called in Sanskrit *pañca mahābhūtāni*.

[5] A departed soul is called *preta*, *i.e.*, one that has left the mortal frame and assumed an astral body. The

is a remarkable instance of the degradation of meaning. It is popular superstition that is responsible for such abject transformation of sense. *Ghṛṇā* is now more used in the sense of 'disgust' than in that of 'compassion.'

Of all the forces that operate in the formation of a language, analogy and metaphor seem to have been the most conspicuous by virtue of their weighty influence upon both forms and meanings of words.[1] Analogy is what gives rise to new forms and significations in all languages. But what one should particularly remember is that analogies are not always accurate; they are often results of wrong imitation or false observation.

To give an instance of analogy, we may say that *grāma*, *jana*, *bandhu*, *sahāya* and *gaja* take the affix *tal*, though in a different sense altogether (*grāmatā*=a collection of villages;

region in which such disembodied souls live is known as *pretaloka* (*cf.* येयं प्रेते विचिकित्सा मनुष्ये—Kaṭhopaniṣad, 1. 1. 20). *Pretas* or *pitṛs* do not really deserve our contempt, but they have been eulogised by ancient seers as commanding our respect and worship.

[1] 'Analogy must therefore be regarded as a primordial condition of all Language.'—Semantics, p. 77.

The three principles of linguistic change, imitation, emphasis and laziness, are incessently at work on the meanings as well as upon the sounds of words.'—Sayce: The Science of Language, Vol. I, p. 238.

janatā=an assembly of people, etc.), *i.e.*, collection,[1] by the force of analogy with the same suffix (*tal*) which is generally used to denote *bhāva* [2] or the state or quality of something (*e.g.*, *kāraṇatā* means the state of being a cause)

The word *ambara* means 'sky.' But when a man first spoke of a piece of cloth as *ambara*, he undoubtedly made use of an analogy, being actuated to do the same on account of the similarity of the sky with a vast sheet of cloth spread all around.[3] *Kūṭa* means 'the peak of a mountain' or an anvil, but the term *kūṭastha*,[4] as applied to Consciousness or Brahman, signifies 'motionless' or 'extremely subtle' by the same principle. Śaṅkara has recorded an example of analogy. The word *jyotiḥ*, he observes, though usually restricted to fire by popular usage, is sometimes used to signify 'sacrifice' for the sake of nothing but its supposed similarity with the former.[5] The use

1 ग्रामजनबन्धुभ्यस्तल्—Pāṇ., 4. 2. 43.

2 तस्यभावस्त्वतलौ—*Op. cit.* 5. 1. 119.

3 *Digambara*, which has now come to mean 'naked,' is an epithet of Śiva, *i.e.*, a deity who has four quarters for his clothing. The goddess Kālī is also called *Digambarī*. *Pītāmbara*, as is well-known, is one of the many epithets of the Lord Kṛṣṇa.

4 The word is often found in the Ūpaniṣads and allied literature.

5 ज्योतिःशब्दोऽपि लौकिकेन प्रयोगेण ज्वलन एव रूढः, अर्थवादकल्पितेन तु ज्वलनसाम्येन क्रतौ प्रवृत्त इति—Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya under Brahma-sūtra, 1. 1. 7.

of the word *darśana* in the sense of 'philosophy'[1] has its origin in an analogy which the so-called philosophical or metaphysical outlook bears to the 'eyes' by way of allowing men to get an insight into the ultimate reality of things. The Śaiva philosophy of Kashmir has been sometimes styled *Śaivadṛṣṭi*.

In the Vedas words as *parvata*, *adri*, *gotra*, *giri*, *grāvan*, etc. (all denoting mountains), are sometimes used in the sense of 'clouds,' and the author of the Nighaṇṭu has treated them as if they were synonyms of the same.[2] In order to justify this obvious anomaly one is to take notice of the extreme height of the mountains the lofty peaks of which pierce through the region of clouds.[3] Śiva is called *sthāṇu*

[1] The word *darśana* in this special or technical sense cannot be traced to the early Vedic literature. It is often used to signify 'knowledge' or spiritual vision. Kaṇāda has spoken of twofold knowledge, namely, *ārṣajñāna* (the intuitive knowledge of the *ṛṣis*) and *siddhadarśana*, the latter refers to the vision as is revealed to the saint (Vai. sūtra, IX. 2. 13). The words *prajñā* and *jñāna* often form suitable compounds with *cakṣu* and *netra* (*cf.* *prajñā-cakṣu*, *jñāna-netra*) so as to denote 'inward vision.' *Cf.* यन्नेत्र: प्रतिभात्मायं भेदरूप: प्रतीयते' ।—Vākyapadīya, 1. 119.

[2] All these are included in the list of words denoting clouds.

[3] An analogy between mountains (Himalaya) and clouds in point of loftiness has been clearly shown by Kālidāsa. *Cf.* 'बलाहकच्छेदविभक्तरागाम्' and 'आमेखलं संचरतां

probably from His likeness to a *post* (Lat. *positum*=what is fixed). The idea underlying this analogy is that the Lord looks like a motionless post or pillar while He remains absorbed in deep meditation.

Like analogy, metaphor has also played a considerable part in so far as the change or transference of meaning is concerned.[1] Similarity or likeness lies at the bottom of all metaphorical use of words, and consequently metaphors are largely to be found in the works of poets. It is a fact attested by common experience that a name properly applicable to one thing is sometimes transferred to another on account of its likeness to it in some respects.[2] In the primitive stage of language people had to represent, in the absence of adequate terms, abstract ideas by means of

घनानां छायामधः सानुगतां निषेव्य '—Kumārasambhava, I. 4-5. Mallinātha has explained it in the following terms: एतेनाद्रेरभ्रंकषत्वं गम्यते and अतिमेघमण्डलमस्यौन्नत्यमिति।

[1] 'Then, secondly, there is metaphor with its ceaseless play upon speech. Language is the store-house of worn-out similes, a living testimony to the instinct of man to find likeness and resemblance in all he sees.'—Sayce: The Science of Language, Vol. I, p. 340.

'The vocabulary of a language on its significant side grows by metaphor and analogy.'—*op. cit.*

[2] 'Metaphor changes the meaning of words and creates new expressions on the spur of the moment.'—Semantics, p. 122.

metaphor. Things that are similar with one another are apt to be designated by the same name. Poetical fancy has lent much colour to the transference of meaning. By the expression *netraiḥ papuḥ* (Raghu, 2. 73) Kālidāsa has endowed the visual organs with the function or power of drinking.[1] In *kaṭu vacanam* (bitter words), *madhurā vāk* (sweet speech) one will find metaphorical transference of ideas.[2] Such a practice is more clearly visible in the poetic language. It was almost a fashion (poetic convention) with the Indian poets to speak of the sky and sin as black, fame and smile as white, and anger and love as red.[3] *Andhaṃ tamaḥ*[4] (blind darkness) and *andha-kūpaḥ* (a blind well), etc., are instances how epithets or adjectives properly applicable to sentient beings are figuratively transferred to inanimate objects. The rising sun is called *bālārka*, as if it has an infantile stage like men. The setting sun is often compared with the last days of a man's life. The Gītā has made use of a beautiful metaphor when it applied the term *kṣetra* to the

[1] This is to transport the function of seeing into the domain of drinking.

[2] Similar English expressions are as follows: 'a warm reception,' 'a blind lane' 'a bitter reproach,' etc.

[3] मालिन्यं व्योम्नि पापे यशसि धवलता वर्ण्यते हासकीर्त्योः। रक्तौ च क्रोधरागौ—Sāhityadarpaṇa, 6.

[4] असूर्या नाम ते लोका अन्धेन तमसावृताः।—Īśopaniṣad, 3.

body.[1] The word *dvāra* means a 'door,' but the expression *bhavitavyānāṃ dvārāṇi*[2] (means of attaining the future or what is in store) is really a figurative use. *Varṣā-prabhāta* is used to denote 'the end of rainy season,' though the word *prabhāta* means really 'the dawn of the day.' A dice is called *durodara* (possessing an injurious belly) since it brings about ruin on the gambler.

Words with more than one meaning are numerous in Sanskrit.[3] A mere glance into a Sanskrit dictionary, specially *Nānārtha-kośa*, will convince one how a single word may have more than a dozen of meanings in some cases. Words like *go* and *hari*[4] are best examples of multiplicity of meanings. If the plurality of meanings is considered to be a sign of civilisation, Sanskrit may reasonably claim to have been the language of a highly cultured people whose range of intellectual pursuit is almost proverbial.

Dhāman means both light and abode; *dhātu* belongs to medical science (vital element—*tridhātu*) as well as to the science

[1] इदं शरीरं कौन्तेय क्षेत्रमित्यभिधीयते ।—Gītā.

[2] Śakuntalā 1.

[3] नानार्थाः केऽपि कांतादिवर्गेष्वेवात्र कीर्त्तिताः ।—Amarakośa.

[4] यमानिलेन्द्रचन्द्रार्कविष्णुसिंहांशुवाजिषु ।
शुकाहिकपिभेकेषु हरिर्ना कपिले त्रिषु ॥—Amarakośa.

of grammar (grammatical roots); and *aṅka* has its application in mathematics, theatre and painting. *Sūtra* has a twofold meaning of thread and aphorism. *Jaivātṛka* means both man and the moon. The word *rasa* has got manifold meanings (*mercury* in medical science, *sentiment* in *poetics* and so on). *Upacāra*[1] has a double meaning: it means 'necessaries of worship' in religious rites and 'transference of epithet' in the science of poetry.

There are also words which have two opposite meanings; as, for instance, *ārāt* means 'proximity' as well as 'distance.'[2] *Puṣpavanta* signifies at the same time both the sun and the moon.[3] Words that are otherwise synonymous also exhibit considerable difference of sense.

In ordinary parlance no difference is made between *sukha* and *ānanda*, but in philosophical language they have distinct meanings: the former is used to denote material or gross pleasure and the latter signifies sublime or spiritual bliss.[4] *Vināyaka* has been an epithet of Gaṇeśa, Buddha and Garuḍa (the leader

[1] The word *bhākta*, which comes from *bhakta* or *bhakti* (meaning 'boiled rice' and 'division' respectively) is also used in the sense of 'transferred or secondary sense' (*lākṣaṇika*).

[2] आराद्दूरसमीपयोः—Amarakośa.

[3] एकयोक्त्या पुष्पवन्तौ दिवाकरनिशाकरौ ।

[4] One is not allowed to replace *brahmānanda* by *brahmasukha*.

of birds) ;[1] *pataṅga* means both 'bird' and the 'sun',[2] and *mitra* both 'friend' and the 'sun.'[3]

The world would have been a phenomenon of bewildering complexity but for the contrivance of names and forms. It seems to have been the foremost duty on the part of God—who created all—to reduce this complexity to simplicity by giving each object a distinct name and form (*nāmarūpe vyākarot*). Unless there were such distinguishing symbols or labels as names, says Bhartṛhari, the world would have ever remained an unnameable and indiscernible mass.[4] We need not trouble ourselves with the authorship of these two invaluable devices. The question that naturally suggests itself is: how names were given to things and in so doing what facts were actually taken into consideration? Yāska,[5] as we have already stated, holds that names (*saṃjñā*) are given by words and not by gestures or physical signs, because the use of words represents the easiest possible means for securing freedom from doubts and accuracy at the same time. These artifices are of great help to us in making

[1] सुगते च विनायकः—Amarakośa.

[2] पतङ्गौ पक्षिसूर्य्यौ च—*op. cit.*

[3] मित्रोरवावपि—*op. cit.*

[4] तदुत्क्रान्तौ विसंज्ञोऽयं दृश्यते काष्ठकुड्यवत्।—Vākyapadīya, 1.128.

[5] अणीयस्त्वाच्च शब्देन संज्ञाकरणं व्यवहारार्थं लोके।—Nirukta, I. 2.

division and classification of objects. Things that look similar in appearance are distinguished from one another by means of their respective names.[1] A name by which a thing is known is not only a conventional artifice of human society, but has its exact counterpart deeply engraved in the mind. A *saṃjñā* or name has a double form,[2] namely, internal (*antaḥ-saṃjñā*) and external (*bahiḥ-saṃjñā*); the former is related to internal consciousness and the latter to popular usages. *Antaḥ-saṃjñā* which manifests itself in the sensation of pleasure or pain is just proportionate to the range and activity of *vāk*.[3]

It is really difficult to say what precisely counts much in giving a name to a thing. The intention of the speaker is no doubt the prime factor. A thing gets its particular name from the idea or sensation it evokes in the mind. Objects, speaking generally, acquired their respective names either by virtue of their inherent properties and outstanding actions which readily appeal to the imagination of man,

[1] तद्वशादभिनिष्पत्तौ सर्वं वस्तु विभज्यते ।—Vākyapadīya, 1. 126.
अभिनिष्पन्नवस्तूनां समानाकाराणां विभागोऽपि व्याकृत एवेत्यर्थः—
Puṇyarāja.

[2] सैषा संसारिणां संज्ञा बहिरन्तश्च वर्त्तते ।
तन्मात्रामव्यतिक्रान्तं चैतन्यं सर्वजन्तुषु—Vākyapadīya, 1. 127.

[3] सुखदुःखसंविन्मात्ररूपान्तःसंज्ञापि यावद्वाग्रूपतानुवृत्तिस्तावदेव भवति । बहिःसंज्ञा लोकव्यवहारः सोऽपि वागधीन एव—Puṇyarāja.

or on account of the special purposes they serve. An object may be a substratum of innumerable qualities ; it may serve more than one purpose and differently knock at the door of our knowledge from time to time. But the name of a thing can hardly be so framed as to express all that one knows about it. It has been justly remarked that 'things are designated in an incomplete and inaccurate manner.'[1] How insufficient is the name *himāṃśu*, meaning etymologically 'one possessing cold rays,' to connote all that is suggested by the moon ? A name, so to speak, suggests only one of the many aspects which a thing possesses, or gives prominence to one of its manifold qualities.[2] Similarly,

[1] 'One conclusion is to be drawn from all that has gone before: it is an undoubted fact that Language designates things in an incomplete and inaccurate manner. *Incomplete*: since we have not exhausted all that can be said of the sun when we have declared it to be shining, or of the horse when we say that it trots. *Inaccurate*: since we cannot say of the sun that it shines when it has set or of the horse that it trots when it is at rest, or when wounded or dead.'—Semantics, p. 170.

We cannot strictly call a cow *gauḥ* (*i.e.*, one that moves) when it is lying down (*cf.* व्युत्पत्तिलभ्यस्य मुख्यार्थत्वे 'गौः शेते' इत्यत्रापि लक्षणा स्यात्।' 'गमेर्डोः' इति गम्धातोर्डोप्रत्ययेन व्युत्पादितस्य गोशब्दस्य शयनकालेऽपि प्रयोगात्—Sāhityadarpaṇa, 2).

[2] 'But if I take a real entity, an object existing in nature, it will be impossible for language to introduce into the word all the ideas which this entity or object awakens in the mind.'—Semantics, p. 171.

sūrya, as a name of the sun-god, implies only the idea of *shining* and does not bring out other qualities that are also associated with the sun. This conspicuous act of shining won for the sun in later times a good many names, such as *prabhākara*, *vibhākara*, *vibhāvasu*, *aṃśumān*, etc.

It is not necessarily the most conspicuous feature of a thing that is always taken into account in giving a name to it. A careful study of several names will make it clear that what determines the designation of an object has been very often the feature which first strikes the attention of a man. Tracing the history of certain names, we might even say that the principle of naming rests upon the observation of some aspects, no matter whether they are essential or only accidental. The name *vṛkṣa*, for instance, which appears to be the oldest one among its synonyms, originated from the idea of *cutting*, probably due to the fact that trees were cut down for no other purposes than fuel in the most primitive stage of human society. But names as *pādapa* and *mahīruha*, which betray some knowledge of the botanical science, are considered to be of comparatively modern growth. A tree is called *śākhī* and *druma* from the fact of its possessing branches; *taru* from the idea of giving shelter, and *anokaha* from that of obstructing the passage of cars.

What was the idea that arose in the mind of a man when he first happened to gaze upon the profound ocean? 'A vast sheet of water' was probably the impression he received at the first sight; and consequently he called it by various names (*arṇava, abdhi, udanvān, udadhi,* etc.) denoting the same idea. When he was gradually aware of its limitless expanse, he gave it such names as *akūpāra,*[1] *pārāvāra,* etc.[2] The name *ratnākara* gives an indication of man's more advanced knowledge of the sea 'as being the abode of jewels.' A thing thus begins to acquire more and more designations along with the advance of knowledge. In the multiplicity of names of a thing one can discern different gradations of knowledge—different stages in the unfolding of human mind. But literature has not carefully registered records in all cases for our guidance.

[1] समुद्रोऽप्यकूपार उच्यते अकूपारो भवति महापारः—Nirukta, IV. 18.

[2] The sea is called *samudra* from the fact of its bearing *mudrā* or seal. Yāska has derived it thus: समुद्रः कस्मात् समुद्द्रवन्त्यस्मादापः समभिद्रवन्त्येनमापः—Nirukta, II. 10. For the name *sāgara* we must look to the mythological account (*sāgara* is so called because it is believed to have been excavated by the sons of Sagara).

Cf. 'गुरोर्यियक्षोः कपिलेन मेध्ये रसातलं संक्रमिते तुरङ्गे ।
तदर्थमुर्वीमवदारयद्भिः पूर्वैः किलायं परिवर्धितो नः ॥'

Raghu, 13. 3.

It is sufficiently clear that the principles on which objects received their respective names were far from being perfect and exhaustive. When a thing is entitled to a name on account of its particular function or characteristic feature, the name so given depends for its currency and popularity on the unanimous acceptance of the whole society. But when it is once generally accepted, it becomes almost impossible to transfer this designation to other objects, even if they are found to exhibit the same feature or property. This is why all that moves is not designated *go*; all that shines as *sūrya*; all that excites pleasurable sensation as *candra*; and all that grows in mud is not called *paṅkaja*.

Yāska has given us some valuable information as to how names are given to things. As this problem has already been dealt with in a previous chapter, we have very little to add here. A thing, according to Yāska, gets its particular designation from a *particular* action (*kriyā*).[1] A conclusion like this was arrived at from the conviction that all names are derivable from verbal roots (which mean 'action'), *i.e.*, every name might be traced back to some sort of action. But what deserves particular attention in this respect is as follows: though the same action is performed.

[1] Nirukta, I. 12-14.

by a good many people or objects, it does not necessarily follow that all of them should have the same designation, *e.g.*, all who cut wood are not called carpenter (*takṣā*); everything that pricks is not *tṛṇa*; all that trots is not a horse; and all who wander about is not called *parivrājaka.*[1] Again, a thing, inspite of its association with more than one action, usually receives its popular designation by virtue of one action only: a post (*sthūṇā*) is not often called *daraśayā* even when it lies in a cavity, and *sañjanī* when a piece of bamboo is attached to it.

A minute investigation of linguistic phenomena will go to show that every name, as given to a thing, has a history behind it, though it is not always within our reach to trace the actual psychological operations which secured for those objects their respective names. Grammatical analysis and etymological interpretations may sometimes serve as the most scientific instruments whereby one can get some clue as to the real origin and signification of words. But we are sometimes disappointed and deluded too when we look upon such interpretations as the only means of getting into the real history of names. It is evident

[1] It is quite manifest that Yāska has here indirectly referred to what we have just explained as the Law of Specialisation.

that when a thing gets many names, a chronological order, is clearly visible in them. The names *śaśadhara* and *abja*, as given to the moon, and *pādapa* and *mahīruha*, as denotative of tree, do not chronologically belong to the same period of history in which *candra* (or *soma*) and *vṛkṣa* were respectively more frequently used. As man advanced in civilisation and became more and more familiar with the properties and characteristics of material bodies, new names suggestive of more accurate knowledge of nature were given to things.

Mythology and superstition have played an important part in multiplying the names of objects. The names *mṛgāṅka*, *śaśadhara* and *śaśalāñchana*, as assigned to the moon, have their origin in a superstitious belief that the black spots faintly observable in the planet are the figures of fawns lying on its lap.[1]

[1] Śrīharṣa has given a very beautiful poetical interpretation of these spots :—

'यदस्य यात्रासु बलोद्धतं रजः
स्फुरत्प्रतापानलधूममञ्जिम ।
तदेव गत्वा पतितं सुधाम्बुधौ
दधाति पङ्कीभवदङ्कतां विधौ ॥'—Naiṣadha, I. 8.

Kumudabāndhava (a friend of the lotus), as a name of the moon, is only figurative. Popular tradition has turned the moon into a 'sea of nectar' (*sudhānidhi*). It is also supposed to consist of 16 *kalās* (digits) and consequently called *Kalānidhi*.

From the popular legend which speaks of the chariot of the sun being drawn by seven horses, the sun got the name of *saptāśvavāhana.* For the history of such names as *abja*[1] (growing in water) and *kṣīrābdhitanayā* (daughter of the ocean), we must look back to the ancient legend of 'sea-churning' which narrates the evolution of the moon and the Goddess of wealth from the primordial sea. *Makaradhvaja* (a god with a banner wherein the figure of a dolphin is engraved) and *puṣpadhanvā* (a god with a bow made of flowers), as names of the god of love (*kāmadeva*), might be traced back to similar myths or folk-lores. Shadow (*chāyā*) is called *sūryapriyā*[2] (the beloved of the sun) from the legendary account of her being the wife of the Sun-God.[3]

The history of proper names is a very interesting study in Sanskrit. So far as the process of naming is concerned, there is but little difference between what we are accustomed to call proper and common names. A proper name may become a common name and *vice versa.* All names have some amount of

[1] *Abja* means 'lotus,' 'conch' and the 'moon.' अब्जौ शंखशशाङ्कौ च—Amarakośa.

[2] छाया सूर्यप्रिया कान्तिः प्रतिबिम्बमनातपः —Amarakośa.

[3] *Śanaiścara* (Saturn), so-called for its slow movement, is said to have been born of Chāyā.

signification attached to them; and what we call proper names are not entirely devoid of sense. We cannot fully subscribe to the conclusion of Mill that proper names are denotative but non-connotative. The observation of Mr. Johnson is worthy of attention. 'This does not,' says Johnson, 'amount to saying that the proper name is non-significant or has no meaning.' One who is familiar with the etymological interpretations of the Nirukta[1] will not wholly agree with the bold statement that 'the etymological sense of proper names is of no avail at all.' We do not contradict that etymological meanings, derivable from most of the proper names, are not found to be such as would suggest any precise and accurate idea of the individuals so named. The majority of proper names is more or less whimsical and has no real correspondence with persons or things it designates. But such is not exactly the case with some *paurāṇika* or legendary names which by grammatical analysis give us regular sense, *i. e.*, sense that suggests the person to a considerable extent.

Most of the proper names occurring in the Mahābhārata and the Rāmāyaṇa seem to be

[1] Yāska has given etymological meanings of proper names. *cf.* शन्तनुः शंतनोऽस्त्विति वा शमस्मै तन्वा अस्त्विति वा—Nirukta, II. 12. विश्वामित्रः सर्वमित्रः—*op. cit.*, II. 24. च्यवन ऋषिर्भवति च्यावयिता स्तोमानाम्—*op. cit.* IV. 19.

impregnated with sense. Vaśiṣṭha, for example, got his name probably from his natural 'control over desires or passions'; Viśvāmitra, as Yāska has interpreted, was so called because 'he was regarded as the 'friend of the world' and so on. The history of the name Māndhātā is also recorded in the Purāṇas (this designation being due to his saying *ko māṃ dhāsyatīti* (who will allow me to suck her breast ?).

Proper names such as Śūrpaṇakhā (a female with finger-nails as big as a winnowing fan), Kumbhakarṇa (one with ears as large as jars), Śatrughna (a destroyer of enemies), Bhīṣma and Bhīma (the dreadful) and Paraśurāma (one who amuses himself with an axe), etc., are really significant and suggestive of the persons they stand for. Does not the name Yudhiṣṭhira, as the designation of the eldest Pāṇḍava, really correspond with his characteristic calmness and placidity even in the midst of warfares ? The names Duryodhana and Duḥśāsana are really significant in characterising the persons they signify.[1] Names like Yajñadatta and Devadatta are also supposed to be not without signification.[2]

[1] But it is difficult to surmise that the parents (Dhṛtarāṣṭra and Gāndhārī) could foresee in the moment of baptising that those two sons would turn out respectively 'difficult to struggle with' and 'ungovernable.'

[2] 'One given to sacrifice' and 'one consecrated to the gods.'

There are certain proper names which should be explained with reference to the lineage, *e.g.*, Kaurava, Yādava, Kākutstha, Rāghava, etc. In ancient India people were sometimes called by patronymic names and sometimes by their matronymic names. Saubhadreya, Aitareya, Rādheya, Āditeya, Gāṅgeya, Vainateya, Pārtha, Mādreya, etc., are matronymic, while names such as Dāśarathi, Jāmadagnya, Vāsudeva, Dhārttarāṣṭra, etc., are patronymic.

CHAPTER XIII

Logic and Language

The logical background of language—mental process and the principles of grammar—syntax—the order of words and the process of thinking—position of the substantive and of the attributive —Sanskrit has no hard-and-fast rules for the arrangement of words—the principle of correlation and its violation —*anvaya* and logical analysis of a proposition—*samāsa*—combination of two concepts—logical basis of classifying *samāsas* —difference between *samāsa* and *vigraha*—meaning of a compound—*sāmarthya* as *ekārthī-bhāva* and *vyapekṣā*— additional signification of a compound—grammatical gender and preponderance of popular usages—no importance of sex-consideration—Patañjali and physiological explanation— Kaiyaṭa's observation on neuter gender—linguistic side of the problem—Logic and Grammar.

In the foregoing chapter we tried to show how words change their meanings in accordance with some intellectual laws. It is found that a word exhibits a mental stage or process at every stage of its meaning-shifting. What has been termed as 'the tendencies of words' is in reality the tendency of the human mind.

As 'the living expression of the mind and spirit of a people,' language is said to have its Logic and Metaphysics. But we must admit at the outset that these terms are somewhat loosely used in relation to the internal framework of language. While using such expressions as 'the Logic of language' and 'the Metaphysics of language' one should be sufficiently cautious not to confound them with

the sciences proper. Logic, or more properly, formal Logic, is organically connected with language: both are concerned with formal consistency or correctness, but not so much with the material validity of thought. No one can question the linguistic correctness of an expression like 'a mountain of gold,' although the existence of a golden mountain is a matter of doubt to one and all.[1] Language has its peculiar logic, that is to say, it follows a number of principles or axiomatic truths (as one will find in the rules of grammar), which have a semblance of logical fundamentals. The logical background of language may be briefly stated as follows: (*i*) a verb should always agree with the subject in number and person; (*ii*) an adjective should have coincidence with the noun it qualifies in respect of number, gender and case-ending;[2] (*iii*) a pronoun should not be allowed to precede a noun; (*iv*) the *vigraha* (the sentence in which a compound is dissolved) should be so constructed as to bring

[1] Sumeru is supposed to be a fabulous mountain of gold, and consequently called *hemādri* in the Purāṇas.

[2] विशेष्यविशेषणयोरेका विभक्तिः समलिङ्गता च।
गुणवचनानां शब्दानामाश्रयतो लिङ्गवचनानि भवन्तीति॥

—Mahābhāṣya under Pāṇ., 1.2.52.

But there are words like *pramāṇa* and *pradhāna* which, though used as predicate (*vidheya*), do not correspond with the subject in number and gender. *Cf.* 'वेदाः प्रमाणम्' and 'प्रधानं पुरुषः.' Hence runs the dictum—'उद्देश्यविधेयभावे तु लिङ्गानां नास्ति तन्त्रता.'

out the full import of a compound ;[1] and (*v*) two negatives make the sense affirmative and so on.[2]

Though the science of grammar is more closely connected with the formal than with the logical aspect of speech, there are yet some principles of grammar which evidently show clear adhesion to mental processes and

[1] A reverse of the case is not, however, obligatory, *i.e.*, it is not binding upon a compound that it should express all that is signified by the sentence in which it might be dissolved.

Cf. 'विग्रह एव समासलभ्यार्थस्य बोधकत्वं तन्त्र' न तु समासे विग्रहार्थस्य'।

—Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā, 32.

[3] द्वौ नञौ प्रकृत्यर्थं गमयतः। 'He is not unwell' is equivalent to 'he is well.' It is not impossible to turn a negative proposition into a positive one and *vice versâ*. The word *andha* (blind) means 'a person who cannot see,' or, in logical language, 'a person qualified by the absence or destitution of the power of seeing,' though there is no negative element in the term at all. It has been observed by Raphael Demos that 'every case of knowledge expressed through a negative proposition was in reality of a positive nature.' A negative statement is not absolutely negation of facts, but it sometimes becomes a clear sign of affirmation. The proposition of the atheist that 'there is no God' has been treated by the theist as an evidence in itself as to the existence of God. In the grammatical analysis of a proposition negation or negative particle (*na*) does not come first to be construed. This is why we have ablative case in both *vṛkṣāt parṇaṃ patati* (a leaf is falling from the tree) and *vṛkṣāt parṇaṃ na patati*, though in the latter what is meant is only a negation of separation (*viśleṣa*).

consistency of a logical nature. 'Every grammatical category, says H. Sweet, 'is or ought to be the expression of some logical category.' The process whereby *samāsas* are formed in Sanskrit will serve to show how the mind unites two coherent concepts together. The systematic precedence of the attributive to the substantive is suggestive of how the mind often distinguishes or characterises an individual belonging to a class by some special features or qualities which it possesses. The rules of grammar, with some reservation, may be interpreted as based upon the principles of thinking. The so-called *paribhāṣās* or grammatical generalisations also rest upon principles of popular experience.

Syntax or the rules regarding the order of words in a sentence is a phenomenon of language where the mental process of thinking has its counterpart With regard to the arrangement of words in a sentence, a certain fixity of order is generally observed for the sake of rendering one's thought intelligible to others. This is by some called 'Logical order.' Almost every language has its peculiar order of construction. The position of words in a sentence has much to do with its import. There are, in fact, some languages in which the sense is so much dependent on the particular order of words that one cannot alter the position

of words without altering the sense.[1] Chinese is a language 'in which the rules of construction alone constitute almost the entire grammar.' Grammar has been dependent on the mode of construction to a considerable extent. Though most of the languages observe a certain fixity of construction, it is very difficult to say what mode of arrangement is truly logical.[2] 'Every nation,' says an English writer, 'is tempted to think that it alone places its words in their true position.' Rivarol has said: 'French, by a unique privilege, has alone remained faithful to the direct order, as though formed wholly of reason.'

Now the way in which words are generally arranged in a sentence (*e. g.*, subject, *copula* and predicate) is considered to be a counterpart of the mental process in which we usually think of objects and their relations to one another. Precisely this or a similar process is followed by languages in general. But a change of order is not wholly unjustifiable and

[1] 'Modify the order: either the meaning will be modified also, or we shall cease to understand.'

—Semantics, p. 215.

[2] 'One can easily, without being wanting in logic, conceive a different order. In the primitive plan of our languages, the verb was followed by its subject. Without leaving the French language, we find propositions which place the subject at the end.' *Op. cit.*

illogical.[1] A proposition in its mental state is not, according to Sweet, formed exactly in the above order, but by simultaneous thinking of the two (subject and predicate). 'But a proposition,' says B. Russell, 'unless it happens to be linguistic, does not itself contain words : it contains the entities indicated by words. The confusion is largely due, I believe, to the notion that propositions are essentially mental and are to be identified with cognitions.' Some have opined that distinction as subject and predicate does not really exist in the process of thinking ; concepts have got these designations from the logical analysis of a proposition.[2] Philologists

[1] Some are of opinion that the form of thinking is not entirely identical with that of the expression it assumes in language. The garment, to be clear, in which thought clothes itself is considered to be more or less accidental. A strict correspondence between words and thoughts has thus been maintained by Donaldson (*The New Cratylus*): 'We find in the internal mechanism of language the exact counterpart of the mental phenomena which writers on psychology have so carefully collected and classified. We find that the structure of human speech is the perfect reflex or image of what we know of the organisation of the mind: the same description, the same arrangement of particulars, the same nomenclature would apply to both, and we might turn a treatise on the philosophy of mind into one on the philosophy of language.'

[2] 'So far as the act of thinking is concerned, subject and predicate are one and the same, and there are many languages in which they are so treated.'

Sayce: The Science of Language, Vol. II, p. 329.

have found fault with Aristotle's analysis of the proposition, since it is empirical and at the same time does not correctly represent the usual way of thinking.

Another instance of logical order is shown by the position of the substantive and the adjective, the qualifying words invariably preceding those that are qualified. The logical criterion of *viśeṣaṇa* (adjective) has full agreement with this order. An attributive, it is held, is that idea which comes first of all to one's comprehension in the course of verbal cognition (*śābdabodha*).[1] The genitive, which possesses in Sanskrit the full force of *viśeṣaṇa*, has necessarily a priority of position in relation to the word that is associated with it.

There are, however, no hard-and-fast rules in Sanskrit regarding the order of words in a sentence. In Sanskrit one is allowed to say *asau puruṣaḥ* (this man) and *puruṣo'sau* as well as *Rāmo gacchati* (Ram is going) and *gacchati Rāmaḥ* without any change of meaning. We have herein a laxity of the principles as to the priority of the adjective to the noun. The verbal form is also sometimes used just at the beginning of a sentence for the sake of nothing but an emphasis. Examples may be multiplied

[1] शाब्दबोधे प्राक्प्रतीयमानत्वं विशेषणत्वम्।

from the writings of eminent authors to show this kind of departure.[1]

The principle of correlation or succession as is uniformly and invariably shown by the two relative pronouns, namely, *yat* and *tat*, has not even been strictly observed by writers in Sanskrit. The pronominal form *saḥ* is sometimes used independently, *i.e.*, without being preceded by the correlative form *yaḥ*.[2] A dictum, however, runs to the effect that *tat* may not, under certain circumstances, require to be preceded by *yat* (*e.g.* when it refers to a thing that is either well-known or within the reach of one's experience).[3]

There is a rule, more honoured in its breach than in its observance, that what is predicate (*vidheya*) should not be stated before the subject (*uddeśya*).[4] A reverse of the position, that is, to place the predicate before the subject, gives rise to a kind of rhetorical defect known as *avimṛṣṭa-vidheyāṃśa*.[5]

1 अस्त्युत्तरस्यां दिशि देवतात्मा।—Kumāra., 1.1; and अस्ति गोदावरीतीरे विशाल: शाल्मलीतरु:—Hitopadeśa. Bāṇabhaṭṭa and others have often begun a long narrative with *asti* or *āsīt* and put the subject at the end.

2 *Cf.* सोऽहमाजन्मशुद्धानाम्।—Raghuvaṃśa, 1.5.
ते हि नो दिवसा गता:।—Uttaracarita, 1.

3 प्रक्रान्तप्रसिद्धानुभूतार्थविषयस्तच्छब्दो यच्छब्दोपादानं नापेक्षते।

4 अनुवाद्यमनुक्त्वैव न विधेयमुदीरयेत्।

5 No poetical works are entirely free from this kind of *doṣa*. Viśvanātha has taken notice of the verse न्यक्कारो ह्ययमेव, etc., as one that consists of this defect.

In Sanskrit one has, therefore, much liberty to change the order of words, provided in so doing he does not alter the import. In Sanskrit the speaker as well as the listener does not care so much for the construction as for the implication (*tātparya*) that is conveyed by the combination of words. This indifference to any fixed order has been rather an advantage to those who have got to speak in Sanskrit.

But there is some order even in the midst of disorder. We should not forget that a somewhat fixed principle is followed by both grammarians and the Naiyāyikas, so far as the question of *anvaya* (grammatical arrangement of words) and logical analysis is concerned. If a grammarian is called upon to show the *anvaya* of a sentence, he is sure to arrange the words strictly in their grammatical relations so that no one will find any difficulty in understanding the sense. Similarly, a Naiyāyika in his analysis of a proposition is expected to give us an order in which a couple of concepts will exhibit the logical relation as exists between a substantive and an attributive. *Ghaṭaṃ karoti* (a pot is being made) is turned into *ghaṭa-vṛtti-karmatvānukūlā kṛtiḥ* (an action favourable to the objectivity which pertains to the pot) and *gaurasti* (there is a cow) into *astitvavān gauḥ* (a cow having existence). It must be remembered here that verbs are treated as regular

adjectives by the Naiyāyikas : *gacchati* in *Rāmo gacchati* (Ram is going) is as good as an adjective qualifying Rāma, *i.e.*, 'Rāma who is in a state of movement.' The Naiyāyikas and grammarians hold further that in all compounds (*samāsas*) words are related to each other as substantive and attributive.[1]

Now we come to *samāsa*. *Samāsa* is a device for shortening a long phrase. It is not really words alone that combine with one another in a compound, but their meanings too get so mutually related as to give rise to one qualified idea. A word retains its distinct meaning so long as it does not enter into a combination with another, but the moment it does so, it ceases to be an independent word with its particular signification. What we practically find is that a *samāsa*, though made up of two or more words, generally produces only one idea in the mind. In *samāsas* we can trace the process by which the mind combines together two concepts as are mutually expectant and efficient (*samartha*) to make a harmonious whole. *Samāsas* are therefore said to rest upon a psychological background. The primary condition of *samāsas* in general is that words that go to constitute a compound must have reciprocal competency (*sāmarthya*) for consistent

[1] *Cf.* विशेषणं विशेष्येण बहुलम् ।—Pāṇ. 72. 1. 57.

unification, so far as their psychological aspects are concerned.[1] The correlation of meanings is an important fact without which no compound is possible. This is why an arbitrary juxtaposition of words like *gauraśvaḥ puruṣo hastī*, fails to make a compound in the grammatical sense of the term.

There is formal as well as logical basis of classifying *samāsas*. In the first place, the ancient grammarians divided *samāsas* into four groups according to the prominence of signification of the members that go to constitute a compound.[2] Thus, the compound in which the signification of the first member seems to predominate over that of the other is styled *pūrvapadārthapradhāna* (*i.e.*, *Avyayībhāva*) and so on. In a *Bahuvrīhi* compound, as the rule of grammar enjoins,[3] the sense of none of the constituents appears prominently but that of

[1] Pāṇini has laid stress on this kind of *sāmarthya* as the fundamental requisite of *samāsa*. *Cf.* समर्थः पदविधिः ।—Pāṇ., 2. 1. 1.

[2] इह कश्चित् समासः पूर्वपदार्थप्रधानः कश्चिदुत्तरपदार्थप्रधानः कश्चिदन्यपदार्थप्रधानः कश्चिदुभयपदार्थप्रधानः ।—Mahābhāṣya under Pāṇ., 2. 1. 6.

Jagadīśa has, however, spoken of five classes of *samāsas* :—

पूर्वमध्यान्त्यसर्वान्यपदप्राधान्यतः पुनः ।
प्राच्यैः पञ्चविधः प्रोक्तः समासो वाभटादिभिः ॥

—Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā. 33.

[3] अनेकमन्यपदार्थे ।—Pāṇ., 2. 2. 24.

one that lies outside the construction. Ordinary divisions of compounds as *Dvandva*, *Karmadhāraya*, etc., are only formal. Jayāditya has reduced these divisions to two groups, namely, *nitya* (permanent) and *anitya* (optional) compounds.[1] A *nitya-samāsa* is so formed that we cannot dissolve it into its constituent parts without altering the sense or import. It may be also held that the form *kṛṣṇasarpa* is in reality one word and not a compound at all, and in consequence of this fact one is not justified in disjoining it into parts. Again, *samāsas* are nowhere obligatory (excepting, of course, those instances of permanent compounds), because it depends upon one's option to say either *nīlam utpalam* or *nīlotpalam* (a blue lotus).

There is, however, some degree of difference between a compound and the sentence which shows its formation. Patañjali says that a compound is distinguished from the *vigraha* (sentence) by the following features :[2] (*i*) elision of case-endings ; (*ii*) absence of intervention or extreme proximity ; (*iii*) certain fixity of construction ; (*iv*) oneness of accent ; (*v*) non-specification

विभक्तिमात्रप्रक्षेपान्निजान्तर्गतनामसु ।
स्वार्थस्याबोधबोधाभ्यां नित्यानित्यौ समासकौ ॥

[2] सुब्लोपो व्यवधानं यथेष्टमन्यतरेणाभिसम्बन्धः स्वरः संख्याविशेषो व्यक्ताभिधानमुपसर्जनविशेषणं चयोगः ।—Mahābhāṣya under Pāṇ. 2. 1. 1.

of number, etc. A *samāsa*, though consisting of more than one part, is grammatically treated as one inflected word (*ekapada*). The words forming a compound are so intimately related to each other as to render the whole look like one indivisible word ; and it is for this reason that a compound has been treated as a kind of *prātipadika* (crude form) to which terminations are added.[1] It should be, however, particularly remembered that a word, when it has once entered into combination with another to form a *samāsa*, is not generally allowed to have grammatical connection with an attributive or word lying outside the compound.[2] But *samāsas* in *Devadattasya gurukulam* (the family of Devadatta's preceptors) and *Caitrasya dāsabhāryā* (the wife of the servant of Caitra) have been sanctioned by popular usages on account of their direct expressiveness (*gamakatva*).[3]

[1] कृत्तद्धितसमासाश्च ।—Pāṇ., 1. 2. 46.

[2] सविशेषणानां वृत्तिर्न and न सापेक्षे कृत्तद्धितसमासाः ।—Mahābhāṣya.

प्रतियोगिपदादन्यद् यदन्यत् कारकादपि ।
वृत्तिशब्दैकदेशस्य सम्बन्धस्तेन नेष्यते ॥

—Kātantra-pariśiṣṭa (samāsaprakaraṇa).

[3] Though *samāsa* in *ṛddhasya rājamataṅgāḥ* (ऋद्धस्य राजमातङ्गा इति न स्युः प्रयुक्तयः) is not at all allowed, the instances quoted above have received general approval as in those cases no one finds any difficulty in understanding the sense. *Cf.* सापेक्षत्वेऽपि गमकत्वात् समासः ।

A point that deserves particular attention here is: what is precisely implied by a compound? There is some amount of diversity of opinions with regard to the exact nature of the import as is brought about by a *samāsa*. The meaning expressed by a compound is specifically distinct from those of its component elements. In his long but critical exposition of the rule *samarthaḥ padavidhiḥ*, Patañjali has clearly set forth two views, namely, *ekārthībhāva* and *vyapekṣā*.[1]

We do not like to enter elaborately into the grammatical side of the question, but only propose to state the fact from the standpoint of *Semantics*. According to the first view (*ekārthībhāva*),[2] words, when they constitute a compound, express but one undifferentiated sense. In bringing such *oneness of sense* the component words have to give up their respective meanings to a considerable extent; as, for instance, a carpenter engaged in the work of a king is naturally compelled to leave

1 तत्रेदमपरं द्वैतं भवत्येकार्थीभावो वा सामर्थ्यं स्याद्व्यपेक्षा वेति।—

Mahābhāṣya under Pāṇ., 2. 1. 1.

2 This view is held by all grammarians.

बहूनां वृत्तिधर्माणां वचनैरेव साधने।

स्यान्महत् गौरवं तस्मादेकार्थीभाव आश्रितः॥

—Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa, 31.

aside his own work.[1] The grammarians have given greater preference to this view-point than to the other, because they adhere to the doctrine that *samāsas* by virtue of the combination of words and the correlation of meanings acquire a kind of special or additional sense which is not implied by any member of the compound when taken separately.[2] This is what has been designated in grammar as *jahatsvārthā vṛttiḥ*.[3] According to the second view which is almost the same as held by the Naiyāyikas, a compound does not gather a special or additional signification in excess of those that are denoted by its component parts.[4] The Naiyāyikas did not find sufficient reason for the assumption of such additional power (*atirikta-śakti*). But they had to face a great difficulty in analysing the meaning of compounds in general and *Bahuvrīhi* in particular. *Rājapuruṣa*, for instance, gives the idea of 'a person related to the king' (*i.e.*, a royal officer), but this

[1] एवं हि दृश्यते लोके। पुरुषोऽयं परकर्मणि प्रवर्त्तमानः स्वं कर्म जहाति। तद्यथा, तक्षा राजकर्मणि प्रवर्त्तमानः स्वं कर्म जहाति।

—Mahābhāṣya under Pāṇ., 2.1.1.

[2] समासे खलु भिन्नैव शक्तिः पङ्कजशब्दवत्।

—Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa, 31.

[3] का पुनर्वृत्तिर्न्याय्या? जहत्स्वार्था।—Mahābhāṣya.

[4] Jagadīśa has referred to the followers of Patañjali as those who insist on the special signification of compounds. —इति तु समासशक्तिवादिनः पातञ्जलाः—under Śabdaśakti 33.

qualified sense (*rājasambandhaviśiṣṭa*) is neither derivable from *rājan* nor from *puruṣa* when taken individually. The Naiyāyikas were consequently compelled to take the help of *lakṣaṇā* for the sake of getting what the grammarians declared to be *additional power of denotation.*[1]

The question of grammatical gender constitutes a branch of study where one is guided more by popular usages than by logic. The venerable theory that 'grammatical gender was properly a mark of sex' does not stand even the shadow of logical test. No doubt the idea of gender had its origin in the distinction of sexes such as male and female, but when we turn to words or masculine and feminine names and discuss the propriety of their respective genders, we find them too obstinate to yield to any logical generalisation, so far as the popular conception of sex is concerned. Tracing the history of gender some have arrived at the conclusion 'that masculine and feminine names of things go back to a time when language was modified as the speaker was a man or woman.'[2]

[1] Gaṅgeśa was fully alive to the necessity of recognising *lakṣaṇā* in the case of compounds. बहुव्रीहौ न वाक्ये लक्षणा किन्तु पदे समुदायशक्तौ मानाभावात्—Tattvacintāmaṇi (Śabdakhaṇḍa), p. 746.

अतएव राजपुरुष इत्यादौ पूर्वपदे षष्ठ्यर्थसम्बन्धे लक्षणेति मणिकृदुक्तमपि सङ्गच्छते—Śabdaśakti, 34.

[2] Dr. J. G. Frazer.

Grammar has been so much dependent on popular usages particularly with regard to the determination of gender that it utterly failed to give any scientific explanation for the same. So far as the problem of gender is concerned, no system of grammar could offer any plausible solutions.[1] The reason as to why the Indian grammarians, in spite of their accurate observation of all important aspects of linguistic phenomena, failed to make a logical and at the same time exhaustive treatment of this particular topic is simply this : the subjective element appears to be so predominant a factor in the determination of gender, and the popular usages of gender, on the other hand, often betray such rigidity and wanton absence of logic that it is nothing but idle to aim at any justification for the so-called grammatical gender.

If one is asked to explain the question of sex in the words like *jyotsnā* (moon-beams) and *nadī* (river), he will have no other justification than to refer to a certain psychological, or, more properly, poetical tendency which represents all that excites pleasurable sensation as if it were feminine in character. In English, moon, ship, fortress and others are considered

[1] Patañjali has frankly stated—तस्मान्न वैयाकरणैः शक्यं लौकिकं लिङ्गमास्थातुम्—Mahābhāṣya under Pāṇ. 4. 1. 3.

to be feminine. To regard a planet like moon as feminine on the astronomical ground of its dependence on the sun for luminosity has absolutely nothing to do with the proper conception of sex. Nor can we fully subscribe to the view that words denoting objects which exhibit female virtues such as tenderness, loveliness, submissiveness, etc., belong to the feminine gender, and that words expressive of manly qualities such as strength, courage, ambition, etc., are of masculine gender. Turning our attention to popular usages and grammar, we find just the reverse of it. A flower, though tender and graceful to one's aesthetic experience, has all its equivalent Sanskrit terms (*i.e.*, *puṣpam*, *kusumam*, etc.) in neuter gender The laxity of sex-consideration is best shown by such forms as *dārāḥ* and *kalatram* which, though signifying 'wife,' are by popular sanction always used in masculine and neuter genders respectively.[1] That it is practically impossible to justify the popular usages of gender is the conclusion that forces itself upon us in view of these and other irregular instances.

The word *liṅga* literally means a mark or sign by which a thing is distinguished, but in

[1] लोकोपचाराद् ग्रहणसिद्धिः ।—Kalāpa-sūtra.

शब्दानामेकार्थेऽपि लिङ्गवचनभेदः, यथापो जलं दाराः कलत्रं भार्य्येति ।—

Durgasiṃha (Vṛtti).

grammatical usage it has got a restricted application. The popular conception of sex [1] is not at all harmonious with grammatical gender. Can any one logically support the grammatical use of gender in *khaṭvā* (couch) and *vṛkṣa* (tree) ? [2] It is with regard to the entire domain of inanimate objects that the question of gender cannot properly be explained. How is it possible to maintain any standard when a thing is denoted by words of different, genders ? The bank of a river, for instance, is called *taṭaḥ*, *taṭī* and *taṭam* in contravention of all sex-considerations.[3]

Patañjali has shown some amount of physiological knowledge in his dissertation on gender. When all attempts to solve the problem were set at naught, he was forced to seek the answer elsewhere.[4] Growth and productivity, he continues to say, respectively represent the essential characteristics of females and

1 स्तनकेशवती स्त्री स्याल्लोमशः पुरुषः स्मृतः ।
उभयोरन्तरं यच्च तदभावे नपुंसकम् ॥—

Mahābhāṣya under Pāṇ., 4. 1. 3.

2 खट्वावृक्षौ न सिध्यतः—*loc. cit.*

3 तटे च सर्वलिङ्गानि दृष्ट्वा कोऽध्यवसास्यति । तटे च खल्वपि सर्वाणि लिङ्गानि दृष्ट्वा तटः तटी तटमिति कस्तदध्यवसातुमर्हतीयं स्त्रीयं पुमानिदं नपुंसकमिति ।—*loc. cit.*

4 अवश्यं च कश्चित् स्वकृतान्त आस्थेयः—*loc. cit.*

males :[1] what bears or forms the substratum of embryo is called *strī*, and the agent of production as *pumān*. These features, we should remember, do not belong to persons but to their qualities. A criterion like this may sound somewhat plausible from a physiological standpoint, but it does not preclude the possibility of confusion, because all material bodies exhibit the qualities of growth and production. These two cannot, therefore, be maintained as fundamental attributes that distinguish males from females. To take a more far-reaching view of the case,[2] it should be stated that everything has its growth, development as well as decay. When these are possessed by all things, no one of them can properly be regarded as a particular characteristic of a sex, male or female. Patañjali has come in close touch with the Buddhist doctrine of flux [3] as well as with the philosophy of Heracleitus when he observed that 'everything is in a constant flux of change' in consequence of which a thing cannot

[1] संस्त्यानप्रसवौ लिङ्गमास्थेयौ स्वकृतान्ततः। ननु च लोकेऽपि स्त्यायतेरेव स्त्री सूतेश्च पुमान्। अधिकरणसाधना लोके स्त्री। स्त्यायत्यस्यां गर्भ इति। कर्तृसाधनश्च पुमान्। कस्य पुनः स्त्यानं स्त्री प्रवृत्तिर्वा पुमान्? गुणानाम्। सर्वाश्च पुनर्मूर्त्तय एवमात्मिकाः संस्त्यानप्रसवगुणाः शब्दस्पर्शरूपरसगन्धवत्यः।—*loc. cit.*

[2] According to the theory of Vārṣyāyaṇi, everything is liable to pass through six different stages of modification. —Nirukta, I. 2.

[3] Kṣaṇabhaṅgavāda.

remain in the same state for a moment.[1] There is no growth that is not accompanied by decay, and no decay that is not followed by evolution or production.[2] Growth and decay are one and the same thing, the latter being only passage to the former.

When the question of absolute growth and decay thus proved inadequate, the well-known grammarian could not conceive of any other scientific standard to determine the distinction of gender in popular usages. What course is, then, to be adopted? Patañjali has finally laid emphasis on *vivakṣā* or the intention of the speaker as what really accounts for gender : a thing is designated as *strī* when stress is laid on the idea of growth, and *pumān* when prominence is given to the idea of production.[3] Patañjali has at last referred to the authority of Pāṇini to corroborate the view that the whole question of gender rests on popular usages.[4]

Kaiyaṭa has made an important observation with regard to the characteristic features of

[1] न ह्रीह कश्चित् स्वस्मिन्नात्मनि मुहूर्त्तमवतिष्ठते—
Mahābhāṣya under Pāṇ., 4. 1. 3.

[2] वर्धते वा यावदनेन वर्धितव्यमपायेन वा युज्यते—*loc. cit.*

[3] यद्युभयं सर्वत्र कुतो व्यवस्था ? विवक्षातः। संस्त्यानविवक्षायां स्त्री प्रसव-विवक्षायां पुमानुभयोरविवक्षायां नपुंसकम्—*loc. cit.*

[4] पठिष्यति ह्याचार्यो लिङ्गमशिष्यं लोकाश्रयत्वाल्लिङ्गस्येति—*loc. cit.*

neuter gander. *Napuṃsaka*, which comes midway between growth and decay, has been explained by him as 'retention of power' (*sthiti*).[1] We do not know if we are allowed to use the scientific expression *conservation of energy* as an exact equivalent of *sthiti*, but it is almost incontestable that neutrality or a state of equilibrium on the part of 'primordial matter' (*prakṛti*) may be interpreted as preservation of dormant power. The use of the word *brahman* (Supreme Being) in neuter gender may be traced back to a similar conception. The epithet *avyaya* (one without diffusion of energy), as often applied to Brahman, gives the same idea of an inexhaustible potentiality.

Regarding the linguistic side of the question, we find that the origin of noun-genders is really obscure. Prof. Brugmann tried to throw some light on this complicated problem. We may somewhat account for the two prominent feminine terminations, namely, *ā* and *ī* : the former is supposed to be a shortened form of *sā*, or formed in imitation of *sā* (a pronominal adjective whereby females are denoted) and the latter represents similarly the last lengthened vowel of *strī*. Tho popular custom prevalent among the Hindus also favoured the

[1] आविर्भावतिरोभावान्तरालावस्था स्थितिरुच्यते सा च नपुंसकत्वेन व्यवस्थाप्यते
—Bhāṣyapradīpa.

practice of making all female-names end in lengthened vowels (generally *ā* and *ī*).[1]

The department of study that has greatly encroached upon the field of grammar is Logic. Logic has lent its stamp of subtlety to all later speculations on grammar. The advent of the neo-school of Logic with its peculiar construction and phraseology exercised so tremendous an influence on grammar that it is now impossible to restore the later grammatical speculations from the thraldom of Logic. The two great exponents of the Navya-Nyāya from Bengal[2] have treated the problems of grammar in such a way as to turn grammar virtually into a branch of study providing immense scope for the display of all logical niceties. Though they profess to be contributions on grammar, the Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā and the Vyutpattivāda have been decidedly more logical than grammatical. If a present-day Sanskrit grammarian is asked, for instance, to give a correct definition of *karaṇa-kāraka* (instrumental case), he is not likely to say simply *sādhakatamaṃ karaṇam*, but will give one couched in logical terms, namely, *vyāpāravat kāraṇaṃ karaṇam*, *i.e.*, a cause in

1 Manu, 2. 33.

2 Jagadīśa and Gadādhara: the former is the author of the Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā and the latter of the Vyutpattivāda.

action is what is called *karaṇa* (instrumental case).

What we have precisely learnt from the logicians (Naiyāyikas) regarding certain points of grammatical interest may be briefly summarised as follows : (*i*) In cases other than those of particles, the meanings of two words are related to each other as if they were identical ;[1] (*ii*) suffixes like *matup*, *in*, etc. (which are generally used to denote *it has this*) should not be added to a *Karmadhāraya* compound, if the sense is available by treating the same as a *Bahuvrīhi.*[2] *Mahādhani* or *Mahādhanavān*, for instance, is redundant or inadmissible, because a *Bahuvrīhi* like *mahādhana* (one who possesses much wealth) is good enough to give the intended sense ; (*iii*) an *Avyayībhāva* compound is grammatically treated as an *avyaya* (indeclinable), and consequently it is not allowed to form compounds with other words.[3]

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[1] निपातातिरिक्तस्थले नामार्थयोरभेदान्वयस्यैव व्युत्पन्नत्वात्—

Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā.

[2] न कर्मधारयान्मत्वर्थीयो बहुव्रीहिश्चेत्तदर्थप्रतिपत्तिकरः—

Mathurānātha on the Vyāptipañcaka.

[3] अव्ययीभावसमासस्याव्ययतया तेन सह समासान्तरं न स्यात्—

op. cit.

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S—*contd.*

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V—*contd.*

V—*contd.*

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V—*contd.*

W

Extracts from Opinions on the Works of the Author

The Linguistic Speculations of the Hindus, published by the Calcutta University, Demy 8vo. pp. 500

Mahāmahopādhyāya Dr. Ganganath Jha, C.I.E., M.A., D.Litt., Vice-Chancellor, Allahabad University :—

21. 2. 1925.

" I have formed the impression that it was an important piece of research on a subject to which practically no attention had been given till now ; it also evinced the promise of a very important and fascinating field of study and research. I hope you will soon be placed in a position where you will be sufficiently free from cares to be able to devote your entire attention to your important studies and research. "

A Berriedale Keith, Regius Professor of Sanskrit and Comparative Philology at the University of Edinburgh :—

6. 5. 25.

" I have read your papers with care and I consider that they set forth in a clear and effective manner the fundamental doctrines of Indian speculations on questions of speech. The adduction of the evidence of the Māhābhāṣya and of the Vākyapadīya is specially interesting and valuable, and all who are interested in linguistic matters must be glad to have so convenient a summary, disengaged from the unnecessary detail, of the views of Sanskrit grammarians. "

M. Winternitz, Ph.D., Professor of Indian Philology and of Ethonology at the German University of Prague :—
21. 2. 1925.

" It is not too much to say that grammar is the only science in which the ancient Indians by far surpassed all other nations of antiquity. No wonder that both grammarians and philosophers were not content with studying the grammar of Sanskrit, but also occupied themselves with speculations on the science of language. Your papers are a valuable contribution to our knowledge of these speculations. It is interesting to see how these problems have been approached from different points of view by grammarians, philosophers and students of poetics. "

L. D. Barnett, British Museum:—

" I think your work a very instructive and useful statement of the leading facts. "

Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, January, 1926. Pages 123-124 (Reviewed by J. Charpentier) :—

" The lengthy papers by Mr. P. C. Chakravarti, on the Linguistic Speculations of the Hindus is, in general, far beyond the criticism of the present writer who pleads to be more or less unacquainted with the detailed theories of the Vaiyākaraṇas, Naīyāyikas and Mīmāṃsakas. But it seems that the author has stated his points in a fairly clear way, and given an analysis of the often very intricate linguistic speculations belonging to the ancient schools of Hindu grammarians and philosophers which is not wholly out of reach of the outsiders. There is a great interest attached to the part of the work dealing with the very ancient idea of the eternity of the Vāk ; that this idea does in reality belong to the oldest set of Hindu speculations has for long seemed clear to me, from quite different reasons. "

" *Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies,* " London Institution. Vol. IV, part II, Nov., 1926, pp. 377-379.

"This work is an interesting contribution to the history of Linguistics and is an attempt to bring into a consistent whole the linguistic theories of ancient Hindu philosophers and grammarians. The author gives a fairly complete exposition of Hindu theories on the origin of language and his treatment of the well-known controversy on the eternity of sound shows considerable freshness and sound judgement. Attention may also be drawn to the very interesting record of speculations on the nature of the sentence (p. 84 ff.) and on the relation between the stem and the suffix (p. 96 ff.)."

Dr. V. Lesny, Professor of Indian Philology in the University of Prague :—

" Your essay is an able enrichment of our grammatical studies."

See also Review of this work by Dr. V. Lesny in *Listy Filologicke* (Journal of Philology) 1926, p. 191.

Prof. S. N. Dasgupta, M.A., Ph.D. (Cal.), Ph.D. (Cantab.), I.E.S., Professor of Philosophy, Presidency College :—

" Dr. Prabhatchandra Chakravarti, M.A., Ph.D., has been making a special study of Pāṇini's Grammar, the Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali, Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari and other kindred works on grammatical literature and philosophy of grammar. He has been the first man to undertake a study of philosophy of grammar a difficult and abstruse line of research, in which no work has hitherto been done either in Europe or in India. In his two short booklets he has made a beginning of his studies in this field and I am assured that he is continuing his work in this difficult field and Dr. Chakravarti is soon expected to be the leading exponent in this field when he publishes more comprehensive works on this subject. I understand

that he is also translating the Māhābhāṣya of Patañjali and I could think of but few men who would be com-petent to undertake such a task. Dr. Chakravarti comes from a family of Pundits and is inspired with the glories of traditional and orthodox Sanskrit learning and is largely unaffected by the western views of scholarship."

Philosophy of Sanskrit Grammar, Demy 8vo. pp. 500 1930. Rs 5-0.

Prof. A. Berriedale Keith, University of Edinburgh:—"Dr. Prabhatchandra Chakravarti is well-known for his valuable work on the exposition of Sanskrit grammar, and his new work on the Philosophy of Sanskrit grammar adds substantially to our obligations to his industry and critical acumen."

Prof. Sylvain Levi, Paris:—"...........Undoubtedly one of the best pieces produced by the University; it is a marvel of science, as days are clear, full of informations new and important. Though bearing on minute technicalities, it reads quite fluently. The author deserves the highest compliments."

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Prof. J. Charpentier, Upsala: —"I feel struck with the profound learning and sound methods of the author and feel quite convinced that his work will be of the greatest value to all scholars interested in Sanskrit Grammar."

Prof Sten Konow, Oslo, Norway:—"It is a very interesting and carefully written book, and to us in the West its value is enhanced through the fact that the author throughout represents the Indian view and does

not attempt to present matters in European garb, as is so often the case in the discussion of Indian historical and literary problems."

Pandey Ramavatar Sarma, Sāhityācārya, M.A., Senior Professor of Sanskrit, Patna College:—

"I had an opportunity of going through the papers on the philosophy of Sanskrit Grammar written by Mr. Prabhat Chandra Chakravarti, M.A., Ph.D. These writings show profound study and capacity for research. He has selected a rather difficult subject for his study, but has already dealt with it with throughness marvellous for his age and limited resources available in the country."

Prof. Hermann Jacobi, University of Bonn:—"I may say that it impresses me as very useful to students who desire complete and authentical information on the theories of the grammarians concerning their *Sāstras.*"

Dr. E. Thomas, University Library, Cambridge:—"I think there is no doubt that the author's claim to fill a long felt want is fully justified, and that it is carried out in a masterly manner. His work ought to stimulate his countrymen to increase study of one of the most characteristic achievemets of Indian thought while it will also be of great value to western students who are seeking to grasp the Indian conception of the philosophy of Sanskrit Grammar."

Prof. A. H. Sayce:—"It has at last put into our hands a complete and authoritative account of Indian linguistic philosophy and I need not say how welcome it will be to all students of linguistic science. India has been the home of the philosophy of grammar."

Prof. Siddheswar Varma M. A. D. Lit., Prince of Wales College, Kashmere:—"In a sense it is a unique work on a unique subject. When consulting along with

the author's previous work, "The Linguistic Speculations of the Hindus," it is the conspectus of its kind, in a modern language, of that branch of knowiedge in which India is pre-eminently unique. It is a work in which the author evinces profound learning and scholarship. Grammar is by far the most learned subject in Sanskrit, and to write a conspectus of the subtle side of the subject indicates no mean scholarly qualifications."

Dr. Otto Straus, Breslau (Orientalistische Literatur-Zeitung, 1931, Nr. 8)—(translated) "The author, Lecturer in Sanskrit of the Calcutta University, already known through his work 'Linguistic Speculations of the Hindus' (cf. *Z.* D. M. G. 81, 99 A 1), was given the inspiration to take this important theme by Sir Asutosh Mookerjee, the great genius of all Scientific Researches in Bengal during the last decade. His claim, that by means of a systematic research of purely philosophical aspect of the Sanskrit Grammar, he has filled a long-felt want, will be gladly acknowledged by every one who has read those two substantial as well as difficult works, namely, the Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali and the Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari. The context contains such solid stuff, so many well-chosen verses out of the authoritative works, that no Indologist who has not worked in this field can pass over this work..............This short description of the context will show to every Indologist that we have before us a book which is rich in substance. Everywhere are given quotations with exact descriptions of the origin of the quotations so that the reader can clearly understand the ground on which it stands. And, therefore, the work will be very useful also to them who might not agree with the arrangement and interpretation of the substance, because every quotation leads one in the middle of this difficult but still so attractive Indian scholastic.

The Mahabhasya of Patanjali-Ahnika I— Translated into English for the first time with historical, grammatical, philological and philosophical notes (published in the Indian Historical Quarterly, December, 1925.)

E. J. Thomas, M.A., D.Litt., Senior Under-Librarian, Cambridge University :—

"I thank you for your three most interesting papers, and specially for the first part of your translation of the Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali. It is a work thoroughly worth doing, first because a good translation like yours with your valuable and exhaustive notes will form the best possible commentary for ordinary students of this work,

Further the translation will be invaluable to others who are studying Indian history and antquities, and you would make it accessible to those who are not prepared to dive into the original. I have examined the part you have completed, and think it very ably done. I hope you will stick to your purpose to translate the whole, and thus establish a place for yourself in Sanskrit scholarship and confer a great boon on western scholars. I shall be glad to do all that I can to make your undertaking known."

A. B. Keith, Edinburgh :—

20. 3. 26.

"I am very glad that a scholar has at last appeared with the leisure and equipment sufficient to undertake the task of translating the Mahābhāṣya which remains largely a closed book for the world of scholarship. I should have liked to take a longer time to study with greater care your version of the first Āhnika. But I am very busily engaged and shall be so for some months to come and I must therefore content myself with saying that your work appears to show every sign of competence and care. There are many difficulties in the Mahābhāṣya,

and it would be vain to hope at a first attempt to solve them all, but if you persist in the work on the lines of specimen you have sent to me, I have no doubt that you will accomplish a work of the highest importance in the field of Sanskrit grammar."

Mahāmahopādhyāya Dr. Ganganath Jha, C.I.E., M.A. D.Litt,, Vice-chancellor, Allahabad University:—

"Many thanks for the specimen pages of your valuable work on the Mahābhāṣya. I hope you will be given the time and the facility for completing this work on the magnificent scale on which you have begun it."

Prof. Rapson, Cambridge:—

"All that I can say is that your translation of the Mahābhāṣya will be most useful and most welcome. It is a difficult work, and I most cordially wish you all success in your great undertaking."

Theory of Sphota, published in the Calcutta Review, January, 1926.

Dr. E. J. Thomas, M. A., D. Litt.:—

"I also like your Theory of Sphoṭa. I understand it to be a philosophical theory of the essential nature of speech. We have nothing like it in western philosophy... I think that if Herder had known the theory of Sphoṭa, he would have accepted it as the most adequate expression of what he meant to say. I see in Sphoṭa the most adequate statement of the nature of language."